2020年政治奖二等奖

Governments do a lot of things, such as collecting taxes and drafting people into the military, that we would object to individuals doing. Can this be justified?

政府做了很多事情,比如收税和征召人们参军,我们会反对个人这样做。这能合理吗?

Elizabeth Zhu,加拿大多伦多大学学校
2020年政治奖第二名|7 分钟阅读

Introduction

The political authority of governments rests on two grounds, both independent of each other: first it is justified on the basis of necessity, to protect citizens from a harmful state of nature, and second, on the basis of reciprocity and citizens’ normative duties to their government.

What do I defend in this essay? I argue that it is justified for democratically elected governments to impose reasonable costs on citizens to bring about societal good. These ‘reasonable costs’ fall under a set of criteria: a) they must not severely violate the basic rights of citizens b) they should be absolutely necessary as a means to fulfill the societal good c) on net, citizens should be made better able to exercise their rights and freedoms in the long term. For example, laws that enforce slavery or severely breach individuals’ privacy are excluded from the authority of governments. As Locke argued, the purpose of the state is to protect the ‘natural freedoms’ of individuals, including life, liberty and property rights (Locke). By extension, Joseph Raz argues that governments should only order citizens to do what they had prior reason to do (Raz). Thus, governments are justified only in enforcing just laws that protect the best interests of citizens in the long run, such as enforcing property rights, controlling borders, criminalizing hate speech, and punishing those who violate the law. Moreover, citizens have a reciprocal duty to obey these laws; though political authority differs from political obligation, the former implies the latter, and thus a defense of a duty to obey the law strengthens the justification for political authority.

Necessity and Securing Freedoms

First, governments have a right to impose certain demands on citizens out of necessity: to protect all citizens from an anarchic state of nature, particularly the most vulnerable. Take the absence of the examples stated in the prompt: without collecting taxes, governments would lack the funds to implement necessary public services and a functioning criminal justice system, and without military conscription, the state would be unable to properly defend itself from foreign attacks.

More broadly, without enforceable property and criminal laws, frequent conflicts and disagreements are likely to occur. Vigilante justice would replace a legitimate justice system, risking ineffective deterrence and biased punishments for perpetrators. In a brutish state of nature, individuals are unlikely to lead prosperous lives or pursue productive projects for fear of having the fruits of their labour stolen without consequence. Hobbes correctly argued that life without political order leads to a society “where every man is enemy to every man” (Hobbes). Rousseau famously said, “man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains” to describe the exploitative and unequal anarchy that exists in a state of nature (Rousseau). Provided this, the state has a samaritan duty to prevent a state of nature, and can only do so by demanding certain trade-offs from citizens. Moreover, government authority is particularly beneficial for the most vulnerable members of society who would otherwise be left at the mercy of anarchy. The poor, people with disabilities, and historically oppressed groups are likely to face unregulated discrimination and structural barriers in a state of nature where every individual must fend for themselves. In contrast, by taxing citizens to fund welfare programs, infrastructure, and public services, the government can provide a safety net and legal protection for individuals who may be disadvantaged by the lottery of birth. Therefore, governments are justified in imposing basic demands to secure the freedom of all individuals, and to prevent exploitation that will likely occur in a state of nature, thereby ensuring equality.

This begs the question: what grants governments unique political authority? Unlike individuals or private companies, the state is uniquely situated to protect us from a state of nature because only it has the means to fix a problem of collective action. As Wellmann puts it, political peril is a “coordination problem” which can only be resolved through state coercion (Wellmann and Simmons). Without forcible taxation or military conscription from the government, it is likely that citizens will free-ride on public goods rather than contribute. To use the example of taxation, self-interested individuals may be reluctant to sacrifice their earnings to contribute to the societal good. Similarly, individuals are often unwilling to risk their lives in war, yet protecting the safety of all citizens in a country requires that some citizens fight on the frontlines. Only governments are able to enforce a cohesive set of laws across a geographic area, unlike individuals or private organizations with conflicting interests. Only governments can reliably oversee an impartial justice system, in contrast to individually motivated and often disproportionate punishments led by vigilantes in a state of nature. Another reason why governments are uniquely equipped to enforce the law is due to their vast political expertise and knowledge of their state; a lawmaker is educated to weigh the pros and cons of a bill in their country, and are likely to be more well- informed of its societal and geopolitical implications than the average individual.

