2023年John Locke论文竞赛新变化要知道!John Locke论文竞赛含金量剖析!

John Locke论文竞赛是什么

John Locke 论文竞赛是由由位于英国牛津的独立教育组织John Locke Institute与牛津、普林斯顿、布朗、白金汉大学等名校教授合作组织的学术项目,其评审全部来自英国牛津大学。旨在鼓励和奖励世界各地高中生和本科生的哲学思考和研究,提高学生对哲学领域的兴趣和了解。该竞赛以英国哲学家约翰·洛克(John Locke)的名字命名,是世界上最受欢迎和知名的哲学竞赛之一。

竞赛的主题涉及哲学各个领域。参赛者需要根据竞赛规定撰写一篇不得超过2000字论文,并在规定时间内提交作品。每年的竞赛主题和具体要求会有所不同,但都需要参赛者具备一定的哲学素养和独立思考的能力。

John Locke 论文竞赛的获奖者将有机会获得在牛津大学参观和交流的机会,与国际上其他具有相似兴趣的年轻人交流和学习。

 2023年John Locke评选标准及细则

参加2023年John Locke写作竞赛的同学需注意,今年的参赛规则有所变化!

John Locke竞赛适合人群全球18岁以下对英美学术写作感兴趣、想要挑战自我的同学们均可参加。比赛分为14岁-18岁的高年级组和14岁以下的低年级组(Junior Prize)。

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2023年John Locke竞赛主要变化

今年的比赛在流程方面与往届相比发生了两个重要变化:

所有候选人必须在英国夏令时2023年5月31日下午1点59分之前使用有效的电子邮箱注册参加比赛,不接受在截止日期前未注册的候选人提交的文章。注册将于2023年3月15日开始。

如果候选人出于某些原因错过了6月30日的文章提交截止日期,在满足以下两个条件的情况下,可进行延迟报名:

必须在原定截止日期后二十四小时内通过信用卡支付20.00美元的延迟报名费论文必须在英国夏令时2023年7月10日晚上11点59分之前提交

John Locke论文竞赛含金量

John Locke论文竞赛的含金量会根据不同的比赛组织、比赛规模、奖项设置和评审机制等因素而有所不同。一般来说,如果比赛由一些知名的机构或学术组织主办,评审团队由一些著名的学者或专家组成,比赛的奖项设置丰富并有一定的奖金,那么这样的比赛的含金量会比较高。

此外,John Locke论文竞赛的含金量还取决于参赛者的自身实力和成果。如果参赛者能够提交高质量的论文,有新颖的研究思路和深入的分析,能够很好地理解和应用John Locke的思想,那么他们在比赛中获胜的机会就会更大,获得的荣誉和奖励也会更加有价值。

总的来说,John Locke论文竞赛的含金量取决于多种因素的综合影响,参赛者需要仔细研究比赛的组织机构、评审标准、奖项设置等,以及自身的实力和成果,来判断比赛的含金量是否足够高。无论如何,参加这样的学术比赛都可以提升自身的学术水平和实力,对于参赛者的学术和职业生涯都有很大的帮助。

6月30日截止提交!文科生千万不容错过John Locke论文竞赛!

John Locke 是文科生非常有利的背景提升工具,向大学展现学生对所申请专业的“热爱”,往届优胜者遍布哈耶普斯牛剑G5等世界名校。John Locke论文竞赛是什么?适合哪些学生?参加John Locke论文竞赛有何意义?

John Locke论文竞赛介绍

John Locke Essay Competition(约翰·洛克论文竞赛)写作竞赛是由位于英国牛津的独立教育组织John Locke Institute与牛津、普林斯顿、布朗、白金汉大学等名校教授合作组织的学术项目,其评审全部来自英国牛津大学,参赛对象为全世界范围内思考能力最强的中学生。

往年参与学生录取成绩包括普林斯顿、哈佛、耶鲁、斯坦福、芝加哥、伯克利、牛津、剑桥等世界名校。

参赛人群:

任何国家和任何学校的学生均可参加,学生年龄为18岁(或者18岁以下),初中奖的候选人在截止日期前年龄不能超过14岁。
高年级组:15~18岁(7个人文社科领域选择题目)低年级组:15岁及以下(初中组题目)

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关键时间节点

注册开始:2023年3月15日

注册截止日期:2023年5月31日(需要在此日期之前注册以便后续提交)

提交截止日期:2023年6月30日

延迟报名截止日期:2023年7月10日(延迟报名需在7月1日前支付20.00美元的费用)

通知入围候选人:2023年7月31日

学术会议和颁奖晚宴:2023年9月

John Locke论文竞赛参赛意义:

提高学术能力:参加John Locke论文竞赛需要撰写高质量的学术论文,这可以帮助参赛者提高他们的学术能力和写作技能。

提升知名度:参加John Locke论文竞赛可以让参赛者的论文被更广泛地阅读和了解。如果参赛者的论文在比赛中获奖或被认可,他们的知名度将会得到提升。

获得荣誉和奖励:参加John Locke论文竞赛可以让参赛者获得荣誉和奖励,例如奖金、证书、出版机会等。这些奖励可以在参赛者的学术和职业生涯中提供额外的推动和鼓励。

推广研究成果:参加John Locke论文竞赛可以让参赛者的研究成果得到更广泛的推广和传播。这可以让他们的研究成果得到更多的关注和应用。

拓展学术交流:参加John Locke论文竞赛可以让参赛者结识更多的学者和研究人员,并与他们进行学术交流和合作。这可以拓展参赛者的学术网络和视野。

综上所述,参加John Locke论文竞赛可以为参赛者的学术和职业生涯提供许多机会和优势。无论参赛者是否获奖,他们都可以从比赛中获益,并将这些经验应用到未来的学术和职业发展中。

低龄可冲的高含金量写作竞赛!2023年John Locke论文竞赛备考建议来了!

John Locke论文写作竞赛,2023赛季的题目已经公布!John Locke论文竞赛备受英美名校青睐,含金量极高,对于今年报名参赛的同学来说,又该如何准备这项人文社科竞赛天花板存在的论文竞赛呢?

John Locke Essay Competition(约翰·洛克论文竞赛)写作竞赛是由位于英国牛津的独立教育组织John Locke Institute与牛津、普林斯顿、布朗、白金汉大学等名校教授合作组织的学术项目,其评审全部来自英国牛津大学,参赛对象为全世界范围内思考能力最强的中学生。

适合学生:

适用对象:各个国家及学校的学生都可以参与。

高年级组:14岁~18岁

低年级组:14岁及以下

竞赛要求:

个人参赛,提交一篇2000词以内的论文(不包括图表、注释、参考文献和作者声明)

可选题目涉及哲学,政治,经济学,历史,心理学,神学,法律共七个领域的21个题目

时间节点:

报名考试日期:2023年3月15日

报名截止日期:2023年5月31日

提交作品截止日期:2023年6月30日

迟到的参赛作品截止日期:2023年7月10日(迟交的作品要收取20美元的费用,在7月1日前支付)

通知入围结果日期:2023年7月31日

学术会议和颁奖晚宴:2023年9月

扫码免费领取John Locke往年优秀作品

咨询报名注意事项+预约试听体验课

预约最新真题讲座、课程详情可添加下方顾问老师咨询

关于评比

John Locke写作比赛首先会在提交作品后由以牛津大学为主的学者团体评定,进而公布入围Shortlist的名单,之后会再从入围Shortlist的作品中再评选出Grand Prize、一二三等奖,及High Commendations获得者。

奖项与证书:设置4类奖项

Grand Prize (终极奖)

在各类学科下再分设:

Winner(冠军)

Second Prize(二等奖)

Third Prize(三等奖)

John Locke论文竞赛是一个对于哲学、政治和伦理学方面的研究人员和学生来说极具挑战性的比赛。以下是一些准备John Locke论文竞赛的建议:

确定研究领域:选择一个适合您的专业领域进行研究,例如哲学、政治或伦理学。

阅读John Locke的历年获奖论文:在开始撰写论文之前,可以多阅读John Locke的历年获奖论文,学习借鉴这些优秀的论文风格。

设定研究问题:根据您选择的研究领域和主题,制定一个有挑战性的研究问题,并对其进行深入分析。

收集资料:寻找关于您研究问题的相关资料。包括书籍、学术文章和其他参考资料。

评估资料:评估您找到的资料,确定哪些资料最有价值,可以用于支持您的论文。

撰写论文:撰写您的论文,并确保您的论文能够清晰地表达您的研究问题和研究发现。您的论文应该包括简要介绍、背景、研究问题、方法、结果和结论等部分。

重复检查:在提交之前,反复检查您的论文,确保没有任何拼写、语法或格式错误。

总之,准备John Locke论文竞赛需要花费大量的时间和精力,但是如果您充分准备并按照上述步骤进行,您将有机会在比赛中获得成功。

2019年初级奖

According to Nobel Laureate, Milton Friedman, 'there is one and only one social responsibility of business...to increase its profits...' Do you agree?

诺贝尔奖获得者米尔顿·弗里德曼(Milton Friedman)表示,“企业的社会责任只有一项......以增加其利润...”你同意吗?

Ethan Zhu,澳大利亚国王学校
2019年初级奖|平等获得者8 分钟阅读

Milton Friedman was a Nobel Prize winning economist who famously defended free market values and conservative politics. In his 1970 article, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits”, Friedman discusses the stockholder theory, stating that firms only have a ‘legal responsibility’ to make a profit for their shareholders.[1] Friedman’s view emerges in the context of the post-World War II rise of corporate capitalism as firms and executives tried to reconcile social and moral obligations with a stronger cultural emphasis on profit. Prior to this time, in AngloAmerican context, there was a strong belief that firms have moral standards beyond rational selfinterest. For instance, the concept of the ‘Christian’, civically-minded businessperson which predominated in the 19th century and well into the 20th. Friedman’s essay is especially relevant today due to the resurgent debate on the viability of Corporate Social Responsibility. This essay will argue there are five major flaws in Friedman’s arguments. Firstly, it will question Friedman’s argument that, while people have moral obligations, firms are not really moral actors. Relatedly, it will critique his moral distinction between privately owned firms and public companies. Secondly, it will examine Friedman’s odd concession that companies should still observe ‘ethical customs’, which contradicts his general stance. Thirdly, it will explore the complexity of determining when companies are seeking profit or acting morally. This is an issue Friedman acknowledges, but this essay will argue that he downplays its significance. Fourthly, this essay will critique Friedman’s argument that firms would not be efficacious in their attempts to achieve aims other than making profit. Fifthly, it will interrogate Friedman’s claim that firms can leave serious environmental and social reform to governments.

From the outset of his essay, Friedman argues that “only individuals can have responsibilities. A corporation is an artificial person and, in this sense may have artificial responsibilities, but "business" as a whole cannot be said to have responsibilities”.[2] He states that individuals who wish to contribute to a certain cause may do so with their own money and time, however, seeking to do it through a business is wrong, as it involves spending someone else’s money for one’s own interest. By contrast, he states that the obligations of a firm are to follow the law, not espouse any further morality.[3] However, Friedman’s argument is flawed, because corporations are formed by individuals. For instance, let us imagine an anti-racist CEO working in a racist area with weak anti-discrimination laws. If they follow Friendman’s argument, they would not hire a racial minority job candidate in a public-facing role. By doing so, however, they would perpetuate one of the worst forms of racism, economic disenfranchisement, and entrench race-based income inequality. In a capitalist society, individuals spend much of our lives at work and, indeed, it is often the role where we can most impact our community. While Milton Friedman states that individuals can have morals, therefore, he denies them the opportunity to express those morals or act in accordance with them.

