Progress and Retrogression in Philosophy

In the physical world, time measures progress and retrogression as steps along the linear timeline based on the empirical evidentiary facts. These facts are verified or falsified as time passes, which inextricably links time and progress. For example, replacing the heliocentrism with geocentrism is retrogressive because the astronomical evidence accumulated through time discredits the latter. However, progress in philosophy is incompatible with such a view because philosophy belongs to the abstract world, where the lack of empirical factual basis obfuscates the link between time and progress. Hence, a step backward in time does not necessarily equate to retrogression: we cannot say that the Aristotelian concept of justice is retrogressive compared to the Rawlsian concept purely based on the concept of time.

To answer the question, we need to construct a method that measures progress in philosophy. I seek to achieve this by asserting that, in philosophy, a certain degree of falsification is achievable. Utilizing philosophical inquiry and thought experiments, we can rationally assess the logical validity of theories and assign “true” and “false” status to philosophical thoughts. With this in mind, I propose to employ the fourth process of the Popperian model of progress - “t2 has passed tests which t1 failed to pass”[1] - divided into the following two conditions:

Progress occurs:
1. When the new theory provides a logical response to the deficiencies of existing thoughts.
2. When the new theory can be rationally justified from criticisms.

The first condition is crucial because the new theory must be a development from the previous idea to be considered as progress, where development is defined as rectifying the existing deficiencies. If not, the new theory fails the tests that existing theories had failed, which condemns it to the same false status as the existing theories. The second condition indicates that the new theory cannot be unjustifiably false, since no philosophers, seekers of the truth, would consciously advocate for a false theory. Holding false position necessitates irrational dogmatism, which deprives philosophy of truth and reason, of its goal and foundation.

Utilizing these two conditions, I contend that Aristotelian virtue ethics was progress from Kantian ethics and utilitarianism.

First Condition: Overcoming Social and Moral Schizophrenia

Social Schizophrenia

The sense of moral obligation thoroughly pervades within Kantian ethics and utilitarianism. Kant writes that only “an action done from duty has moral worth”[2]; likewise, Bentham states that pain and pleasure “point out what we ought to do.”[3] When used as moral terms, “ought” and “duty” adopt the special connotations of being obliged, bound, or required, which are concepts that necessitate a presence of law.[4] This insertion of law into ethics has its genealogical genesis in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, from its notions of the divine law and God (the law-giver). Although the Enlightenment rejected the existence of this divine law-giver, Enlightenment duty-based theories have preserved the Judaeo-Christian concepts of law-based obligation. In other words, they have clung onto the remnants of religious tradition despite the Nietzschean concept of the “Death of God.” Since the Enlightenment eliminated the notion of God, the core pillar of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, it becomes illogical for Enlightenment theories to maintain other aspects of the belief that it subverted. As Anscombe described, “it is as if the notion ‘criminal’ were to remain when criminal law and criminal courts had been abolished.”[5] Such phenomenon depicts my notion of “social schizophrenia,” where the societal disharmony arises from the simultaneous acceptance and rejection of Judaeo-Christian tradition.

To circumvent social schizophrenia, three non-divine alternatives to divine law have been proposed as the moral norm: society, contract, and human virtue.[6] However, if society were the moral standard, an individual is subjected to the circumstantial moral luck concerning whether the rules of the society are good or evil (e.g., 2019 Geneva vs. 1939 Munich). On the other hand, contracts cannot be the standard because people are ignorant of their being under a moral contractual obligation, when, unlike law, it is impossible to be under a contract without being aware. Thus, given the shortcomings of other alternatives, human virtue is the ideal moral norm. However, this outlook on human virtue replaces the Judaeo-Christian concept of “law-based obligation” with the Aristotelian “good man,” who is the rational “standard” of a virtuous and ethical life.[7] Adopting human virtue as the moral norm entails the elimination of “moral obligation” and the rejection duty-based theories in favor of Aristotelian virtue ethics.

In short, there are two approaches to overcome social schizophrenia:
1. Maintain duty-based theories but re-establish God as the divine law-giver (divine law as the norm)
2. Replace duty-based theories with Aristotelian virtue ethics (virtue as the norm)

The first choice reverts the secular philosophical progress since the Enlightenment, and, consequently, normative ethics retrogresses to infallible religious dogma, in which stagnation is the only possibility. Contrarily, the second option is more compatible with the progress of Enlightenment secularism in its overcoming of social schizophrenia.

Moral Schizophrenia

Kantian ethics and utilitarianism establish reason as the basis of moral duties and obligations. However, as evident in Kant’s rejection of emotions as a moral motivation or Bentham’s exclusion of motives from the list of variables for the felicific calculus, these theories eliminate personal motives - “values of personal and interpersonal relations and activities” - from ethical decisions.[8] We can deduce from this that there are moral circumstances where reason and motives clash in a state of disharmony. Michael Stocker calls such phenomenon “moral schizophrenia,” which he describes as “not to be moved by what one values” and vice versa.[9] Like social schizophrenia, moral schizophrenia raises detrimental implications to Kantian ethics and utilitarianism.

Let us consider the Trolly Problem to illustrate moral schizophrenia, ceteris paribus. A trolley is headed towards one’s child, who is on the main track. The moral agent can pull the lever to divert the trolley to the sidetrack, which contains three thieves.