Importantly, our right to basic goods such as security, property and liberty entails a further right to have those goods enforced. Citizens cannot access rights unless there is a state that ensures those rights are granted; rights do not exist in a vacuum or in the abstract. Kant said, “justice is united with the authorization to use coercion against anyone who violates justice” (Kant). According to Kant’s categorical imperative, an individual should only be able to claim a right of their own upon upholding the rights of others. To guarantee that fundamental rights are enforced for all, governments must extract demands from citizens; for example, taxing them to fund public services to provide basic necessities or conscripting citizens into the military to protect the state, thereby upholding the lives of citizens at home. Only through taxation is the government able to guarantee the right to public healthcare and education. Freedom for individuals can only occur under state coercion; only then can citizens feel secure and have their bodily integrity upheld.

An oft-cited counterargument against the authority of governments is the libertarian view that individuals know what is best for themselves and have earned the fruits of their labour, meaning that government intervention is a violation of their autonomy. However, there are two flaws with this argument. First, though individuals may know what is best for themselves, they are ill- equipped to know what is best for society; the government is justified to impose reasonable costs on individuals to protect society as a whole. This is because the state has a duty to protect the moral equality of all citizens above the political whims of individuals. Conversely, individuals ought to obey the law to rescue others from a dire state of anarchy (Wellmann and Simmons). Second, it is unlikely that individuals would have amassed wealth in the first place without government intervention. A businessman likely benefits from roads built by the government, subsidies, intellectual property laws, and most of all, the maintenance of an orderly society. In exchange, it is only appropriate for the government to demand that citizens contribute to the functioning of the state. In a similar critique of the authority of governments, Robert Wolff argues in In Defense of Anarchism that moral autonomy is incompatible with political authority as obeying the state requires that individuals do not follow their own moral compass (Wolff). Yet this is precisely the purpose of political authority; as morality is subjective, an individual’s moral views should not dictate the law, but rather, the majority’s views should determine how society is governed. While in a state of anarchy the most powerful individuals are likely to dictate society regardless of the morality of their views, through demands such as taxation and military conscription that apply equally to most citizens, the government is able to enforce democratic checks and balances that ensure the views of all citizens are represented.

Associative Obligations and Reciprocity

Second, governments are justified in enforcing these demands due to the uniquely normative and reciprocal relationship they have with citizens. Normatively, the moral authority of governments can be justified on a purely associative basis: citizens have an inherent obligation to obey the state they were born into. As Dworkin argued, “Political association, like family or friendship and other forms of association more local and intimate, is itself pregnant of obligation” (Dworkin). Similar to a family unit where children owe duties to their parents by virtue of being born into that family regardless of their consent, citizens acquire obligations to obey political authority by virtue of being born into a state. In Crito, Socrates reasoned that he ought not to flee the state but rather accept his punishment of hemlock because his long residence in Athens meant he had entered an ‘agreement’ with the city’s laws (Plato). Thus, one’s continued birth, education, and residence in a state signals tacit consent to its authority.

Beyond appealing to our intuitions, government authority is justified on a reciprocal basis. Rousseau argued in The Social Contract that citizens agree to a hypothetical pact to transfer certain rights to a collective governing body that serves the common good (Rousseau). Unlike individuals, democratic governments have been elected into power, and thus represent the interests of a majority of the population. In exchange for letting citizens participate in the political process, the state is justified in enforcing laws. More importantly, citizens benefit from public goods that are integral to their wellbeing, from laws that protect citizens against theft to welfare programs that provide a safety net for the poor. The mere presence of state authority ensures that individuals live in an orderly society rather than an anarchy; a functioning society is implausible without taxes or military conscription. Irrespective of whether we have explicitly consented to state authority, our participation in an orderly society and enjoyment of public goods means we have a reciprocal duty to repay the state through taxes and military conscription.

To this, Hume objected that not all individuals have chosen to be a part of the state and receive these benefits as most individuals cannot move out of their country of origin. He raises the analogy of an individual being forcibly carried onto a ship where they are unjustly subject to the captain’s commands (Hume). However, a duty to reciprocate still exists for three reasons. First, the fact that citizens benefit from public services and reside in an orderly society, or at the very least are presented with the option of doing so, entails tacit consent of the state’s authority and thus a duty to obey the law, lest they become a free rider. Second, ignoring duties to oneself, citizens have a samaritan duty to contribute their share in protecting others from a state of nature, and consequently, governments have a proportional duty to impose demands on citizens. Third, the importance of explicit consent is questionable, since we tend to dismiss consent when the act in question is exceedingly immoral or harmful. For example, we prohibit individuals from consenting to sell themselves into slavery or to sell their organs. Given this, it is unclear why the opposite does not equally apply: if individuals fail to explicitly consent to an action that is extremely beneficial or just, should a lack of consent bar that action? To illustrate this using Hume’s analogy, if a ship was sinking and the captain ordered all the passengers to coordinate to patch up the hole, assuming the ship can only be saved if everyone obeys the command, arguably this authority is justified regardless of an individual’s lack of consent to being ordered.