Tellingly, Friedman excludes ‘individual proprietors’ from his essay and ‘focuses on corporate executives’.[4] This is because, technically, individual owners have total control over their business. The business is funded by their own money, and therefore, all expenditures are technically a ‘personal social cause’, which he states they are well within their rights to pursue. However, it should be noted that shareholders are very similar to individual proprietors. Shareholders simply have a portion of capital in a firm and use their shares to make decisions within the company, based on an agreed voting system. As such, if the collective will of the firm is that they should pursue corporate social responsibility then that is not meaningfully different from an individual proprietor. Even if one might say that the shareholders rarely vote on corporate strategy, they select the board who hires the CEO to act on their behalf every day. Part of the CEO’s considerations will naturally be to maximise all interests of the shareholders, including their moral values. Later in his essay, Friedman states, that “the newer phenomenon of calling upon stockholders to require corporations to exercise social responsibility” will... “involved is some stockholders trying to get other stockholders… to contribute against their will to ‘social causes’”. But the reverse is also true: totally-profit-seeking shareholders impose their will on more sociallyminded shareholders.[5] As Asher Schechter has argued in response to Friedman, paraphrasing the theories of Nobel Prize winning economists Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales, “A company’s ultimate shareholders are ordinary people who, in addition to caring about money, are also concerned about a myriad of ethical and social issues”[6] Friedman also argues that when large public companies pursue ethical standards also might harm consumers or employees[7] but similarly, pursuing profit also does not always please your customers, or employees. For example, raising the prices of your product may increase profit, but will likely frustrate customers, whilst lowering wages to cut costs may also annoy your employees. As scholar Lynn A. Stout noted when examining Friedman’s views “certainly they can choose to maximize profits; but they can also choose to pursue any other objective that is not unlawful, including taking care of employees and suppliers”.[8]

Having identified some flaws in Friedman’s definition of a ‘company’, this essay will now turn to problems in his conception of what constitutes non-profit based goal or objective. Friedman argues that “responsi­bility is to … make as much money as possible while con­forming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.''[9] This is contradictory since ‘ethical custom’ could include a range of moral objectives and values. It can be argued that following these customs will not always maximise company profits, or even may damage them. For example, not lying is an ethical custom, and outside of fraud laws, one is not mandated to tell the truth. However, telling the truth might reduce the company’s profits. For example, imagine a CEO is in negotiations with two companies. She instructs her secretary to lie one of those firms about why she cannot meet with them, when in fact she is conferencing with their rival, this would be legal, but not ethical. Following the ethical custom of honesty would, however, weaken the firm’s negotiation position. If Friedman believes the CEO should be compelled by ethical custom to tell the truth, what is the distinction between this behaviour and the CEO making environmental goals a condition of the tender? Friedman thus contradicts himself here by conceding that there are some cases where a firm should not seek to maximise profitability.

Thirdly, Friedman concedes that there are some unclear cases where profit may or may not conflict with other goals[10], but massively underestimates how often this might occur. This is significant because it makes his advice to executives impractical. Friedman only considers the case where doing some social good may improve your brand image. For example, some banks refuse to lend to fossil fuel projects, which, while does reduce their immediate profits, helps improve their image with current and potential future employees. There are, however, other instances: For example, the government sets baseline standards for non-discrimination in hiring staff but firms often have diversity policies that exceed this because workers value working alongside colleagues that reflect the society which they live in. A more diverse workforce increases company productivity, leading to long term profitability. Moreover, as David Rodin argued in “The Ownership Model of Business Ethics” “the separation of long-term profitability and the social good becomes arbitrary” especially since the “viability of society and the environment are central to the performance of firms over time”[11]. As such, Friedman’s strict distinction between profit and other goals is difficult for firms, directors and executives to uphold.

Finally, Friedman also makes an argument about efficacy. He states that many executives do not know how to truly bring social good, and therefore, they should not attempt doing so. Milton uses the example of an executive told to fight inflation:[12] “He is told that he must contribute to fighting inflation. How is he to know what ac-tion of his will contribute to that end?... But nothing about his selection makes him an expert on inflation. Will his hold-ing down the price of his product reduce infla­tionary pressure?”[13] This argument is spurious, as inflation is unlikely to be combated by individual firms lowering the prices of their goods. There are, however, other examples where corporate change is possible. For example, executives are likely to know how to decarbonise within their industry, and also would know that such a change would improve the environment.

For example, Google has been carbon neutral for two years now, their data centres use 50 percent less energy than comparable facilities and their ‘campuses’ are made from sustainable materials[14]. Google thus chose to forgo immediate profits to pursue an objective that was not required by law. But more importantly, Google were clearly effective: as a major energy-using corporation they cut emissions in California in a non-negligible way. Their actions have also set the standard for their industry.[15] Even if other firms are not experts on how to have an environmental impact, they can hire consultants to help their decisions. Moreover, logically, if people working at a firm suspected their socially-minded actions would not have an impact, it is unlikely they would risk profits, even in the short term. In reality, this debate is confined to cases where the benefits of a socially just decision are probable and measurable.

On the issue of efficacy, Friedman argues that the government has set basic ‘ethical’ regulations on companies, and will continue to do when a problem, such as global warming, become more serious.[16] However, this contradicts the views Friedman has articulated in his broader scholarship, that governments are often not best placed to act and misunderstand the needs of wider society. Additionally, the government can be short-sighted when making regulatory decisions, since they are focussed on winning elections every few years. This means radical action will not happen soon enough for issues such as global warming. Corporations have short term incentives too, of course, like annual earnings targets, but they also have an interest in the long term. For example, companies are actually incentivised to reduce their negative impact on the environment because they recognise the long-term viability of their business is dependent on a healthy ecosystem.

Friedman argues that it is undemocratic to impose social obligations and moral preferences that are not legally enforced since this goes against the will of the majority in a society. Rather, he also calls on socially-minded executives to lobby for change in the electorate or legislature.[17] However, this option is not very realistic. In his conception massive corporations are unable to bring about change, so why would individuals, like socially-minded executives, be better placed to do so? Individuals have fewer resources and power compared to corporations, so lobbying for change is more challenging and less likely to yield results. In addition, it is not likely that executives could both effectively argue for social change and continue to work at a firm that undermines it. For instance, it would be odd for the CEO of a firm that does not hire any women as senior executives to call for quotas to be imposed. Or, let us assume, these executives will be successful. By this logic, powerful and wealthy individuals who perform moral actions that are not required by law could also be viewed as anti-democratic since they are imposing their values on an unwilling polity.

Milton Friedman was undoubtedly an incredible economist, and his work has had an immense impact on public policy. However, Friedman was unable to predict the complex role of morality in contemporary business and the blurring of the difference between profit and social good. Especially in a status quo where society faces issues such as global warming and structural inequality, it is important that firms do more than seek profit.

Footnotes

1 Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits”, The New York Times Magazine, September 13, 1970, located at: https://web.archive.org/web/20060207060807/https://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html, accessed 1/06/2019.

2 Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business”, op cit.

3 Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business”, op cit.

4 Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business”, op cit.
5 Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business”, op cit.
6 Asher Schechter, “Why Friedman Was Wrong”, in “It’s time to rethink Milton Friedman’s shareholder argument’, Chicago Booth Review Online, 07/12/17, https://review.chicagobooth.edu/economics/2017/article/it-s-time-rethink-milton-friedman-sshareholder-value-argument
7 Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business”, op cit.

8 Lynn A. Stout,, "The Shareholder Value Myth" (2013). Cornell Law Faculty Publications. Paper 771. http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/771

9 Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business”, op cit.

10 Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business”, op cit.
11 David Rodin, The Ownership Model of Business Ethics. Metaphilosophy Vol 36, No 1-2, (2005) 163–181.
12 Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business”, op cit.
13 Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business”, op cit.

14 Google, “Environment Projects”, n.d., located at: https://sustainability.google/environment/, accessed 15/07/2019.
15 Ibid.
16 Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business”, op cit.
17 Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business”, op cit.

Bibliography

Friedman, Milton,“The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits”, The New York Times Magazine, September 13, 1970, located at: https://web.archive.org/web/20060207060807/https://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertaria ns/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html, accessed 1/06/2019.

Google, “Environment Projects”, n.d., located at: https://sustainability.google/environment/, accessed 15/07/2019.

Schechter, Asher, “Why Friedman Was Wrong”, in “It’s time to rethink Milton Friedman’s shareholder argument’, Chicago Booth Review Online, 07/12/17, https://review.chicagobooth.edu/economics/2017/article/it-s-time-rethink-milton-friedman-sshareholder-value-argument, accessed 16/07/2019

Stout, Lynn A., "The Shareholder Value Myth" (2013). Cornell Law Faculty Publications. Paper 771. http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/771, accessed 16/07/2019.

Rodin, David, The Ownership Model of Business Ethics. Metaphilosophy Vol 36, No 1-2, (2005) 163–181.

2020年初级奖二等奖

How socialist is Sweden?

瑞典有多社会主义?

Anna Rantakari,惠灵顿公学,英国
2020年少年奖二等奖|8 分钟阅读

Socialism can refer to many things. It can refer to an ideology that values equality, community, and solidarity. It can refer to an economic and political system where wealth is distributed by the government to ensure everybody’s needs are met. It can also refer to a social protest movement in which socialism is romanticized to oppose and antagonize capitalism. At first glance, claiming Sweden is socialist may seem valid, however, this is incorrect and frequently due to inconsistent definitions of socialism combined with difficulty distinguishing between the socio-economic system and the strong welfare state. This essay will argue Sweden is a capitalist country despite being closer to achieving ideals of socialism than many other countries. Firstly, it will examine Sweden’s economic and political systems in the past, focusing on what impact it has had on the current situation. Secondly, it will analyze Sweden’s economy and how it conforms to characteristics that tend to be most prevalent within a capitalist market. Thirdly, it will explore Sweden’s political system and class politics to demonstrate the lacking presence of key features of a socialist country’s political system outlined by the Marxist-Leninist model. Fourthly, the aspects of Sweden’s economy considered socialist, like the highly equitable share of wealth, will be evaluated and discussed in depth. Finally, it will critique the importance of Sweden achieving socialist ideals in debating how socialist is Sweden.

Sweden’s current socioeconomic status is a product of wealth gained during the Post-World War II Economic Expansion and the social reforms implemented in the 1970s. Sweden’s economy benefited heavily from the Post-War Economic Expansion as they had stayed neutral during the conflict and consequently had not been economically devastated like many other nations. This allowed Sweden to climb to be fourth in the OECD rankings of GNP per capita, by the 1970s, as a result of sustained economic growth and high employment rates (Heyman, Norbäck, & Persson, 2019). This is significant because economic growth combined with industrialization acted as a foundation for Sweden to become a Fordist welfare society (Östberg, 2019) of which we can still see much resemblance to in modern-day Sweden. For example, some key characteristics of Fordism include wage compression and a universalistic welfare state (Viktorov, 2005) both of which are still highly valued in Sweden and maintained by key organizations such as the Swedish Trade Union Confederation and the Swedish Government. Although Sweden is no longer considered Fordist, the economic growth, industrialization, and establishment of an active welfare state, that resulted from the employment of the ideology of advanced capitalism, have had lasting effects such as creating a foundation for a capitalist economy.

As mentioned previously, the social reforms implemented in the 1970s by the social-democratic prime minister, Olof Palme, led to what many call ‘Sweden’s Socialist Experiment’ (Norberg, 2020). Before the Swedish social democrats implemented extensive reforms, Sweden had grown their economy by maintaining ‘highly competitive market-based policies’ (Fernandez-Villaverde & Ohanian, 2019) as is demonstrated by Sweden achieving one of the highest per capita incomes in the world (Östberg, 2019). However, in the early 1970s, the Social democrats raised taxes and heavily regulated businesses and the labor market, hence crippling the economy, and causing many businesses and entrepreneurs to leave. During these 10 years, the public sector’s share of GNP increased by a staggering 50% (Östberg, 2019) which is illustrative of the radical approach of the reforms. The reforms caused extensive damage forcing the government to turn to a market-oriented approach effectively reversing the social reforms: privatizing parts of the health-care system, reducing welfare benefits, deregulating industries, and cutting corporate tax rates (Fernandez-Villaverde & Ohanian, 2019). This demonstrates how socialist policies, in the past, have had negative impacts causing Swedes to shift in favor of capitalist policies and how Sweden is still working to reverse and recover from the failed socialist experiment. Nonetheless, although Sweden now pursues competitive market-policies and is still decreasing corporate tax rates, some aspects of the socialist reforms are still visible, such as being one of the strongest welfare states, misleading people to think Sweden still primarily employs socialist policies.