Based purely on personal motives, the agent would resolutely pull the lever because the paternal love for one’s own child surpasses all the other relationships. However, a utilitarian agent, whose reason values mathematical utility, cannot sacrifice three lives for one, since utilitarianism regards every person as no more or less than a single human being. Similarly, a Kantian, whose reason values the categorical imperative (particularly the Second Formulation in this case) as the duty, cannot deliberately condemn the three people as means to the child’s end. For both cases, the agent experiences moral schizophrenia due to the dichotomy between the personal motive and reason.

As shown above, since moral actions lead to discontent in lieu of fulfillment, people are unable to attain the good life (eudaimonia) when reason and motive are in disharmony. Conversely, to actualize eudaimonia, one needs to live in accordance with virtue, which harmonizes reason and motive. I believe the reason is that Aristotle includes emotion within virtue ethics along with reason, since motives such as love and friendship are emotion-based, not reason-based. Aristotle holds that it is the characteristic of virtue to allow emotions “at the right times” and “in the right fashion.”[10] Here, Aristotle is not asserting emotions over reason, since the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean keeps emotions within the reins of reason. Instead, he is saying that one must possess a harmony of motive (emotion) and reason, as the purpose of virtue is to attain eudaimonia, not to fulfill a duty. To return to the Trolley Problem, a virtuous person would pull the lever based on the virtue of love as the harmony of the motive of parental love and the reasoning that a parent has a duty towards the child. Hence, unlike Kantian ethics and utilitarianism, Aristotelian virtue ethics succeeds in overcoming moral schizophrenia.

Second Condition: Defense of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

Self-Centeredness

Critics assert that self-centered ethical theories are retrogressive, as they claim that ethical theories progressed during the Enlightenment by placing the interests of others at the center. Prima facie, Aristotelian virtue ethics is self-centered: the purpose of a virtuous life is to gain eudaimonia for oneself.

Philippa Foot defends virtue as being “beneficial either to others, or to its possessor as well as to others.” Through the virtue of charity, the principal recipients of happiness are others.[11] Furthermore, the virtue of justice is “giving people what they deserve” based on merit, without particular regard to oneself.[12] However, this raises a deeper criticism that a virtuous agent generally disregards the virtuous character of others. From an act of virtue, the virtuous agent receives the most valuable thing (virtuous character for eudaimonia), while others receive momentary happiness. This “virtuous-character-for-self-and-happiness-for-others” mentality treats others and their happiness as a secondary means for the primary achievement of eudaimonia.

Intriguingly, David Solomon employs tu quoque (partner-in-crime) approach to reveal that this kind of self-centeredness is not unique to virtue ethics. In Kantian ethics, “it is self-contradictory to demand that I do (make it my duty to do) what only the other person himself can do.”[13] We can deduce from the previous statement that Kantian ethics is self-centered, considering that there is no duty requiring one to help others to act based on duty and achieve moral status. More subtly, this asymmetry between self and others is also observable in utilitarianism, a principle where an agent endeavors to make others benevolent as well. The benevolence of others is “only of instrumental concern” (to increase utility), while benevolence of self is more than such: benevolence of self is the perspective that gives the “moral significance” to the benevolence of others, but cannot “attain moral significance from this perspective because it is the perspective,” which grants oneself the exclusive “special status.”[14] Since self-centeredness is fundamentally shared amongst prevalent ethical theories, we, as human beings, must ask whether the complete detachment of self, or absolute self-less-ness, is even plausible.

Explicit Action-Guidance

The purpose of normative ethics is “to discover what the right action is.”[15] However, people criticize that Aristotelian virtue ethics lacks explicit action-guidance for all moral circumstances, that it is unable to clearly identify right and wrong, contrary to Kantian ethics and utilitarianism. This raises the fundamental issue of whether Aristotelian virtue ethics is a theory of normative ethics.

Firstly, I affirm that virtue ethics can provide specific action-guidelines. The Aristotelian mean doctrine defines vice (excess and deficiency) and virtue (mean of two vices) as “prohibition” and “positive instruction” that manifest clear specifications of “right action.”[16] These definitions enable us the capability of identifying right and wrong, which we can apply in moral circumstances as the guiding principles.

For those declaring virtue ethics as retrogression due to its lack of explicitness, they have to ponder whether explicit guidance for all moral possibilities is genuinely feasible. Sarah Broadie maintains that other theories fail to emulate the vast applicability of virtue ethics because only virtue ethics recognizes the impossibility of providing explicit action-guidance for every moral scenario “in itself,” considering that what is right “always depends on the particulars.”[17] Although Kantian ethics and utilitarianism claim to provide explicit moral guidance for all possibilities based on absolute principles (categorical imperative and utility), countless cases
expose their inadequacy, e.g., lying to a Nazi officer about a Jew hiding in the basement (Kantian ethics) or demagogically framing Jews for the sake of nation’s overall peace and stability (utilitarianism). However, since each moral circumstance is unique, the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean is not a rigid mathematical mean between two vices but instead is a flexible concept with the capacity to tailor to particular circumstances based on the agent’s practical and intellectual reasoning. However, unlike Nietzschean ubermensch, the standard of judgment is not the arbitrary individual will, but is rather the established definitions of virtues and vices. All things considered, the lack of explicit action-guidance for all possibilities, in reality, is a strength that enables a vast application of Aristotelian virtue ethics.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Aristotelian virtue ethics successfully fulfills the two established conditions of philosophical progress. Although virtue ethics belonged to an era two thousand years back in time, its resurgence in the twentieth century was a step forward in normative ethics.

