2019年心理学奖得主

What are the most important recently-acquired insights from neuroscience which have yet to be widely applied to education?

最近从神经科学中获得的最重要的见解是什么,尚未广泛应用于教育?

周子凯,小石中学,中国
2019年心理学奖得主|6 分钟阅读

[1] Memories can be cruel. As a girl is about to raise her hand in class, the prior experience of being discouraged by a teacher emerges in her mind, the scene floating before her eyes, classmates’ voices rebounding inside of her ears, and she can feel the blush on her cheeks. People tend to try their best to put behind unpleasant memories, which, unfortunately, are often the more rememberable ones. To forget, one might think the best way is “not to remember." However, contrary to previously held beliefs, a team of neuroscientists led by Tracy Wang discovered that intentional forgetting was most successful when there was moderate activation of the material to be forgotten in relevant cerebral regions. In this essay, I will discuss how forgetting is undervalued in conventional pedagogies and explain why I believe findings from Wang's study have profound implications for helping students realise their best potential in classrooms.

[2] Memorization has long been incorporated into pedagogies around the world. Memorising vocabulary, mathematical theorems, or physics laws often aids students in achieving high test scores, which usually serves as an important metric for measuring student performance. In some Asian countries, increased emphasis on test scores means more memorisation tasks for students, which raises concerns about equating the memorisation of knowledge with learning. Various strategies seeking to enhance memorisation have been proposed, including sleep regulation, physical exercises, and offering rewards (Ribeiro, 2014; Trudeau, 2008; Mitry, 2001).

[3] Forgetting, on the other hand, is seldom associated with pedagogies. Many of us are frustrated with forgetting, when we fail to remember the facts for a big test or miss the deadline of an essay submission. However, many learning science theories have proposed that students are constantly affected by their learning environment, especially by negative memories from the past. Research has also shown that students benefit greatly from being able to forget unwanted memories. Bear and Malenka (1994), for instance, discovered that when acting on the same item, memorisation and forgetting are two different processes, which rely on long-term potentiation (LTP) and long-term depression (LTD) respectively; however, when directed at different items, LTD does facilitate LTP. McFarlane and Humphreys (2012) took their findings a step further and found that the removal of unwanted information from students' brain contributed to a better memorisation of more important information.

[4] Much of our forgetting is unconscious, unintentional forgetting, which is passive and irresistible (Maxcey, 2019). This type of forgetting, as Frankland et al., (2013) suggested, is a natural process that happens in the brain to clear up space. Hippocampus, the brain region associated with memorisation, draws connections between neurons and circuits physically and chemically (Fell, 2001). Continuously exposed to incoming information, the hippocampus, even when we are sleeping, is busy coupling and decoupling neurons. However, not all information is worthy of the hippocampus' attention — unimportant information is either filtered or overlooked — which leads to forgetting.

[5] However, as discussed earlier, there are circumstances where we want to be able to forget something at will, be it an embarrassing incident, or previous failure. Whether the intention to forget affects our ability to forget has long intrigued both psychologists and neuroscientists. One of the earliest available researches exploring intentional forgetting was conducted by Lehman and Bovasso in 1993, in which they explored intentional forgetting in children. Two mechanisms for intentional forgetting have since then been proposed: direct suppression and thought substitution. In 2005, a team led by PT Hertel discovered that the mingling of the target neuron with other signals led to successful forgetting (Hertel, 2005). This result was in line with the thought substitution hypothesis, which states that forgetting is achieved when alternative memories, rather than unwanted memories, are activated. The direct suppression hypothesis, on the other hand, states that forgetting is successful when unwanted memories are inhibited. van Schie et al. (2012) found evidence for this resorting to the Think/No-think paradigm. When we are asked to forget something, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in our brain sends inhibitory signals to the hippocampus and prevent memory encoding in this brain region. Both the direct suppression and thought substitution hypotheses imply that in order to forget an unwanted memory, one needs to turn away from engaging with it.

[6] A recent study conducted by Tracy Wang and her colleagues shed new light on the mechanisms of intentional forgetting. The team recruited twenty men and women to view a set of 200 images of faces and scenes on the screen. Next to the images were commands of either “TBF (to-be-forgotten)” or “TBR (to-be-remembered)”. While participants studied the images, the experimenter used fMRI to observe the activities of their ventral temporal cortex and sensory cortex. After this visual input, the participants are asked to recall the images they just saw. The main results of this study were twofold. First, the TBF commands were associated with enhanced brain activity. Second, participants were most successful at forgetting the TBF images when there was moderate, not too high or too low, brain activity when studying the images. As concluded by Wang et al., (2019): "An increase in attentional focus on TBF items during a deliberate forgetting attempt increases their memory activation, which in turn, facilitates their forgetting." Although it is unclear what strategy participants used — thought substitution, direct suppression, or both — to forget the items, contrary to previous assumptions, moderate processing of to-be-forgotten memories improves rather than inhibits the forgetting of these memories.

[7] These findings have profound implications for education. Educators first need to understand the impact of negative memories from the past on student performance. They also need to incorporate methods that teach students how to navigate these negative memories through their learning experience. To minimise the impacts of negative memories, educators should help students learn to properly engage with their own memories rather than suppress or avoid them. One such practice is mindfulness, an approach by which students learn to observe their own thoughts and memories without trying to judge, analyse or suppress them (Valentine, 2019). Moderate engagement with unwanted memories might, in turn, improve students' ability to forget about those memories.

[8] Practicing engaging with memories has benefits beyond just preventing students from being affected by unwanted memories. Learning to engage with one's memories improves people's attentional abilities. Malinowski (2013), for instance, discovered that mindfulness helps refine people's ability to allocate attention to information at the onset of input processing, and improves people's capacity for attention control.

[9] Furthermore, learning to engage with one's memories also improves people's abilities to cope with their emotions. When a student frequently recalls a stressful event, thereby starting to feel anxious or depressed, the pituitary gland - under the command from the hypothalamus - starts to stimulate the adrenal glands in his or her body, thus propelling the secretion of an excessive amount of cortisol. An excess amount of cortisol can compromise the student's immune system, rendering his or her more susceptible to diseases (Hoehn, 2010). Both the pain and possible sicknesses can give rise to a higher stress level, forcing the brain commanding the system to secrete a greater amount of cortisol. This way, the body and the brain mutually and negatively feedback to each other. With some emotional events removed from the brain, this feedback cycle will less likely be initiated - the way in which intentional forgetting benefits students in terms of their memorisation abilities and physical health. With the coordination between body and mind, the emotional state of students – during their studies – will be more stabilised and thus beneficial.

[10] One may misunderstand the significance of forgetting as only limited to prevent every negative emotion such as awkwardness, which is an absolute understatement. With a tremendous number of people joking that they are “depressed,” the severity of depression may not be overlooked. A recent study discovered that people with depressive tendency are more likely to recall negative experiences in the past (Xie et al., 2018). With some 350 million people across the globe suffering from this illness, according to a 2018 survey, depression is undoubtedly influencing the world population immensely (Licinio et al., 2018). Negative memories, both the cause and the symptom of depression, constitute a vicious cycle so malevolent that harms the hippocampal function and can even drive people suicide (Beck, 2009). Closely related is PTSD, or post-traumatic stress disorder, which are mostly caused by the experiences of violence, rape, and war, which give rise to a frequent and morbid recall of these memories (Yehuda, 2002). In the aspect of forgetting unwanted or sometimes detrimental memories, the strategies to undermine or divert relevant brain circuits may be of use by breaking the thorny cycle. Incorporating the skill of “how to forget” in education will to a large extent prevent the aggravation of memory-related psychological syndromes like depression and PTSD, reducing the hospitality fee, suicide rate, and social turbulence. Therefore, if one takes a more in-depth view, “forgetting” becomes even more crucial to individuals and societies.

[11]Integrating materials from psychology and neuroscience, I have demonstrated that forgetting can be an important learning strategy for students, who are under the constant influence of memories from their experience. Tracy et al., (2019) showed that forgetting is not a “laissez-faire” process — the intention to forget increases processing of the to-be-forgotten material, and contributes to its successful forgetting. Given this newly acquired insight about how forgetting works, educators shall develop strategies to help students better engage with their memories, and forget them when in need. With comprehensive and appropriate applications of the technique of intentional forgetting, we are expected to see further socio-economical benefits, as educational institutes are the reproduction of current, and hopefully future, society.
Author's Note

Though there is still a no small distance from my essay’s word account to the word limit of a John Locke Competition essay, I have ordered all the information I see as crucial in this paper. However, that is not to say that this essay is comprehensive or even almost comprehensive. Psychology and education are two areas of study that worth one to devote his or her life to pursue, so broad that an essay can never cover. So much so, what I have done is pitching a small corner in and trying to work out the most practical and potential application of a neuroscience insight with my effort.

Bibliography

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2020年心理学奖三等奖

How can we resist the tendency to believe what is evolutionarily adaptive at the expense of truth? And would it increase or diminish human flourishing to do so?

我们如何才能抵制以牺牲真理为代价来相信进化适应性的倾向?这样做会增加还是减少人类的繁荣?

杰西卡·娜,因特莱克高中,美国
2020年心理学奖三等奖 |8 分钟阅读

Humans have a natural tendency to process information in a way that saves time and minimizes cognitive efforts. We categorize things we observe into our existing knowledge, better remember what we have seen more recently, or are quicker to identify information that is consistent with our beliefs. While these patterns of thinking, referred to as heuristics, help us quickly make sense of the world and make expedited decisions, they often come at the expense of the truth. Given that humans have evolved to use heuristics in everyday decisions, how can we resist such “hard-wired” tendencies, especially when using heuristics may lead to faulty conclusions? In this essay, I will first demonstrate how heuristics can result in inaccuracies despite their evolutionary benefits, using stereotypes as an example to illustrate the negative implications of heuristics. Based on my analysis of the sources of biases in heuristic thinking, I propose ways in which we can intervene to resist this tendency of stereotyping others. Finally, I will discuss how such interventions can promote human flourishing.

Heuristics are evolutionarily adaptive strategies that enable humans to systematically process information and make decisions quickly (Haselton et al., 2015). We are most likely to rely on heuristics when we face a situation that affords limited time or information, as heuristics “reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p.1124). From an evolutionary standpoint, using such mental shortcuts is particularly useful when one experiences a threat to one’s safety, as the cost of engaging in a slower and more complex reasoning outweighs the potential benefit of enhanced accuracy (Arkes 1991). In a study that induced participants to feel an ambient physical threat by lowering the light level of the room, participants showed a stronger belief than those in the control condition that outgroup men were violent, displaying the use of heuristics that associate outgroups with a greater risk (Schaller et al., 2003). This example shows that heuristic thinking is a deeply ingrained human tendency that gets activated even by the subtle cue of the environment.

Although heuristic thinking is useful under limited time and resources, it can also lead to systematic inaccuracies in our judgments or decisions. When people use a representativeness heuristic, they make automatic associations between the entity and the features of its categories based on a previously formed subjective impression, regardless of the objective truth (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). However, this can lead to erroneous overgeneralization, as these associations are often ignoring the individual characteristics of the entity in question. Stereotyping, a tendency to categorize individuals into groups and develop beliefs about them based on the group membership (Powell et al., 2002), is a clear example of how using a representativeness heuristic can lead to inaccurate beliefs about an individual. For example, a study conducted prior to the 2008 election found that participants thought of Obama as “less American” than British prime minister Tony Blair (Devos & Ma, 2013). Being White prototypically represents American-ness, and therefore, people categorized Obama based on the representativeness of his race rather than his true national identity. Like this example, even if we know the target in question, the power of heuristics is strong enough to influence our belief about others.

As the by-products of heuristic thinking, stereotypes negatively impact individuals on wide- ranging domains. When an individual becomes aware of the negative stereotypes about their social group, they feel anxious about confirming the stereotype (Steele & Aronson, 1995). The stress resulting from such “stereotype threat” depletes the person’s cognitive resources and impairs performance. A process like this affects how one perceives their own abilities even when the stereotype does not apply to them. As such, by engaging in heuristic thinking that generates stereotypes, people may end up stigmatizing others and creating a vicious cycle of letting the stereotypes become self-fulfilled. Then, how can we resist the urge to form erroneous beliefs about others based on heuristics, which seems hardwired and difficult to control?

One way to reduce automatic stereotyping based on heuristics is to have more frequent and high- quality interactions with members of a group that one has limited experience with. “Contact hypothesis” suggests that close interactions between majority and minority members can lead to reduced stereotyping and prejudice (Allport et al., 1954). Through learning more about outgroup members and forming relationships with them on a deeper level, people can de-categorize outgroup members and see them as individuals, focusing on their unique characteristics rather than automatically ascribing stereotypic characteristics to them (Gaertner et al., 1993). Increased interactions with outgroup members also reduce anxiety about the intergroup contact over time (Stephan & Stephan, 1985; Blascovich et al., 2001). As people are more likely to use heuristics when their attentional resources are constrained by the situation (Pohl et al., 2013), reduced anxiety could also lower the likelihood of using heuristics to form quick beliefs about outgroup members.

Also, exposing people to counter-stereotypical examples can reduce the bias that may result from using erroneous heuristics. Frequent interactions with diverse groups of people would increase the chance of encountering a person who does not conform to socially-constructed stereotypes, thus changing what is thought of as “representative” of a group in one’s mind. Research by Dasgupta and Asgari (2004), which examined the stereotypic beliefs about one’s own social group, provides compelling evidence that even a brief exposure to a counter-stereotypic exemplar can impact people’s automatic beliefs. In this study, female students saw pictures or read paragraph-long descriptions of famous women in positions of power (e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, U.S. Supreme Court Justice), which is counter to the common stereotype that associates women with subordinate roles or less power. After seeing or reading about women in power, participants were quicker to associate women with leadership compared to those who saw control stimuli. The result was replicated by a year-long study that examined the longer-term effects of attending a college with a greater proportion of female leadership. Compared to the ones who attended a coeducational college, those who attended a women’s college were less likely to show automatic stereotypic beliefs about women. This effect was explained by how frequently one was exposed to female leaders (i.e., female faculty).

Another way to prevent people from forming inaccurate beliefs based on stereotypes is to interrupt automatic, heuristic thinking and to facilitate slower reasoning that can systematically correct one’s biases (Kahneman, 2011). When the circumstance affords one to use mental shortcuts, biases can creep in. This happens often in the evaluation process within organizations, but simple measures that disrupt the automatic process of heuristic thinking can prevent people from reaching these biased conclusions. For example, in one resume screening study, it was found that portfolios with the same qualification levels were four to six times more likely to get rejected when they had ethnic minority names (e.g., Arab names) as compared to ethnic majority names (e.g., Dutch names) (Derous & Ryan, 2012). However, anonymizing resumes and thus removing the cues that activate heuristic thinking has

been shown to reduce such biases (e.g., Åslund & Skans, 2012; Kang et al., 2016). Ambiguous evaluation criteria also invite biased evaluations based on the use of stereotypes instead of objective evidence of individual traits. Stanford researchers found that the performance reviews at a company with little evaluation guidelines showed a gendered pattern in the criteria used: women were criticized for being too aggressive, and men for being too soft (Mackenzie et al., 2019). When the researchers created a checklist to help managers use criteria consistently and reference specific data to base their evaluations, gender gaps in ratings were reduced.

Would resisting a tendency to use heuristics and stereotype others help human flourishing? A large volume of literature suggests so. One direct evidence comes from the results of multiple studies that used the “jigsaw classroom” paradigm (e.g., Blaney et al., 1977; Lucker et al., 1977; Aronson et al., 1978). These studies were designed based on the contact hypothesis in an effort to resolve the racial

tensions across the U.S. in the 1970s. In the “jigsaw classroom,” a diverse group of students were instructed to learn from each other and cooperate on tasks that required interdependence. Such close and respectful intergroup interactions resulted in a remarkable decrease in negative ethnic stereotypes (Blaney et al., 1977; Geffner, 1978). Coupled with the reduction in stereotypes, students in the jigsaw classroom showed better academic performance, greater liking of school, and higher self-esteem than students in traditional classrooms. In particular, minority students showed a significant improvement in their performance, which effectively narrowed the achievement gap between White and racial minority students (Lucker et al., 1977).