One of the most defining factors in determining whether Sweden is socialist is its economy. Sweden is a free-market economy consisting of profit-driven privatized corporations similar to other capitalist countries such as Singapore. A free market is an economic system where there is an absence of or little interference from the government meaning individuals make economic decisions. According to Statista’s Index of Economic Freedom (2020), Sweden was 74.9% economically free ranking 22nd overall indicating there is minimal regulation on business and lack of government-imposed tariffs which are currently just 1.69% (Macrotrends, 2020). Moreover, private property rights in Sweden are some of the highest in Europe scoring 89 on the Property Rights Index (The Heritage Foundation, 2020) further emphasizing Sweden’s high levels of economic freedom typically characteristic of a capitalist economy. Capitalism is also based upon the principle that competition and profit drive business. With Sweden’s highly competitive market, this is absolutely the case. Sweden ranks 8th out of 140 countries in terms of competitiveness (World Economic Forum, 2018). Many companies are based in Sweden due to the tax incentives implemented with the goal of reattracting companies to Sweden’s market after social reforms in the 1970s drove them away. For instance, the corporate tax has decreased drastically and is scheduled to decline to 20.4% by 2021 (Fernandez-Villaverde & Ohanian, 2019) in turn acting as a stimulus for domestic businesses to stay in Sweden and international corporations to come to Sweden. These economic reforms have allowed Sweden to recover from the damage caused by the socialist experiment of the 1970s as is apparent from Sweden having a high GDP per capita of $51,610 (World Bank, 2019). Clearly, Sweden’s economy corresponds to many factors of a capitalist economy. On the contrary, if Sweden were in fact socialist, their economy would look vastly different. The economy would be entirely state-controlled, there would be collective ownership of over means of production, and goods would be produced for usage value rather than for profit determined through laws of supply and demand.

A common misconception is that a socialist government always equates to an authoritarian or communist government. This stems from the fact that many countries considered socialist, based their government systems on the Marxism-Leninism model and therefore have political systems that share attributes with communism rather than democracy. Some of these countries include the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Cuba, both of which have social economies under communist party control. Contrarily, Sweden has a capitalist economy and is a constitutional monarchy paired with a parliamentary democracy. A socialist government could favor democracy, like Sweden, because a priority of a socialist nation is equality and the empowerment of the people, however, Sweden is democratic as the government and parliament strongly value peoples’ freedoms while a socialist system would prioritize equality over individual liberty. In the most recent elections in 2018, 87.2% of the population eligible to vote voted (Statistics Sweden, 2018) suggesting that the people of Sweden value democracy as much as the government. This also implies that voters understand and practice one of Sweden’s fundamental freedoms, the freedom of speech as is outlined in the Constitution (Riksdag, 2018). The Constitution also expresses other freedoms Swedish citizens are entitled to including, but not limited to, freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and freedom of information (Sweden.se, 2020). These freedoms play a role of paramount importance in Swedish society taking precedence over all other laws which would be uncharacteristic in a socialist society where the end goal of essentially eliminating social classes and achieving an egalitarian society would surpass all other matters.

Having discussed how Sweden became a capitalist nation and how capitalism is at the core of Sweden’s economy and political system, this essay will now critique and invalidate the importance of arguments often made when defending the stance that Sweden is socialist, primarily focusing on aspects of Sweden’s economy deemed socialist such as high taxes, redistribution of wealth, and the ‘safety-net’ provided to citizens in the form of a strong welfare state. Furthermore, the importance of achieving socialist ideals such as equality and advanced workers’ rights protection will be discussed.

Although many features of Sweden’s economy and market are considered capitalist like the minimal government interference in business and the highly competitive market, some aspects of the economy are products of and still reflect the social reforms from the 1970s. Firstly, someone could claim Sweden should be considered socialist because they have extremely high taxes. This is not true. Swedes pay fewer taxes than many other European countries. France’s tax revenue is 46.2% of the GDP compared to Sweden’s is 43.9% (OECD, 2019). This demonstrates how taxing and redistribution of wealth are socialist methods however they do not define a country as socialist as it is a single factor of many that are considered. Even countries traditionally considered capitalists have relatively high tax revenues as a percentage of the GDP. For instance, Germany’s tax revenue is 38.2% of the GDP which is above the OECD average of 34.3% (OECD, 2019). Taxing is a method of redistribution of wealth which is often associated with and utilized by socialist countries to create a more equitable society, but Sweden is surprisingly unequal in terms of income and this inequality is still growing. Sweden has a low Gini coefficient of 0.28 (OECD, 2017) which would influence one to assume Sweden is economically equal. However, the top 1% richest in Sweden own 25-40% of total wealth which is level with the 35% of total wealth that the top 1% richest in the capitalist country of the United States of America possesses (Cowen, 2014). This demonstrates how Sweden is unequal in terms of income despite often being falsely idealized as a model socialist nation with little inequality.

Sweden’s welfare state is often misinterpreted as socialism. Socialism strives for a system that ensures everyone’s needs are met which is also the role of the welfare ‘safety net’ Sweden has created for its citizens. The welfare system encompasses many things: childcare, education, medical care, unemployment benefits, pensions, and many more. Both the high taxing and the welfare state are products of the socialist reforms from the 1970s, yet they both actively enable a highly competitive economy. University tuition is free, making it more accessible hence creating more highly skilled workers; childcare pricing is based on income ensuring parents can afford to have their child or children cared for while at work; unemployment benefits are generous but given on conditions that encourage people to find jobs, leading to less unemployment and poverty. Similar ‘socialist’ systems that prioritize citizens’ welfare can be seen in other capitalist countries as well. For example, the NHS, in the United Kingdom, is a publicly funded healthcare system. Another example, the United States of America’s government finances public schools with taxpayers’ money.

Lastly, Sweden is highly unionized. According to the OECD’s latest report on trade union density around 65% of workers were in labor unions (2018) which is harmonious with socialist beliefs of protecting and empowering the working class as well as class solidarity. However, the argument is to be made that labor unions protect human rights and ensure humane working conditions making them human rights organizations rather than socialist organizations. This furthers the idea that Sweden identifies its citizens’ freedoms and rights as being of utmost importance.

There is no single term to describe Sweden’s socio-economic and political system as no country is solely socialist or exclusively capitalist. Each nation takes ideas from a wide array of ideologies and systems to create a unique, complex web of concepts woven together to create a structure that helps society develop and thrive. Sweden is unlike any other country as its history, values, and people cooperate to construct a holistic system in which a capitalist free-market economy, democratic government, and a strong welfare state coincide to complement each other.

Bibliography

Cowen, T. (2014, May 30). Sweden has lots of wealth inequality. Retrieved July 10, 2020, from https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2014/05/wealth-inequality-in-sweden.html

Dorfman, J. (2018, July 08). Sorry Bernie Bros but Nordic Countries Are Not Socialist. Retrieved July 06, 2020, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2018/07/08/sorry-bernie-bros-but- nordic-countries-are-not-socialist/

Fernandez-Villaverde, J., & Ohanian, L. (2019, January 9). How Sweden Overcame Socialism. Retrieved July 09, 2020, from https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-sweden-overcame-socialism-

11547078767

The Heritage Foundation. (2020). Sweden. Retrieved July 09, 2020, from https://www.heritage.org/index/country/sweden

Heyman, F., Norbäck, P., & Persson, L. (2019, June 24). Turnaround of the Swedish Economy: Lessons from Large Business Sector Reforms. Retrieved July 10, 2020, from https://academic.oup.com/wbro/article/34/2/274/5522304

Norberg, J. (2020, March 05). Sweden's Lessons for America. Retrieved July 11, 2020, from https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-report/swedens-lessons-america

OECD. (2018). Trade Union. Retrieved July 09, 2020, from https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TUD

OECD. (2019). Revenue Statistics 2019 - Sweden. Retrieved July 07, 2020, from https://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-policy/revenue-statistics-sweden.pdf

OECD. (2019). Income inequality. Retrieved July 10, 2020, from https://data.oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm

Riksdag. (2018, August 29). The Constitution. Retrieved July 09, 2020, from https://www.riksdagen.se/en/how-the-riksdag-works/democracy/the-constitution/

Statista. (2020, March 27). 2020 Index of Economic Freedom. Retrieved July 11, 2020, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/256965/worldwide-index-of-economic-freedom/

Statistics Sweden. (2018, November 21). Highest turnout since 1985 general elections. Retrieved July 10, 2020, from https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject- area/democracy/general-elections/general-elections-results/pong/statistical-news/namnlos/

Sweden.se. (2020, April 28). Openness shapes Swedish society. Retrieved July 11, 2020, from https://sweden.se/society/openness-shapes-swedish-society/

Viktorov, I. (2005, January). Fordism and the Swedish Model. Retrieved July 09, 2020, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/251436459_Fordism_and_the_Swedish_Model

The World Bank. (2016). GINI index (World Bank estimate). Retrieved July 11, 2020, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?view=map

The World Bank. (2018). Tariff rate, applied, weighted mean, all products (%). Retrieved July 12, 2020, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TM.TAX.MRCH.WM.AR.ZS?end=2018

World Population Review. (2020). Socialist Countries 2020. Retrieved July 09, 2020, from https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/socialist-countries

Östberg, K. (2019, September 25). Was Sweden Headed Toward Socialism in the 1970s? Retrieved July 09, 2020, from https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/08/sweden-1970s-democratic-socialism- olof-palme-lo

2020年初级奖得主

Who should own your data? The companies with which you agree to share your data, everybody, just you, or nobody?

谁应该拥有您的数据?您同意与之共享您的数据的公司,所有人,只有您,还是没有人?

Jason Hausenloy,东南亚联合世界学院(东校区),新加坡
2020年初级奖得主|7.5 分钟阅读

Today, we produce unfathomable amounts of data, leading the OECD to call data a “key pillar of 21st-century growth.”[1] Legislators, politicians and the popular press have increasingly called for ownership of data.[2]

Ownership is generally defined as “full and complete control with recognised legal rights,” with legal discretion for the rightsholder to exploit, change, destroy, possess, exclude others from and transfer their property.[3] An ownership right for personal data does not currently exist in the legal statutes of any industrialised country.[4] Property laws intentionally exclude personal data from subject matter definitions and newly introduced regulatory frameworks do not specify data ownership.[5] [6]

In 1893, Sir William Blackstone noted the human fascination with ownership, saying we desire “sole and despotic dominion … in total exclusion of rights of other individuals in the universe.”[7] In this case, that fascination detracts from the problems and solutions surrounding personal data today. An ownership right should not be created for data. To illustrate this, I shall explore the implications of assigning a data ownership right to corporations, everybody, individuals and then discuss why data should not be owned at all.

Corporations

Legally, data generated by corporations have limited protection under trade-secret and other commercial laws.[8] However, corporations have gained de facto control of our data without our explicit consent through cleverly-crafted user interfaces, consumer nonchalance and labyrinthine policies hidden within fine print. The Norwegian Consumer Council exposed “dark patterns” - default settings, nudging, the creation of an illusion of choice - used by tech companies to discourage consumers from exercising their privacy rights.[9] Furthermore, surveys show, in light of recent data privacy scandals, individuals say they are increasingly distrustful in corporations to adequately protect their privacy.[10] Nevertheless, in practice, individuals demonstrate little regard for their personal data, a dichotomy referred to as the “privacy paradox.”[11] Empirical research has shown the majority of users lack the time and expertise to understand fine print.[12] Consumers readily grant consent to handover data in exchange for convenience or access to services.[13]

By examining the current state of the data economy, under the de facto control of corporations, we can anticipate the potential implications of corporate data ownership.

Dominant players of the data economy boast revenues that eclipse national GDPs and user populations that exceed continents.[14] They aspire to automate, predict and influence individual behaviour, often without their knowledge. In this way, they have provided immense consumer benefit. Few can imagine living without Google search, WhatsApp messaging, or Amazon delivery. However, this monopoly on data has equipped tech giants with enormous power, which has resulted in a stagnant data economy and monopolistic markets.

Data exhibits unique properties from other economic goods. It is intangible, non-exhaustible, easily duplicated and can be simultaneously used by multiple parties in a non-rivalrous manner.[15] Through analysis of existing datasets, new findings and knowledge can be extracted. At the onset, these attributes imply data should circulate freely to maximise the scope of potentially beneficial applications. Unfortunately, this is not happening with each company protects its own vaults of user data with limited transactions.[16] Untraded, data suffers “the tragedy of the anticommons” in which a non-rivalrous good is wastefully underused at the detriment of consumers and society.[17]

Digital monopolies have a data-supported “God’s eye” view of their own market, with unparalleled insight into nearly every aspect of consumer life. They buy or undercut smaller, potential competitors. Facebook’s purchase of WhatsApp or Amazon’s undercutting of third-party sellers are two of many examples.[18] They are unlikely to be blindsided by small start-ups or unexpected technological shifts and, with undue pricing advantages, can consolidate or expand their market shares without necessarily innovating.[19] With legally-recognised ownership, corporations further lack the incentive to reduce current inequalities in wealth distribution from the expanding data economy, protect consumers or actuate a sustainable data economy to facilitate societal progression.[20]

To summarise, corporations have shrewdly gained our permission and can easily do so again. The data economy desperately requires data standardisation and portability to level the playing field and realise the immense socioeconomic potential of today’s abundance of data. Corporate ownership of data removes control and protections from consumers and regulators and will worsen today’s problems. So why not entrust data ownership to “everybody” who, by definition, should act for the common good?