Conclusion

Governments must extract certain sacrifices from citizens to protect their freedom. Though the alternative of anarchy creates the illusion of freedom, individuals cannot access security and liberty without state coercion. Unlike individuals, governments hold a uniquely reciprocal relationship to citizens, granting them a right, and indeed a duty, to tax and conscript citizens to provide public goods and services that individuals cannot provide for themselves.

Bibliography

Christiano, T. (2012). Authority. Retrieved July 15, 2020, from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/authority/

Dworkin, R. (1986). Law's Empire. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Green, L. (2003). Legal Obligation and Authority. Retrieved July 15, 2020, from

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-obligation/

Hume, D. (1985). “Of the Original Contract,” in Essays, Moral Political, and Literary ed. E.F. Miller. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics.

Huemer, M. (2013). The Problem of Political Authority: An Examination of the Right to Coerce and the Duty to Obey. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

Hobbes, T, 1588-1679. (1968). Leviathan. Baltimore: Penguin Books,

Kant, I. (1797). The Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Plato & Gallop, D. (1997). Crito. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Raz, Joseph. (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Rousseau, J.-J., & In Frankel, C. (1947). The Social Contract. New York: Hafner Publishing Co.

Wellman, C. H., & Simmons, A. J. (2005). Is there a duty to obey the law? New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wolff, Robert Paul. (1970). In Defense of Anarchism. Harper Collins.

2020年政治奖三等奖

 An analysis of American charitable giving and its implications on government efficacy
美国慈善捐赠及其对政府效能的影响分析

Calvin Xu,加拿大阿普尔比学院
2020年政治奖第三名 |6.5 分钟阅读

Among the hundreds of billions of dollars dedicated by Americans towards philanthropy each year, the state receives a minuscule fraction of this money. The ultimate goals of charities and the state are often aligned: to promote social wellbeing and improve the lives of people. The state often does so through the funding of numerous universal social services, while charities tend to focus on protecting the interests of certain vulnerable groups in society. While the state is in many cases more efficient than private charities, the specific niches charities fill, and the contrasting public perceptions of charities and the state make governments unable to compete with private charities for donations. The implication is therefore not that cannibalization of one over the other would greatly serve the social good, but that their coexistence is necessary to achieve common goals.

An intuitive answer to the reason why philanthropic contributions are mostly directed towards private charities rather than the government is a free-market capitalist idea of competition. This reasoning claims that consumers, in this case donors, would choose to make contributions to the institution that would maximize the impact of their donation. However, the idea that the private sector is always more efficient than the state is misleading. The government can provide many public services in a much more efficient way than the private sector. For instance, in the United States, where the private sector has a significantly higher share in the healthcare industry, total healthcare spending per capita in 2019 was around double that of European countries and Canada where there exists universal healthcare under a single-payer model funded by government spending, despite similar outcomes judging by life expectancy (OECD, 2020). Similarly, the government is generally more efficient in the operation of public services. In the UK, for example, public subsidies towards railways actually increased dramatically following privatization, while rail services that remained state operated cost taxpayers less money (Simms & Reid, 2013). This demonstrates a higher efficiency on the part of the state towards the funding of widely accessible social services. This includes, among others, services such as healthcare, public transportation networks, and a social security net.

These services require massive bureaucracies and significant funding to be operational. The US government has the advantage of a far higher budget than the $300 billion dollars Americans donated to charity each year and is therefore better suited to fund most public services.

Therefore, in many cases, the government is not only the most efficient but also an irreplaceable actor in providing critical social services.

A common argument raised as to why the private sector is more efficient is that there exists an incentive structure to constantly improve efficiency to gain a competitive advantage. A charity that provides educational resources in low income communities, for example, has a direct incentive to prove it can do so more efficiently than other organizations performing similar functions, thereby securing more donations. The public sector, opponents argue, lacks the same incentives which is what allows waste and inefficiency. Not only is this somewhat offset by aforementioned advantages of the public sector, the assertion that there exists little to no incentive to improve efficiency in the public sector is also false. Politicians in democratic systems of governance have a direct incentive to improve efficiency as they hope to be reelected by taxpayers. Similarly, bureaucracies operating within the state have an incentive to be more efficient and improve processes because a negative perception towards it will likely result in cuts in funding towards that bureaucracy. For example, perception of wasteful spending on the part of the department of transportation would likely lead to voters calling for reduced funding, or even partial privatization. Therefore, there exists a similar incentive in the public sector to improve efficiency and the management of taxpayer dollars.