Benefits of reduced biases and stereotyping are not only apparent in individuals who are the targets of stereotyping, but also those who engage in the act of stereotyping. A study by Prati and colleagues (2015) found that a thought exercise to think about a gender counter-stereotype led participants to display less dehumanization of unrelated outgroups such as asylum seekers and the homeless. In other words, the intervention targeting stereotypes not only changed participants’ beliefs about the group in question, but also shifted their views on unrelated groups. Importantly, this effect was explained by the reduced reliance on heuristics. The finding suggests that interrupting heuristic thinking can enhance cognitive flexibility in individuals by helping them adjust their prejudiced beliefs about a wide range of social groups. Reduced stereotyping also opens individuals up to more diverse perspectives that enable them to think more innovatively and attain higher-quality solutions (Hoffman & Maier, 1961). These positive outcomes of the reduced biases are shown to lead to measurable business outcomes. A study by the Boston Consulting Group found that companies with more diverse leadership teams reported higher revenue and “earnings before interest and taxes” (EBIT) margins (Lorenzo et al., 2018). As such, reduced stereotyping, or the environment that provides opportunities for reducing stereotypes through intergroup contact, contributes to a greater flourishing of individuals and work groups.

Without a doubt, heuristic thinking is an evolutionarily adaptive tendency that helps humans navigate the world under limited time and resources. However, it is important to notice that it often leads humans to inaccurate beliefs about others as illustrated by the examples of stereotyping. Based on the empirical evidence from social psychology, I proposed various ways that can help people resist the natural tendency to rely on heuristics and stereotypes. While we should continue using heuristics under situational constraints, we should take a more analytic approach and remove possible biases in our thinking when we can afford time and cognitive efforts. Taking this balanced approach will have far- reaching positive implications for individuals and society.

Humans are continuously evolving beings. If we remind ourselves that slowing down at the right moment and checking our own biases can better serve others and ourselves, our beliefs about the world will gradually shift closer to the “true” state of the world, making the society a more fair and just place than before.

Bibliography

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Derous, E., & Ryan, A. M. (2012). Documenting the adverse impact of resume screening: Degree of ethnic identification matters. International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 20(4), 464-474.

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2020年心理学奖二等奖

According to evolutionary psychology, we are evolved to believe what is useful, whether or not what is useful is also what is true. How can we resist the tendency to believe what is evolutionarily adaptive at the expense of truth? And would it increase or diminish human flourishing to do so?

根据进化心理学,我们进化到相信什么是有用的,无论有用的东西是否也是真实的。我们如何才能抵制以牺牲真理为代价来相信进化适应性的倾向?这样做会增加还是减少人类的繁荣?

亨利·巴克,费尔斯特德学校,英国

2020年心理学奖二等奖|8 分钟阅读

Evolutionary psychologists believe that both genetic and cultural traits have co-evolved to promote Darwinian fitness. This process of natural selection has created cognitive biases that leave us susceptible to a number of false beliefs, which may compromise our ability to pursue our own personal goals. As Nesse states, “Natural selection doesn’t give a fig for our happiness,” (1999, p.433). Indeed, some have argued that humans are mere survival machines - passive vessels designed to fulfil the goals of selfish genes and memes.[1] Against this, however, the interests of the so-called vehicles and replicators often coincide; whilst evolutionarily adaptive biases that appear to impede rational decision-making may themselves act to promote human flourishing. Moreover, where personal goals are found to diverge from those of our genes or memes, we can actively employ conscious analytical thought processes to override automatic behaviours, including using surrogates as a proxy for future emotions to circumvent the systematic errors inherent in the process of prospection. However, we must first ensure that the tools we are using to evaluate our options, have themselves been reflectively acquired.

Examples of automatic cognitive functioning that make evolutionary sense, but may not be rational (utility maximising) today, include our preference for sweetness and disgust at facial disfigurement.[2] Perhaps the most pernicious influence of natural selection processes on human flourishing, however, is the widespread acceptance of the meme that happiness is derived from economic success. Generating a desire to compete for resources that enhance socio-economic status and increase the chances of reproduction, this belief has become a mainstay of cultural wisdom, because it has the essential attribute of a super-replicating biological gene: it promotes its own means of transmission. Societies in which individuals strive for economic success flourish, and flourishing societies provide the means by which beliefs can propagate.

A multitude of evidence exists, however, that refutes this belief. Neuroscientific investigations into the mid-brain dopamine circuits have revealed that there is a difference between wanting and liking;[3] whilst research by social scientists suggests that individuals consistently overestimate the effect acquisitions will have on their wellbeing.[4] Such studies typically conclude that failure to account for our evolutionarily adaptive ability to habituate to new circumstances, means that seeking happiness through the acquisition of material goods is akin to running on an hedonic treadmill.[5] Rather than flourishing, this belief often leaves us anxious and dissatisfied; as Schopenhauer states, “Wealth is like seawater, the more we drink, the thirstier we become,” (Auweele, 2016, p.98).

In order to resist untruths, it is necessary to understand the cognitive processes that engender them; in particular, the evolutionarily adaptive biases inherent in the process of prospection. These include our tendency to be unduly influenced by memories of unusual or extreme experiences and to give more weight to final outcomes than to the overall level of satisfaction derived, because our brain, having limited storage, chooses which information to retain and typically prioritises that which is most useful. Similarly, errors in affective forecasting arise from a proclivity to view the future through the lens of the present. Although this prioritisation of reality over imagination keeps us safe,[6] it compromises our ability to take into account the effect of psychological adaptation on future feelings, leaving us prone to systematic decision-making errors, such as those arising from the endowment effect[7] and anchoring and adjustment biases.[8]

Not only do heuristics and biases foster the generation of false beliefs, but they also make it harder for us to employ methods that might be useful in resisting such untruths. For example, confirmation bias[9] may be evolutionarily adaptive, since it promotes a healthy degree of optimism in our decision-making abilities and forms a key part of the psychological immune system,[10] but by affecting our perception of experiences, it impedes our ability to learn from them. Similarly, the availability bias[11] acts to reinforce cultural wisdom, by compromising our ability to scrutinise the efficacy of our desires. An example of this is the persistence of the belief that reproduction is advantageous. Present in all societies, the cultural wisdom that children are expedient is refuted by evidence of actual satisfaction levels experienced by parents in wealthy countries.[12] However, the brain’s fixation with endings encourages women to repeat the experience of childbirth, whilst its tendency to prioritise the storage of unusual experiences, explains why experienced parents continue to extol the virtues of parenting, as memories of birthday parties and graduation ceremonies overwrite those concerning the mundanities of childcare. This, in turn, feeds into the biases of confirmation and availability, reinforcing the belief that reproduction is advantageous.

However, although humans may be predisposed to execute algorithms that champion reproductive fitness, it is possible to resist reflexive tendencies by consciously employing analytical thought processes to override automatic brain functioning, i.e. to use System 2 thinking to override System 1.[13] In the case of our penchant to strive for economic success, this could involve using evidence that we habituate to material acquisitions, to encourage us to consciously divert our efforts towards pursuits that generate sustainable increases in wellbeing, such as becoming more socially embedded or prioritising the actualization of non-positional goods[14] over the generation of wealth.[15] The knowledge required for System 2 thinking could be provided by the use of a surrogate, as research suggests that using the feelings of people actually experiencing the outcomes being considered as a proxy for our own future emotions, circumvents the cognitive biases inherent in the process of prospection.[16]

One example of how conscious analytical thought can be used to modify automatic impulses is the use of contraception: behaviour stimulated by our evolutionarily adaptive tendency to find sex pleasurable, is moderated by the rational thinking that raising children is not. However, it is often very difficult to rationally scrutinize the efficacy of behaviours endorsed by cultural wisdom. Not only is our ability to select options that would maximise personal utility compromised by a number of evolutionarily adaptive and mutually reinforcing heuristics and biases,[17] but the memes themselves often include elements that are resistant to scrutiny[18] and our intellectual tools of evaluation sometimes invoke rules that have been unreflectively acquired and which act in the interest of memes.[19] Thus although it is possible to consciously apply analytical thought processes to counteract any sphexish[20] tendencies that do not directly serve our own personal interests, it is first necessary to actively evaluate our memes. In particular, we must intellectually scrutinize our cultural beliefs logically and/or empirically, by subjecting them to a range of efficacy tests, (such as the falsifiability and preference consistency criteria), to ensure they specifically code our own personal interests, rather than those of our genes or memes.[21]

Assuming, however, that we are able to install the necessary mindware[22] to execute the somewhat Neurathian process[23] of meme evaluation, it is not necessarily certain that this would enhance human flourishing. For example, whilst it may be true that, in wealthier countries, personal interests may be better served by rejecting the belief that economic success fosters happiness, the universal rejection of this belief could shatter the social fabric. As Adam Smith explained, it is only through the belief that the production of wealth brings happiness, that individuals do enough to sustain their economies.[24] Similarly, we must believe that children bring happiness, as to hold the opposite view could lead to our own extinction.[25] Thus, if the preservation of social systems is a necessary condition for human flourishing, beliefs that disguise activity that is good for society, as behaviour that is beneficial to the individual, are not actually false.

Moreover, if human flourishing is defined as the experience of eudaemonia,[26] then the pursuit of goals that benefit society is itself a source of wellbeing. The concepts of symbolic utility[27], “Authentic Happiness”, (Seligman, 2011) and ethical preferences all support this virtue hypothesis theory[28] that human flourishing depends not only on the freedom to strive for individual goals, but also on acceptance within our community. As Haidt states, “we are not mere apes,…..we are also part bee,” (2006, p.235); or to paraphrase John Stuart Mill, no-one wants to be a satisfied pig.[29] Thus if we resist beliefs that are socially useful, choosing instead to indulge in behaviour that is perceived as selfish, it may negatively impact upon our ability to flourish. (Against this, however, some may argue that, given the present Climate Emergency, evolutionary adaptations that may have been useful in the past, such as the pursuit of economic growth, may no longer be evolutionarily adaptive).

Finally, overriding our automatic system to resist untruths may adversely affect human flourishing, because the cognitive biases that foster the false beliefs themselves often serve to promote wellbeing. For example, studies reveal that we derive a great deal of pleasure from imagining the future, even if our predictions turn out wrong.[30] Additionally, the availability bias, combined with the fact that we spend more time thinking about success than failure,[31] means that we enjoy an overly optimistic view of the future both in relation to our peers and our current circumstances.[32] This sense of optimism promotes human flourishing even in the face of adversity, particularly since it is sustained, and may even increase, in response to negative external stimuli.[33]

Prospection also gives rise to a feeling of control, in itself a fundamental human need;[34] and whilst this may be illusory, numerous studies illustrate that effectance motivation[35], real or otherwise, is a significant positive contributor to mental health.[36] In addition to this, although our peculiar ability to imagine a future is inextricably linked to feelings of fear and anxiety, even the experience of these negative emotions has been found to confer considerable benefits. For example, the anticipation of harm not only motivates us to try to preclude harmful situations without first having to experience the trauma, but it also reduces the emotional impact of harm.[37]

Similarly, although retrospection may be more fabrication than information retrieval, we derive great comfort from our memories. In the same way, although confirmation bias may compromise our ability to learn from experience, it enables us to change our view of situations we cannot change and, hence, is an important contributor to feelings of wellbeing, whether or not we are, actually, flourishing.[38] Finally, whilst the overestimation of our own uniqueness may cause us to reject the use of a surrogate as a proxy for our own future feelings, studies show that belief in our individuality is a great motivator, it raises self-esteem and we cherish our uniqueness.[39]

Overall, therefore, although it is true that genes and memes have co-evolved to promote reproductive fitness and that this process of natural selection has created a number of cognitive biases that make us vulnerable to false beliefs, it does not mean that we are hostage to our genes and memes, nor that our ability to flourish is necessarily diminished. We are both selfish and hive creatures, thus goals that appear to champion societal needs may also serve our own self-interest. Not only this, but whilst it may be argued that humans need contact with reality to genuinely flourish,[40] most would accept that some cognitive biases, such as those that enable us to reframe situations that we cannot change, are themselves a source of wellbeing. That is not to say, however, that we should always conflate our own interests with those of our genes/memes; and where a conflict of goals is discovered, conscious analytical thought processes should be actively employed to override automatic tendencies. Moreover, in deciding our preferences, we must first be careful to scrutinise our beliefs, ensuring they pass selective tests of efficacy and directly code our personal interests rather than simply ensuring their own successful propagation, as only then can we be sure that we not just reproductively fit, but also flourishing.

Footnotes

1 Dawkins deliberately employed pejorative terms such as survival machine, replicators and vehicle in The Selfish Gene, (1976), to encourage the reassessment of Natural Selection.

2 The evolutionary adaptation to favour sweet food is probably shaped by the fact that the most nutritious fruit are often those with the highest sugar content. For a discussion on how beauty is often used as a proxy for reproductive fitness, see Buss, (1989) and Langlois et al., (2000).

3 For a review of some of these experiments see, Nettle, (2009, chapter 5).

4 For evidence of the overprediction of the impact of increased material wealth, see Lowenstein & Schkade, in Kahneman, Diener & Schwarz, (2003, p85-108); and Brickman et al., (1978).

5 The term hedonic treadmill was first used by Brickman and Campbell, in M. H. Appley, ed., (1971, p.287-302). A study clearly demonstrating the hedonic treadmill effect can be found in Easterlin, (2003).

6 For example, it prevents us from drinking engine oil, if we happen to be thinking about coffee.

7 The endowment effect is a tendency for individuals to overestimate the impact of a loss. For evidence of how this impacts decision-making, see Kahneman, et al. (1990, 1991).

8 The anchoring and adjustment bias is based on the premise that individuals estimate future values by starting at an initial, (often random), value, (the Anchor) and then adjust their guess. A bias exists, because research suggests that the adjustments will always be insufficient. See Tversky & Kahneman, (1974).

9 The confirmation bias suggests that individuals scrutinise sources that support their view less critically than those that oppose it; similarly, less evidence is required to endorse a strongly held belief than is needed to reject it. For evidence of the effect of confirmation bias, see Frey & Stahlberg, (1986); Holton & Pyszczynski, (1989); Ehrlich et al., (1957).

10 Gilbert uses the term psychological immune system to refer to processes that “defend the mind against unhappiness in much the same way that the physical immune system defends the body against illness”, (2006, p.177). For an overview of other psychologists’ discussions on psychological defence mechanisms, see Paulhaus, Fridhandler & Hayes, in Hogan et al., ed., (1997, p543-79).

11 The availability bias suggests that people are more likely to believe something is true, if they can easily recall an instance of it. For more detail, see Tversky and Kahneman, (1973, 1974).

12 A number of studies have revealed that marital satisfaction levels fall significantly following the birth of the first child and do not return to even close to their original levels until the youngest child leaves home. See Walker, in Chester et al., (1977, p127-129); D. G. Myers, (1992); and Kahneman et al., (2004).

13 The idea of the mind being composed of a number of different systems that can conflict with each other has a long history, often described through the use of vivid metaphors. Plato, for example, described thinking in terms of a charioteer commanding two horses, see Cooper, (1997, Phaedrus 253d); Buddha characterises the mind in terms of the taming of a wild elephant, see Mascaro, (1973, verse 326); Kant portrayed human nature as being part animal and part rational, (1959/1785) and Freud conceived the mind as being composed of the id, ego and superego, (Freud & Freud, 1995/1900). The terms System 1 and System 2 were first used by Keith Stanovich and Richard West, (2000), but have recently been popularised by Daniel Kahneman in his international bestseller, Thinking Fast and Slow. System 1 refers to automatic brain functioning, which can be contrasted with System 2 thinking that “allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations”. See Kahneman, (2012, p.20).

14 Frank makes the distinction between positional goods, (valued because they increase social status, such as cars and houses), and non-positional goods, (valued for their own sake rather than through comparison with what other people own, such as health, wisdom and the quality of the environment), (2014).

15 Exploring these avenues may be more beneficial in terms of increasing subjective wellbeing, once the threshold to remove finances as a stressor has been reached. In the UK, this figure has been estimated to be around £43,000 p.a. per family, Dolan, (2015). The specific level, however, has been found to vary with profession. For example, clergy require only £20,000 p.a., whilst those in the legal profession need significantly more, Evans et al., (2015).

16 Biases inherent in the process of prospection include the tendency to subconsciously fill in missing details when imagining future events, the proclivity to view the future through the lens of the present and the failure to incorporate the psychological immune system’s ability to rationalise a loss. For a comprehensive overview of these biases and the difficulties of affective forecasting, see Gilbert, (2006). See also, Ligneau-Herve & Mullet, (2005); Dunning, et al., (1990) and Vallone et al., (1990).

17 An obvious example here is the confirmation bias, however, cognitive biases also make us predisposed to reject the use of information from surrogates. For example, despite evidence that the satisfaction levels of someone actually experiencing the outcome being considered is a good proxy for our own future feelings, we are apt to disregard the opinions of others, because we have evolved to attend to and search for differences between ourselves and other people, resulting in a tendency to overestimate both the strangeness of others and our own individuality. Although a heightened sensitivity to the differences between ourselves and other people typically serves us well, (for example when selecting partners for life, business or even sports), it makes us inclined to reject the use of a surrogate as a proxy for our own future feelings. For a comprehensive review of evidence of the ways in which individuals perceive themselves as different, as well as the reasons why, see Gilbert, (2006, p.252-255).