Everybody

Having everybody owning everyone’s data implies all can legally access, manipulate and mine everybody else’s identifiable data. In this scenario researchers could analyse unbiased population datasets, start-ups could access the same raw data as giant corporations and AI algorithms could train on continuously acquired, diverse datasets. However, privacy would be non-existent and current innovation stymied.

There are obvious privacy issues if identifiable personal data are accessible by all. Openly-available data, in the wrong hands, can be manipulated for mass surveillance, identity theft, blackmail or even social engineering. To address this, regulators have proposed anonymisation as a potential solution. Data protection laws consider anonymised data as “non-personal,” stripping it of many privacy protections.[21] In theory, properly anonymised data, by definition, would be impossible to link to an identifiable person - however, current anonymisation techniques are ineffective. There are countless examples of supposedly anonymised databases being re-identified.[22] [23] [24] To promote transparency, the Australian Government released de-identified health records of 10% of Australians, which the University of Melbourne subsequently re-identified with openly available public information.[25] The Guardian secured the browsing history of three million Germans from a so-called “data broker” and individually identified users and exposed deeply sensitive information such as sexual preference or medications.[26] Furthermore, Rocher, Hendrickx and Montjoye, published a statistical model that can, with just 15 demographic attributes, uniquely identify 99.98% of Massachusetts residents. They challenged “the technical and legal adequacy of the de-identification release-and-forget model.”[27]

Even personal data handled by governments and corporations are anonymous only in name. The extensive detail of these datasets pale, however, in comparison with the plethora of data collected by today’s digital giants. If released, anonymised or otherwise, individual privacy would cease to exist.

Furthermore, data collectors would rightfully object to competitors using data produced from their investment or grants. Data’s mandatory release jeopardises business models made possible through data collection and removes incentive for continued innovation. A report released by MIT and Oracle argues that, for corporations, user data is an indispensable capital good and competitive advantage.[28] Forced, non-discriminating distribution of capital goods undermines key principles of the free market.

In summary, public ownership of data, anonymous or otherwise, results in significant degradation in privacy and innovation. So how about an option championed by privacy campaigners, politicians and media alike - individual ownership?

Individuals

Proponents for individual ownership argue that this offers the ultimate protection of privacy and allows fair financial compensation for personal data.[29] You own your house, you retain the full legal rights to sell it, to rent it and to exclude others from entering. It is understandably appealing.

Unfortunately, these arguments are flawed. Individual ownership and accompanying data markets, are impractical, harmful for consumers and, counterintuitively, degrade and damage privacy.

Firstly, information today rarely concerns a single individual. We take group photos, travel with other people and even our genetic code reveals information about our parents. Assuming the predicament of co-ownership can be solved, a data market is impractical.

Given its intangibility, putting a price on data is extremely challenging. Small businesses cannot afford to pay for people’s data, making it difficult to complete and comply and the compensation paid by large companies will be negligible. For example, Facebook’s worldwide revenue per user is

$6.42 - only a fraction of that would be paid as “data dividends.”[30] Furthermore, consumers would have to continuously manage data contracts with each service provider, which could result in consumer decision fatigue.[31] Corporations may then take advantage of this by appending clauses demanding exclusive, royalty-free, ownership rights to data as a prerequisite to the use of services. A single bad decision to sell or sign away personal data could be irreversible. Corporations would have little incentive to promote data portability or competition; users will continue to be walled into ecosystems of data monopolies.

In addition, individual ownership may damage the common good. It opens the door to unwanted nuisance or even civil disruption to governance and law enforcement. For example, during the globally-enforced COVID-19 lockdowns, individuals could object to their location being tracked and contest police enforcement strategies, such as CCTV cameras or drones.[32] Socially beneficial activities, like medical informational studies or AI research, may only have greatly diminished or biased data sets.

Lastly, human rights such as privacy and data protection, under current legislation, are inalienable rights.[33] Under individual ownership, those rights are degraded to alienable economic goods,[34] and should not be open to surrender or sale.[35]

In summary, individual data ownership fails at many levels. Privacy International, a leading privacy advocacy organisation, concluded that individual ownership fails to protect consumers, combat data monopolies and is fundamentally incompatible with data.[36] Therefore, current legislation, human rights organisations and academia have largely ignored or argued against ownership of data.[37] Why?

Nobody

The problems and challenges of data ownership highlighted in the prior sections, can be summarised as follows; market concentration of tech companies, wasteful underuse of data, privacy concerns and increasing consumer distrust but subsequent inaction. Many associate legislative inaction to assign data ownership as the root cause of these problems, blaming the control vacuum for inviting greedy corporations and autocratic governments to seize power. There is an important distinction between the non-assignment of ownership and inaction, however. Demands for radical change are warranted, but should take the form as a continuation of current progress. Continued discussion of the precarious implementation of data ownership side-tracks political, academic and public focus to address these underlying problems.

Professor Lothar Determann argues there is no legal principle for data ownership, writing in the Hastings Law Journal, that “property laws may protect physical embodiments of information...but such protection does not extend to the informational content.”[38] He further contends that incentivising data collection, the rationale offered by lawmakers for creating ownership rights in data, is invalid, as collection will continue to grow exponentially.[39]

Legislative progress has been made without data ownership. The EU has incentivised data access and EU-wide data markets, even making its own publicly held datasets accessible for reuse, while simultaneously balancing individual concerns, introducing the widely-adopted General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).[40] It grants specific rights to individuals over generated and inferred personal data such as; erasure, rectification, data portability and more.[41] Furthermore, it sets out privacy principles such as data minimisation, fairness and purpose specification, which shift the burden from individuals to corporations.[42]

There are many examples of revolutionary data-driven advances in many sectors of society[43] including decentralised systems and various business models (the “sharing economy,” for example).[44] Distributed Data Network architectures for medical research are trialling in Canada, the EU and Japan.[45] Federated Learning enables Machine Learning training on decentralised data, like that saved on individual devices - and is already being implemented.[46] More recently, unfettered access to personal data has been critical in the fight against today’s COVID-19 pandemic.

OpenSAFELY, an analytics platform for sharing the data of 17 million NHS patients,[47] has enabled the discovery of new risk factors and novel treatments for COVID-19.[48] Apple and Google have partnered to develop a Bluetooth contact-tracing platform for COVID-19 that addresses user privacy and security concerns. Under the rigidity of data ownership, these efforts would not have been possible.

Today, policy makers must strike a balance between individual rights and extracting societal benefits of data. It is the subject of age-old philosophical debate; whether to prioritise a categorical imperative of privacy at the expense of utilitarian societal progress. Assigning data ownership to a single party means choosing a side, one side will inevitably lose out - sacrificing progress or privacy. Thankfully, reality does not reflect this simplistic trade-off. Ergo, legislators must continue to push for a sector-specific rights-based regulatory framework to complement existing efforts and forgo the need to legislate through assigning data ownership. Therefore, I believe, data should remain as is, res nullius - “property of no one.”

Author's Note:

Unless specified otherwise, I will interpret “your data” to mean personal data as it is commonly differentiated as such in regulation and discussion on data protection. Personal data is a category of data defined, according to the General Data Protection Regulation, to be “any information which are related to an identified or identifiable natural person.”

Footnotes

1 OECD (2015), Data-Driven Innovation: Big Data for Growth and Well-Being, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264229358-en.

2 E.g. The Economist. 2019. “We Need to Own Our Data as a Human Right—and Be Compensated for It.” The Economist. January 21, 2019. https://www.economist.com; “Digital Privacy Rights Require Data Ownership.” 2018. Financial Times. March 21, 2018. https://www.ft.com/; Ritter & Mayer, Regulating Data as Property: A New Construct for Moving Forward, 16 Duke Law & Technology Review 220-277 (2018)

3 “Definition of OWNER • Law Dictionary • TheLaw.Com.” The Law Dictionary, July 12, 2014. https://dictionary.thelaw.com/owner/.

4 Determann, Lothar. 2018. “No One Owns Data.” SSRN Electronic Journal. 24-25 https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3123957; Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, “Arguments Against ‘Data Ownership’ - Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition.” 1-2. Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition. 2020. (“However a data ownership right does not currently exist either at EU or Member State level, or in any other industrialised country”)

5 See General Data Protection Regulation, para. 63 “(General Data Protection Regulation)” 2016. https://eur- lex.europa.eu/

6 Determann, See Supra note 3, at 24-26

7 Blackstone, Sir William. 1893 “Of Property, in General” in George Sharswood (ed) Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books (J.B. Lippincott Co, Philadelphia, 1893) Vol 1, Bk 2, Ch 1 8 Determann, See Supra note 4. 14-17

9 “Report: Deceived by Design : Forbrukerrådet.” 2018. Forbrukerradet.No. 2018. 6, 13-19, 31. https://www.forbrukerradet.no

10 Shipman, Frank M. and Catherine C. Marshall. “Ownership, Privacy and Control in the Wake of Cambridge Analytica | Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems.” 2020. https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3313831.3376662.

11 Barth, Susanne and Menno D.T. de Jong. “The Privacy Paradox – Investigating Discrepancies between Expressed Privacy Concerns and Actual Online Behavior – A Systematic Literature Review.” Telematics and Informatics 34, no. 7 (November 2017): 1038–58. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tele.2017.04.013.

12 “Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts on JSTOR.” 2014. 9-13, 31-32. Jstor.Org. 2014. https://www.jstor.org/;

13 Whitley et al. 2018. “Report on a Study of How Consumers Currently Consent to Share Their Financial Data with a Third Party.” https://www.fs-cp.org.uk/

14 See Winck, Ben. 2020. “The 5 Most Valuable US Tech Companies Are Now Worth More than $5 Trillion after Alphabet’s Record Close.” Markets.Businessinsider.Com. January 17, 2020. https://markets.businessinsider.com See Also Business Insider España. 2018. “25 Giant Companies That Are Bigger than Entire Countries” Business Insider. July 25, 2018. https://www.businessinsider.com

15 Jones, Charles I. and Christopher Tonetti. “Nonrivalry and the Economics of Data.” Stanford Graduate School of Business, 2019. https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/

16 See the Economist. 2017. “Data Is Giving Rise to a New Economy.” The Economist. May 6, 2017. https://www.economist.com/ (“The data economy, that term suggests, will consist of thriving markets for bits and bytes. But as it stands, it is mostly a collection of independent silos.”)

17 Heller, Michael, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets (January 1998). 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621-688 (1998), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=57627

18 See “WhatsApp: The Best Facebook Purchase Ever?” 2020. Investopedia. 2020. https://www.investopedia.com See also Anderson, George. 2014. “Is Amazon Undercutting Third-Party Sellers Using Their Own Data?” Forbes, October 30, 2014. https://www.forbes.com/

19 Arrow, Kenneth. 1962. “Chapter Title: Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention” ISBN: 0– 87014. 615-619 https://www.nber.org/chapters/c2144.pdf. (“The preinvention monopoly power acts as a strong disincentive to further innovation”)

20 The Economist. 2020. “Who Will Benefit Most from the Data Economy?” The Economist. February 20, 2020. https://www.economist.com/

21 See para. 26 “EUR-Lex - 31995L0046.” 2018. Europa.Eu. 2018. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31995L0046.

22 E.g. Lavrenovs, Arturs and Karlis Podins. 2016. “Privacy Violations in Riga Open Data Public Transport System.” 2016 IEEE 4th Workshop on Advances in Information, Electronic and Electrical Engineering (AIEEE), November. https://doi.org/10.1109/aieee.2016.7821808; See Also Montjoye, Y.-A. de, L. Radaelli, V. K. Singh and A. S. Pentland. 2015. “Unique in the Shopping Mall: On the Reidentifiability of Credit Card Metadata.” Science 347 (6221): 536–39. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1256297.