Given that the state is often more efficient in the promotion of social wellbeing through funding public services, the same line of reasoning of competition would therefore suggest that most charitable donations would go towards the state, rather than private charities, which is contradicted by the actual behavior of donors. This occurs due to two main factors. Firstly, the relationship between the state and private charities is for the most part not one of competition. Instead, the state and private charities complement each other in their functionalities, where private charities are able to fill niche roles where the state has failed or is less efficient. Therefore, while the state may be more efficient in broad social services accessible to wide ranges of people, charities often focus on specific vulnerable groups. For instance, while the state may be an effective provider of a social safety net in the form of welfare checks and food stamps for those in poverty, the specific needs of communities that were placed in poverty in the first place by government neglect or past and current instances of institutional racism on the part of the state are ones that may be better, or uniquely, addressed by non-profit organizations that have a deeper understanding of such a community. Social problems seen as “too small” for governments, but nevertheless have an enormous negative impact on the lives and wellbeing of people, can be combatted through philanthropy. This is clearly understood by governments, because there exist government grants and subsidies for non-profit organizations. In fact, a study done by the Global Centre for Public Service Excellence found “no conclusive evidence that one model of ownership is intrinsically more efficient than the others” (Rao, 2015). Rather, the paper suggests that the type of service and contextual factors generally determined the efficacy of the private versus public sector (Rao, 2015). Therefore, the conclusion drawn is not that private charities or government spending should be abolished in favor of the other, but that the coexistence of both complement each other in a way that is best able to serve the social good.

The notion that private charities fill niches governments are unable or unwilling to is further supported by the distribution of charitable giving. In 2018, charitable giving to international affairs as well as environment and animal organizations rose, with giving to environment and animal organizations reaching an all-time high (Giving USA, 2019). This comes amid the current US administration, which has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement and placed lowered emphasis on environmental concerns in favor of economic development (Pompeo, 2019). Additionally, this administration has also been criticized for its handling of international affairs, with global favorability ratings of American foreign policy sliding (Buttigieg & Gordon, 2020). The increase in charitable donations to these areas can be seen as a response to where the government has failed and provides further support for the complementary nature of the government and charities.

Moreover, donors favor private charities because they have a generally better perception than the government and its policies. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, taxation is widely unpopular among the general public. A Gallup poll on the perceptions of Americans towards government taxation policy found that although less individuals today compared to previous decades feel that they pay too much federal income tax, that number is still around half of all Americans and over a third believe that the amount of income tax they paid was unfair (Gallup, n.d.). In fact, since 1956, the percentage of individuals who felt they paid too little federal income tax has never exceeded 4% (Gallup, n.d.). Therefore, due to the ill will towards the existence of what is effectively an obligatory contribution towards the government, and the minuscule amount of people who feel they pay too little in taxes, individuals are unlikely to want to donate to the government.

Secondly, the effects of your donation to private charitable organizations is far more observable and traceable. Donations to the government are put into a wide variety of government programs. Therefore, the donor does not know what they are donating to when they are making a contribution. While an individual may support increased funding to healthcare, or roads, or education, they may not support increased funding to military spending and vice versa. Given that the individual is often unable to control the spending of their donation, it is far more appealing for someone passionate about education to donate to a private charity focused solely on education, or for someone passionate about the military to donate to a private charity focused solely on providing financial assistance to homeless veterans. Private charities cater towards specific goals, which allows donors to have increased choice in the spending of their donation, therefore being much more appealing to donors that are passionate about a specific cause or a specific community. Additionally, donating to governments is inherently political, and governments will often allocate spending and enact policies that a significant portion of the population may disagree to, while charities tend to be uncontroversial and universally appealing.

Thirdly, the idea of the government as a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy is one that is quite pervasive, and many people buy into the narrative that the private sector is more efficient, despite this being inaccurate. Private charities are therefore far more sympathetic, seen as good actors in contrast to the government, even though inefficiencies and corruption exist in equal, or even greater quantities in private charities. This is further exacerbated by advertisement campaigns commonly employed by private charities that portray sympathetic individuals in need and empowering success stories that provoke strong emotions. While politicians also highlight the successes of the government during campaigns for the purposes of reelection, adversaries to the incumbents in power often do the exact opposite, pointing out the failures of the government, creating a less favorable image of the government in general. This means that a significant part of the reason as to why the state cannot compete with private charities for donations lies not in the state’s actual inefficiency compared to private charities, but in the perception of the state in contrast to private charities.