18 Examples of memes that are difficult to evaluate include many which are faith based, (such as the promise of huge rewards in the afterlife), most conspiracy theories and perhaps even the recovered-memory meme that infiltrated clinical psychology at the end of the last century. For examples of such memes, see Dawkins, in Dahlbom ed., (1993, p.13-27); Dawkins, (1995); Lynch, (1998); Piper, (1994); Dawes, (2019).

19Whilst it often assumed that employing System 2 thinking will increase personal autonomy, the philosophical example of Huckleberry Finn illustrates how rational decision making can be compromised, if it invokes unreflectively acquired rules. After acting on his instincts to free his friend, Huckleberry then begins to question the morality of a white man assisting a slave to run away. In this case Huckleberry’s automatic tendency to find slavery unjust, serves him better than the unreflectively acquired rules that govern his intellectual thought processes, see Bennett, (1974). The idea that some memes may have evolved simply to promote their own means of transmission was first suggested by Dawkins, (1976, p.200).

20 The term sphexish was first employed by cognitive scientist Douglas Hofstadter, (1982), to allude to the fact that human behaviour can sometimes be characterised as a pre-programmed response to external stimuli, in much the same way as the digger wasp’s preparation for its larvae, which appears to be thoughtful and considered, but it is actually just an automatic reaction.

21For a comprehensive discussion of how we should actively evaluate which memes are good for us, see Stanovich, (2004, chapter 7).

22 The term Mindware is used by both Clark, (2014) and Perkins, (2014), to allude to the fact that acquiring the meme evaluation tools that are necessary to ensure that our analytical thinking processes directly code our own personal interests is like installing software on a computer.

23 Stanovich refers to the process of meme-cleansing as Neurathian, alluding to Otto Neurath’s allegory of fixing a rotten boat, whilst out at sea, (2004, Chapter 7). The difficulty here, is that evaluating beliefs necessarily requires using rules and practices that may themselves be “rotten”. However, Stanovich argues that it is possible to intellectually scrutinize our beliefs and suggests that the efficacy of “meme-cleansing tools” have already been illustrated, for example in Nozick’s book on rational preferences, (1993, p.139-51) and could be based on the insights of Rawls’ Original Position, (1971, 2001) and Parfit’s idea of treating our future selves as different people, (1984); see Stanovich, (2004, Chapter 7).

24 For a full discussion of this idea expressed by Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (1759; Adam Smith Institute, 2001), see Ashraf et al., (2005, p.131-45).

25 An example of this is the historical experience of the Shakers. Members of this community have been discouraged from engaging in sexual intercourse, which has led to a decline in their population from a peak of around 6000 to just a few elderly members today.

26 Literally “good spirit”, but more commonly interpreted as a life well lived.

27 Symbolic utility arises when utility is derived from an action that represents the utility of something else, see Nozick, (1993, p.27). For example, the act of voting has symbolic utility, see Baron, (1998); Quattrone and Tversky, (1984).

28 The term virtue hypothesis is used by Haidt to encapsulate ideas that have been repeatedly suggested by philosophers including Plato, Buddha and Franklin that duty brings its own rewards. It is supported by a large and diverse body of evidence, such as Durkheim’s study that found suicide rates are positively correlated with freedom from social ties, (1951/1897), to Thoits and Hewitt’s longitudinal study that undertaking volunteer work improved every measures of happiness, (2001).

29 This idea that happiness is not simply the experience of pleasure, rather it is derived from living a meaningful life, is discussed in J. S. Mill, “Utilitarianism” (1863), in On Liberty, the Subjection of Women and Utilitarianism, (2002).

30 For example, evidence suggests that most people would opt for a slight delay before a pleasant experience, in order to derive pleasure from both the event and the anticipation of it. Investigations into the utility derived from the anticipation of delayed consumption include Loewenstein & Prelec, (1993); Loewenstein, (1987); and Elster & Loewenstein, in Loewenstein & Elster eds., (1992, 213-34).

31 For evidence of the frequency and utility derived from positive daydreaming, see Singer, (1981); Klinger, (1990).

32 For a selection of evidence regarding the unrealistic levels of optimism about future events relative to our peers, see Weinstein, (1980, 1987); Shepperd et al., (2015). Evidence of levels of optimism in relation to current circumstances can be found in Brickman et al., (1978).

33 For example, research suggests that cancer patients may experience higher levels of optimism as compared to their healthier counterparts, see Stiegelis et al., (2003); and that optimism quickly returns to its previous, (unrealistically high), level following a natural disaster Burger & Palmer, (1992).

34 For discussions of the need for self-efficacy, see A. Bandura, (1977, 1982, 1990).

35 The effectance motive was first illustrated by Robert White, (1959). The term describes a basic desire in human beings to make things happen.

36 For a selection of evidence on how a sense of agency, perceived or otherwise, contributes to feelings of wellbeing, see Seligman, (1975); Langer & Rodin, (1976); Rodin & Langer, (1977); Taylor & Brown, (1988).

37 For evidence regarding the positive effects of anticipating negative outcomes, see Micheli & Castelfranchi, (2002); Norem, in Sanna & Chang, eds., (2003, p91-104); Wheeler, Stuss & Tulving, (1997); Norem & Cantor, (1986), 1208-1217; Norem, (2001); Arntz, et al., (1991).

38 For a discussion of the way confirmation bias causes us to re-evaluate decisions that are irreversible, see Frey et al., (1984); Frey, (1981).

39 Research regarding the effects of overestimating our own individuality, includes studies that show that we like to be seen as different, we often view ourselves as better than average and we try to differentiate ourselves from others. See Kruger, (1999); Wylie, (1979); Larwood & Whittaker, (1977); Felson, (1981); Walton & Bathurst, (1998); Cross, (1977); Pronin et al., (2002); Johnson et al., (1985); Fromkin, (1970, 1972).

40 For example, in Nozick’s thought experiment, the Experience Machine is used to show that real experience is preferable to a better, simulated version, suggesting that humans need contact with a “deeper reality” to genuinely thrive, (1974, p.43).

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2020年心理学奖得主

Isn't all reasoning (outside mathematics and formal logic) motivated reasoning?

不是所有的推理(数学和形式逻辑之外)都是有动机的推理吗?

贾天一,普林斯顿高中,美国
2020年心理学奖得主|8 分钟阅读

Introduction

When voters vehemently defend a candidate after his or her weaknesses have been exposed, or smokers convince themselves that cigarettes are actually not as bad for their health as they appear, these instances highlight how personal preferences can generally influence beliefs. People have a tendency to reason their way to favorable conclusions, with their proclivities guiding how evidence is gathered, arguments are evaluated, and memories are recollected. These actions of reasoning are all driven by underlying motivations, leading to beliefs tinged with bias that can seem objective to the individual (Gilovich and Ross, 2016). Motivated reasoning, a phenomenon studied in social psychology, can be defined as the “tendency to find arguments in favor of conclusions we want to believe to be stronger than arguments for conclusions we do not want to believe” (Kunda, 1990). This concept often contrasts critical thinking, which is generally viewed as the rational, unbiased analysis of facts to form a judgment at the highest level of quality (Paul and Elder, 2009). In this essay, I will champion a case for motivated reasoning and in turn, prove why there is no such thing as “good” or “accurate” critical thinking. Instead, all reasoning, outside mathematics and formal logic, is essentially motivated reasoning – justifications that are most desired instead of impartially reflect the evidence.

An Evolutionary Perspective

Motivated reasoning has been a pervasive tendency of human cognition, since the beginning of time, as it is ingrained in our basic survival instincts. Evolutionarily, people have been shown to utilize motivated reasoning to confront threats to the self. Research shows that people

weighed facts differently when those facts proved to be life-threatening. In 1992, Ditto and Lopez compared study participants who’d received either positive or negative medical test results. Those who were told they’d tested positive for an enzyme associated with pancreatic disorders were more likely to believe the test was inaccurate and discredit the results (Ditto and Lopez, 1992). When it comes to our health and quality of life especially, we tend to delude ourselves. Although we may prefer that human decision making be a thoughtful and deliberative process, in reality, our motivations tip the scales to make us less likely to believe something is true if we do not wish to believe it. For instance, a study by Reed and Aspinwall found that women who were caffeine drinkers engaged in motivated reasoning when they dispelled scientific evidence that caffeine consumption was linked to fibrocystic breast disease (Reed and Aspinwall, 1998).

In addition to protecting their health, evolutionarily, humans use motivated reasoning to bolster their self-esteem and protect their self-worth. A common example of this is the self-serving bias, which is “the tendency to attribute our successes to ourselves, and our failures to others

and the situation” (Stangor, 2015). For instance, students might attribute good test results to their own capabilities, but perform motivated reasoning and make a situational attribution to explain bad test results, all the while upholding the idea that they are intelligent beings. The phenomenon of the self-serving bias is widely considered to be essential for people’s mental health and adaptive functions (Taylor and Brown, 1994). It is thought to be a universal, fundamental need of individuals for positive self-regard (Heine et al., 1999). That is, people are motivated to possess and maintain positive self-views, and in turn, minimize the negativity of their self-views – by glorifying one’s virtues and minimizing one’s weaknesses, relative to objective criteria. This basis begs the question of whether humans are truly ever able to process information in an unbiased fashion.

A Fight for Personal Beliefs

People not only interpret facts in a self-serving way when it comes to their health and well-being; research also demonstrates that we engage in motivated reasoning if the facts challenge our personal beliefs, and essentially, our moral valuation and present understanding of the world. For example, Ditto and Liu showed a link between people’s assessment of facts and their moral convictions; they found that individuals who had moral qualms about condom education were less likely to believe that condoms were an effective form of contraception (Ditto and Liu, 2016). Oftentimes, the line between factual and moral judgments become blurred in this way.

In the context of identity, there are powerful social incentives that drive people’s thought processes. People strive for consistency among their attitudes and self-images. Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory highlights this tendency – he found that members of a group who believed in the end of the world for a predicted date became even more extreme in their views after that date had passed, in order to mitigate their cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962). Moreover, when it comes to voting, normatively, new negative information surrounding a preferred candidate should cause downward adjustment of an existing evaluation. However, recent studies prove that the exact opposite takes place; voters become even more supportive of a preferred candidate when faced with negatively valenced information, with motivated reasoning as the explanation for this behavior (Redlawsk et al., 2010). In a 2015 APA analysis, 41 experimental studies of bipartisan bias were examined, demonstrating that self-identified liberals and conservatives showed a robust partisan bias when assessing empirical evidence, almost to an equal degree (Weir, 2017). Additionally, neuroscience research suggests that “reasoning away contradictions is psychologically easier than revising feelings” (Redlawsk,

2011). Given the context of groupthink and one’s group identity, the bias’ prevalence is powerful and persistent. Ultimately, people are psychologically motivated to support and maintain existing evaluations, even when confronted with disconfirming information, as to take an opposing viewpoint against a group would damage one’s reputation and challenge one’s existing social identity.

The Illusion of Objectivity

With the exception of mathematics and formal logic, all reasoning, essentially, is motivated reasoning. When it comes to decision-making and critical thinking, total unbiased analysis or evaluation of factual evidence, is largely illusory. In reality, we act based on an incomplete vision, perceived through filters constructed by our individual history and personal preferences. To scientifically operate on an objective level cannot be achieved. Every second, we as humans receive and process thousands of bits of information from our environment. To consciously analyze all of the sensory stimuli would be overwhelming; thus, our brain utilizes pre-existing knowledge and memory to filter, categorize and interpret the data we receive. The brain extrapolates information it believes to be missing or eliminates those deemed extraneous, to form a considerably coherent image (Thornton, 2015). Each person has unique filters that prevent them from being unbiased, even on a granular level, to cope with life’s complexity. Whether we are aware of our biases or not, affective contagion occurs, a phenomenon where “conscious deliberation is heavily influenced by earlier, unconscious information processing” (Strickland et al., 2011).

Even in scientific journals, statistical analysis is utilized to provide a stamp of objectivity to conclusions. However, people tend to use statistical information in a motivated way, further perpetuating the illusion of objectivity. Berger and Berry argue that although objective data from an experiment can be obtained, “reaching sensible conclusions from the statistical analysis of this data requires subjective input,” and the role of subjectivity inherent in the interpretation of data should be more acknowledged (Berger and Berry, 1988). Similarly, in law, lawyers and advocates for both the prosecution and the defense utilize motivated reasoning to prove innocence or guilt. The judge’s job, on the other hand, is to eliminate motivational bias in their own assessment of evidence when drawing up a conclusion. However, the interpretation of the law can be skewed; sometimes, preferred outcomes, based on legally irrelevant factors, drive the reasoning of judges too, without their full awareness. Redding and Reppucci examined whether the sociopolitical views of state court judges motivated their judgments about the dispositive weight of evidence in death penalty cases. They found that judges’ personal views on the death penalty did indeed influence their decisions (Sood, 2013).

In the modern day, one of the greatest promises of artificial intelligence and machine learning is a world free of human biases. Scientists believed that operating by algorithm would create gender equality in the workplace or sidestep racial prejudice in policing. But studies have shown that even computers can be biased as well, especially when they learn from humans, adopting stereotypes and schemas analogous to our own. Biases can creep into algorithms; recently, ProPublica found that a criminal justice algorithm in Florida mislabeled African-American defendants as “high risk,” approximately twice the rate it mislabeled white defendants (Larson and Angwin, 2016).

Conclusion

Essentially, I demonstrate that all reasoning, aside from logic-based, is essentially motivated. Ultimately, to support preferred conclusions, people unknowingly display a bias in their cognitive processes that underlie reasoning. Even though we can never fully be rid of motivated reasoning, consistently striving towards an unbiased evaluation of facts is still key to achieving rigorous standards for decision-making. With today’s media landscape and the internet, a deviation from a purely fact-based evaluation has been amplified; it is now easier than ever to operate in an echo chamber and choose which sources of information fit one’s preferred reality. A report by Stanford’s Graduate School of Education found that students ranging from middle school to college were all poor at evaluating the quality of online information (Donald, 2016). Fake-news websites and the spread of misinformation that have proliferated in the past decade, all compound the problem. Mistrust of the media has increasingly grown to become a powerful tool for motivated reasoning. To restore our faith in facts, media literacy must take place. I champion improving existing channels of communication so that they help us to identify the roots of our biases, then encourage us to adjust our beliefs accordingly. Becoming aware of our deeply-rooted tendencies and thinking mechanisms is valuable, as it enables us to make decisions with more lucidity and transparency, and hopefully, for the betterment of our world.

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2019年历史一等奖

According to Henry Kissinger ‘those ages which in retrospect seem most peaceful were least in search of peace. Those whose quest for it seems unending appear less able to achieve tranquility.” Comment on this claim in light of events since 1945.

根据亨利·基辛格(Henry Kissinger)的说法,“那些回想起来似乎最和平的时代最不寻求和平。那些对它的追求似乎永无止境的人似乎不太能够实现安宁。根据 1945 年以来的事件评论这一说法。

Rosie Ashmore,英国哈格利罗马天主教高中
2019年历史奖得主|7 分钟阅读

Kissinger, like his suggested historical model Metternich, takes a particularly defeatist world view. A cursory look at history from 1945 onwards substantiates the claim made in his first comment. Statistically we have experienced, and are continuing to live through, a golden age of peace. In pre 19th century societies 15% of the population died violently, five times the number recorded in the 20th century resulting from war, genocide and man-made famine combined (Pinker, 2011). Hyper globalization, fast communication and huge progress defines the peaceful post war era. Yet this, according to Kissinger, is an entirely retrospective narrative. Underlying these achievements, a cold war ensued. The competing political ideologies left nations not “in search of peace” but global domination. Revisionist historians have gone on to rename the conflict “the long peace” despite the threat of humanity’s destruction (Cuban missile crisis 1962) and the hot pockets of violence created in the developing world.

Likewise, his assertion that earnest attempts at peace can often be the undoing of this same ambition are demonstrated in the major geopolitical fault lines that have emerged. The quest for peace and unity in areas such as Israel and Palestine, North and South Korea, have remained unresolved. The interstate tensions continuing to resurface throughout the latter half of the century despite attempts made for peace. Looking at the global peace movements of this century, Kissinger’s view is that our interconnectedness in the “international system” is also our weakness, leaving us “at the mercy” of rogue states or “rebel chieftains” (Kaplan, 1999). This can be seen played out in the wars that consumed both Vietnam and Iraq. This essay will explore whether this “real politik” hard stance perspective is in line with wider movements of peace in this half of the century.