23 Brewster, Thomas. 2017. “120 Million American Households Exposed In ‘Massive’ ConsumerView Database Leak.” Forbes, December 19, 2017. https://www.forbes.com/

24 Brewster, Thomas. 2015. “191 Million US Voter Registration Records Leaked In Mystery Database.” Forbes, December 30, 2015. https://www.forbes.com/

25 Teague, Vanessa. 2017. “The Simple Process of Re-Identifying Patients in Public Health Records.” Pursuit. The University of Melbourne. December 17, 2017. https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/

26 Hern, Alex. 2017. “‘Anonymous’ Browsing Data Can Be Easily Exposed, Researchers Reveal.” The Guardian. The Guardian. July 31, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/

27 Rocher, Luc, Julien M. Hendrickx and Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye. 2019. “Estimating the Success of Re- Identifications in Incomplete Datasets Using Generative Models.” Nature Communications 10 (1). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-10933-3.

28 “The Rise of Data Capital.” MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW CUSTOM. 2016. http://files.technologyreview.com/whitepapers/MIT_Oracle+Report- The_Rise_of_Data_Capital.pdf?_ga=2.99922398.1378618533.1594295645-622520249.1591953709.

29 WILL.I.AM, See Supra note 2.

30 Reiff, Nathan.“Facebook Earnings: What Happened.” Investopedia, 2020. Table 1 . https://www.investopedia.com/facebook-earnings-4692424.

31Tierney, John. “Do You Suffer From Decision Fatigue?” The New York Times, August 17, 2011. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/magazine/do-you-suffer-from-decision-fatigue.html.

32 Pidd, Helen and Vikram Dodd. 2020. “UK Police Use Drones and Roadblocks to Enforce Lockdown.” The Guardian. The Guardian. March 26, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/; Hadavas, Chloe. “France Is Using A.I. to Detect Whether People Are Wearing Masks.” Slate Magazine. Slate, May 8, 2020. https://slate.com/

33 “Charter of Fundamental Rights.” European Data Protection Supervisor - European Data Protection Supervisor, 2020. (Those rights… are inalienable... The rights include the right to privacy and the right to data protection) https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/our-work/subjects/charter-fundamental-rights_en.

34 Jeong, Sarah. “Opinion | Selling Your Private Information Is a Terrible Idea.” The New York Times, July 5, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/

35 “Privacy and Human Rights - Overview.” 2020. Gilc.Nl. 2020. (“Privacy underpins human dignity and other key values such as freedom of association and freedom of speech”) https://www.gilc.nl/

36 Pavel, Valentina. 2019. “Our Data Future.” Privacy International. July 17, 2019. https://privacyinternational.org/long- read/3088/our-data-future.

37 Determann, Supra note 3

38 Ibid. 25.

39 Ibid. 6-7, 35.

40 2020. “A European Strategy for Data.” (“aim to increase the use of and demand for, data and data-enabled products and services throughout the Single Market.”) https://ec.europa.eu/; See Generally Directive 2003/98/EC on the re-use of public sector information

41 General Data Protection Regulation, See supra note 5, at Section 3 Art. 16, 17, 20.

42 Ibid. See Art. 5 (“Principles relating to processing of personal data”)

43 Bryant, Randal, Randy Katz and Edward Lazowska. 2008. “Big-Data Computing: Creating Revolutionary Breakthroughs in Commerce, Science and Society Motivation: Our Data-Driven World.” See Also Richards, Neil and Jonathan King. 2014. “BIG DATA ETHICS.” 393-394

44 Benkler, Yochai. 2004.“Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production.” The Yale Law Journal. https://www.jstor.org

45 Evans, Barbara. 2011. “MUCH ADO ABOUT DATA OWNERSHIP.” Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 25. 99-101; See Also Richard Platt et al., The New Sentinel Network — Improving the Evidence of Medical-Product Safety, 361 New England Journal of Medicine. 645–47 (2009)

46 Bonawitz, Keith, Hubert Eichner, Wolfgang Grieskamp, Dzmitry Huba, Alex Ingerman, Vladimir Ivanov, Chloé Kiddon, et al. 2019. “TOWARDS FEDERATED LEARNING AT SCALE: SYSTEM DESIGN.” and Yang et al. 2018.

“Applied Federated Learning: Improving Google Keyboard Query Suggestions.”

47 “OpenSAFELY.” Opensafely.org, 2020. https://opensafely.org/.

48 Williamson, et al. “OpenSAFELY: Factors Associated with COVID-19 Death in 17 Million Patients.” Nature, July 8, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-020-2521-4.

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2019年法律奖一等奖

Should computer generated child pornography be permitted?
是否应该允许计算机生成的儿童色情制品?

Judy Hyojoo Rhee,加拿大大学山中学
2019年法律奖得主 |8 分钟阅读

In this essay, I argue that the possession, publication, and distribution of computer-generated child pornography should be legal, given that a) there is inadequate evidence to substantiate the claim that computer-generated child pornography (hereinafter CCP) causes harm to children or society, and b) CCP is a legitimate form of speech meriting legal protection. I will defend my position by first, refuting some of the more convincing propositions put forward by advocates of criminalization, and second, by explaining my own argument.

Before delving into the discussion of relevant arguments, I will clarify the definition of CCP. The United Nations defines child pornography as “any representation, by whatever means, of a child engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual activities or any representation of the sexual parts of a child for primarily sexual purposes” (Europol, 2005). CCP is defined as “realistic images of a non-existent child involved or engaged in the conduct” described in the U.N. definition of child pornography (Europol, 2005).

One of the major arguments proposed by those supporting criminalization is that consuming CCP stimulates pedophiles to sexually abuse real minors. For instance, in the United States, it was found that about 34% of 1,807 individuals charged with child pornography during the years 1997 to 2004 had committed sexual abuse against children (Kim, 2004). However, apart from the ‘correlation does not indicate causation’ problem inherent in this statistic, only some of the existing evidence supports the aforementioned claim. In his paper, Virtual Child Pornography, Michael Veber notes that child pornography may bring “therapeutic and cathartic effects” to viewers, referring to an interview conducted with a group of thirteen men guilty of possessing child pornography (Veber, 2004). While some of the men had maintained child pornography helped to drive the desire to harm children, others had explained that the material satiated their sexual desires, or even induced a sense of disgust towards the notion of making sexual advances to a child (Veber, 2004).

Evidence is to be found outside of the anecdotal realm. In the late 20th century, when Denmark, Japan, and the Czech Republic saw an increase in the availability of child pornography, child abuse rates decreased for all three countries (Diamond et. al, 2010). What the conflicting data serve to affirm is the idea that it would be disingenuous for one to claim CCP unequivocally leads to more sexual abuse, or, if one is arguing for legalization, that it does not. Hence, I will not use this point of contention to support my position, but merely to emphasize that the argument should not enhance the persuasiveness of the side proposing the criminalization of CCP.

Another argument I will deal with is the claim that CCP leads to the objectification of children. I will separately address the objectification done by consumers of CCP and that which is done by the rest of society. In the case of the former, I question whether the issue of objectification is nearly as relevant. This is because many of whom are expected to consume CCP are individuals who are not only attracted to children, but those who also wish to experience sexual arousal through CCP. In the minds of such consumers, children are already objectified, because viewers are choosing to conjure a situation in which they are engaging in sexual activity with a minor, despite acknowledging that the actions contained in the imaginings would severely harm a child in reality. If this stands true, I find it dubious that legalizing CCP would meaningfully impact the way in which consumers view children. In the case of non-consumers, by definition, they will not be well exposed to CCP. That is, even if we entertained the notion that viewing CCP is likely to influence individuals’ morals, non-consumers may lack sufficient exposure to the material in question. However, I reject the very idea that CCP will change society’s perception of children. Most individuals regard children to be a vulnerable cohort of citizens who require special legal protection because people have been socialized in such a manner (one could also argue that people have innate morality, but this is up for another debate). Even if CCP were to be legalized, I am confident that people will recognize that what is being tolerated is not the behaviour depicted in CCP, but instead, the expression of one fantasising about the behaviour. According to an analysis of interview responses of 10,946 American men and 14,101 American women to survey questions from the General Social Survey, those who consumed pornography were more inclined to support gender equality than those who did not (Baer and Watts, 2015). Based on this study, I could argue this. Among those who watch adult pornography, there are individuals who only wish to fantasise about consensual sex and not sexual violence. These are individuals who likely do not hold objectifying beliefs against women. What the above study suggests is that exposure to pornography does not sway the attitudes of these individuals. Similarly, the legalization of CCP is unlikely to cause the average citizen to objectify children.

The playing of violent video games can also be used to draw an analogy (Luck, 2008). Violent video games, like CCP, involve humans immersing themselves in content that realistically depict actions deemed morally wrong by society. And it is possible that some of the consumers, similar to the consumers of CCP, enjoy watching the immoral actions. Yet the rise in prevalence of violent video games has not been accompanied by a propagation of attitudes that dehumanize human beings. Though violent video games may not be interchangeable with CCP, the example seems to suggest that people are capable of distinguishing what belongs in the virtual world from what is permitted in reality.

The final argument for criminalization I will examine goes as follows: the desire to engage in sex with a minor is reprehensible, and knowingly “cultivating” an immoral desire is repugnant, therefore CCP should not be sanctioned by the state because CCP facilitates such a cultivation (Bartel and Cremaldi, 2018). This line of reasoning seems to endorse the application of legal moralism, where “a community has the right to use the legal system to proscribe conduct that is wrong according to community moralit\y” (Cranor, 1979). It is questionable, however, whether punishing someone can be justified on the mere basis that one violated a moral principle. Not only might there not exist a coherent “community morality” in the first place, moral standards are inherently subjective (Cranor, 1979). A particular action could violate one community’s standard but not that of another, and hence, it does not seem fair that a person could be punished for committing an act that has not caused any obvious harm to oneself or to others. Indeed, one could use the proposed argument to justify the criminalization of homosexuality, based on the idea that the latter is incompatible with some sort of unspoken moral law. (Stahl, 2009).

If the ‘cultivation’ argument is rephrased to become ‘the state should prevent the degradation of moral character which occurs as a result of cultivating an immoral desire’, another issue becomes evident – is ‘cultivating’ an appropriate word to describe the way in which consumers’ desires are affected by CCP? I argue that it is not. ‘Cultivating’ pertains to the idea that one is ‘developing’ a sexual desire. But one could simply be ‘stimulating’, or ‘fulfilling’ their sexual appetites, rather than developing them. And if an individual is simply ‘stimulating’ their desires through CCP, it appears that the intensity of the desire – in the long run – will remain relatively the same whether or not the individual consumes CCP. That is, a person’s moral character is unlikely to corrupt further.

Even if we were to assume that all viewers of CCP necessarily ‘cultivate’ their desires rather than ‘stimulate’ them, I maintain that state paternalism is not justified in this instance, for the reason that it could infringe upon citizens’ autonomy. As the state’s aim is to prevent the moral character of consumers of CCP from further corrupting, the state would have to prevent these individuals from having certain thoughts, provided that the goodness of one’s character depends on one’s thoughts and beliefs. Herein lies the problem. While most members of society agree that freedom of speech can be justly limited when it prevents others from exercising their rights, I doubt that the same group of individuals will assent to the government’s interference in the lives of private citizens to restrict the scope of their thoughts, especially if these thoughts do not translate into objectively harmful acts against others or oneself. Thus, the proposed argument is in danger of granting the state undue authority over citizens.

Why is the freedom of speech valued? According to J.S. Mill, free speech allows conflicting opinions to be expressed, which brings society closer to its ultimate goal of realizing the ‘truth’ (Mill, 1859). If we were to consider CCP in light of this view, the production and consumption of CCP may at first appear to be irrelevant to this truth-seeking endeavor. However, the opinion conveyed by CCP is the idea that it is pleasurable to fantasise about sexual encounters between adults and children. This opinion may be deemed ‘low-value’ and unconscionable in nature – but it is precisely the nature of the message intimated by CCP that begs its legal recognition. The primary purpose of free speech is to bring out into the open the most controversial ideas rather than the most accepted, as it is expected that opinions shared by the majority will be permitted regardless of whether the right to free speech is formally established (Loewy, 2002). Hence, not only does CCP reveal a legitimate viewpoint, legalization is necessary for the sake of upholding the integrity of free speech principles. And if self-expression truly does “[derive] from the widely accepted premise…that the proper end of man is the realization of his character and potentialities as a human being”, an objection based on ‘insulting to moral values’ does not seem to justify censoring the expressions of pedophilic individuals (Emerson, 1963), (Stahl, 2009). Further, legalizing CCP does not prevent those who find it offensive to voice their opinions on why the production and consumption of the material is unethical.  On the contrary, legalization can push those who disagree with the policy to more actively advocate for their position; this would allow everyone to participate in the societal discourse concerning the morality of CCP. Though it is unlikely that those opposing CCP will persuade viewers to discontinue the activity, the point here is not that the consumers of CCP will stop viewing it with legalization (which is anyhow an apparently self-contradictory statement). Instead, we should tolerate CCP for the reason that it provides an avenue by which society can promote moral values – namely, that of not engaging in CCP – in a noncoercive manner.