The government provides many critical services that have an enormous impact in improving general social wellbeing among the public, often in a far more efficient way than private institutions. However, there exist needs that the government is unable or unwilling to fulfill, thus creating the demand for private charities aimed at addressing these specific needs. Individuals choose to donate primarily to these private charities because of a negative perception towards the government, whether in regards to taxation, perceived waste of resources, or generally as a sympathetic actor. Additionally, government policies and spending are inevitably controversial, and spread across a broad range of issues concerning the general good. Donors who value choice highly, or who are primarily concerned with addressing specific issues will therefore turn towards charities, who are more focused on an uncontroversial niche. The implications of the apparent disconnect between government efficiency and charitable donations are neither that the inefficient government should be replaced by private sector non-profit organizations, nor that the functions performed by private charities should be cannibalized by the state. Instead, the conclusion that should be drawn is that governments cannot compete with private charities because their relationship should not be one of competition, but rather that they should complement each other in ultimately promoting the wellbeing of a society.

Bibliography

Buttigieg, P., & Gordon, P. H. (2020, July 14). Present at the Destruction of U.S. Power and Influence. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/14/trump-biden-foreign- policy-alliances/

Gallup. (n.d.). Taxes. Gallup.Com. Retrieved July 12, 2020, from https://news.gallup.com/poll/1714/Taxes.aspx

Giving USA. (2019, June 18). Giving USA 2019: Americans gave $427.71 billion to charity in 2018 amid complex year for charitable giving. https://givingusa.org/giving-usa-2019- americans-gave-427-71-billion-to-charity-in-2018-amid-complex-year-for-charitable- giving/

OECD. (2020). Health spending. OECD. http://data.oecd.org/healthres/health-spending.htm Pompeo, M. R. (2019, November 4). On the U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. United

States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-from-the-paris- agreement/

Rao, S. (2015). Is the private sector more efficient? A cautionary tale. Global Centre for Public Service Excellence. https://gsdrc.org/document-library/is-the-private-sector-more- efficient-a-cautionary-tale/

Simms, A., & Reid, S. (2013, April 25). “The private sector is superior”. Time to move on from this old dogma. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/apr/25/private-sector-superiority- mythbuster

2020年政治奖一等奖

American citizens give away more than $300 billion each year in charitable donations. Only a tiny fraction of this (less than 0.001%) is donated to federal, state, and local governments. Politicians claim that they spend taxpayers' money efficiently, to accomplish the most good with the budgets at their disposal. But if this were true wouldn't governments be able to compete more successfully with private charities? What are the implications of your answer?

美国公民每年捐赠超过3000亿美元的慈善捐款。其中只有一小部分(不到0.001%)捐赠给联邦,州和地方政府。政客们声称,他们有效地使用纳税人的钱,以利用他们可支配的预算实现最大的好处。但如果这是真的,政府难道就不能更成功地与私人慈善机构竞争吗?你的回答意味着什么?

Helny Hobbs,纽斯特德伍德学校,英国
2020年政治奖得主|7 分钟阅读

Introduction

Americans are one of the most philanthropic peoples in the world with their voluntary giving exceeding the total GDP of nations such as Israel and Chile. However, donations to federal, state and local governments are astronomically low, despite the aim of government being to advance social good in the same way as the third sector. Government’s inability to successfully compete with non-profits stems, not from lack of efficiency as it would appear prima facie, but from their inability to match the 'warm glow’ provided by private charity and, most of all, philanthropic particularism. The implications of these factors are that America’s welfare system perpetuates the status quo and often does not deliver necessary change. Government and private charity should be provoked to compete on terms of efficiency, to ensure the maximum potential for social good is fulfilled by devising new methods to measure efficiency and informing Americans of their biases. However, in cases where particularism cannot be overcome, it is the duty of government to step in and increase taxation.

A Matter of Efficiency?

When it comes to explaining the gulf between donations to government and private charity, the veracity of the claim that government does not use its money efficiently is inconsequential – instead, it is whether government is perceived as inefficient that may influence how people donate. Since President Carter popularised small-government rhetoric in the seventies, Americans have become notorious for their distrust of government effectiveness (especially at the federal level), with 73% of Americans - both Republicans and Democrats - believing that charities are more cost-effective than government agencies.

However, efficiency is not a significant consideration in philanthropic decisions for most individuals as it is subjugated by human nature. For example, imagine a burning building in which there is a child and $1 million that you have pledged to give to the Malaria Foundation. Would you save the child or the money that could save the lives of many more children? While the latter would be more effective, human nature favours the former demonstrating how humans are motivated by considerations besides efficiency. Singer agrees in his “drowning child” hypothetical. This becomes increasingly evident when looking at the third sector: according to Guide Dogs of America it costs $42,000 to train a guide dog but only $25 to fund 80% effective surgery for sufferers of trachoma in Africa which could restore their sight, however, the former charity still receives donations. Further, even if donors try to be effective, because of the difficulty in evaluating the efficiency of an initiative donors experience an ‘evaluability bias’ (Ord) that sees them prioritise easily measurable factors such as overhead ratio, irrespective of cost-effectiveness. Therefore, even if governments were viewed as on-par with the third sector in terms of efficiency, they would still not be able to compete for funds as there are more powerful factors at play that sway the preference of Americans towards private charity.