The overarching narrative consuming international politics since 1945 is the Cold War and this can be viewed as a remarkably peaceful era. Historian Harari suggests it was during this time humanity broke the “Chekhov law” that states “a gun appearing in the first act of a play will inevitably be fired in the third”. Despite acquiring the scientific capabilities for mass destruction, the gun was never fired (Harari, 2016). “Nuclear weapons have turned war between superpowers into a mad act of collective suicide”. Yet, the “guns” presence on our global stage meant living in constant anticipation of the apocalypse. Against all expectations, zero nuclear weapons were used, and zero violent wars occurred between western or developed countries. Kissinger’s claim is correct in light of the escalating tensions between the USSR and the US throughout the period. If you take war to be merely a clash of ambition, then the increasing conflict surrounding the established political doctrines meant peace was not possible until one dominated. Why then did this have so little impact, statistically, on the Western nations involved? It is because, instead, the issue of peace and its resolution within the cold war, manifested itself in emerging fault lines during the decolonization of former empires. Post war, the economic benefits of empire plummeted, creating 96 new nations since 1945 across the Middle East, Africa and Asia. The fear of European powers was that this new political map contained “quasi states” that would become economic and political liabilities in the global order (Christopher, 2002). Countries such as Vietnam and Korea were halted in their “quest” for self-actualization, peace and unity. Instead these emerging nations were used as testing grounds to let capitalist democracy and autocratic communism come to a head. In the Cold war, states quickly became enmeshed in the profound ideological and military rivalry. Although peace was a desperate dream for these newly freed nations, they continued to be pulled further away by conflicting political doctrines.

To explore both elements of Kissinger’s claim I will look at the two largest postcolonial conflicts since 1945: The Korean War 1950-53 and The Vietnam War 1955-75. Since the peninsula’s freedom from Japanese imperialist power, Korea has experienced some of its most tumultuous years. Known as the “forgotten war” the conflict by proxy between the US and the Soviet Union killed over 2.5 million Korean people. Kissinger’s claim is correct in application to an era that was relatively free from disturbances for Western nations in “retrospect” but left newly emerging countries torn apart. The Cold War players let their conflict become heated in developing nations, whilst preserving peace in their own. Korea had been unified for nearly 1,500 years. The idea of unity equating to peace became embedded in nationalist ideology when the ancient Silla dynasty united the country in the 7th century. What disrupted this “quest” for peace post 1945 was America’s desperation to contain the spread of communism. Korea has been named the “storm center” of the far east, feeling the activities of superpowers Russia, China and Japan. Once communist influence in North Korea began to take shape, foreign leaders arbitrarily drew up the 38th parallel divide (still in place 70 years later) drawing the nation away from ambitions of peace. However, it is not the “unending quest” that has left ambitions unfulfilled as Kissinger suggests, it is the international political battleground that subsumed the nation as the nationalist cause played out above it. The urge for peace has never diminished yet tensions and frictions are still evident. In the 21st century, “reunification was still fresh on the minds of the Korean people but with separate administrators it seemed unlikely to occur under peaceful auspices” (Wilson, 2002) The external climate in which Korea emerged as a newly freed nation ensured their “quest” for self-identification, peace and unity remained futile, not the chase itself.

One year after the Korean war a new arbitrary divide was created by the great foreign powers in Vietnam. At the Geneva conference of 1954 the division between the North and South Vietnam at the 17th parallel was decided. Similarly, the pattern of strong nationalist desire for unification, overtaken by the clashing ideologies of the cold war emerged. By this time the Truman administration in the US had come to believe and fear the “domino effect”. The communist ideologies propagating the minds of North Vietnamese people became too threatening to America’s ideal of global capitalist democracy. So much so that appeasement of North Vietnamese ambition had to be resisted. This is where Kissinger would play his own role in world history. The American involvement in the Vietnam war lasted for a violent and bloody twenty years, an estimated 4 million Vietnamese people were killed in the conflict and 58,000 American troops. Nixon’s election in 1968 upon the promise of “peace with honor” had Kissinger appointed as National Security advisor in a supposed attempt for peace and an end to the Vietnam War. Kissinger’s peace talks successfully aided the initiation of cease fire on January 23rd, 1973, outlining the machinery for peace settlement. For this feat, he was awarded a Nobel peace prize the same autumn. Yet many historians have criticized his methods for attaining “peace” as merely bombing the Vietnamese into submission (Bernam, 2001). The “Christmas bombings” of Hanoi in which Nixon ordered 11 days of intensive bombing between December 18th to the 29th 1972 provides an example of Kissinger’s use of continued violence to attain peace. Furthermore, the secret bombing of Cambodia in March 1969 exposes actions “prolonging and expanding war” (Thompson, 2018). This “ends justify the means” ideology, even when these means are duplicitous, is possibly what he alludes to in his proposition. Those ages, he suggests, that are “least in search” for peace using any means necessary to quell rogue states are those who in “retrospect” come out on top. Perhaps this claim, in light of his involvement in post 1945 events, serves as a justification for peacekeeping methods away from the “moral commonplace of our age” (Pinker, 2011). It is interesting to note that Vietnam when left to its own devices has emerged as a peaceful player in the economic world stage.

Now looking with a macro approach at international history it is clear to see that, leaving the deadliest military conflict in history behind, the “quest” for a peaceful utopia has consumed our major world leaders in the second half of the 20th century. “A basic historical change had taken place in the attitudes of European (and American) peoples towards war” (Brodie, 1973) The peacemakers of our age have enacted an unprecedented avoidance of war that in contrast to Kissinger’s view has largely been successful. Continuing from Wilsonian doctrines the 1946 liaison committee of organizations for peace put energy into supporting the UN that, unlike the failed league of nations, is supposed to “save succeeding nations from the scourge of war” (Boulding, 2000). The major western players have built a series of strategic and commercial clubs aiming to establish and maintain peace globally (UNESCO, EU, NATO, APEC, NAFTA). There has been a sharp decline in death by warfare since 1945 (see graph). You are now more likely to commit suicide than be killed in warfare (800,000 to 120,000 as of 2012 (Harari, 2016)). Where this united blanket of diplomatic peace has failed across the fault lines in our globe, interference from foreign nations can be rooted out as the cause. After the demise of communism, ending the cold war, America emerged as the “global policeman” but “keeping order out of moral outrage is sometimes prioritized over the principles and practice of law” (Annita Lazar, 2005) undermining universal respect for human rights and self-autonomy. Since its inception in 1948 there have been attempts to foster peace between the state of Israel and Palestine but after 70 years it seems more intractable than ever. Peace in the “post war” age seems only possible when the international community listens to the concerns and desires of both sides, not take Kissinger’s non appeasement stance towards conflict. As the Irish peace process shows, reason can lay a road map to resolution. Ensuring self-preservation whilst comprehending others’ individual reasoning allows two conflicting sides to attain peace. Those looking for peace in this age have achieved peace, once they start to listen and appease.

The human security report 2009/10 made two important conclusions about the phenomenal decline in international warfare. One being that indeed the jump in diplomatic intervention and global peacekeeping missions have aided prevention (HSRG, 2011) Additionally, economists Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler of Oxford university have proven interdependent economic growth tends to reduce the probability of conflict occurring. Peace is now more profitable than war. However, the research group, and most historians, are unable to forecast the onset of conflict. Remarkably, thus far, the world post 1945 has seen an era of astonishingly few international wars “during a period in which the number of entities capable of conducting them increased.” (Christopher, 2002) It is important to note that recent political events (Trump/Brexit) mean the structures in place now, could in 10 years’ time have completely crumbled. Our “quest” for peace may be further opening the gate for violence and warfare to reign once again. President Jimmy Carter’s national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski has suggested “factors that make for international instability are gaining the historical upper hand over the forces at work for more organized cooperation” (McDougall, 2019). In the globalization process, peace, security and economic progress have become interdependent, a positive step in the achievement of peace. This unity on the other hand has allowed for more conflict over ideas, further worsened by the “profound instabilities, extreme inequalities and precariousness” transnational capitalism creates (Pijl, 2006). In a time of Brexit reopening old tribal wounds, and continued anxiety about rising superpowers dominating the globe, perhaps conflict is building up under our noses. The era of an “unending quest” for peace may be coming to an explosive close. In the near future Kissinger’s defeatist view on peace may prove to be irrefutable, but for now we should celebrate the historical achievements of humanity in the last 74 years and continue to endlessly to strive for “peace” as, thus far, it has not been a futile journey.

Author’s Note

In response to this question I will take an international approach, looking to explore the suggestions within the comment, considering statistical phenomena regarding global warfare and for the purposes of this essay disregarding internal and civil conflict. The definition of peace will alter accordingly between “freedom from disturbance” and the typically historically accepted “a state in which there is no war, or a war has ended.”

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Kaplan, R. D. (1999, June). Kissinger, Metternich and Realism. The Atlantic.

McDougall, W. A. (2019, June 18th). 20th century international relations. Retrieved from Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Mueller, J. (2009). War has almost ceased to exist . 297-307.

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Winkler, A. M. (2001). The Cold War: A History in Documents. Oxford University Press.

2020年历史奖并列第三名

Is a strong state a prerequisite or an obstacle to economic growth?

强大的国家是经济增长的先决条件还是障碍?

圣津公园,惠灵顿公学,英国
2020年历史奖并列第三名|8 分钟阅读

Introduction
There has been much ink spilt in favour of the limited government. Bodies of empirical work confirm the economic benefits of free markets and the robustness of such evidence seems hard to deny: markets deliver economic growth and governments make plenty of mistakes. [1] [2] A cursory glance at such evidence may lead to the presumption that strong states hinder economic growth. That is, if markets and private transactions are the engines for economic growth, strong states may seem a mere obstruction. However, this laissez-faire line of thought overlooks the state’s role in providing the very background for such growth-conducive arrangements.

Indeed, much of recent empirical and theoretical work has been devoted to buttressing the exact opposite intuition. In work-related to the economic development of weak states in Africa, for instance, the factor crucial to the failure of economic development of African states has been identified as the state’s lack of capacity rather than an overwhelming projection of state power. [3] [4] More significantly, the main lessons learned from Acemoglu and Robinson’s seminal work in historical institutionalism show that growth requires an agglomeration of institutional factors that incentivize agents to behave in ways that are conducive to economic growth. [5]

Now, the aforementioned confusion arises because of a mistaken understanding of what ‘prerequisite’ means in this context. A strong state being a prerequisite for economic growth does not mean that a strong state is a sufficient condition for economic growth. This understanding of ‘prerequisite’ would make the question overly tendentious in favour of the ‘obstacle’ view. There are simply too many strong states that fail at delivering economic growth. For instance, in Venezuela’s case, widespread nationalisation scared foreign investors and inefficiencies in state-owned firms severely hindered economic performance. We may say without qualm that Venezuela was and is a strong state, albeit one in which the strong state acts as an obstacle to growth.

Thus, a proper understanding of ‘prerequisite’ should be that a strong state is a necessary condition for economic growth. That is, wherever there is economic growth, there is a strong state that undergirds that growth, while it is possible to have a strong state that does not deliver economic growth. I will argue that a strong state is a prerequisite for economic growth. I will argue that a strong state enables sociopolitical stability, which acts as the minimal institutional preconditions on which incentives for growth are guaranteed.

In defining state strength, I will stay neutral by following Acemoglu in measuring state strength as having two dimensions along state capacity: economic and political.[6] A state can be strong economically, in which case it has the capacity to utilize and direct resources throughout its territory. (i.e. through taxation and spending) If a state is politically strong, then rulers are not easily replaceable whereas the opposite is true for weak states. These definitions of state strength leave it open whether strong states are prerequisites or obstacles to economic growth because they measure the underlying capacity of states, which can manifest in ways that are conducive or opposed to economic growth.

Political Weakness, Unpredictability and Underinvestment
Political instability is defined as the propensity of a change in the executive, either by “constitutional” or “unconstitutional” means.[7] When there is political instability, social instability, measured by incidence of revolution, frequency in change of power and likelihood of war become much more likely.[8] In the absence of a politically strong state that guarantees such social stability, the following problem for economic growth arises.

First, institutional predictability is threatened, which significantly reduces consumer and investor confidence. A lack of consistent policies augmented by the likelihood of expropriation by various actors facilitates capital outflows. This is because investors’ propensity to invest depends on the knowledge that financial institutions will generate returns on savings and investments in the long-run; politically weak states fail to guarantee this due to the risk of unrest.[9] Moreover, inconsistent expropriation creates uncertainty for firms and makes the state a less attractive place to invest. Under these conditions, households are also disincentivized from saving with financial institutions, which are perceived to be insecure. The net effect is a decrease in the overall capital stock and significantly lower economic growth than in the counterfactual.

Second, continuity in infrastructural investments is threatened. Under conditions of political weakness, the state does not have sustainable infrastructure strategies because of persistent changes to policy priorities and a lack of transparency in infrastructure projects’ procurement.[10] This means that firms have little incentive to cooperate and invest and mechanisms such as public-private partnerships (PPPs) are likely to fail to be efficient.[11] Thus, for instance, politically weak states such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, suffer from chronic supply-chain disruption due to seasonal flooding and inadequate road networks. [12] [13] This represents a large obstacle to growth because crucial infrastructure such as transport infrastructure minimizes downtime and delays and allows for smooth supply chains, allowing industries to be consistently more productive.

This trend of political weakness of states further exacerbates economic weakness of states by laying ground for states’ inability to facilitate investments in high value-add industries. For instance, much of the literature on the resource curse attributes many resource-rich African states’ dependence on low-value and volatile raw materials to be based on just such a lack of state capacity to set up crucial infrastructure. [14] This is consistent with the observation that most weak African states have mainly been exporters of lightly processed or unprocessed natural resources which, when processed, increase in value by up to 400 times that of the original commodity.[15]

Instability, Clientelism and Waste
Political weakness also generates systematic incentives for wastefulness which saps economic growth potential. Socio-political instability owing to the political weakness of states means higher stakes for incumbent regimes and reliance of client-patron networks in regions where state power does not penetrate.[16] That is because there are divergent levels of penetration in state power, incumbent regimes require cooperation from regional players and survive by private goods provisions to their small winning coalitions instead of public goods provisions for the wider public.[17]

These clientelist networks are detrimental to economic growth in at least the following two ways. First, client networks often foster a culture of corruption in which regional players are able to run graft schemes through which much of the resources devoted to those projects are divided up for private gain.[18] Especially because clientelist networks often operate on the basis of guaranteed employment, “underinvestment stems from the need to keep offers of employment credible in order to increase the probability of re-election”.[19] As a net effect, clientelism creates a feedback loop which prevents businesses from being established, hindering economic growth and limiting tax revenue to already weak states, trapping them in a cycle of under-investment.[20]

Second, clientelist networks that stem from the weakness of states lead to wastefulness in public investments. Because weak governments need to consistently invest in the same actors that make up the winning coalition, redundant infrastructure investments happen. For instance, construction of the Kenyan standard gauge railway project was conducted at highly inflated prices, with land confiscation and unfair compensation, local procurement and employment benefiting regions affiliated with the ruling party.[21]

Strong States and Stability
In strong states, such crucial stability is preserved, allowing the state to generate institutional setups that are conducive to growth. In recent history, strong states have mainly existed in two different forms: authoritarian strong states and OECD-type democratic nations, which Acemoglu refers to as “consensually strong states.”[22]

In consensually strong states, there is a state-society consensus; firms and households trust the government and state actors opt to provide public goods to the taxpayers rather than expropriate for private gain.[23] This firstly allows firms and households to invest and save with relative long-term certainty, which generates higher returns on capital. Further, democratically strong states’ capacity to collect taxes permit government investment in infrastructure, legislature and the judiciary which ground the operation of markets. Finally, strong institutions shape the decisions made by the ruler, acting as a check on arbitrary decision making and preventing catastrophic decisions which could lead to economic ruin.[24] Given appropriate operation, this democratic stability creates a stable base for business activity, investor and consumer confidence, and thus sustained economic growth.