Perhaps it is because computer-generated child pornography is concerned with the well-being of children that we adopt a particularly wary attitude when addressing this issue. After all, it is believed to be the intrinsic duty of adults to care for those who are not yet prepared for a world that can at times be menacing and exploitative – given this, even if there exists a small potential for CCP to cause either direct or indirect harm to children, should we not override the freedom of speech to protect the interests of children? I hold that we must reconsider this question. If the legalization of CCP will not lead to an upsurge in sexual violence nor objectifying attitudes against children, and if we agree that criminal law must not be based purely on our notion of morality, then we must not let personal assumptions dictate the legal status of CCP. A world where speech can be curtailed if it fails to reflect the perspectives of the ideally virtuous citizen – this is a world all of us ought to fear.

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2020年法律三等奖

Do the Underlying Principles of Common Law Require that Juries Be Told of Jury Nullification?

普通法的基本原则是否要求陪审团被告知陪审团无效?

杨昊昊,瑞尪教育,中国(香港)
2020年法律奖第三名 |8 分钟阅读

As a matter of jurisprudence, the legitimacy of jury nullification is subject to extensive controversy. Jury nullification, or perverse verdict in the United Kingdom, occurs when a criminal trial jury acquits the defendant despite believing that his guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. This unofficial mechanism in criminal procedure offers a crucial channel for the public to protest against laws that they either find unjust or carry disproportionately harsh sentences. However, critics maintain that it threatens legal certainty to allow laymen to arbitrarily diverge from the letter of the law and to permit jurors to exercise powers beyond that prescribed by law. This essay argues that jury nullification is not only consistent with fundamental common law principles, but crucial to their survival, that it must be required that all jurors be informed of this power. This proposition shall be justified on two grounds:

  1. Jury nullification not only does no harm to the legal notion of precedent, but it also secures systematic standardisation of judicial proceedings which enhances common law certainty.

  2. The ultimate aim of the common law is to administer justice consistent with modern societal values and to ensure that justice is fairly served. This is best achieved with direct citizen involvement in the judicial system.

Originating from Anglo-Saxon England, the common law can be described as a body of unwritten laws built on past cases.[1] It is unwritten in the sense that unlike civil law, where a comprehensive set of codified legislation is present, the common law lacks a centralised documentation of such rules. Rather, the common law relies on precedents, an agglomeration of previous legal rulings. This distinguishes the common law from other bodies of law, because in the case of the former, the law is primarily developed by the judiciary as opposed to the legislature. Apart from precedents, the common law is also recognised for its flexibility to adapt to changes in social needs.[2] Despite the importance of precedents, common law courts can, when extremely compelling reasoning is submitted, revise and reinterpret the law without the involvement of the legislature.[3] This view is supported by Lord Justices in the UK Supreme Court, writing in the judgment of Willers v Joyce [2016, UKSC 44] that “while the Law Lords would regard their earlier decisions as ‘normally binding’, they would depart from them “when it appears right to do so”.[4] This allows the law to constantly progress gradually orderly alongside evolving political and social values, preventing change from causing immediate and disrupting effects on existing law.[5] These fundamental principles of common law will form the cornerstone on which this essay’s arguments are based.

Stare decisis, or precedent, is a fundamental pillar of common law. Principles and decisions established in previous cases are referenced and applied when adjudicating a future case of a similar nature. This model ensures legal consistency and clarity, or quoting Lord Mansfield, makes “every aspect of the law, its formation, interpretation, and performance, subject to a general duty of good faith and fair dealing”.[6] This certainty allows one to predict to a reasonable degree where the law might stand on a particular issue. However, critics contend that allowing jurors to arbitrarily exercise conscientious acquittals causes inconsistencies, disrupts the system of precedents, and jeopardises legal certainty.[7] This criticism, however, is unfounded, and can be refuted from a legal and a layman approach.

Legally, this argument fails to distinguish between a verdict and a judgment. A verdict is a declaration given without reason by the jury on whether or not they believe a defendant is guilty of the offence he is charged with; a judgment is a set of legal reasoning outlined by the judge on the rationale of his ruling. Emphasising reasoning rather than outcome, a judgment is far more impactful than a verdict on the overall growth of the common law: whereas the former explains legal principles, the latter gives only a short definite answer. In a system that is so rooted in explanation and analysis, it is unlikely that an acquittal rendered without reason would significantly interfere with the integrity of legal precedent. This shows that telling juries of perverse verdict is, at the very least, consistent with the elementary principle of certainty. Therefore, it is unsubstantiated for critics to object the requirement for juries to be told of their nullification based on this point.

To a layman, the idea of certainty is viewed differently. Jury nullification, although contentious, is not explicitly outlawed. It is, however, a power that the judiciary and legal practitioners appear to hide from the jury, hoping that it would not be exercised. This is precisely the problem that threatens certainty. While some may be ignorant, certain knowledgeable jurors may still know of and use this power of acquittal. In fact, courts have no way of knowing whether this power has been invoked since juries do not justify their verdicts.[8] When court procedures are not uniform, when certain powers are only known to some but not to all, an element of randomness is introduced into the jury, where the composition of the jury may affect the verdict just as much as the facts of the case. This compromises legal consistency alongside its legitimacy. The common law guarantees that defendants be tried before a competent tribunal, yet this can hardly describe a jury that is unclear of its own powers and limitations. Logically, therefore, jury nullification must be made clear to all jurors to mitigate entropy in judicial proceedings. Otherwise, the public may doubt the legitimacy of the court, subsequently weakening the force of stare decisis. Since common law survives and thrives on precedents, precedents that are subject to entropy will provide an unstable basis on which future judges can cement their own reasonings on, and thereby cripple the credibility of the common law system. If jury nullification cannot be completely eradicated from court, as indeed it cannot, then requiring that all jurors be told of this practice is the only realistic method to standardise court procedures and guarantee certainty.

Legal certainty is a hallmark of common law, and the system of precedent is a means to achieve it; however, it should be considered whether strict legal certainty, or upholding justice, is its ultimate aim. Lord Mance discussed this dilemma between certainty and justice in depth in his speech Should the Law Be Certain given in Oxford in 2011. He offered a balanced argument. Initially, he mentioned the importance of precedent and legal certainty and cited numerous authorities to support this point.[9] Certainty eliminates confusion and makes it easier for citizens to understand and thereby follow the law. But, he also recognised the presence of limits to absolute legal certainty. He cited Lord Goff, who described the common law as “a living system of law”, “reacting to new events and new ideas”, and being a system of “practical justice relevant to the times in which they [citizens] live”;[10] he referenced Lord Mansfield: “The most desirable object in all judicial determinations… is to do justice”.[11] It is evident that Lord Mance saw more in the common law than just an adherence to precedent; rather, he believed that it portrays societal values, and is an instrument for the pursuit of justice.

If Lord Mance’s view precisely describes the common law as a reflection of social values, then this further justifies why everyone must be informed of jury nullification. To demonstrate this, we turn to the situation of stealing in Medieval England. At a time when crime was rampant, criminal punishment was harsh. A crime’s severity was determined by whether a thief stole over or under a set threshold, with the former punishable by death.[12] While the death penalty was a fearsome deterrent, the public soon felt that it was disproportionate to the crime of stealing. Historical evidence suggested that juries began acquitting defendants for this reason, hence jury nullification became a mechanism for jurors to reflect inconsistencies between the law and societal principles.[13] Lord Denning once described juries as a “cross section of society”, making them the best candidates to introduce modern societal values and sentiments into the courtroom.[14] Critics can argue that this disrupts stare decisis; however, one can equally dismiss this argument by contending that the common law characteristic of compiling new case laws supports the gradual acclimation of the law to a new status quo. If one were to take the perspective of Lord Mance, that the law reflects society, then the right of a juror to give a perverse verdict must be made known to all, even if this may be perceived to interfere with precedent. Otherwise, this becomes self-defeating, as on the one hand the law values keeping up with societal attributes, yet on the other jurors are being denied the knowledge of knowing that they can voice objections towards outdated jurisprudence.

Another fundamental function of the common law, according to Lord Mance, is to pursue justice. By its very nature, justice demands a moral consideration of right and wrong, and this extends beyond the letter of the law. Described by Lord Brown as a “bulwark against injustice”, juries are designed to protect unpopular interests, or the interests of the unpopular, against persecution.[15] If this ideal role of the jury is to be realised, then jurors must be invested with the power of nullification to intervene in the face of tyranny. So was the case in the trial of John Lilburne, an outspoken critic of the then tyrannical British Government.[16] In 1649, he was tried twice for high treason for denouncing the legitimacy of the Commonwealth and criticising Parliament. Facing capital punishment, the jury, sympathising with his commitment to the common good and his bravery in challenging authority, nullified his charge and spared him from death.[17] Subsequently, the Court of Common Pleas acknowledged that the right to jury trial entailed a right to acquit, irrespective of the judge’s view on whether or not the defendant was guilty.[18] This ruling had implicitly affirmed not just the legitimacy of jury nullification, but its importance in allowing the law to serve faithfully as an instrument for the pursuit of justice. Critics may be inclined to cite the dangers of entrusting the common law to a layman’s moral discretions; however, by its very nature, determining fairness requires one to apply his own moral judgement to the situation, adding on his understanding of societal norms, to decide on whether or not something is fair. Failing to disclose the existence of jury nullification to jurors is a denial of their right to translate their moral values into action in an attempt to eliminate injustice in society. In other words, since jury nullification is an effective means to pursuing justice, which is in itself an objective of the common law, then it would be inconsistent to champion the common law and not jury nullification.

The debate on jury nullification wrestles with the very principles integral to common law. It calls into question how the possible unpredictability of a layman’s input into the judicial process may disrupt the order of precedent and threaten legal certainty. It also pushes one to consider whether stare decisis, or the attainment of justice in accordance with the societal values of the time is the ultimate purpose of the common law. This essay has proven that jury nullification does not threaten the legal notion of precedent, and more importantly, denying jurors the power of conscientious acquittal will undermine the legitimacy of the common law’s goal to dispense justice fairly. Based on the arguments aforementioned, it is clear that common law principles require that juries be told of jury nullification.