The ‘Warm Glow’ of Philanthropy

The first of these factors is the increased emotional reward from donating to charity over governments, or the ‘warm glow’ theory (Andreoni). The dominant motivation behind charitable giving is “the internal satisfaction that individuals derive from the act of giving” (Hernández-Murillo) which economists model as a commodity which individuals shop for in the market of philanthropy, trying to find the best place to get their money’s worth. Governments are significantly worse at providing this emotional reward; they are large so donors feel disconnected from the end result of their money, seeing it as swallowed up into the great administrative machine, unlike private charities which use advertising to link donors to their work such as: “£5 could pay for a goat for two families” (Oxfam) which gives donors more satisfaction as they feel that they are having a tangible impact. Further, the extensive impact of government schemes is a blessing and a curse as a single victim is better at inducing a strong affective response than a large number of victims presented in a statistical form (Slovic). One only must look to the recent George Floyd protests to evidence how powerful the story of one man receiving injustice is compared to statistics about police brutality that have been available for years.

The prioritisation of emotional reward means that philanthropic competition is reduced to an emotionally driven marketing campaign. However, some warn of the dangers of straying away from this approach, replacing emotion with facts and figures and thereby removing our humanity as "privately funded charity is the only charity stemming from individual compassion” (Tocqueville). However, there is a misconception that less emotional approach eradicates human empathy when it can enhance it. Mill argued that those who must concern themself with society are “those few whose actions have an influence that extends that far”; in the global world we live in today, this applies not to the few but to the majority. Empathy must take on a different form, one that accommodates for the vast information available to us about suffering across the world. To ignore this data and continue to base philanthropic decisions upon how emotionally roused we are by specific issues would be to be unempathetic to the rest of the suffering that happens across the world. While we cannot entirely withdraw emotion from charitable decisions as it is a powerful tool that motivates us to do good in the first place, we must have a measured approach, harnessing this empathy while recognising how it informs our biases: as Singer states, philanthropic decisions must be a “combination of heart and head”.

Philanthropic Particularism

The second and most influential factor is ‘philanthropic particularism’ (Salmon) - where donors tend to prefer certain groups and issues. Americans are much more likely to donate to private charity as it gives them the scope to display their personal preference without the interests of the rest of the country having to play a role, as they do when donating to the democratically elected government. In the US especially, with its laissez-faire neo-liberal attitudes, the impoverished are seen as ‘undeserving’ (a trope fuelled by racial divisions) which sees many Americans prefer to donate to religious organisations (32% of all donations) over redistributive organisations such as governments. The significance of particularism becomes more evident when looking to countries with highly homogenous populations like Scandinavian countries where people derive adequate satisfaction from government ‘charity’ as they relate to the recipients. Therefore, a much larger proportion of Scandinavians are prepared to support growth of the welfare state, unlike America where demographic divisions see more conflicts of interest within the electorate who are averse to an opposing group benefitting at their expense. While one may avoid their donation being used for a cause they are adverse to by specifying what the money should go towards, this is easier to do in private charity where there is more transparency about exactly how the money can be used, unlike governments where information about schemes being undertaken is not readily available.

This partisanship is reinforced by the belief that in America, civic duties are fulfilled through paying tax and that if government needed more money they would raise taxes - a falsehood, as the US government keeps taxes low to keep support amongst the electorate even though they have scope to do good with additional funds. Americans defend their right to income post-taxation, arguing for the liberty to spend it how they wish. However, the inadequate taxes enforced leave government with little capacity to implement social welfare meaning the responsibility falls upon private charities to fill the gaping holes in the social safety net, and thus the responsibility for choosing which issues need attention on donors.

Therefore, particularism has drastic ramifications as it dictates the shape of the welfare system and causes philanthropy to become a plutocracy with billionaires such as Bezos having the power to decide who deserves aid in America. Konkzal highlights that this system “channels aid towards the interests and needs of those who already hold large amounts of power” exemplified in the extortionate amount of charitable giving that goes into political advocacy and elite colleges. Where drastic and transformative change is needed that may be at the expense of those in the upper echelons of society, change will be opposed and the issue disregarded (Reich). Carter would criticize this, arguing that private charity is “democracy in action” with people ‘voting’ with their money, protecting non-mainstream ideas. However, wealth inequality means that not every ‘voter’ is equal, a necessary qualification for democracy.