Footnotes

1 Alex Deagon, “Popper or Kuhn: Truth and the Progress of Science” (paper, Perspectives on Progress Conference, University of Queensland, Brisbane, 27-29 Nov. 2013, Academia),. 3,
www.academia.edu/5254144/Popper_or_Kuhn_Truth_and_the_Progress_of_Science.

2 Immauel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. Allen W. Wood (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), 15.

3 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2000), 14.

4 Gertrude Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy." Philosophy 33, no. 124 (1958): 5.
www.jstor.org/stable/3749051.
5 Ibid., 12.
6 Ibid., 13-15.
7 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. trans. F. H. Peters (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1893), 74.

8 Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories." The Journal of Philosophy 73, no. 14 (1976): 455. doi:10.2307/2025782.

9 Ibid., 454.

10 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 46.
11 John Hacker-Wright. Pilippa Foot’s Moral Thought (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013), 77
12 Michael Sandel, Justice: What’s The Right Thing To Do? (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 187.
13 Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), 44.

14 Yong Huang, Why Be Moral?: Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers (New York: SUNY Press, 2014), 84
15 Roger Crisp, “What is Virtue Ethics?” Practical Ethics Bite. University of Oxford, 22 Sep. 2014, podcasts.ox.ac.uk/what-virtue-ethics.
16 Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtue theory and Abortion.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 20, no. 3 (1991): 227.
17 Sarah Broadie, Ethics With Aristotle (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 102.

Author’s Note

Given the broadness of the topic and the word limit, I have focused on the evaluation of the resurgence of Aristotelian virtue ethics as progress or retrogression exclusively within the field of normative ethics, despite the resurgence of virtue (aretaic turn) within other philosophical fields, such as epistemology, political philosophy, and legal theory. Furthermore, this essay narrows the field of normative ethics in the twentieth century to its two most dominant and prevalent ethical theories: utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. The answer to the question requires the comparison of Aristotelian virtue ethics with the existing ethical theories in the twentieth century. If too many theories are taken into consideration, this paper would not be able to delve into thorough depth, considering the word restriction. Therefore, comparing Aristotelian virtue ethics to utilitarianism and Kantian ethics as the representation of the twentieth century normative ethics prior the resurgence of virtue ethics would be the most coherent and efficient method for the evaluation of virtue ethics as progress or retrogression.

Bibliography

Anscombe, Gertrude. "Modern Moral Philosophy." Philosophy 33, no. 124 (1958): 1-19.
www.jstor.org/stable/3749051.

Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Translated by F. H. Peters. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1893.

Bentham, Jeremy. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2000.

Broadie, Sarah. Ethics With Aristotle. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Crisp, Roger. “What is Virtue Ethics?” Practical Ethics Bites. University of Oxford, 22 Sep. 2014.
podcasts.ox.ac.uk/what-virtue-ethics.

Deagon, Alex. “Popper or Kuhn: Truth and the Progress of Science.” Paper presented at Perspectives on Progress
Conference, University of Queensland, Brisbane, 27-29 Nov. 2013, Academia,
www.academia.edu/5254144/Popper_or_Kuhn_Truth_and_the_Progress_of_Science.

Hacker-Wright, John. Philippa Foot’s Moral Thought. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013.

Huang, Yong. Why Be Moral?: Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers. New York: SUNY Press, 2014.

Hursthouse, Rosalind. “Virtue theory and Abortion.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 20, no. 3 (1991): 223-246

Kant, Immanuel. The Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited by Mary J. Gregor. New

York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964.

Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited and translated by Allen W. Wood. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002.

Sandel, Michael. Justice: What’s The Right Thing To Do? New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009.

Stocker, Michael. "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories." The Journal of Philosophy 73, no. 14 (1976): 453-66. doi:10.2307/2025782.

直觉之于哲学，就像观察之于科学吗？

Urging the question is a reasonable enough suggestion: rather as empirical observation in science provides the basis for the evaluation of hypotheses concerning the workings of the physical universe, intuition would similarly seem to operate as a sounding board for the evaluation of arguments and theories (normative, of mind, knowledge, art, inter alia) in philosophy. But in order to better assess whether both entities occupy the same functional roles in their respective disciplines beyond this prima facie symmetry, it is necessary to submit either to a sort of truth-conditional analysis of its uses.

‘Observation’ in this discussion refers to the empirical data-gathering procedures – fieldwork, experiment, simulation, etc. – which, aided by the use of sophisticated technical instruments, form the basis of conventional scientific practice. A suitable definition of ‘intuition’, which in the literature has been variously interpreted as a belief, a disposition to believe, and even a wholly sui generis mental state, is more difficult.[1] However, as a working definition that best establishes a comparable functional role to ‘observation’ in science, an intuition may be described as a mental state approaching ‘surmise’, a kind of pre-theoretical impression about a state of affairs, often though not always with isolable propositional content, and of variable conviction and sophistication.

This discussion will focus on some of the more pressing and, in the author’s estimation, interesting threats to the intuition-observation symmetry, with particular emphasis on the incommensurability of data and the nature of falsification and academic consensus.