In contrast, authoritarian strong states are generally more interventionist, and exert more control over their markets: there are usually no fully functioning check-and-balance systems in place. This can drive economic growth or, if the strength is misapplied, can cause the strong authoritarian state to become an obstacle. For instance, strong authoritarian states’ ability to intervene in the private sector can lead to certain groups being favoured in return for support, which can reduce market efficiency, or leaders pursuing policies aimed at consolidating power and lining allies’ pockets rather than enriching the country. Strong authoritarian states’ ability to rewrite laws to their benefit makes private-state contracts insecure, reducing trust and business confidence, and misapplication of power can cause them to “become predators of private sector wealth”.[25]

History provides numerous examples of strong authoritarian states which hampered economic growth in these ways. In Hussain’s Iraq, frequent, arbitrary interventions in the market made the Iraqi economy highly unpredictable, leading to chronic problems in savings and investments.[26] Likewise, the USSR suffered due to government intervention and the development of a command economy with price floors and ceilings. This created inefficiencies and market collapses, which led to further controls, further inefficiencies, and further economic woes.[27]

On the other hand, a strong authoritarian state pursuing growth-oriented policies can act as a robust engine for economic growth. The so-called Asian Tigers - Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea - were all, to large extents, strong authoritarian states during periods of rapid economic growth. All four Tigers saw state-led investment in education, combined with government financing which created low-interest corporate loans to fuel business growth and ultimately the policies were carefully fostered economic incentives, rather than arbitrary interventions.[28]

An instructive example is found in the industrial strategy of Park Chung-hee’s military regime in South Korea, which saw exponential growth since the 1960s. The strategy was to direct massive state-led investments in high-value-add infrastructures and industries. For example, the 1973 National Investment Fund Act allowed funds collected from state bond issuance to be lent out at low-interest rates to companies engaged in heavy industry and chemical sectors. Policies such as these introduced long-term certainties in the financial system at a time when investment destinations were generally unpromising by ‘picking’ winners in conglomerates such as Samsung, Hyundai and LG. This contributed to a sustained increase in savings and investments.[29]

These targeted interventions, such as the demand that major companies deliver certain levels of production and profitability in return for government support, allowed private actors to pursue profits but, crucially, left them with the freedom to choose the means to that end.[30] These policies also aligned the interests of the government and conglomerates, encouraging cooperation for large infrastructure projects such as the Gyeongbu Highway and investments in state-led enterprise projects such as the Pohang Iron & Steel Company. Growing tax revenues also aided further investments in further large-scale infrastructure projects. [31] [32]

Conclusion
Alexander Hamilton once wrote “the state ought to excite the confidence of capitalists, who are ever cautious and sagacious, by aiding them to overcome the obstacles that lie in the way of all experiments,”[33] and these words are consonant with my findings. Strong states are required as a

minimal background for economic growth.

However, that doesn’t mean that strong states are a panacea. While strong democratic states which minimize market intervention are generally able to sustain moderate economic growth, strong authoritarian states show a much wider range of outcomes. Misdirected and arbitrary institutions can create obstacles to economic growth and even catastrophic outcomes. On the other hand, careful interventions and management of industry can create the type of growth seen in the ‘Asian Tigers’ economies.

I conclude that although a strong state is a prerequisite for economic growth, the extent to which this strong state acts as an obstacle or an enabler depends on policies, markets and institutions.

Footnotes

1 David Woodward, Debt, Adjustment and Poverty in Developing Countries: National and International Dimensions of Debt and Adjustment in Developing Countries (London, New York: Pinter Publishers in association with Save the Children, 1992)

2 Milton Friedman, An Economist’s Protest (Thomas Horton & Daughters, 1975)

3 Robert H. Bates, Prosperity & Violence: The Political Economy of Development (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009)

4 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992 (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990)

5 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown Business, 2012).

6 Daron Acemoglu, Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States, Journal of Monetary Economics 52, (2005): 1199–1226

7 Alberto Alesina, Sule Özler, Nouriel Roubini, and Phillip Swagel, Political Instability and Economic Growth, Journal of Economic Growth 1, no. 2 (June 1996): 189-212

8 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968)

9 Ari Aisen and Francisco Jose Veiga, “How Does Political Instability Affect Growth?” IMF Working Paper, January 2011.

10 WBG PPP CCSA, GGP, COST, and PPIAF, Disclosure in Public Private Partnerships: Jurisdictional Studies, August 2015, 7.

11 ibid.

12 IBP USA, Congo Democratic Republic Country Study Guide Volume 1 Strategic Information and Developments (Washington D.C.: IBP USA, 2012)

13 Atsushi Immi, Effects of Improving Infrastructure Quality on Business Costs: Evidence from Firm-Level Data in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, The Developing Economics 49, no. 2 (June 2011): 121-147

14 Michael Lewin, ‘Botswana’s Success: Good Governance, Good Policies, and Good Luck,’ in Chuhan-Pole, P., et al. (eds.), African Success Stories, World Bank Group, 2011.

15 “Information Brief: Enhancing Natural Resource Governance in Africa,” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2017

16 Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, Logic of Political Survival (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003)

17 Wouter Veenendaal and Jack Corbett, Clientelism in Small States: How Smallness Influences Patron–Client Networks in the Caribbean and the Pacific, Democratization 27, no. 1 (2020): 61-80, DOI:10.1080/13510347.2019.1631806

18 Jean-Louis Briquet, "Clientelism," Encyclopædia Britannica, December 29, 2015, accessed July 15, 2020, h ttps://www.britannica.com/topic/clientelism

19 James A. Robinson and Thierry Verdier, The Political Economy of Clientelism, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 115, no. 2 (2013): 260-291

20 3. African Development Bank, “Africa’s Infrastructure: Great Potential but Little Impact on Inclusive Growth” in African Economic Outlook 2018, 2018, 63-94.

21 Yuan Wang and Uwe Wissenbach, Clientelism at Work? A Case Study of Kenyan Standard Gauge Railway Project, Economic History of Developing Regions 34, no. 3 (2019): 280-299, DOI:

1 0.1080/20780389.2019.1678026

22Acemoglu, Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States.

23 ibid.

24 Hilton L. Groot, Do Strong Governments Produce Strong Economies? The Independent Review 5, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 565-573

25 ibid.

26 Abbas S. Mehdi, "The Iraqi Economy under Saddam Hussein: Development or Decline," Middle East Policy 4, no. 1-2 (1995): 242+. Gale Academic OneFile (accessed July 15, 2020).

27 Michael Ray, "Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse," Encyclopædia Britannica, accessed July 15, 2020, h ttps://www.britannica.com/story/why-did-the-soviet-union-collapse

28 Groot.

29 OECD (2020), Saving rate (indicator). doi: 10.1787/ff2e64d4-en (Accessed on 16 July 2020), https://data.oecd.org/natincome/saving-rate.htm

30 Tae-gyun Park, The 8·3 Measure and Industrial Rationalization Policy: Economic Foundation of the Yushin System, 역사와 현실, no. 88 (2013): 101-144

31 최광승, 박정희는 어떻게 경부고속도로를 건설하였는가, 한국학(구 정신문화연구) 33, no. 4, (2010): 175-202

32 POSCO, “History of POSCO: 1967~1970 Foundation of POSCO,” Accessed July 15, 2020, h ttp://www.posco.co.kr/homepage/docs/eng6/jsp/company/posco/s91a1000012c.jsp

33 Chalmers Johnson, The Industrial Policy Debate (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984),17.

Bibliography

Daron Acemoglu, Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States, Journal of Monetary Economics 52, (2005): 1199–1226

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown Business, 2012).

3. African Development Bank, “Africa’s Infrastructure: Great Potential but Little Impact on Inclusive Growth” in African Economic Outlook 2018, 2018, 63-94.

Ari Aisen and Francisco Jose Veiga, “How Does Political Instability Affect Growth?” IMF Working Paper, January 2011.

Alberto Alesina, Sule Özler, Nouriel Roubini, and Phillip Swagel, Political Instability and Economic

Growth, Journal of Economic Growth 1, no. 2 (June 1996): 189-212

Robert H. Bates, Prosperity & Violence: The Political Economy of Development (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009)

Milton Friedman, An Economist’s Protest (Thomas Horton & Daughters, 1975)

Hilton L. Groot, Do Strong Governments Produce Strong Economies? The Independent Review 5, no.4 (Spring 2001): 565-573

Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968)

IBP USA, Congo Democratic Republic Country Study Guide Volume 1 Strategic Information and Developments (Washington D.C.: IBP USA, 2012)

Atsushi Immi, Effects of Improving Infrastructure Quality on Business Costs: Evidence from

Firm-Level Data in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, The Developing Economics 49, no. 2 (June 2011): 121-147

“Information Brief: Enhancing Natural Resource Governance in Africa,” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2017

Chalmers Johnson, The Industrial Policy Debate (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984),17.

Michael Lewin, ‘Botswana’s Success: Good Governance, Good Policies, and Good Luck,’ in Chuhan-Pole, P., et al. (eds.), African Success Stories, World Bank Group, 2011.

Jean-Louis Briquet, "Clientelism," Encyclopædia Britannica, December 29, 2015, accessed July 15, 2020, https://www.britannica.com/topic/clientelism

Abbas S. Mehdi, "The Iraqi Economy under Saddam Hussein: Development or Decline," Middle East Policy 4, no. 1-2 (1995): 242+. Gale Academic OneFile (accessed July 15, 2020).

Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, Logic of Political Survival (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003)

OECD (2020), Saving rate (indicator). doi: 10.1787/ff2e64d4-en (Accessed on 16 July 2020), https://data.oecd.org/natincome/saving-rate.htm

Tae-gyun Park, The 8·3 Measure and Industrial Rationalization Policy: Economic Foundation of the Yushin System, 역사와 현실, no. 88 (2013): 101-144

POSCO, “History of POSCO: 1967~1970 Foundation of POSCO,” Accessed July 15, 2020, http://www.posco.co.kr/homepage/docs/eng6/jsp/company/posco/s91a1000012c.jsp

Michael Ray, "Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse," Encyclopædia Britannica, accessed July 15, 2020, h ttps://www.britannica.com/story/why-did-the-soviet-union-collapse

James A. Robinson and Thierry Verdier, The Political Economy of Clientelism, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 115, no. 2 (2013): 260-291

Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992 (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990)

Wouter Veenendaal and Jack Corbett, Clientelism in Small States: How Smallness Influences Patron–Client Networks in the Caribbean and the Pacific, Democratization 27, no. 1 (2020): 61-80, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2019.1631806

Yuan Wang and Uwe Wissenbach, Clientelism at Work? A Case Study of Kenyan Standard Gauge Railway Project, Economic History of Developing Regions 34, no. 3 (2019): 280-299, DOI: 1 0.1080/20780389.2019.1678026

WBG PPP CCSA, GGP, COST, and PPIAF, Disclosure in Public Private Partnerships: Jurisdictional Studies, August 2015, 7.

David Woodward, Debt, Adjustment and Poverty in Developing Countries: National and International Dimensions of Debt and Adjustment in Developing Countries (London, New York: Pinter Publishers in association with Save the Children, 1992)

최광승, 박정희는 어떻게 경부고속도로를 건설하였는가, 한국학(구 정신문화연구) 33, no. 4, (2010): 175-202

2020年历史奖二等奖

Is a strong state a prerequisite or an obstacle to economic growth?

强大的国家是经济增长的先决条件还是障碍?

克里斯托弗·康威,英国温布尔登国王学院学校
2020年历史奖第二名 |8 分钟阅读

In 1989, the Cold War victory of the capitalist USA over the communist USSR led Francis Fukuyama to proclaim the ‘End of History’, and the ‘total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism [free trade and the “limited state”].’[1] The following decades have not borne this out. Though the realm of historians is the past, that does not preclude them from keeping one eye on the present. Now China, the great repudiator of the ‘Western idea’, has risen as a challenger to the USA’s global power, avoiding the worst of the 2008 recession, and surpassing the USA in PPP-adjusted GDP by 2014.[2] Meanwhile, the strength of Western democracy seems to be at a low ebb: in the UK for example, 69% are inherently dissatisfied with how democracy is functioning.[3] Therefore, the rise of the “Beijing Consensus”

– a state’s political monopoly in return for economic growth – may interest the historian much more than before. Aspects of a “consensually-strong” state – taxation, regulation, state monopoly on violence – are of course necessary for healthy GDP growth.[4] Yet I wish to investigate how far economic growth is fuelled by the accountable, “domineering state”. Three “facets” separate these from consensually-strong states:

  1. Political legitimacy not founded on taxpayers’ votes.

  2. Economy serves politics, not vice versa.

  3. Socially freedoms noticeably restricted.

The historian can isolate the effect of the “domineering state” on economic growth by tracing the parallel transition of Russia and China from communism to capitalism between 1978-91; their divergent political- economic outcomes from 1990-2000; and their recent convergence into domineering states. Though no template “prerequisite” is prescribed, I argue the well-managed domineering state has powerfully challenged the Washington Consensus due to some notable successes in these years.

The Soviet and Chinese states until the 1980s were strong states that would largely satisfy the three facets. In the USSR, the Communist Party (CPSU) had the leading role. Gosplan, a state organ, oversaw the command economy (largely isolated from global markets), and free speech was ultimately restricted by the KGB. Yet, the USSR’s economic growth deteriorated over time: between 1970-80, GDP growth averaged a 1.7% a year, low in comparison to many Western economies.[5] Furthermore, as Miller has argued, the state was strong, but weak enough so that Gosplan lobbying groups began to exert direct power of the running of the economy, instead of the CPSU General Secretary.[6] Business apparently did not serve politics. Gorbachëv, inspired to reform the Soviet state, took steps to reintegrate the Soviet Union into global markets. Perestroika began in 1987-88, involving reduced government control over corporate enterprises. Since no satisfactory socialist market framework was created in such a short time frame, it was estimated that the shadow economy grew to 11% of nominal GDP (i.e., US$150 billion) by 1990, with some earning double their official earnings on the black market.[7] Then in February 1990, Gorbachëv did fatally weaken state control by removing the constitutional article stipulating the “leading role” of the CPSU. This decision effectively rid the USSR of facets I and III; realistically, II was already absent. This positive feedback cycle of political/economic disintegration continued until December 1991, when the USSR itself disintegrated. The USSR, a strong state, failed to deliver the economic growth needed to sustain itself. However, it was the relinquishing of political control that caused it to fall up apart, politically and economically, in a mutually- reinforcing cycle.

In Maoist China, conversely, growth had been similarly mediocre. Between 1953-78, annual real GDP growth was 4.7%, though stability was offset (unlike in the USSR) by the highs of the early Five Year Plans, and the intense lows of the Great Leap Forward (1958-62) and then the Cultural Revolution (1966-76).[8] Between 1952-88, China lagged significantly behind the USSR’s GDP (see Appendix I). However, where China differed was that the Communist Party (CPC) did not resort to political liberalization in order to correct this. The end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, and the death of Mao and the toppling of the Gang of Four in 1978 strengthened economic reformers in the CPC, notably Deng Xiaoping. They embarked upon a series of reforms mainly increasing financial autonomy of managers in large state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Crucially, these were completed in a much more gradualist manner than Soviet ‘shock therapy’. By 1988, Chinese GDP had exceeded the USSR’s. Yet while the CPC allowed greater autonomy it differed from the CPSU by maintaining supervision of business organs, and absolute control over the Chinese political system. A 1991 party memo gleaned from the fate of the CPSU that ‘the Party must grasp not only the gun but the asset economy as well.’[9] The CPC cemented control by repressing the pro-democracy demonstrations at Tiananmen Square in spring 1989 (while Gorbachëv was visiting Beijing) and all similar movements thereafter. While the CPSU sacrificed political and economic control, the CPC retained political hegemony (I, III), and, despite deregulation, substantial control in economic affairs (II).

Divergent strategies produced divergent economic results between 1978-1999. Post-CPSU Russian politics tobogganed into the economic anarchy unleashed by perestroika. In 1989, crime rates increased by 32% across the Union, a clear indicator of decaying state control.[10] Disintegrating political control led to the August 1991 failed coup, which also placed Gorbachëv – the president – under house arrest. During the Novo-Ogarëvo talks in December 1991 to dissolve the USSR, Gorbachëv was not invited. The comparative weakness of the new Russian Federation spawned geographical disintegration: a number of states declared autonomy (e.g. Chechnya and Tatarstan), and in 1998, the Kaliningrad authorities declared they would no longer remit taxes to Moscow.[11] Moscow was unable to enforce Federation-wide taxation, anti-corruption measures, or efficiency standards in loss-making corporations. These especially had the leverage of providing employment, key to winning votes for Yeltsin, and by 1996 had accumulated arrears of 13.7 trillion roubles.[12] This power of the ex-SOEs in turn constrained Moscow in reducing their share in the economy, increasing liability to recession when energy prices dropped (as in 1997-98). To reduce the huge Soviet consumer subsidies now hindering the Russian economy, Yeltsin was forced to shell the Russian parliament building in 1993. Consequently, the disintegration of political control, and associated fall-out, caused GDP to drop 35% during the 1990s.[13]

In China, by comparison, similar problems failed to appear. Geographical integration was preserved. Suppression of the pro-democracy movements cemented the political domination of the CPC. This allowed the leadership to carry out economically-intense reform to improve efficiency of China’s SOEs (now, not so untouchable as in Russia). Zhu Rongji , for example, laid off as many as 40 million workers from loss-making SOEs between 1997-2003, and reduced their number by 37%.[14] Often, these were later privatised. These sweeping powers, combined with deregulation to increase efficiency, allowed for striking economic growth not possible in Russia largely due to the constraints placed upon its leadership (alongside material and demographic constraints). While the Russian and Chinese economies were almost identical in size in 1993, by 2003, China’s was three times as large.[15] The stronger state cultivated by the CPC, it would seem, has been able to pursue specific reforms while ignoring the disaffected, whereas in Russia’s weaker state, any leader pursuing this might have been voted out.