The Case for Effective Altruism

While competition isn’t to do with effectiveness but emotional reward and particularism, governments and private charity should be competing in the market on the sole term of efficiency, with donors taking a utilitarian approach. The recent, rapidly accelerating effective altruism movement - headed by Peter Singer - argues for a new approach to welfare motivated by efficiency alone, making philanthropy “more about the beneficiaries of our money than our own need for warm and fuzzy feelings” (Fraser). The effectiveness of different charitable organisations can vary by as much as 2000%, suggesting huge scope for improving the effectiveness of welfare by redistributing resources. Once it becomes a competition of effectiveness, market forces will ensure that both charity and governments focus on improving their effectiveness instead of on ways to harness emotion and unimportant factors in advertising (such as reducing their overhead costs).

The easier it becomes to donate effectively, the more Americans will. To eliminate the ‘evaluability bias’ and distrust in government effectiveness, government and private charity must adopt comparable scales of effectiveness (such as the STEPS framework proposed by Eder) and make this information accessible and widely available. This will allow potential donors to realise the areas where government is more suitable to deal with an issue than charity. For example, non-profits such as ‘Ascension’ are trying to remedy issues with healthcare however their work often deals with the symptoms of the issue instead of the root of the problem in the way that government could if they reform the entire structure. This example illustrates how even though political action is often more unpredictable in yielding results, the “benefits of successful initiative are potentially much higher” in many cases (Baron), which will be made evident through these comparable statistics so that individuals have the capacity evaluate the most effective use of their money.

However, donating efficiently involves not just donating to the organisation that is best suited to deal with a chosen issue, but donating towards issues that are most in need. While quantifying effectiveness of institutions that are addressing similar issues is undemanding, it is difficult to compare dissimilar issues - for example, is curing a hundred children of blindness better than saving the life of one child? - so it is unrealistic to deploy statistics in this situation. Instead we must be mildly optimistic that philanthropic individuals have a measure of objective desire to do good with their money, so if informed of biases that are preventing them from doing so, will try to overcome them. Indeed, Americans will receive a heightened ‘warm glow’ knowing that they are donating more effectively, which will be a strong motivator. However, this more subjective approach based upon trusting individuals will not eradicate philanthropic particularism, so in the numerous cases where particularism sees the most important issues being disregarded, it is the duty of governments to protect the needy amongst their electorate and step in, acquiring additional funds through state or federal tax.

Conclusion

By changing the perception of government to an institution bent upon aiding those in need and deserving to be considered by donors in the same way as non-profits, doors will be opened to new approaches to social issues that utilise the power of government. Competition based solely on efficiency should be stimulated, by making it easier to evaluate this factor and by cultivating a culture of effective altruism. However, as ingrained biases mean that Americans cannot shoulder the responsibility of identifying the most pressing social issues, government must begin to step in and obtain the necessary funds through taxation to aid those disregarded by the Americans able to afford charitable giving.

Bibliography

Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote. Why Doesn’t The US Have A European-Style Welfare State? Harvard Institute of Economic Research, November 2001.

Andreoni, James. Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving. The Economic Journal, vol. 100, no. 401, 1990, pp. 464–477. JSTOR, <www.jstor.org/stable/2234133>

Bapanapalli, Satish. Why Forced ‘Charity’ Is Bad Economics. Foundation for Economic Education, 13 May 2020. < https://fee.org/articles/why-forced-charity-is-bad-economics/>

Baron and Szymanska. Heuristics and Biases in Charity. December 2010.

CAF. Giving Thought Podcast: Philanthropy and the Welfare State. 18 November 2018. <https://www.cafonline.org/about- us/blog-home/giving-thought/podcasts-from-giving-thought/philanthropy-and-the-welfare-state>

Caviola, Everett, Faulmüller, Kahane and Savulescu. The evaluability bias in charitable giving: Saving administration costs or saving lives? Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 9, No. 4, July 2014, pp. 303–315 <﷟ttp://journal.sjdm.org/14/14402a/jdm14402a.pdf>

Eder, Paul. How Do You Measure the Effectiveness of Government? Government Executive, 15 July 2015. <https://www.govexec.com/management/2015/07/how-do-americans-measure-effectiveness-government/117814/>

Fraser, Giles. It’s called effective altruism – but is it really the best way to do good? The Guardian, 23 November 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/money/belief/2017/nov/23/its-called-effective-altruism-but-is-it-really-the-best-way-to-do- good>

Gneezy, A, Gneezy, U and Keenan, E.A. Avoiding overhead aversion in charity. Science, October 2014. <https://science.sciencemag.org/content/346/6209/632>

Govindarajan and Ramamurti. How One Nonprofit Is Expanding Health Care for the Uninsured. Harvard Business Review, 11 October 2018. <https://hbr.org/2018/10/how-one-nonprofit-is-expanding-health-care-for-the-uninsured>

Hernández-Murillo and Roisman. The Economics of Charitable Giving: What Gives? Federal reserve Bank of St Louis, October 2005.