Resisting falsification in philosophy

One possible asymmetry between intuition and empirical observation is that the former is functionally impotent in respect of falsifying erroneous theories, unlike empirical data.

Essential to the scientific method is the notion that observation provides the fundamental basis for the evaluation of hypotheses. Specific, falsifiable hypotheses are subjected by a community of trained peers to several rounds of experimental scrutiny. The presence of any data directly contrary to the closely defined expectations of a hypothesis will begin to provide grounds for disconfirmation. Sufficient replication of disconfirmatory results will entirely annihilate its chances of widespread acceptance within a scientific community. As such, empirical observation may be imputed to bear the functional role of falsifying erroneous scientific theories.[2]

In philosophy, however, while one’s intuitions about a matter are sometimes treated as providing a sort of prima facie justification for believing a proposition, they might similarly contravene a particular argument’s conclusions, but with no necessary consequences for the argument’s veracity.

Consider William Macaskill’s simple hypothetical concerning whether an agent should save a multi-million-pound Picasso or a child from a burning building.[3] On a utilitarian framework, the likelier prescription, ceteris paribus, would probably be to save the painting, for the money acquired from its sale could be reliably used to purchase several anti-malaria bed nets for vulnerable African children, and unambiguously save many more lives.[4] Nevertheless, for various intuitive reasons, most agents would probably be more inclined to rescue the child.

However, despite the inconsistency between the utilitarian conclusion and quite plausibly an overwhelmingly popular contrary intuition, such an incompatibility alone does not necessarily disconfirm the utilitarian verdict, or the utility calculus at large, as with incongruous evidence in science. One can, in moves resembling Strawson’s distinction concerning ‘descriptive and revisionary metaphysics’, choose to defend one’s intuitions, or follow a chain of reasoning to its ultimate conclusions and revise them.[5]

Indeed, it would be no sin for the philosopher not to rule in accordance with strong intuitions, insofar as her conclusions were independently justified. If, as Peter Singer observes, one’s own interests really are no more important than others’, and it would be diminishing greater suffering to procure those anti- malaria bed nets, then perhaps the utilitarian verdict here is correct after all. As per Singer’s ‘escalator of reason’ metaphor, the autonomy of the human reasoning faculty ensures that, over our species’ evolutionary trajectory, the indiscriminate exercise of reason in worldly affairs is liable, eventually, to lead one towards certain difficult conclusions such as this.[6] It seems possible for one to be ‘rationally persuaded’ in this way of the truth of a nonetheless counterintuitive proposition.

But it is also possible that a certain falsificatory impotence is to be expected in ethics, where resisting intuitional pulls is often justified under the guise of systematising one’s judgements.

(Similar intuitional incongruity is also easily demonstrated in, for instance, the philosophy of mind: credence in physicalist and functionalist theories is threatened by strong intuitions about irreducible qualia, perhaps attributable to a species-wide “common-sense dualism”.[7] Yet such intuitional incongruity is again not understood to falsify these theories which, indeed, are popular philosophical positions.)[8] However, conceding a falsificatory impotence to intuition in even one major philosophical domain like ethics is sufficient to substantially disturb the intuition-observation symmetry.

Of course, if no other intuitions were involved here, this would also suggest that intuitional influences can be resisted altogether in evaluating philosophical theories. But this is not clear; indeed, it might be impossible to accept an argument’s conclusions without some intuitional motivation. Favouring the utilitarian or functionalist options above might appeal to certain, more fundamental intuitions concerning ethical consistency or logical laws, or even be reducible to broader intuitions resembling Kant’s transcendental categories, conditioning one’s experience. Indeed, if every philosophical judgement were intuitionally motivated, the possibility of intuitional falsification would itself be unfalsifiable – one’s intuitions might just happen to accord with the ‘correct’ position every time.

But in assessing intuitions, one would ultimately seem to be confronted with two possibilities:

• Either such fundamental, ‘categorical’ intuitions are independently verifiable – i.e., something like the law of non-contradiction may be construed as true independently of one’s experience of the world through it. On this view, siding with categorical intuitions in a philosophical dilemma may be regarded as being non-intuitionally, ‘rationally persuaded’ of a proposition. This means that, rather than a battle between competing intuitions, a real incongruity between a philosophical proposition and the remaining genuine intuition in the dilemma is preserved. Yet because this incongruity cannot alone falsify the theory, intuitions retain their falsificatory impotence.

• Or, if every philosophical judgement appeals to some intuition, including ineluctable perceptual categories, no intuition can be shown to be more ‘legitimate’ than another. One cannot demonstrate the validity of the law of non-contradiction because one cannot escape the categorical intuition of non-contradiction. Because of such sceptical concern, one is no more justified in siding with a category-based intuition than any other intuition. Hence, no intuition can be considered legitimate enough to establish from its relation to a theory an incongruity that may give rise to the theory’s falsification, and once again, intuitions retain their falsificatory impotence.

Thus, either because intuitional incongruity may be entirely repudiated or because it is impossible to establish genuine intuitional incongruity, philosophical propositions would not seem to be intuitionally falsifiable. Naturally, moreover, if one cannot distinguish the intuitional circumstances under which a philosophical theory would be false, then one cannot establish conditions for intuitional verification or Popperian ‘corroboration’ of philosophical theories, either.[9]

Resisting falsification in science

But there is another variable that would threaten intuition’s apparently exclusive falsificatory impotence. As Thomas Kuhn observed, in science, observational data can be ‘theory-laden’.[10] In particular, there is a permanent possibility that an observer brings to bear various theoretical presuppositions that filter their perception and conceptualisation of empirical data.