Perhaps Vladimir Putin recognised these weaknesses. Miller’s ‘three pillars of Putinomics’ are:

  1. Strengthen central authority.

  2. Prevent popular discontent.

  3. Increase business efficiency, solely to serve I and II.[16]

This seems to emulate CPC policies and rejected CPSU ones. While Yeltsin struggled to deal with wealthy rival power blocs, Putin used his links to the security services firstly to discipline rival blocs, and then co- opt them to achieve his political and economic objectives. An example of this was the cashiering of Mikhail Khodorkovskii, previously Russia’s richest man. Owner of the giant energy conglomerate Yukos, he had tried to avoid punitive tax measures in the aftermath of the 1997-98 crisis. Putin’s response was to order his arrest in 2003 and imprison him for eight years. Taxes were raised on the Russian ultra-rich, allowing the budget to re-balance in the early 2000s, and government saving eventually allowed more insulation from the financial crisis of 2007-8. This was mainly achieved by Beijing-style policies which allowed the Russian government to utilise high oil prices in the early 2000s to strengthen state finances.[17] The Russian state currently represents about 35% of GDP, though large increases have been observed in energy and banking, also key strategic areas for Beijing.[18] In Russia, ‘indirect’ state involvement in the economy has enlarged the state’s presence, a more nuanced approach which appears a third way between Soviet over- regulation and Yeltsinite under-regulation. However, it has not automatically produced growth: demographic and diplomatic constraints have limited GDP growth, such that between 2013-18, disposal incomes fell annually.[19] Thus it remains to be seen whether Putin’s new strategies will enhance the economic growth of a stronger Russian state.

The CPC views control of business as crucial to its survival. Although between 1978-2017, SOE employment/population dropped by 80%, and share of output by two-thirds, Xi Jinping has committed to improving both the efficiency and wealth of SOEs. Incidentally, the private sector’s share of profits have declined steadily since 2015, and in 2018 – the first time since 2011 – SOEs surpassed private enterprises in gross profits.[20] SOEs constitute 50% of the 500 largest manufacturing companies in China. Meanwhile, 14/16 largest Chinese companies operating outside China are SOEs.[21] Subjecting them to CPC political prerogatives – enriching China, increasing FDI stocks, and thus China’s global power – has often been a mutually-beneficial arrangement. The CPC has also extended political control into the private sector, creating monopolies or leverage for Chinese companies: e.g. bankcard company UnionPay, whose monopolisation of the Chinese bankcard sector the CPC sponsored against American rivals until 2014. 68% of Chinese private enterprises had party bodies in 2016, and 70% of foreign enterprises; meanwhile, corporations such as L’Oréal, Disney and Dow Chemicals all have party committees, and display the hammer and sickle in their Chinese offices.[22] Furthermore, degree of CPC affiliation has affected the ability of private enterprises to accumulate bank loans (see Appendix V). The deregulation of the 1980s-2000s undoubtedly produced astonishing economic growth, averaging 9.5% GDP growth p.a. 1979-2018.[23] However, amidst forecast of declining growth rates past 2020 (see Appendix VI), the CPC seems to be strengthening its involvement in the economy to preserve its power, and direct these assets abroad to build power globally: the key example is the risk-laden Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a potential $8 trillion investment.[24] It is thus hard to deny that the CPC is the ‘silent partner’ of business, an economically as well as politically strong state, but in a much more subtle form than the communist states of the previous century. Corruption and inefficiency are not rare, and have hindered economic growth to some extent. However, Russia has noticed China’s successes: just recently, United Russia delegates have begun visiting China to learn how it opened up its economy without sacrificing political control.[25]

Ultimately, I would not prescribe a strong state as a “prerequisite” for economic growth because, as seen in the USSR and Maoist China for decades, political strength hindered growth. Furthermore, the laissez-faire approach of the USA, and neoliberal policies in the UK, have aided growth in those countries. Yet, a strong state is not necessarily an obstacle. Maintaining political control, while cultivating a more nuanced and decentralized approach to political ownership of business has hitherto benefited the CPC. Domineering states in today’s world are increasingly challenging the idea that Western liberal ideas will herald the ‘End of History’. Naturally, corruption and party interest groups undermine growth, as was seen in the late USSR when it economically diverged from China, despite reform.[26] However, under Xi Jinping, the CPC has taken a hard-line attitude to corruption.[27] Regardless, should China’s BRI[28] succeed in establishing the global influence the CPC seeks from it, Washington might find that its political and economic prescriptions will begin to be successfully challenged worldwide by power blocs with very different values.

Footnotes

1 F. Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, The National Interest, no. 16 (1989), pp. 3-18: 1.

2 W.M. Morrison, ‘China’s Economic Rise’, Congressional Research Service (2019), p. 10.

3 R. Wike & S. Schumacher, ‘Satisfaction with democracy’, Pew Research Centre, 27 February 2020. Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/02/27/satisfaction-with-democracy/.

4 See D. Acemoglu, ‘Politics and Economics in Strong and Weak States’, NBER Working Paper 11275 (2005), pp. 19-25. Acemoglu gives as examples the United Kingdom (with its NHS and welfare system), and Sweden.

5 P. Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: Economic History of the USSR 1945-1991, Routledge (Abingdon, 2003), p. 131.

6 C. Miller, The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR, North Carolina U.P. (Chapel Hill, NC, 2016), p. 57: ‘In theory, the CPSU controlled the economy, but in reality the industries controlled the party.’

7 R. Parker, ‘Inside the Collapsing Soviet Economy’, The Atlantic, June 1990.

8 A. Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, 960-2030, OECD Development Centre (2007), p. 150.

9 Quoted in R. McGregor, ‘How the state runs business in China’, The Guardian, 25 July 2019.

10 A. Ogushi, ‘The disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’, PhD thesis (University of Glasgow, 2005), p. 231. See also Appendix II.

11 M. Gilman, No Precedent, No Plan: Inside Russia’s 1998 Default, M.I.T. Press (Cambridge, MA, 2010), pp. 192-3.

12 Miller, Putinomics: Power and Money in Resurgent Russia, North Carolina U.P. (Chapel Hill, NC, 2018), p. 15.

13 A. Aslund, Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc, Cambridge U.P. (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 118, 308. Russian male life expectancy dropped nearly 10%, and suicides rose 60%, showing the extent of economic stress.

14 Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Are state-owned enterprises reformable?’, 18 December 2018.

15 World Bank, Sodruzhestya nezavisimykh gosudartsv v 2005g (Moscow, 2006).

16 Miller, Putinomics, p. xiii.

17 It can also go the other way: the political subjection of the Venezuelan state oil company, PDVSA, means that its workers are hired on a basis of political allegiance to the United Socialist Party of Venezuela. In 2002, when PDVSA employees went on strike to protest the policies of Chávez, 19,000 were fired, and Intevep, the research and development arm of PDVSA lost 80%, reducing its ability to innovate and compete globally. 1976-92, 29% of PDVSA revenues went towards costs, and 71% to the government. Because of this, Chávez and his successor Nicolás Maduro have been accused of treating it like a ‘piggybank’.

18 See G. Di Bella, O. Dynnikova, S. Slavov, ‘The Russian State’s Size and its Footprint: Have They Increased?’, IMF WP 19/53 (2019). See also Appendix III.

19 Miller, ‘Russians Lower Their Standards’, Foreign Policy, 11 February 2019.

20 EIU, 2018. See also Appendix IV.

21 ‘Chinese Multinationals Gain Further Momentum’, Vale Columbia Centre and Fudan University survey, 9 December 2010. Available at: https://emgp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/China_2010.pdf.

22 McGregor, ‘How the state runs business’.

23 Morrison, ‘China’s Economic Rise’, summary.

24 A. Bruce-Lockhart, ‘China’s $900 billion New Silk Road. What you need to know’, World Economic Forum, 26 June 2017. Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/china-new-silk-road-explainer/. It is estimated that 80% of funds invested in Pakistan, 50% in Myanmar, and 33% in Central Asia will be lost (J. Kynge, ‘How the Silk Road plans will be financed’, Financial Times, 9 May 2016). However, the trade off for this is an increase in Chinese hard power: land collaterals for debt in Kyrgyzstan (where per capita debt was $703 in 2018) or the entire Hambanthota Port in Sri Lanka (See M. Abi-Habib, ‘How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port’, New York Times, 25 June 2018. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html). In addition, it may prove to be a boon for the Chinese workforce, since 89% of BRI contracts will go to Chinese corporations.

25 J. Kurlantzick, State Capitalism: How the Return of Statism is Transforming the World, O.U.P. USA (New York, NY, 2016), p. 111.

26 Miller, The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy, p, 178: ‘Where the Soviet Union diverged from China, it was because powerful interest groups obstructed Gorbachëv’s policies’. Elsewhere, a school of thought argues that the new “interest group” in Russian politics is not economic, but military-political: the old guard of the KGB, the new FSB and SVR security services. For the best piece on this, see C. Belton, Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and then Took on the West, William Collins (London, 2020).

27 In 2016, Xi Jinping released a statement saying that ‘one million’ Chinese officials had been punished for corruption between 2013- 16 (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-37748241).

28 For an interesting and suggestive investigation of the Belt and Road Initiative, refer to P. Frankopan, ‘The Roads to Beijing’, in The New Silk Roads: The Present and Future of the World, Bloomsbury (London, 2019), pp. 87-151.

Graphs

29 Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance, p. 61.

30 V. Popov, ‘China’s rise, Russia’s fall: Medium term perspective’, TIGER Working Paper Series No. 99 (2007), p. 10.

31 A. Abramov, A. Radygin & M. Chernova, ‘State-owned enterprises in the Russian market: Ownership structure and their role in the

economy’, Russian Journal of Economics, vol. 3, no. 1 (2017), pp. 1-23, fig. 6.

32 EIU, 2018.

33 N.R. Lardy, ‘State Sector Support in China Is Accelerating’, PIIE, 28 October 2019.

34 V. Nee & S. Opper, ‘On politicized capitalism’ (2006), p. 41, table 7.

35 Morrison, ‘China’s Economic Rise’, p. 9; EIU database.

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2020年历史奖并列第三名

How is the modern world different from previous periods of history and why did it come into existence when and where it did?

现代世界与以前的历史时期有何不同,为什么它是在何时何地出现的?

梅根·崔,菲利普斯安多弗学院,美国
2020年历史奖并列第三名|8.5 分钟阅读

Transport yourself to the moment when you open your eyes every morning. Think carefully about what your first impulse is. Perhaps your first thought is something along the lines of: what’s going on? Or, perhaps more accurately: what have I missed? And you reach for your phone to find out. You’re not alone; 80% of people check their phones within fifteen minutes of waking up each morning and a whopping one quarter of people check it within the first minute![1] It is precisely this shared impulse that defines us as members of a modern society.

It’s impossible to pinpoint a specific period in history when the world transitioned into modernity because there isn’t one. Instead, the key to what engendered the modern world existed within the minds of an uncountable number of individuals. Most people might indicate a major technological shift, like the Industrial Revolution, when seeking the start of the modern era. Technology did in fact play a tremendous role in ushering in the modern age, but it was not the only factor. It was the urge of people to become part of something greater, in tandem with technological growth, which is closer to the truth. The technological development in question is the advent of media via the printing press, leading to mass media with the transistor radio, the telephone, the television, the internet, and the smartphone. As national consciousness grew among the occupants of the world’s fledgling nations, so too did the demand for faster, more comprehensive media to sustain the common need to become part of an imagined community. Regardless of the time period, whenever national consciousness awoke in large part due to a sophisticated media system, modernity was being formed. In short, historically, modern is media.

The philosophical underpinnings of this thesis lie with Benedict Anderson and his book, Imagined Communities. The central idea is that modernity and nation-building went hand in hand. Although we could therefore pin the answer to the question during the era of the nation-state[2], it would be a disservice to the sociological and psychological developments taking place in the mind, where modernity truly resides. Due to the proliferation of print media (in the form of newspapers and novels) the very concept of time was forever altered, laying the foundation for the nation to emerge. A person in a pre-modern society believed they were living in a flat timeline, forever in the “end times” approaching the apocalypse. This is why the Catholic Church held such sway over most of Europe—they dictated how time was experienced. People would have rarely left their individual communities, farms, and congregations. They wouldn't have thought of themselves as “Frenchmen” but rather something much more mundane like “Jacques from up the bend.[3]” They certainly wouldn’t care what Marguerite from the coast of Nice was up to and probably couldn’t even conceive of the lived experience of Li Wei from Shanghai.

Print media changed that forever. For the first time, Jacques could read a newspaper about “new” things occurring that were important to know. Experiences from around the country and the world filled in the mental map Jacques had of the world, broadening his scope but at the same time planting him firmly in France. Things presented in the newspaper became legitimate because of the fact that they were publicized for all to read. Newspapers helped shape public opinion of the members of a nation, suppressing dissenting views and shaping what it meant to think like a Frenchman, Chinese, American, etc. If something was done “for the people” like the creation of public education or even starting a war, modern listeners would readily accept it. More intimately, people gained the sense of intersubjectivity—that they could share an experience with another member of their nation that they will never even meet. This idea can be illustrated best with letter writing (or text messaging today) because in order to rationally write a letter and expect a reply, one had to assume there would be another person doing the same thing, living a life very similar to theirs. People began to care about other “selves” in the world. By reading novels they could get into the minds of characters from their own nation, from other nations, other genders, ages, and on. By spending leisure time at the cafe, they could interact with other selves by discussing the news of the day.

A modern nation is only possible because of this imagined community, a sense of shared stuff that all people from that nation possess. As states became modern, they adopted a national flag, a clearly defined border, and a shared history that included all people for the first time[4]. National identities were constructed around a “bricolage” of things that were already present in society and this was presented by the media as the type of person to emulate. As Michael Kim lays out, this is how Koreans envisioned themselves as more than just a subset of China (as the old Yangban elites might have preferred) to a new national Korean people, putting Korea as the new center rather than accepting China’s status as the “middle country”. Koreans at the dawn of modernity had to collectively agree that all other Koreans eat kimchi, write in hangul, speak a certain dialect, and live specific cultural patterns based on their particular bricolage and what was carried over the airwaves from Seoul-based radio stations. In fact, television and radio were heavily responsible for destroying regional dialects and cultures to promote a kind of national mono-culture. Even though those regional accents and proclivities may still exist in the world today, by just following the media one might never know it. According to structuralism, a speech act performed by the media could implant an idea in the minds of consumers. If an American is supposed to fear Mexicans, the president might go on television and say, “Mexicans are dangerous” and make it so. The disparity of power the media has on the minds of citizens can be compared to the power differential between a preacher at a mega-church and a homeless preacher on the sidewalk. Their power rests in the size of their audience, not in what they say.

The cultural pattern is worth delving further into because the media greatly shaped the ways that early modern people lived their lives, creating a human that might even be recognizable today as “modern”. By imagining that everyone else in one’s nation is doing the same thing, it encourages conformity and senses of security and belonging by doing those things. In the mornings, an early modern person would go buy their daily newspaper driven by the same impulse that compels you to reach for your phone upon waking. By reading the news, they would know what to talk about during the coffee break at their job. It’s worth considering why they are even taking a break at all, (because it’s permissible, because their peers do, because there’s time), and why coffee is the beverage of choice, (because it’s advertised everywhere in the paper and regaled as the popular thing to drink, of course[5]). The adoption of cultural patterns lead to a convergence towards a uniform national identity, even in mundane matters like the beverage one drinks. Years ago in America there were so many regional tonics and elixirs like cronk sarsaparilla[6]—which was touted in local newspapers as “the drink”—but in modern America, there’s really only Coca-Cola and Pepsi.