Footnotes

1 Segal, T., ‘Common Law’, Investopedia, 29 March 2020, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/common-law.asp, (accessed 10 July 2020)

2  Wikipedia Contributors, ‘Common Law’, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_law, (accessed 10 July 2020)

3  Wikipedia Contributors, ‘Common Law’, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_law, (accessed 10 July 2020)

4 Willers v Joyce and another (in substitution for and in their capacity as executors of Albert Gubay (deceased)) [2016] UKSC 44, https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2016/44.html, (accessed 10 July 2020)

5  Wikipedia Contributors, ‘Common Law’, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_law, (accessed 10 July 2020)

6 Mance, J., Deputy President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, ‘Should the Law Be Certain’ (The Oxford Shrieval lecture given in the University Church of St. Mary The Virgin, Oxford University, 11 October 2011), https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech_111011.pdf, (accessed 10 July 2020)

7 Brooks, T., ‘The Right to Trial by Jury’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, volume 21, number 2, 2004, p. 197-212, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24355195?seq=1, (accessed 10 July 2020)

8 Smith, D., ‘The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform’, Hofstra Law Review, volume 25, issue 2, Winter 1996, p. 380-505, https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1958&context=hlr, (accessed 10 July 2020)

9 Mance, J., Deputy President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, ‘Should the Law Be Certain’ (The Oxford Shrieval lecture given in the University Church of St. Mary The Virgin, Oxford University, 11 October 2011), https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech_111011.pdf, (accessed 10 July 2020)

10 Mance, J., Deputy President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, ‘Should the Law Be Certain’ (The Oxford Shrieval lecture given in the University Church of St. Mary The Virgin, Oxford University, 11 October 2011), https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech_111011.pdf, (accessed 10 July 2020); citing Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln CC [1992] 2 AC 349, 377-379

11 Mance, J., Deputy President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, ‘Should the Law Be Certain’ (The Oxford Shrieval lecture given in the University Church of St. Mary The Virgin, Oxford University, 11 October 2011), https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech_111011.pdf, (accessed 10 July 2020); citing Alderson v Temple (1768) 4 Burr 2235, 2239

12 Smith, D., ‘The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform’, Hofstra Law Review, volume 25, issue 2, Winter 1996, p. 380-505, https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1958&context=hlr, (accessed 10 July 2020)

13 Smith, D., ‘The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform’, Hofstra Law Review, volume 25, issue 2, Winter 1996, p. 380-505, https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1958&context=hlr, (accessed 10 July 2020)

14 Brooks, T., ‘The Right to Trial by Jury’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, volume 21, number 2, 2004, p. 197-212, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24355195?seq=1, (accessed 10 July 2020)

15 Mance, J., Deputy President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, ‘Should the Law Be Certain’ (The Oxford Shrieval lecture given in the University Church of St. Mary The Virgin, Oxford University, 11 October 2011), https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech_111011.pdf, (accessed 10 July 2020); see paragraph 16

16  Robertson G., Queens Counsel, ‘Magna Carta and Jury Trial’, British Library, https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-and-jury- trial, (accessed 10 July 2020)

17  Robertson G., Queens Counsel, ‘Magna Carta and Jury Trial’, British Library, https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-and-jury- trial, (accessed 10 July 2020); Smith, D., ‘The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform’, Hofstra Law Review, volume 25, issue 2, Winter 1996, p. 380-505, https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1958&context=hlr, (accessed 10 July 2020)

18  Robertson G., Queens Counsel, ‘Magna Carta and Jury Trial’, British Library, https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-and-jury- trial, (accessed 10 July 2020)

Bibliography

Brooks, T., ‘The Right to Trial by Jury’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, volume 21, number 2, 2004, p. 197-212, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24355195?seq=1, (accessed 10 July 2020)

Mance, J., Deputy President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, ‘Should the Law Be Certain’ (The Oxford Shrieval lecture given in the University Church of St. Mary The Virgin, Oxford University, 11 October 2011), https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech_111011.pdf, (accessed 10 July 2020)

Robertson G., Queens Counsel, ‘Magna Carta and Jury Trial’, British Library, https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-and-jury-trial, (accessed 10 July 2020)

Segal, T., ‘Common Law’, Investopedia, 29 March 2020, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/common-law.asp, (accessed 10 July 2020)

Smith, D., ‘The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform’, Hofstra Law Review, volume 25, issue 2, Winter 1996, p. 380-505, https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1958&context=hlr, (accessed 10 July 2020)

Wikipedia Contributors, ‘Common Law’, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_law, (accessed 10 July 2020)

Willers v Joyce and another (in substitution for and in their capacity as executors of Albert Gubay (deceased)) [2016] UKSC 44,

https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2016/44.html, (accessed 10 July 2020)

2020年法律二等奖

Why is racial discrimination illegal on employment websites but not on social websites such as Facebook or Tinder?

为什么种族歧视在就业网站上是非法的,而在Facebook或Tinder等社交网站上却不是?

张俊芳,华中书院(学院),新加坡
2020年法律奖第二名 |8.5 分钟阅读

Introduction

The hiring of new employees, and the selection of content to bump up on social websites: both are underpinned by the goal of establishing a “best fit” — between employer and employee, and user and content/profiles suggested respectively. Why is racial discrimination prohibited in the former, while race-based filters and matching algorithms remain common practice in the latter?

It is almost unequivocal today that distinction with regards to race in employment should be condemned. Acts such as the Equality Act in the United Kingdom and Civil Rights Act in the United States disallow employers from requiring racial details that do not relate to one’s ability to perform the role, or to implement policies that disadvantage a certain race. The principle that underpins this is equal opportunities — that only qualifications, ability to do the job and relevant experience should be considered in selecting job candidates (Boyle et al., 2005).

Yet, a very different standard seems to apply on social websites. Of the 25 highest grossing dating apps in the US, 19 requested users to input their race, 11 collected users’ preferred ethnicity in a potential partner, and 17 allowed users to filter others by ethnicity (McMullan, 2019). TikTok uses an algorithm that mimics the physical characteristics of a user’s profile picture in subsequent recommendations, including the colour of one’s hair and skin (Gassam, 2020). Though TikTok’s spokesperson expressed that recommendations are “based on user behavior”, the point remains that racial features are considered to affect the “likeability” of a profile.

In this essay, racial discrimination on employment websites shall be scoped to discriminatory practices during hiring, where race influences the candidate’s job suitability. Racial discrimination on social websites shall refer to acts of collecting and utilising racial information, whether by the user or platform, to create the best match between user preferences and content/profiles suggested. Though other forms of racial discrimination on social websites exist — famously Facebook’s alleged race-based advertisement targeting — the definition above provides the closest parallel to how racial information may be utilised in employment, from which more meaningful comparisons can be made.

This essay shall explain the different standards regarding racial discrimination by making the case for employment and social websites separately.

Racial discrimination and employment

The arguments for why racial discrimination is not justified in employment are as such:

  1. Hiring serves to find the most suitable person to perform a particular job; given that empirical evidence shows that race does not influence an individual's work ability, it is unjustified to allow racial information to sway hiring decisions.

  2. Employment is inextricably tied to standard of living and quality of life. If we accept that everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for a dignified life, no person should be disadvantaged in that pursuit on the basis of race.

Let us first contend with argument (1). The world of work and recruitment is as old as civilisation itself. In ancient China, imperial examinations served to select officials for the state bureaucracy based on merit (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019); the Spartans of ancient Greece were notoriously selective in which young men could enroll in their elite army. Times and contexts have changed, but the rationale underpinning these selection practices have not: to hire personnel with appropriate skills and abilities to meet the needs and requirements of organizations (Kapur, 2018).

That established, there is a plethora of scientific evidence that shows race does not genetically determine intelligence or capabilities. Following the controversial publication The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray in 1994 which found differential IQ scores for different races, the American Psychological Association established an 11-person Task Force to evaluate the book’s conclusions. With regard to the cause of the mean Black–White IQ score difference, the Task Force concluded: “There is certainly no support for a genetic interpretation” (Neisser et al., 1996). In fact, as suggested in 2012 study by Hampshire et. al further, differences in intelligence test scores are driven by “other correlated demographic variables such as socioeconomic status, education level, and motivation.” (Hampshire et. al, 2012) Since race has not been found to influence an individual's capabilities, it is unjustified to allow racial information to sway hiring decisions.

It may be objected that a discussion of social issues addresses cognitive and biological studies to such lengths. However, it is important to recognise that as unthinkable as “biological racism” might be to our modern mind, theories concerning racial differences in intelligence are age-old and antedate empirical studies by thousands of years (Eysenck, 1984). Greek and Roman writers in the centuries preceding and following the birth of Christ had much to say about the weak intellects of “barbarians.” Carolus Linnaeus in his Systema Naturae (1758) ranked the various races by appearance, temperament and intelligence, putting the European man at the top, and the African man invariably at the bottom (‘crafty, slow, foolish’). Thus, it is important to firmly establish that there is no empirical basis for differential performance due to race.

Let us now proceed to argument (2). Standard of living can be defined as “the aspirations of an individual or group for goods and services” (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018) It is undeniable that employment is inextricably linked to standard of living. The outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development recognises in paragraphs 143-157 the linkages among poverty eradication, full and productive employment and decent work for all (United Nations, 2012). The kind of employment opportunities we get (or, as above, the availability of employment in the first place) directly influences the income we receive. This in turn determines the amount of goods and services we can consume. With that established, insofar as we accept the principles enshrined in the UN Declaration of Human Rights that “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family” (United Nations, 1948, art. 21.3), no person should be disadvantaged in that pursuit because of race. Evidently, fairness is of principal significance in recruitment processes (Klug, 2017).

Racial discrimination on social websites

The defence for why racial discrimination is permissible on social websites can be understood to comprise the following arguments:

  1. Racial discrimination on social websites reflects private preferences;

  2. State intervention in private preferences generally occurs only when the gratification of private preferences produces "harm to others”;

  3. There is inadequate evidence that race-based filters and algorithms cause harm to users or the rest of society.

Thus, state non-intervention is justified.

That said, the above argument avails itself to an even more complex question: accepting that these are cases of personal preference, is there a point at which “personal preference” becomes a more problematic matter of prejudice? While the focus of this essay will still be to explain the status quo, I shall argue at the end of this section that this status quo should not persist. While individual preferences can be regarded as a private issue free from external valuation and influence, systematic patterns in such preferences — and the structures that promote and preserve them — hold serious societal implications.

Let us first explain premise (1). Social platforms, particularly mobile dating platforms, represent “one of the only remaining domains in which individuals may feel entitled to express explicit preferences along lines of race and disability” (Hutson et al., 2018). This is because personal preference is definitionally discriminatory: to have any predilection for a quality will leave one person favored, and the other not. How then should we delineate which qualities are socially permissible to favour? If the argument is that immutable characteristics should not be discriminated against, what is the fundamental difference between expressing a preference for a certain height as opposed to a certain race? Furthermore, if we recognise that attraction is the expression of some unconscious inner drive — a preference well outside control and beyond reason (Hutson et al., 2018) — is it still fair to call people out for having predilections that happen to fall on racial lines? There is no definite way to distinguish racial preferences from other non-controversial preferences. Thus, it remains firmly as a private preference.

Now, let us analyse premise (2). This premise is tied to the liberal notion that “the individual is best placed to know what is in his or her interests.” (New, 1999) In the case of social websites, individuals are arguably in the best position to find fulfilling relationships and social content that maximise their own welfare. In fact, as argued by John Stuart Mill in his seminal treatise, On Liberty (1859), if intervention is pursued unnecessarily, “the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place”. Thus, limiting people’s liberty is only justifiable when absolutely necessary — to prevent harm to others. Otherwise, the liberal state grants individuals a great autonomy over how we lead our lives.

There are many examples around us of state intervention in private preference to prevent third-party harm. One may prefer to smoke in public areas, but because this harms others via inhalation of second-hand smoke, the state limits smokers to designated areas. Similarly, though taking drugs may produce sensations of euphoria, drug consumption is highly regulated as it harms an individual’s health, financial situation, relationships with others, which thus has destablising effects on society at large.

This brings us to premise (3). To justify state intervention on race-based filters and algorithms, third-party harm must be proven. Yet, evidence for this does not exist beyond the anecdotal realm. In a Forbes article, African-American teenager Jalaiah Harmon shared how Charli D'Amelio, a popular Caucasian user, was credited for viral dance, the Renegade, though Harmon was the one who started it (Gassam, 2020). Though the experience is sympathetic, it has not been verified that TikTok’s algorithm played a causal role in Harmon’s limited visibility. It is possible that Harmon and D’Amelio’s posts were arbitrarily bumped up or down, and the wrongful accreditation of the Renegade happened to occur along racial lines. Similarly, it is difficult to prove that race-based filtering of potential partners harmed those who have been filtered out, because any such evidence would exist in the realm of the hypothetical.

The three premises above therefore explain why racial discrimination is presently permissible on social websites. That said, this should not remain the case. True, we do not choose whom we find attractive. However, “sexual preferences do not emerge from a psychological or cultural vacuum” (Hutson et al., 2018). Cultural forces inform us on what relationships are acceptable and desirable, and these same cultural forces may find their roots in histories of subjugation and segregation. It is worth keeping in mind that the argument that personal preferences are above racism was the very sort of rhetoric used to defend segregated schools, water fountains, and restaurants for persons of color in the United States through the 1950s and 60s (Bhargava & Bedi, 2020). There is a point at which “personal preference” becomes a problematic matter of prejudice or discrimination, and easy-to-use features filters and algorithms allow users to perpetuate these prejudices without challenge.