Because these background assumptions are never themselves subject to experimental scrutiny, two scientists belonging to radically different paradigms can interpret the same phenomena as vindicatory of different hypotheses. Thus, “when Aristotle and Galileo looked at swinging stones, the first saw constrained fall, the second a pendulum”.[11] These experiments may be reproduced indefinitely, and yet, because they are unable to distinguish between the conceptual underpinnings of either hypothesis, the empirical data appear consistent with both and unable to falsify either.[12] It would hence seem that, just as intuitions cannot falsify erroneous philosophical theories, the theory-ladenness of observational data constrains their ability to falsify erroneous scientific hypotheses, too.

However, differences in the theoretical presuppositions of competing hypotheses have not always been significant enough to adversely affect predictive power, indicating that their sensitivity to the truth is not significantly compromised by interstitial conceptual details. Famously, Priestley and Lavoisier obtained the same quantitative results in key experiments on combustion, although one was an adherent of the theory of phlogiston, and the other of oxygen.[13]

Additionally, an observer’s theoretical presuppositions can be greatly rectified by subsequent generations when previously overlooked implications of their hypotheses come to conflict with established data. As Popper remarks, competing hypotheses undergo a process resembling natural selection, whereby one is provisionally adopted if it constitutes an improvement over an existing paradigm in respect of explanatory power, and holds promise in respect of predictive power.[14] Crucially, its integration into a field’s multi-paradigm matrix requires the attempted falsification of its most radical predictions, deduced as ‘propositions’ from the initial hypothesis.[15] This hypervigilant screening of hypotheses serves to sustain a longer-term falsificatory potency in science. One might then still reasonably conclude that intuition in philosophy is possessed of a falsificatory impotence not rivalled even by theory-laden observation in science.

One minor concession that might be made in intuition’s favour is that intuitional judgements still exert some influence over an argument’s palatability. The counterintuitive quality of the utilitarian verdict in Macaskill’s dilemma, though not binding one to any conclusion about the argument, might place an added epistemological burden on one who ignores the pull of her intuitions to justify this opposite judgement. This may also explain why philosophers from Grice to Parfit are often compelled to provide ‘error theories’ that ‘explain away’ intuitional incongruity.[16] However, this is still far from occupying the role of outright falsification that empirical observation plays in science.

Intuitional variation

Another curious aspect of the intuitional character is that it is subject to two kinds of variation not available to its putative empirical counterpart. First, and less consequentially, there is some variation in the importance that is often granted to philosophical intuitions. With respect to fringe ethical scenarios, philosophers – including the aforementioned Singer and Macaskill – sometimes recommend that one should not always rely so closely on one’s intuitions, without the risk of an almighty backlash from their peers, such as one might expect were one to encounter a scientist exhorting others not to consider empirical data.

Secondly, it is an open question whether intuitions have any objective basis, but even supposing they do, philosophy appears to lack a common evaluative framework with which members of the profession might independently reach the same, ‘legitimate’ intuitive judgements. No amount of philosophical analysis seems fit to isolate ‘correct’ intuitions, much less without eroding the common-sense understanding of intuitions as pre-theoretical impressions.

One consequence of the lack of such a framework is that intuitions are in practice subject to a degree of irresolvable individual variation. Thus, two new asymmetries in the functional roles of intuition and observation emerge: first, critical internal disagreement between ‘philosophical data’ is made possible, whereas in science, empirical data are in principle and increasingly in practice assimilable under common theoretical frameworks (although present difficulties in, e.g. reconciling the Standard Model with general relativity may disturb this trend). But inconsistent datasets of this sort also prevent ‘results’ from being reproducible, creating a diffidence towards scholarly consensus in philosophy. By contrast, although Kuhnian paradigm shifts can disturb the solidity of scientific consensus, the truth-sensitivity of scientific practice, evident in the ‘epistemic pruning’ of empirical falsification, contributes to a kind of long-term consensus hitherto unseen in philosophy.[17]

Conclusion

It is difficult to glean the precise influence of intuition over all philosophical inquiry. The philosopher finds herself in the unusual position of being swayed by intuitional data, even conjuring error theories to account for them, in a discipline in which confirmatory intuitional data are not even an explicit sine qua non of theoretical legitimacy.

However, intuitional judgements would at least seem to vary significantly enough in nature and application as to occupy a different functional role from observation. This is epitomised in the relevant dissimilarities of being incommensurable, indisposed to scholarly consensus, and unable to falsify erroneous theories.

Author's Note:

Because it is not possible to demonstrate exhaustively over the course of an essay of this sort whether falsification through intuitional judgement is really impossible in all areas of philosophy, the author has elected instead (with relevant qualifications to his argument) to survey moral philosophy and, briefly, philosophy of mind, to provide an indication of the scope of such a criticism.