Modernity, propelled by the media and implanted into the minds of citizens, leads to a great convergence. We can say the world is recognizably “modern” because it looks the same everywhere. In the modern world, there is only one “civilization” that each nation must conform to. This concept seems to justify imperialism since if a place exists without the civilization that one’s nation enjoys, it would only be right for a modern citizen to support spreading their modern civilization “over there”. Thus, imperialism acted as a method to spread modernity worldwide and shape all parts of the world into a uni-form, recognizable to all. Before modernity, the world must have been so much more incredibly diverse than we can possibly imagine today. Essentially, the world took after Europe since European powers were responsible for conquering most of it, (with Japan joining in on the trend towards the end).

As media continues to develop, so too does the individuality we regard as essential today. As the world becomes more connected due to technology, we become more sure of our sovereignty. Media helped change the narrative on sovereignty, shifting it from the monarch towards the individual, sanctifying individual rights such as free speech—or the right to put your pen to paper or your finger to the touchscreen and write as you please to a friend. Through the media, people learn the symbolic representations of what it means to be modern such as how to dress, what to buy, how to speak and so on. Modernity becomes a “package deal” that must be consumed like any other commodity. In fact, our identities have become so intertwined with commodities that even personal information can be bought and sold. Essentially, the true aim of mass media is to remove barriers of communication and deterritorialize people in the service of consumption to fuel the modern nation state. This may always have been the aim of media and modernity in general—to individualize people and thus make them easier to control. Eventually, modern people transform the technologies designed to govern them such as mass media, a unified time zone, and schedules into tools to dominate the self on behalf of the state. Remember reaching for your phone after waking up? Just why did you wake up when you did? You woke up because of the alarm you had set for yourself to get up and go to work for the nation state.

Modernity may still be an unfinished project, but its origin is firmly rooted in the development of media and lies not in anything physical but within the minds of individuals. Modernity happened and is happening whenever and wherever in the world things are being “civilized” through a process of standardization informed by mass media. Our system of dates and understanding of history cannot pin an exact time for modernity’s origin because that system is an illusion that never occured the way we think it did. In a pre-modern viewpoint, we could still simply be living day by day, connected merely to those in our inner circle—but we believe ourselves to be part of something much bigger. People have irrevocably changed due to modernity into “individuals” who resemble one another much more closely than pre-modern persons ever did. Perhaps as new media continues to develop, imagined communities will crop up around commonalities that are not tied to any nation-state, altering history once again. People head to online mass media to find their imagined communities, whether it is a livestream of a new video game, a popular discussion forum on reddit, a fandom of personality-driven cooking shows on Youtube, or the thrill of enlisting in the BTS K-Pop army alongside similar individuals with that same niche interest, to which members might claim stronger allegiance than their own nation state!

Footnotes:

1 Pinkman,“80% Of Smartphone Users Check Their Phones Before Brushing Their Teeth ... And Other Hot Topics.” The New York Post goes further, claiming Americans check their phones 80 times per day.

2 Let’s say the 19th Century.

3 Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen.

4 This shared history always purports that the nation had existed in some form in ancient times, even in instances when the actual creation of the nation was much more recent than commonly thought, like with the modern iteration of Italy, founded in 1861 and the PRC in 1949.

5 Not to mention brought in by the boatload from a tropical nation thanks to modern trade routes.

6 The Guardian, “Cronk Rules Everything Around Me”

Bibliography

Anderson, Benedict R. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London, 1982.

Cecco, Leyland. “'Cronk Rules Everything around Me': Long-Lost Beverage Resurrected after 120 Years.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 3 July 2020, www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/03/dr-cronk-drink-canada-brewery.

Habermas Jürgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: an Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991.

Kim, Michael. “Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Transnationalism in Korean History.” The Routledge Handbook of Korean Culture and Society, by Youna Kim, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017, pp. 15–34.

Kim, Michael. “The Colonial Public Sphere and the Discursive Mechanism of Mindo.” Mass Dictatorship and Modernity, 2013, pp. 178–202., doi:10.1057/9781137304339_10.

Kim, Michael. “Nation-Building and Development as Ideology and Practice.” The Palgrave Handbook of Mass Dictatorship, 2016, pp. 51–65., doi:10.1057/978-1-137-43763-1_5.

Pinkham, Ryan“80% Of Smartphone Users Check Their Phones Before Brushing Their Teeth ... And Other Hot Topics.” Constant Contact, 15 Dec. 2014, blogs.constantcontact.com/smartphone-usage-statistics/#:~:text=How%20about%20check%20yo ur%20phone,of%20waking%20up%20each%20morning.

Weber, Eugen. Peasants into Frenchmen: the Modernization of Rural France: 1870-1914. Stanford University Press, 1976.

2020年历史奖得主

How is the modern world different from previous periods of history and why did it come into existence when and where it did? (Dr. Stephen Davies, Institute of Economic Affairs)

现代世界与以前的历史时期有何不同,为什么它是在何时何地出现的?(斯蒂芬·戴维斯博士,经济事务研究所)

Runan Lin,乔治城预科学校,美国
2020年历史奖得主|7 分钟阅读

Picture a country that is the global leader in terms of military strength and political influence. It has a complex law code that governs all parts of the population regardless of their social or economic status; it plays a major role in global trade and maintains a vibrant industrial system divided into public and private sectors; this is a country whose population comes from different cultures and has various religious affiliations, including but not limited to Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam; this country practices the idea of meritocracy - selecting government officials on the base of merit - and has a complex system of government built upon the balance of power. This country is also unrivaled globally in civil and military technology, its inventions being spread across continents.

This country, of course, is China during the Tang and Song dynasties. The “complex law code” refers to the law code of the Tang Dynasty, which went through three major modifications and included four distinct forms of law enforcement;[1] meritocracy is exercised through the Keju examination system; the “complex system of government” refers to the “Three Departments and Six Ministries” model, which divides the government into three major branches and six subordinating ministries; advanced “civil and military technology” is exemplified in the development of gunpowder and the introduction of paper currency. Indeed, for many living during the Tang-Song period, this was the pinnacle of civilization, their “modern” society.[2]

The Oxford Dictionary defines the concept of modern as “[pertaining to] the present time or recent times.”[3] The Encyclopaedia Britannica explains modernity as “the self-definition of a generation about its own technological innovation, governance, and socioeconomics,” and the key phrase in this explanation is “self-definition of a generation.[4] This essay aims to reconsider the questions of how, why, when, and where the modern world came into existence, and what sets it apart from the pre-modern world. Instead of tying the emergence of the modern world to a specific time and place, this work will analyze several historical periods to suggest that the definition of modernity is extremely subjective and that this concept manifests itself differently in various times and places.

Since modernity is, according to the Encyclopedia Britannica, “a self-definition of a generation,” the concepts of modernity and of a modern society have been subject to different interpretations at different time periods. For example, the United States considered itself to be the “City upon a Hill,” the beacon of liberty and the avant-garde in democracy and human rights. American Exceptionalism was a common theme since the founding of the young republic, and Thomas Jefferson famously described the United States in the following words:

[The United States was] trusted with the destinies of this solitary republic of the world, the only monument of human rights, and the sole depository of the sacred fire of freedom and self-government from hence it is to be lighted up in other regions of the earth, if other regions of the earth shall ever become susceptible of its benign influence. All mankind ought then, with us, to rejoice in its prosperous, and sympathize in its adverse fortunes, as involving every thing dear to man.[5]

The founding fathers had indeed provided their citizens with more personal and political freedom under a democratic elective government, and, at the time, the United States did indeed seem modern. However, only several decades later, Frederick Douglass and W.E.B. DuBois would go on to challenge Jefferson’s perception of America as the epitome of modernity and freedom and the best realization of Enlightenment ideals by pointing to the institution of slavery and to racial injustice. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when the US was at the forefront of modernity in terms of industrial developments, activists such as Elizabeth C. Stanton criticised the society’s unequal and backward treatment of women in social, economic, and political spheres. What was thought to be modern in the 19th and early 20th centuries became obsolete within a matter of a few decades, once again demonstrating that the understanding of modernity changes over time.

Even within the same historical period, however, modernity remains an extremely subjective concept that could be interpreted differently in different places and cultures. In the Middle Ages, Europe saw little progress under the shadows of feudalism and manorialism, while the Islamic World and China were entering their respective “golden ages.” In the Middle Ages, the Islamic World was reaching unprecedented heights in cultural and scientific advancements. Mathematician al-Khwarizmi created the concept of algebra, Arab scholars in Cordoba translated and preserved the works of great Greco-Roman writers, and Muslim scholars made remarkable progress in medicine and navigation technology.[6] At the same time, Song Dynasty China was going through a golden age similar to that in the Islamic World. Therefore, while a resident of Song Dynasty China would have considered paper currency, thousand-miles-long canals, and civil service examinations to be modern, a contemporary Western European would have never heard of gunpowder, compasses, spices of Asia, and social mobility and would have seen the heavy plough as the pinnacle of modernity.[7]

When Europeans first discovered the American continent and came into contact with the natives, the Aztecs must have thought that Tenochtitilan was the most developed city of the world, and firearms, written languages, and the Renaissance were definitely not included in their definition “modernity.” Similarly, during the Industrial Age, Emperor Qianlong of Qing Dynasty wrote a letter to King George III of the United Kingdom in which he claimed that “...our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its own borders. There was therefore no need to import the manufactures [sic] of outside barbarians in exchange for our own produce.”[8] At the time of this letter (1793), Great Britain was embroiled in the new ideas of the Enlightenment and the inception of the Industrial Revolution and was considered to be the most advanced nation in terms of its military and civilian technology. While an 18th-century European would have defined modernity in terms of factorial production, voting, and republicanism, a citizen of the Qing Empire would have had a vastly different interpretation of the term. This is reflected in Qianlong’s belief that the Celestial Empire possessed “all things in prolific abundance and lacked no product within its own borders” and therefore did not need to be modernized any further.[9]

In each of the examples above, it is clear that interpretations of the concept of “modern” differ drastically across time and space. Many scholars, including those not coming from a Western background, believe that the Enlightenment marks the beginning of the modern world.[10] However, if these criteria are applied to the contemporary world, then countries that do not have a democratic or republican form of government or do not otherwise conform to the western standards of modernity would have no place in our shared modernity. Such a Western-centric approach dismisses the cultural and scientific innovations that non-Western civilizations have made throughout history, thus contributing to the establishment of the modern world from which they are now excluded. While the Western understanding of modernity is becoming more prevalent around the world due to globalization, the contemporary world still does not have a unified definition of “modern,” nor do people in different parts of today’s world experience modernity in the same way. Even in the 21st century, absolute monarchs retain their power in kingdoms such as Saudi Arabia and Brunei,[11] despite the fact that this system of government goes against the ideals of natural rights, republicanism, and democracy. Even throughout the Western world, undisputedly “modern” to most, is still plagued by issues such as slavery and human trafficking, as well as the remnants of racial discrimination rooted in slavery. 12.3 million people remain under some form of forced labor, and at least 10,000 of them are in the United States - the number would increase further if the incarcerated population were included in this statistic.[12] Stories of forced laborers being moved across huge tracts of land and being abused along the way frequently make us question our socioeconomic definition of “modern.”

In all of the three main factors defining modernity according to the Encyclopaedia Britannica - technological innovation, governance, and socio-economics - the world had never before, has not yet, and probably never will, reach a consensus. In terms of technological innovation, the internet could not be accessed by 89.3% of the households in Africa and 52.4% in Asia and the Middle East.[13] In terms of governance, the debate ensues in terms of the balance between individual freedom and security ever since John Locke’s proposal of a social contract theory. The discrepancy among attitudes towards socio-economics upheld by various nations is even more extensive and complex. Taking these three factors into consideration, it is impossible to identify a specific point in history during which everyone in the world lived according to the same definition of modernity, which suggests that the concept of modernity is subject to individual interpretation and that there has never been and never will be a universal “modern world.”

Footnotes

1 Li Linfu, Tang Liudian, ed. Jiuling Zhang (Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1978).

2 Patricia Buckley Ebrey, The Cambridge Illustrated History of China, trans. Shiyu Zhao, Shiling Zhao, and Hongyan Zhang (Jinan, Shandong: Shandong Huabao Press, 2001), pp.76-92; 98-105.

3 “Modern,” Oxford Learner's Dictionaries, accessed June 12, 2020, https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/modern?q=modern.

4 Sharon L. Snyder, “Modernity,” Encyclopædia Britannica (Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., May 20, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/topic/modernity.

5 Thomas Jefferson, “Thomas Jefferson to the Citizens of Washington, D.C., 4 March.,” National Archives and Records Administration (National Archives and Records Administration), accessed June 13, 2020, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-01-02-0006.

6 Amira K. Bennison, The Great Caliphs: the Golden Age of the Abbasid Empire (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2014), pp.181-186.

7 “China in 1000 CE,” The Song Dynasty in China (Asia for Educators, Columbia University, 2020), http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/songdynasty-module/index.html; Thomas Barnebeck Andersen, Peter S. Jensen, and Christian Skovsgaard, “The Heavy Plough and the Agricultural Revolution in Medieval Europe,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2362894.

8 Qianlong, “Letter to George III, 1793,” Internet History Sourcebooks (Fordham University, 2020), https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1793qianlong.asp.

9 Qianlong, “Letter to George III, 1793,” Internet History Sourcebooks (Fordham University, 2020), https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1793qianlong.asp.

10 Yi Junqing, and Lingmei Fan, "Dimensions of Modernity and Their Contemporary Fate," Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1, no. 1 (2006): 6-21, Accessed June 15, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/30209946. This article serves as a good example ofto the argument above, with the authors - both Chinese- beginning by defining modernity as “the cultural schemata and mechanisms of social action stemming from the Enlightenment.”

11 Harry St. John Bridger Philby, William L. Ochsenwald, and Joshua Teitelbaum, “Saudi Arabia,” Encyclopædia Britannica (Encyclopædia Britannica, iInc., June 13, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/place/Saudi-Arabia; Ooi Jin Bee, Mohamad Yusop Damit, and Pushpa Thambipillai, “Brunei,” Encyclopædia Britannica (Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., June 15, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/place/Brunei.

12 Rodger Doyle, "Modern Slavery," Scientific American 294, no. 1 (2006): 30, Accessed June 16, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/26061289.

13 Marcus Leaning, “Internet Accessibility Continental Comparison,” UNESCO, accessed June 23, 2020, https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/milweek17_marcus_leaning.pdf.

Bibliography

Andersen, Thomas Barnebeck, Peter S. Jensen, and Christian Skovsgaard. “The Heavy Plough and the Agricultural Revolution in Medieval Europe.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2362894.

Bennison, Amira K. The Great Caliphs: the Golden Age of the Abbasid Empire. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2014.

Bee, Ooi Jin, Mohamad Yusop Damit, and Pushpa Thambipillai. “Brunei.” Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., June 15, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/place/Brunei.

“China in 1000 CE.” The Song Dynasty in China. Asia for Educators, Columbia University, 2020. http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/songdynasty-module/index.html.

Doyle, Rodger. "Modern Slavery." Scientific American 294, no. 1 (2006): 30. Accessed June 16,

2020. www.jstor.org/stable/26061289.

Ebrey, Patricia Buckley. The Cambridge Illustrated History of China. Translated by Shiyu Zhao, Shiling Zhao, and Hongyan Zhang. Jinan, Shandong: Shandong Huabao Press, 2001.

Hunter, Shireen T. "Can Islam and Modernity Be Reconciled?" Insight Turkey 11, no. 3 (2009): 1-12. Accessed June 15, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/26331091.

Leaning, Marcus. “Internet Accessibility Continental Comparison.” Internet Accessibility.

UNESCO. Accessed June 23, 2020. https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/milweek17_marcus_leaning.pdf.

Linfu, Li. Tang Liudian. Edited by Jiuling Zhang. Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1978.

“Modern.” Oxford Learner's Dictionaries. Accessed June 12, 2020. https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/modern?q=modern.

Qianlong. “Letter to George III, 1793.” Internet History Sourcebooks. Fordham University, 2020. https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1793qianlong.asp. From E. Backhouse and J.

O. P. Bland, Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1914), pp. 322-331

Snyder, Sharon L. “Modernity.” Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., May 20, 2016. https://www.britannica.com/topic/modernity.

“Thomas Jefferson to the Citizens of Washington, D.C., 4 March 1809,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-01-02-0006. [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Retirement Series, vol. 1, 4 March

1809 to 15 November 1809, ed. J. Jefferson Looney. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, pp. 13–14.]

Yi, Junqing, and Lingmei Fan. "Dimensions of Modernity and Their Contemporary Fate." Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1, no. 1 (2006): 6-21. Accessed June 15, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/30209946.

2019年经济学一等奖

What does economics tell us about the benefits and costs of immigration? What policy should we adopt?

经济学告诉我们移民的好处和成本是什么?我们应该采取什么政策?