Conclusion

Though the hiring process and selection of suggested content on social websites may seem to be parallel processes, closer analysis reveals more differences than similarities. Hiring fundamentally aims to align employer needs with employee capabilities. Since race has no correlation to capabilities, hiring should not be clouded by racial information. Ensuring equal opportunities also ensures no one is disadvantaged in their pursuit of a decent standard of living. Social websites similarly aim to align user interests with content suggested. However, racial information here reflects private preferences, which should be free from external influence except when “harm to others” results. Since there is inadequate evidence that harm is created, state non-intervention is justified.

However, this status quo shouldn’t necessarily remain. Serious issues of racial prejudice can easily masquerade as “personal preference”, whether we are conscious of it or not. Automated race-based filtering features inhibit people from thinking more deeply about the cultural forces which inform their preferences. Grindr, a major dating platform, has pledged to remove its ethnicity filter in the next release of its software in light of the recent #BlackLivesMatter protests. The debate on whether these filters empower or demean racial minorities is still ongoing. However, one thing rings clear: it’s high time we begin questioning the status quo.

Bibliography

Bhargava, V. R., & Bedi, S. (2020, June 13). Are online dating companies swiping left on Black Lives Matter? Thomson Reuters Foundation. https://news.trust.org/item/20200613101926-pk1d7/

Boyle, K., Diène, D., January-Bardill, N., Tomasevski, K., Faundez, J., Parodi, C. T., Bharat, S., Bales, K., Reitz, J., Gächter, A., Zerrougui, L., Sorensen, B., & Pradhan-Malla, S. (2005).

Dimensions of Racism. UN. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/dimensionsracismen.pdf

Gassam, Janice. “Does TikTok Have A Race Problem?” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 14 Apr. 2020, www.forbes.com/sites/janicegassam/2020/04/14/does-tiktok-have-a-race-problem/.

Hampshire, A., Highfield, R. R., Parkin, B. L., & Owen, A. M. (2012). Fractionating Human Intelligence. Neuron, 76(6), 1225–1237. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2012.06.022

Hutson, J. A., Taft, J. G., Barocas, S., & Levy, K. (2018). Debiasing Desire. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, 2(CSCW), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1145/3274342

Kapur, R.. (2018). Recruitment and Selection. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323829919_Recruitment_and_Selection

Klug, Dan. (2017). Recruitment and Selection Handbook for University Staff Positions. Arizona State University. Retrieved July 2, 2020 from https://www.asu.edu/hr/documents/RecruitmentHandbook.pdf

McMullan, T. (2019, February 17). Are the algorithms that power dating apps racially biased? WIRED UK. https://www.wired.co.uk/article/racial-bias-dating-apps

Neisser, U., Boodoo, G., Bouchard, T. J. J., Boykin, A. W., Brody, N., Ceci, S. J., Halpern, D. F., Loehlin, J. C., Perloff, R., Sternberg, R. J., & Urbina, S. (1996). Intelligence: Knowns and unknowns. American Psychologist, 51(2), 77–101. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066x.51.2.77

New, B. (1999). Paternalism and Public Policy. Economics and Philosophy, 15(1), 63–83. https://doi.org/10.1017/s026626710000359x

The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Chinese Examination System.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 8 July 2019, www.britannica.com/topic/Chinese-examination-system.

The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Standard of Living.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 4 Oct. 2018, www.britannica.com/topic/standard-of-living.

United Nations. (2012). Future We Want - Outcome document. Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?menu=1298

United Nations. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

2020年法律一等奖

Does a law that prohibits the selling of sex protects or infringe women's rights?

禁止易的法律是保护还是侵犯妇女的权利?

蔡思瑞,莱佛士书院,新加坡
2020年法律奖得主 |8 分钟阅读

 

“Slavery still exists, but now it applies onto to women and its name in prostitution”, wrote Victor Hugo in Les Misérables. Hugo’s portrayal of Fantine under the archetype of a fallen woman forced into prostitution by the most unfortunate of circumstances cannot be more jarringly different from the empowerment-seeking sex workers seen today, highlighting the wide-ranging nuances associated with commercial sex and its implications on the women in the trade. Yet, would Hugo have supported a law prohibiting the selling of sex for the protection of Fantine’s rights?

As can be seen from the drastic variation in related legal framework across countries, the debate surrounding the regulation of commercial sex is one that is inexplicably linked to morality, human rights and gender roles - and one with no easy answer at that. Before delving into my arguments, I will clarify some key terms and set the scope of discussion: “selling of sex” will be defined as the provision of sexual services in exchange for money or goods, an action in which the prostitute is the doer. A law that prohibits the selling of sex would thus be a law that criminalises and punishes the party providing the sexual services (on top of other parties involved, in most cases), which is most aligned to the prohibitionist model in amongst the four broad models widely referenced by recent literature (Chuang, 2010). While the selling of sex is most definitely not exclusively carried out by women, this essay will limit its discussion as such, given its focus on the implications on women’s rights as well as the relative rarity of male sex work (Brussa, 2004). With these in mind, I argue that a law that prohibits the selling of sex infringes - rather than protects - women’s rights, on the grounds of the validity of the empowerment narrative as well as the limitations of the law in enforcing the rights of vulnerable women in practice.

A key argument proffered by those who believe that prohibiting the selling of sex would protect women’s rights is that prostitution is a violation of human rights in itself, it being a form of oppression against women that is inherently coercive. This is clearly spelt out in the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1950), which states in its preamble that “Prostitution ... (is) incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human person”. It naturally follows that such blatant violation of the most fundamental of rights should not be condoned by the law.

In a similar vein, a further argument in favour of a law prohibiting the selling of sex is that prostitution is the product of structural and institutionalised male dominance, such that the lack of prohibitive legislation would further reinforce and legitimise the patriarchy at the expense of women’s rights and their standing in society. Against the context of long standing patriarchism and the systemic oppression of women (Dobash and Dobash, 1981), sexual commerce perpetuates women’s subordination to men through providing a patriarchal right of access to women’s bodies (Farley, 2005). Women are seen as a mere means to an end, their bodies a mere commodity at the disposal of men seeking sexual satisfaction, only worth the money they receive in exchange for their services. In the absence of a law prohibiting all aspects of the sex trade, such oppression of women is not only allowed to continue, but also institutionally legitimised. This clearly compromises the status of women, infringing their rights to own their bodies and to be counted as equals to the other sex.

While I recognise the validity of the argument that prostitution is harmful to women who had limited agency in entering the trade, a more comprehensive picture would encapsulate a dual reality of empowerment and exploitation (Sagade and Forster, 2019). In the case of the former, prohibition encroaches on the sex worker’s autonomy to free choice of work; for the latter, a law prohibiting the selling of sex is unlikely to be efffective in protecting vulnerable women from the harms of prostitution; it might even work to the opposite effect.

Both of the above arguments in favour of prohibition hinge on the premise that the selling of sex can never be voluntary. They posit that sex workers are the victims of rape and exploitation who lack agency and therefore have no genuine consensual capacity (Tiefenbrun, 2002 and Sullivan, 2007). However, recent developments in the sex positivism movement have surfaced the voices of women who make the rational and voluntary choice to sell sex for an income, to whom prostitution should be seen as legitimate work. At the 2015 Amnesty International Conference, Meg Munoz, a former sex worker, spoke up to advocate for the legitimisation of sex work, stating that escorting served her well, as a source of income and even stability. Similar narratives can be found on the blog ‘Tits and Sass’, on which sex workers contribute entries that seek to celebrate sex worker culture and destigmatise prostitution as immoral and degrading.

One might point out that such activists are a minority who are educated and make hundreds of dollars per hour (Bazelon, 2016), but they do represent authentic and legitimate views of a group of sex workers. For these women, the criminalisation of prostitution is an overly paternalistic move which infringes rights to free choice of work and overall self-determination. Article 23(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states that all should have the right ‘to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment’. In dictating to women that working in prostitution is inherently ‘wrong’, the state is denying them the ability to exercise agency through the negotiation of their sexual autonomy (Sagade and Foster, 2018), drawing the line on what sexual acts are intimate when the decision should have been the individual’s to make, thereby clamping down on their rights to self-determination.

Certainly, this is not to discount the fact that for the majority of female sex workers, selling sex, if a voluntary choice at all, is made as a result of limited alternatives and disadvantaged circumstances. For this group of women, exploitation is an unfortunate reality, seeking “empowerment” in sex work a far flung fantasy. For example, in India, women and children are trafficked for commercial exploitation either by deception or coercion, and some are sold by family members or family friends into sex work, typically in the context of rural poverty, food insecurity and large families (Patel, 2013). Even when direct coercion is not involved, it is common for women to enter prostitution because they are faced with economic insecurity and limited alternatives, choosing this line of work as the “lesser evil”.

In such cases, the harms brought about by prostitution are real and pressing, and the rights of women are inevitably compromised by them being in the sex trade. This, however, does not mean that a law prohibiting the selling of sex will serve to protect their rights; in fact, it is quite the contrary.

First, the argument that prohibiting the selling of sex protects the rights of vulnerable women breaks down when examining how such a law would function in practice. There is little reason to believe that such legislation would be effective in eradicating prostitution; it has long been the case that as long as demand for commercial sex exists, the sex trade will remain, bringing its activities underground and carrying them out illegally. For example, in China, Japan and South Korea - all of which adopt a prohibitionist model - prostitution remains rampant, the sex trade even contributing copious amounts of revenue to the countries’ economies (US Department of State, 2009 and Thompson, 2016).

Furthermore, to charge and punish a woman selling sex can make it more difficult for her to leave the sex trade, further promoting prostitution instead of preventing it (Mullin, 2020). When burdened with a fine, women tend to continue to prostitute themselves in order to pay off the fine. When charged with an offence, a criminal record jeopardises future employability, which forces women to remain in the industry. It is thus clear that merely having a law that prohibits the selling of sex without addressing the root causes of prostitution is largely ineffective in removing the existence of such exchanges; in actual practice, such a law fails to protect women from the harms associated with selling sex, thereby invalidating the above claims that prohibition protects women’s rights.

Not only does a law prohibiting the selling of sex stop short of curbing prostitution and the harms that come with it, it is also likely to further exacerbate the vulnerability of women in the sex trade. When the status of women selling sex is unlawful, they are marginalised, being viewed as criminals (Vance, 2011) and become susceptible to sexual abuse and violence from clients, brothel owners and the police. In Cambodia, for example, law enforcers have used the law on the Suppression of Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation to exploit and abuse sex workers, whose statuses are unlawful due to the prohibitionist legislation. In some cases, sex workers have been forced to pay bribes to avoid arrest or have been raped by officers after being detained (Mullin, 2020).

For women to whom simply exiting the trade is not a viable option, a prohibitive law also means that they would be denied protection by the law in areas such as their safety, health and children, infringing on these basic rights. This leaves them worse off than they would have been otherwise; not only do they continue to be exploited sexually (now without the protection of labour law), they are also subject to penalisation on all fronts. For instance, their children could be expelled from school, and they could find themselves unable to find lawful accommodation. Stigma, poverty, and exclusion from legal social services would also increase their vulnerability to HIV infection. Without tackling the root of the problem - the conditions under which women resort to prostitution in the first place - assigning them an unlawful status brings more harm than good where their rights are concerned.

Even if the law were an effective deterrent such that women would be incentivised to leave the trade as a result, it does not necessarily follow that they would then have fully escaped the wrath of sexual exploitation and rights would be better protected henceforth. Given the fact that vulnerable women are already in disadvantaged positions with limited choices for work, pushing them out of sex work might lead to even more detrimental circumstances. For instance, Indian sex workers cited in interviews that their former occupations - typically domestic service, construction or factory work - were often exploitative and coercive, including expectations of sexual exchanges for work assignments (Sahni & Shankar, 2013). Should they return to these in place of sex work, they would still be exploited sexually, but this time without remuneration, legal protection or control over their sexual exchanges. In this case, their human rights and standing in society compared to men is further jeopardised, which shows that even in the unlikely event that the legal prohibition of the selling of sex succeeds in reducing prostitution, systemic threats to women’s rights remain.

To conclude, in acknowledging the legitimacy of both the empowerment and exploitation narratives, it is clear that at best, legislation against the selling of sex fails to protect women’s rights; at worst, it further infringes them. In order to protect the rights of the vulnerable women in the sex trade, an abolitionist framework - in which buyers and other participants in the sex trade are criminalised but not the women themselves - might be a better alternative to full prohibition. This must also be accompanied by efforts outside the legal sphere to tackle the problem in more fundamental ways, such as lifting women out of socially and economically vulnerable positions so that they do not have to resort to selling sex for money in the first place.

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