Footnotes:

1 Pust, Joel, "Intuition", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Ed.), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/intuition/)

2 More contentious is the claim that empirical data serves to ‘verify’ hypotheses it is consistent with, as Popper noted. Because of the inductive nature of scientific practice, one can at most assert that theory-data consistency may serve to ‘corroborate’ a theory, resulting in its provisional adoption and possible retention after repeated attempts at falsification – and even then, only as a ‘working model’ of the phenomenon in question, and not holy writ.

3 William Macaskill, Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism Can Help You Make a Difference (Guardian Faber, 2016)

4 Let it be assumed that the funds obtained from the auctioning of the painting could be counted upon to save more lives, with no extraneous factors tipping the utility calculus in the other direction (one might, for instance, donate to a GiveWell-approved charity such as the Against Malaria Foundation).

5 Peter Frederick Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (Routledge, 1964)

6 Peter Singer, The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress (Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 135-137

7 Paul Bloom, Descartes’ Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human (Penguin, 2011), pp.191-192

8 Bourget, D., Chalmers, D.J., ‘What do philosophers believe?’, Philosophical Studies Vol. 170, pp. 465–500 (2014) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7

9 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge, 2002, 2nd ed.), pp. 248-252

10 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 2012, 4th ed.), pp. 111-113

11 Ibid. pp. 121-122

12 Ibid. pp. 112-115

13 Conant, J.B., (ed.) “The Overthrow of the Phlogiston Theory: The Chemical Revolution of 1775–1789,” in J.B. Conant and L.K. Nash (eds.), Harvard Studies in Experimental Science, vol. I, (Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 74–80

14 Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp. 90-92

15 Ibid.

16 Climenhaga, Nevin, ‘Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy’, Mind, Vol. 127, Issue 505, January 2018, pp. 69–104, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw032

17 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 50-52

Bibliography

Bloom, P., Descartes’ Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human (Penguin, 2011)

Bourget, D., Chalmers, D.J., ‘What do philosophers believe?’, Philosophical Studies Vol. 170, pp. 465–500 (2014) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7

Climenhaga, Nevin, ‘Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy’, Mind, Vol. 127, Issue 505, January 2018, pp. 69–104, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw032

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Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 2012)

Macaskill, W., Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism Can Help You Make a Difference (Guardian Faber, 2016)

Popper, K., The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge, 2002)

Pust, Joel, "Intuition", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Ed.), Edward N.Zalta (ed.), (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/intuition/)

Singer, P., The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress (Princeton University Press, 2011)

Strawson, P.F., Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (Routledge, 1964)

Is Intuition to Philosophy as Observation is to Science?

When asked what characterizes the empirical sciences, it is often said that its reliance upon observations serves as the answer. When the same is asked of philosophy, many philosophers hold that the answer lies in philosophy’s dependence upon our intuitions. Naturally, then, the question arises: is observation to science as intuition is to philosophy? To answer this question, I will analyze and compare the roles assigned to observation and intuition in science and philosophy, respectively. After such examination, I come to the conclusion that as there are roles that only intuition serves and not observation, their contributions in their respective fields are not analogous to each other.

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Before discussing what roles intuition and observation have, however, it must first be granted that the two do indeed have their places in scientific and philosophical inquiry. As such, the scientific and philosophical method and whether observation and intuition contribute to them must be examined beforehand.

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Scientific Theorization and Evaluation

The scientific method, in contemporary literature, is identified with two steps: theorization and evaluation (Dorling & Miller, 1981; Gieseler, Loschelder, & Friese, 2019; Popper, 2002). Scientists first start their inquiry by postulating rational theoretical systems that, in accordance with reason, explain observations (Gieseler, Loschelder, & Friese, 2019; Popper, 2002; Staley, 2014). In the process, scientists follow what I call Theory Constructing Principles (TCPs). TCPs are the necessary principles of reason[1] that allow scientists to think rationally. Without TCPs, the very rules of reason, no rational theorization can take place. Thus, by constructing rational theories, all scientists follow TCPs.

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After scientists hypothesize theories, they discern the most plausible ones.[2] They carry out this evaluation by using what I call various Theory Evaluation Principles (TEPs): generally, scientists prefer theories that do not contradict empirical observations, that are falsifiable, precise, parsimonious, and in agreement with corroborated theories (Gieseler, Loschelder, & Friese, 2019; Popper, 2002). Theories displaying these virtues laid out in TEPs, are favored over theories that fail to do so. As both theory construction and evaluation are closely related to observation, it seems reasonable to conclude that observation is at the core of the scientific method.

Philosophical Theorization and Evaluation

Philosophers generally believe that philosophical inquiry can be broken down into three major steps: philosophers first canvass intuitions, then construct rational theories that systematize them, and lastly evaluate their plausibilities (Bealer, 1998). Simply put, philosophical inquiry also involves a theorization-and-assessment process.

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As there cannot be any form of rational theorization without the basic principles of reason, philosophers—in constructing rational theories—follow TCPs as well. Furthermore, after their construction, philosophical theories undergo an evaluation process in which philosophers apply their own TEPs: generally, philosophers prefer theories that are largely in agreement with intuitions, that are precise and ontologically parsimonious (Carroll & Markosian, 2010; Pust, 2000). As such, intuition also is deeply connected with the philosophical method in both the theory construction and evaluation process. Therefore, it seems, observation and intuition have their rightful places in science and philosophy, respectively.