卢克·杜西,日耳曼敦学院,美利坚合众国
2019年经济学奖得主和大奖得主|8 分钟阅读

United States President Donald Trump recently voiced the concerns of many citizens when he proclaimed, “Illegal immigration hurts American workers; burdens American taxpayers; and . . . costs our country billions and billions of dollars each year.”[1] Similar sentiments are expressed in the United Kingdom, where native workers fear the “Polish plumber,”[2] and in Australia, where Australian Labor Party leader, Bill Shorten, warns that work visas “undercut local jobs, wages and conditions.”[3] At first glance, it may seem reasonable to conclude that, with a fixed number of jobs available, immigrants present a threat to native workers. However this Malthusian logic incorrectly assumes immigrants are perfect substitutes for locals and that the demand for labor is static.

Recent empirical work demonstrates that firms, workers, and markets are dynamic and able to adapt to an expanded workforce.[4] While large-scale immigration may have distributional implications, there is little evidence to support claims that, on a macro level, immigration depresses wages, drives up unemployment, or burdens taxpayers.[5] In fact, economic theory and empirical studies demonstrate that in the long run immigration raises productivity, wages, and living standards.[6] At the global level, researchers estimate that the removal of all barriers to labor mobility would double world GDP.[7] Staggering gains of this order suggest that international immigration policy deserves careful consideration.

Immigration is a complex and emotion-charged matter, but any serious examination of this issue must be grounded in fact. Fortunately, existing economic literature provides the empirical evidence and the analytical framework to rationally examine the issue, starting with the impetus behind approximately 260 million[8] immigrants in the world today and another 750 million[9] who would move permanently to another country if given the opportunity. In his seminal work first published in 1932, Nobel Laureate John Hicks posits, “Differences in net economic advantages, chiefly differences in wages, are the main cause of migration.”[10] In 1987 Harvard economist George Borjas employed a selection model, based on the work of Andrew Roy, to demonstrate that potential migrants consider relative return to skill and skill transferability in addition to relative income levels.[11]

Individuals weigh the benefits of emigrating against the often-significant costs and barriers presented by such an endeavor. For instance, policy in the host country may target specific individual attributes or restrict the total number of immigrants. Legal immigrants must pay passport, visa, and transportation fees. Undocumented migrants who seek illicit entry may pay a smuggler or incur significant physical risk. Once inside the host country, new immigrants may lack the local network, credentials, or labor market expertise needed to find suitable employment in a timely manner. There are also psychic costs that may arise from the language barrier, unfamiliar cultural norms, and social isolation.

Despite these challenges, the potential productivity gains from migration are significant. In a perfectly competitive labor market, each worker is paid a wage commensurate with the value he produces. Migration allows workers to seek higher wages by moving to a location where they are more productive. This yields a more efficient allocation of labor that economists estimate is worth as much as 130 trillion dollars in additional global output.[12] If even 5% of the world’s poorest were to migrate to developed nations, the increase in world GDP would be greater than the increase from the complete elimination of all international barriers to the movement of goods, services, and capital flows.[13] Yet, in spite of the potential gains, nearly every developed country places restrictions on immigration.[14]

One factor driving these restrictions is that many presume immigrants depress natives’ wages.[15] However in practice, because of differences in language, vocational, and technical skills, most immigrant workers are not close substitutes for native workers and, therefore, do not compete for the same jobs.[16] In fact, immigrants often are complements in production, rather than substitutes. In an oft-cited paper, economists Giovanni Peri and Chad Sparber, present a dynamic process where natives respond to an influx of immigrants by shifting into jobs that leverage their comparative advantage.[17] This occurs across the education spectrum; less-educated natives respond to an increase in less-educated immigrants by shifting from manual-intensive to communication-intensive jobs, and college-educated natives move into managerial roles when high-skilled engineers and scientists enter the country.[18]

Of course, the gains from immigration are not evenly distributed. Harvard economist George Borjas grouped U.S. workers into skill cells based on their education and experience. Borjas found that, within certain skill cells, immigration has a statistically significant negative impact on weekly earnings, particularly among the less educated.[19] Studies in Canada, Germany, and Norway yielded similar results.[20] Although the skill cells technique does not capture the possible benefits to natives who change their skill sets over time in response to immigration, it does offer empirical evidence that in the short run weekly earnings of less-educated natives are hurt by an inflow of immigrants with similar skills.

However in the long run overall wages will rise with productivity, and studies show a positive relationship between immigration and productivity gains. High-skilled immigrants attract capital investment and foster innovation, both of which boost labor productivity.[21] Less-skilled immigrant workers, such as landscapers and childcare providers, encourage more high-skilled natives, especially women, to enter the workforce.[22] Immigrants who are investors or entrepreneurs boost native employment and expand the set of available goods and services.[23] And because immigrants have knowledge of the available products, business norms, and regulations in their home country, they are able to facilitate welfare improving international trade by lowering transaction costs[24] and providing greater product variety.[25]

In addition to concerns about the labor market, many citizens of developed countries harbor fear that immigrants are a burden to native taxpayers.[26] However, here too the evidence suggests that such concerns may be unfounded. Estimates of immigration’s fiscal impact vary but a survey of the relevant literature reveals a number of clear patterns. To begin with, the fiscal impact of immigration tends to be positive and relatively small.[27] For example, a comprehensive study undertaken by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, using static accounting in 2013, found that in twenty out of the twenty-seven member nations studied, the net fiscal contribution by immigrants was between zero and 0.5% of GDP.[28] In general, empirical studies show a greater positive net fiscal impact in countries with more highly skilled immigrants and a lower or even negative impact in countries with large humanitarian immigrant inflows.[29] Younger immigrants tend to have a more positive fiscal impact because they are healthier, participate in the labor force longer, and assimilate more successfully than older immigrants.[30]

The benefits of migration extend to the sending country as well. The most direct benefit comes from remittances which, according to the World Bank, often exceed total foreign aid and, in nine countries, account for more than 20% of GDP.[31] Furthermore, although early research from distinguished economists such as Jagdish Bhagwati and Koichi Hamada warned of dire consequences for origin countries losing highly skilled immigrants—so-called brain drain—the data show these fears to be largely unfounded provided emigration rates do not exceed 35%.[32] Brain drain fails to materialize because, in addition to cash payments and investments, high-skilled emigrants return expertise and institutional reform to the sending country.[33] Furthermore, the mere prospect of emigration incents the population, only a fraction of whom will ultimately leave, to attain greater levels of education and training.[34] All these factors raise total factor production and living standards in the sending country.[35]

Despite the benefits for both the origin and host countries, constructing fair and effective immigration policy is a complicated normative process that must allow for historical, political, and social considerations. As such, current immigration policy varies greatly across the globe from family-based policy in the United States to point-based systems in Australia to guest worker programs in the United Arab Emirates. Family-based immigrants tend to have lower earnings at entry but experience faster wage growth because of better social networks and greater incentive to acquire locally valued human capital.[36] Point-based systems favor immigrants with specified characteristics such as education, occupation, or language skills. These systems result in more high-skilled immigrants but often these skills do not transfer well to the host country, and the criteria may not be flexible enough to keep pace with the dynamic needs of an ever-changing business environment. Guest worker programs offer greater flexibility to meet labor shortages and may discourage illegal immigration, but workers typically return home after a specified period of time and have limited access to social services.[37]

Every policy has relative strengths and each situation is unique, but there are proven measures host nations may take to enhance immigrants’ odds of success, beginning with language training. Language skills are critical, and immigrant-focused language programs lead to greater economic success and social integration.[38] Active labor market programs, such as job search assistance and counseling, workplace introduction, and on-going mentoring, increase employment rates for immigrants.[39] Lastly, immigrants tend to achieve greater success in countries with flexible labor markets and effective anti-discrimination law.[40]

Sound policy must also account for the native workers negatively impacted by immigration, especially older and less-educated individuals.[41] This is a particularly vulnerable group and many government run programs designed to retrain and re-employ this cohort are ineffective.[42] However programs that leverage the power of the private sector are often more successful. For example, Swedish industries and unions jointly established the Job Security Councils,[43] and in Germany the Federal Employment Agency provides vouchers to cover the cost of privately run retraining and job placement services.[44] These programs are more effective because they better identify the skills most in demand and more quickly adjust to changes in the economic environment.[45]

Although economic models predict monumental gains from unrestricted international labor mobility, this is not politically feasible in the near term. An incremental approach to such a grand, and largely irreversible, endeavor is more pragmatic. That said, there is a compelling argument for immigration policy driven by market forces rather than bureaucratic rules. An example of such an approach, first proposed by Nobel Laureate Gary Becker, calls for the daily sale of a set number of visas in an open market, at a price determined by the laws of supply and demand.[46] Economist Benjamin Powell proposes the annual sale of 5 immigrant visas for permanent residency per 1,000 of host country population.[47] The cost of the visa may be paid by the immigrant worker, the employer, or a third party such as a charitable foundation. Payment could be financed with a traditional loan or even an Income Share Agreement.[48]

A market-based approach may be more politically feasible because it attracts immigrants with more productive and entrepreneurial potential, and visa payments contribute to government revenue.[49] It is arguably more fair than existing policy because entry into the country is not determined by family ties, country of origin, inflexible point-based systems, or other Byzantine regulation. Market-based policy could be augmented with a procedure that allows current undocumented workers to purchase a visa, in the open market, after successful completion of a non-trivial amnesty program. In some cases the needs of a nation may be better served by selling two types of visas, permanent and seasonal, in the open market or by making a relatively small number of free visas available to refugees from political or religious persecution. However, regardless of the particulars, free markets depend on the rule of law,[50] and therefore successful market-based policy must—some might say regrettably―include credible and sufficiently harsh consequences for illegal immigrants and their employers.

A robust body of empirical analysis over the last several decades challenges the notion that immigrants, in aggregate, undermine local labor markets or strain government budgets. Rather, the data suggest that in the long run immigration raises living standards for natives as well as immigrants. A further reduction in barriers to international labor mobility could add tens of trillions of dollars to global GDP.[51] Although immigration is often an emotional and politically contentious issue, potential immigrants and future generations deserve thoughtful policy based on sound principles and empirical evidence, not knee-jerk reactions and political pandering.

Footnotes

1 Donald Trump, “Remarks by President Trump on the Illegal Immigration Crisis and Border Security,” The White House, Roosevelt Room, Washington DC, November 1, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/.

2 Daniel Pimlott, “Migration: Why we need Polish plumbers,” Financial Times, February 22, 2006, https://www.ft.com/.

3 William Richard Shorten, “Protecting Local Workers – Restoring Fairness to Australia's Skilled Visa System,” Bill’s Media Releases, April 23, 2019, https://www.billshorten.com.au/.

4 Giovanni Peri, “Do Immigrant Workers Depress the Wages of Native Workers?” IZA World of Labor, (May 2014), 2.
5 Benjamin Powell, The Economics of Immigration: Market-Based Approaches, Social Science, and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 11-70.
6 Giovanni Peri, “Do Immigrant Workers Depress the Wages of Native Workers?” IZA World of Labor, (May 2014), 1.
7 Michael A. Clemens, “Economics and emigration: Trillion-dollar bills on the sidewalk?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22, no. 3 (2011), Table 1.

8 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, International Migration Report 2017: Highlights, (New York, 2017) Table 1, https://www.un.org.

9 Neli Esipova, Anita Pugliese, and Julie Ray, “More Than 750 Million Worldwide Would Migrate If They Could,” Gallop, (December 10, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/

10 John R. Hicks, The Theory of Wages, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1963), 76.
11 George J. Borjas, “Self-selection and the Earnings of Immigrants,” American Economic Review 77, no. 4 (1987): 551-52.

12 Michael A. Clemens, “Economics and emigration: Trillion-dollar bills on the sidewalk?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22, no. 3 (2011), Table 1.

13 Benjamin Powell, The Economics of Immigration: Market-Based Approaches, Social Science, and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 2.

14 Ibid., 11.

15 Giovanni Peri, “Do Immigrant Workers Depress the Wages of Native Workers?” IZA World of Labor, (May 2014), 2.

16 Ibid., 8.

17 Giovanni Peri and Chad Sparber. “Task Specialization, Immigration and Wages.” American Economic Journal 1, no. 3 (2009): 135-69.

18 Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri, “Rethinking the Effect of Immigration on Wages.” Journal of the European Economic Association 10, no. (2012): 191.

19 George J. Borjas, “The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, no. 4 (2003): 1346-48.

20 Cynthia Bansak, Nicole B. Simpson, and Madeline Zavodny, The Economics of Immigration, (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), 183.

21 Cynthia Bansak, Nicole B. Simpson, and Madeline Zavodny, The Economics of Immigration, (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), 188-204.

22 Patricia Cortes and Jose Tessada, “Low-Skilled Immigration and the Labor Supply of Highly Skilled Women,” American Economic Journal Applied Economics 3, no. 3 (July 2011): 110-11.

23 Jennifer Hunt, “Which Immigrants Are Most Innovative and Entrepreneurial? Distinctions by Entry Visa,” Journal of Labor Economics 29, no. 3 (2011): 419-22.

24 Cynthia Bansak, Nicole B. Simpson, and Madeline Zavodny, The Economics of Immigration, (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), 201-02.

25 Chen Bo and David S. Jacks, “Trade, Variety, and Immigration,” Economics Letters 117, no. 1 (March 2012): 243-46, doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.007.

26 Giovanni Peri, “Do Immigrant Workers Depress the Wages of Native Workers?” IZA World of Labor, (May 2014), 2.

27 Cynthia Bansak, Nicole B. Simpson, and Madeline Zavodny, The Economics of Immigration, (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), 232.

28 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Migration Outlook 2013 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013), doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2013-en.

29 Cynthia Bansak, Nicole B. Simpson, and Madeline Zavodny, The Economics of Immigration, (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), 230-32.

30 Ibid., 230-34.

31 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2006 : Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration, (Washington DC: World Bank, 2006), 85-127.

32 Frederic Docquiera and Hillel Rapoport, “Quantifying the Impact of Highly-Skilled Emigration on Developing Countries,” Centre for Economic Policy Research (May 16, 2009): 77.

33 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2006 : Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration, (Washington DC: World Bank, 2006), 25-72.

34 Michael Beine, Frederic Docquier, and Hillel Rapoport, "Brain drain and human capital formation in developing countries: winners and losers," Economic Journal 118, no. 4 (2008): Table 1.

35 Benjamin Powell, The Economics of Immigration: Market-Based Approaches, Social Science, and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 23-31.

36 Cynthia Bansak, Nicole B. Simpson, and Madeline Zavodny, The Economics of Immigration, (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), 281-324.

37 Ibid., 313-318.

38 Barry Chiswick and Paul Miller, Handbook of the Economics of International Migration, Volume 1A: The Immigrants (Oxford: Elsevier, 2015), 213-70.

39 Ulf Rinne, “The Evaluation of Immigration Policies,” IZA Discussion Paper 6369 (February 2012): 19-20.

40 Cynthia Bansak, Nicole B. Simpson, and Madeline Zavodny, The Economics of Immigration, (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), 167, 325.

41 Ronald D'Amico and Peter Z. Schochet, The Evaluation of the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program: A Synthesis of Major Findings, Prepared for U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration. (Oakland, CA: Social Policy Research Associates and Princeton, NJ: Mathematica Policy Research, December 2012) iv..https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/.

42 Jeffrey Selingo, “The False Promises of Worker Retraining,” The Atlantic, January 8, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/.

43 Thomas K. Grose, “The Worker Retraining Challenge,” U.S. News and World Report, February 6, 2018, https://www.usnews.com/.

44 Julia Lang and Thomas Kruppe, “Labour Market Effects of Retraining for the Unemployed - the Role of Occupations,” German Economic Association Conference Paper, (August 2014): 26. http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100420.

45 Council of Economic Advisers. Addressing America’s Reskilling Challenge. (July 2018): 22. https://www.whitehouse.gov/.

46 Benjamin Powell, The Economics of Immigration: Market-Based Approaches, Social Science, and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 146-54.

47 Benjamin Powell, The Economics of Immigration: Market-Based Approaches, Social Science, and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 147.

48 Ibid.,152

49 Robert W. Fairlie, Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity, 1996-2011 (Kansas City, MO: Kauffman Foundation, 2013), 10-13.

50 Samuel Bufford, “International Rule of Law and the Market Economy - An Outline,” Southwest Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas 12, (2006): 311.

51 Michael A. Clemens, “Economics and emigration: Trillion-dollar bills on the sidewalk?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22, no. 3 (2011), 87.

Author’s Note

Unless specified otherwise, this paper will use the word “immigrants” to denote individuals who are not born a citizen of the country where they currently reside. This includes voluntary and humanitarian immigrants, who enter the host country with or without proper documentation, and stay on a temporary or permanent basis.

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