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With this established, to answer the question on whether intuition in philosophy is analogous to observation in science, I will specify the conditions that allow intuition to be similar to observation. If intuition in philosophy lacks the epistemic status observation enjoys in science, or vice versa, an affirmative answer to the question will not be available. Thus, in order for one to be justified in claiming that intuition’s role philosophy is similar to observation’s role science, intuition must satisfy the two following conditions:

1. Intuition in philosophy must not lack any of the roles taken up by observation in science.

   2. Intuition’s role in philosophy must not exceed the roles taken up by observation in science.

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The First Condition: Roles Both Observation and Intuition Serve

Observation’s Roles: Explanandum and Evidence

As mentioned before, theories exist as the explanans that explain observational data. Consequently, in constructing theories, observation takes on the role as the explanandum, i.e., that which is to be explained. As the purpose of a theory lies in explaining observational data, observation is one of the most important pieces of evidence scientists use to test the theory’s validity.[3] Therefore, it could be said that observation, in science, takes up the role as (ⅰ) the explanandum and (ⅱ) the evidence that evaluates a theory’s validity.

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To give a thoughtful answer to the question, intuition and observation’s role in their respective fields must be examined in depth. Observation’s first role is self-evident: observation is that which is to be explained by scientific theories. However, the second role lacks some clarity. Due to the apparent vagueness of the term ‘evidence’, numerous philosophers, in their attempt to analyze the scientific method, have made many endeavors to precisely identify how observation’s evidential role in theory evaluation is to be understood (Chalmer, 2013; Staley, 2014). Of these efforts, I will discuss two of the most widely held considerations:

Hypothetico-deductivism and Bayesian Personalism.

Hypothetico-deductivism on Observation as Evidence. In Hypothetico-deductivism (HD), during their evaluation process, theories are subject to rigorous testing as scientists actively seek to falsify them by finding observational data that contradict their predictions (Popper, 2002). If a theory’s predictions are at odds with actual observations—and thus fail to satisfy the first TEP as laid out before—it is rejected regardless of whether or not it satisfies the rest of the TEPs.[4] By shaving off false theories through rigorous testing, scientists conversely seek to select theories that are consistent with empirical observations.[5] These unfalsified theories—although they never could, in principle, be proven to be true—are among the best, most plausible ones available to scientists.[6] As such, in the theory evaluation process, observation serves as the evidence—perhaps the most important one—that indicates which theories are false and which theories are most plausible.

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Bayesian Personalism on Observation as Evidence. On the contrary, in Bayesian Personalism (BP), the main focus of theory evaluation is on who determines whether a theory must be accepted or not. A theory’s validity is determined by scientists and “ [the] subjective probabilities [, i.e.,] measures of subjective degrees of belief[, they assign to theories]” (Dorling & Miller, 1981, p. 110). In the evaluation process, empirical observation influences probabilities scientists assign to theories by strengthening or weakening scientists’ degree of belief in the theories in question (Dorling & Miller, 1981). As such, the evidential role of observation is to shape a theory’s subjective probability assigned by scientists, i.e., to persuade scientists.

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Intuition’s Role: Explanandum and Evidence

In philosophy, it is widely accepted that “theories are designed to … explain [intuitions]” (Bealer, 1987, p. 312). Moreover, intuition—in philosophical argumentation—is presented as evidence for or against theories (Bealer, 1998; Pust, 2000). Thus, it could be said that intuition, in philosophy, takes up the role as (ⅰ) the explanandum and (ⅱ) the evidence that evaluates a theory’s validity.

The evidential role of intuition displays the same sense of ambiguity that was seen in the evidential role of observation. Therefore, I will further analyze the evidential status of intuition according to the two interpretations of the scientific method discussed before: HD and BP.

Hypothetico-deductivism on Intuition as Evidence. HD could characterize intuition’s role as evidence similar to how it describes the evidential role of observation in science. Philosophers “argue for [a theory] by showing that [what] it implies … is indicated by… intuitive judgements … [and] against the correctness of a theory by producing a … case [or cases] about which intuition disagrees with the theory in question” (Pust, 2000, p. 3). As a good theory must account for all the evidence, i.e., intuitions (Bealer, 1998), philosophers would reject falsified theories whose entailments contradict intuitive judgements. On the other hand, theories that are consistent with our intuitions would be considered to be strongly supported (Pust, 2000). Thus, intuition, in HD, could be interpreted as the evidence that either falsifies or strongly favors certain philosophical theories. HD’s interpretation of intuition’s evidential role seems to closely resemble its interpretation of observation’s evidential role: both intuition and observation either support or falsify theories in their respective fields.

Bayesian Personalism on Intuition as Evidence. In BP as well, intuition could be interpreted to take on an evidential role that closely resembles that of observation. When philosophers are persuaded by intuition to believe in the truth of a theory,[7] BP could emphasize the philosophers—the subjects in philosophical evaluation—and the evidential role intuition has in influencing their degree of belief. Intuition would form a theory’s subjective probability by strengthening or weakening a scientist’s degree of belief in the theory. Therefore, in BP, similar to how observation influences scientists, intuition would have the evidential role of persuading philosophers and thereby shaping a theory’s probability. As such, intuition seems to satisfy the first condition: intuition in philosophy, like observation in science, is the explanandum and the evidence used in theory evaluation in both HD and BP.

The Second Condition: Roles Only Intuition Serves

Intuition as the basis of philosophical theories

The epistemic weight intuition has in philosophical theory construction is quite distinct from that of observation in scientific theorization. As Bealer notes, philosophical inquiry starts from canvassing intuitions and proceeds to theorization by systematizing those intuitions (Bealer, 1998). Philosophical theories, in other words, are rooted in intuition. The only interpretation of the scientific method in which theories are derived from observations is inductivism (Chalmers, 2013). However, both Hypothetico-deductivists and Bayesian Personalists unanimously accept the glaring problems of induction presented by Hume and others (Dorling & Miller, 1981; Popper, 2002). Consequently, both views reject inductivism and would dare not describe scientific theories as being rooted in observational data. Thus, in both HD and BP, intuition serves an additional role that observation does not: intuition is the basis of philosophical theories.

Intuition in the Justification and Identification of TEPs and TCPs

Furthermore, intuition is responsible for much of the justification and identification processes of TEPs and TCPs. In many cases, philosophers—without rational justification—simply have the intuition that there are some theories that are better than others; that there are common qualities those theories possess which make them better; and perhaps most importantly, that philosophers know what those qualities are (Bealer, 1998; Carroll & Markosian, 2010). Simply put, much of the attempts at identifying and justifying TEPs rely on intuition.[8] For example, in discussing the reasons philosophers adhere to the principle of theoretical parsimony,[9] Carroll and Markosian write, “many philosophers just prefer a leaner, meaner ontology” (2010, p. 213).

Not only this, but the only evidence philosophers can offer for TCPs are exclusively their intuitions. Philosophers have the intuition that some truths are necessary for rational theory construction; that those truths cannot be false; and that philosophers know which ones they are. As Bealer writes, “[out of the] many alleged principles of logic and linguistic theory … [a philosopher] tell[s] which ones are true … ultimately by using intuition as evidence” (1987, p.310). Despite intuition’s intricate connection to TEPs and TCPs, observation enjoys no such relationship. Although observation can be used to evaluate theories, it itself cannot justify why it can be used as evidence. These are matters reserved for rational, and intuitive justifications.[10] Furthermore, empirical observation, by definition, has no part in constructing a priori principles of reason as well (BonJour, 1998).

Conclusion

Thus intuition’s role in philosophy can be summarized as the following:

intuition, in philosophy, takes up the role as (ⅰ) the explanandum, (ⅱ) the evidence that evaluates a theory’s validity, (ⅰⅰⅰ) the basis of philosophical theories, and (ⅳ) the evidence for the justification and the identification of TEPs and (ⅴ) TCPs.

There may be additional roles assigned to intuition and observation that I have failed to mention. Some may be assigned to both. However, as I have demonstrated, these three roles assigned to intuition that I have laid out are not to be found in observation. Moreover, it seems that these fundamental discrepancies are too great to be simply discarded as trivial. Consequently, regardless of any additional roles of intuition and observation I may have overlooked, intuition fails to fulfil the second condition. Therefore, the conclusion must be as follows: intuition in philosophy is not analogous to observation in science.

Footnotes:

1 The principles of logic, arithmetic, geometry, set theory, modality, probability, etc.

2 Dorling & Miller, 1981; Gieseler, Loschelder, & Friese, 2019; Popper, 2002

3 Gieseler, Loschelder, & Friese, 2019; Popper, 2002; Staley, 2014

4 Popper, 2002

5 Popper, 2002

6 Popper, 2002

7 Pust, 2000

8 Concerning intuition’s contribution to the justification and identification of TEPs, I do not wish to imply that intuition is the only evidence philosophers can offer. Unlike TCPs, some philosophers do provide other rational justifications for some TEPs apart from mere intuitions.

9 The principle of theoretical parsimony states that theories, preferably, should be ontologically parsimonious and must not posit entities beyond necessity. This principle is stated in TEPs listed above.

10 Bealer, 1998; Carroll & Markosian, 2010

Bibliography

Bealer, G. (1987). The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism. Philosophical Perspectives, 1, 289-365. doi:10.2307/2214149

Bealer, G. (1998). Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy. In DePaul, M., & Ramsey, W. (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. pp. 201-240.

BonJour, L. (1998). In Defense of Pure Reason. Cambridge University Press.

Carroll, J. W., & Markosian, N. (2010). An Introduction to Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press.

Chalmer, A. F. (2013). What is this thing called Science? (4th ed.). University of Queensland Press.

Dorling, J., & Miller, D. (1981). Bayesian Personalism, Falsificationism, and the Problem of Induction. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 55, 109-141. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4106855.pdf?ab_segments=0%252Fbasic_SYC-5187% 252Ftest&refreqid=excelsior%3A034b8233ec77dfcbdabe67ef272d7197

Gieseler K., Loschelder D.D., & Friese M. (2019) What Makes for a Good Theory? How to Evaluate a Theory Using the Strength Model of Self-Control as an Example. In Sassenberg K., & Vliek M. (Eds) Social Psychology in Action. pp. 3-21

Popper, K. (2002). The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2nd ed.). Routledge. Pust, J. (2000). Intuitions as Evidence. Nozick, R. (Ed.) Routledge.

Staely, K. W. (2014). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Cambridge University Press

Is intuition to philosophy as observation is to science?
直觉之于哲学就像观察之于科学吗？

伊森·克里斯蒂安·陈，新加坡英华学校

2020年大奖得主|7 分钟阅读