Husock, Howard. Why Government Can't Replace Charity. Forbes. 10 April 2014. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardhusock/2014/04/10/lesson-for-april-15-why-government-cant-replace- charity/#1334b36279e2>

Independent Sector. How Americans trust and value the charitable sector. Independent Sector, 2016. <https://independentsector.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/United-for-Charity-v5.pdf>

Konczal, Mike. The Conservative Myth of a Social Safety Net Built on Charity. The Atlantic, 24 March 2014. <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/03/the-conservative-myth-of-a-social-safety-net-built-on- charity/284552/>

Logue, John. The Welfare State: Victim of Its Success. Daedalus, vol. 108, no. 4, 1979, pp. 69–87. JSTOR, <www.jstor.org/stable/20024635>

Lowenstein and Small. Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability. Springer Publishing, January 2003.

Mill, J.S. Utilitarianism. 1863.

Niskanen Center. Why Americans Dislike Government, Even When it Works. 3 September 2019. <https://www.niskanencenter.org/why-american-dislike-government-even-when-it-works/>

Olasky, Marvin. The Tragedy of American Compassion. Regnery Publishing, May 1992.

Oppenheimer and Olivola. The Science of Giving: Experimental Approaches to the Study of Charity. Psychology Press, 19 Jan 2011.

Tanner, M.D. Less Welfare, More Charity. CATO Institute, 20 August 2014.

The Chronicle of Philanthropy. Philosopher Peter Singer on Ending World Poverty. 20 December 2019. <https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Philosopher-Peter-Singer-on/247738#disqus_thread>

Vilbert, Jean. What If Charity Replaced Taxation? Foundation for Economic Education, July 2019. <https://fee.org/articles/what-if-charity-replaced-taxation/>

Whitford, James. Could government welfare be undermining compassion? True Charity, September 2019. <http://www.truecharity.us/james-whitford-could-government-welfare-be-undermining-compassion/>

Zinsmeister, Karl. Fixing Problems via Philanthropy vs. Government. December 2019. <https://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/almanac/article/fixing-problems-via-philanthropy-vs.-government

2019年哲学奖得主

Aristotelian virtue ethics achieved something of a resurgence in the twentieth century. Was this progress or retrogression?亚里士多德的美德伦理在二十世纪取得了某种复兴。这是进步还是倒退?

徐英勋,查德威克国际学校,韩国

2019年哲学奖得主|8 分钟阅读

Progress and Retrogression in Philosophy

In the physical world, time measures progress and retrogression as steps along the linear timeline based on the empirical evidentiary facts. These facts are verified or falsified as time passes, which inextricably links time and progress. For example, replacing the heliocentrism with geocentrism is retrogressive because the astronomical evidence accumulated through time discredits the latter. However, progress in philosophy is incompatible with such a view because philosophy belongs to the abstract world, where the lack of empirical factual basis obfuscates the link between time and progress. Hence, a step backward in time does not necessarily equate to retrogression: we cannot say that the Aristotelian concept of justice is retrogressive compared to the Rawlsian concept purely based on the concept of time.

To answer the question, we need to construct a method that measures progress in philosophy. I seek to achieve this by asserting that, in philosophy, a certain degree of falsification is achievable. Utilizing philosophical inquiry and thought experiments, we can rationally assess the logical validity of theories and assign “true” and “false” status to philosophical thoughts. With this in mind, I propose to employ the fourth process of the Popperian model of progress - “t2 has passed tests which t1 failed to pass”[1] - divided into the following two conditions:

Progress occurs:
1. When the new theory provides a logical response to the deficiencies of existing thoughts.
2. When the new theory can be rationally justified from criticisms.

The first condition is crucial because the new theory must be a development from the previous idea to be considered as progress, where development is defined as rectifying the existing deficiencies. If not, the new theory fails the tests that existing theories had failed, which condemns it to the same false status as the existing theories. The second condition indicates that the new theory cannot be unjustifiably false, since no philosophers, seekers of the truth, would consciously advocate for a false theory. Holding false position necessitates irrational dogmatism, which deprives philosophy of truth and reason, of its goal and foundation.

Utilizing these two conditions, I contend that Aristotelian virtue ethics was progress from Kantian ethics and utilitarianism.

First Condition: Overcoming Social and Moral Schizophrenia

Social Schizophrenia

The sense of moral obligation thoroughly pervades within Kantian ethics and utilitarianism. Kant writes that only “an action done from duty has moral worth”[2]; likewise, Bentham states that pain and pleasure “point out what we ought to do.”[3] When used as moral terms, “ought” and “duty” adopt the special connotations of being obliged, bound, or required, which are concepts that necessitate a presence of law.[4] This insertion of law into ethics has its genealogical genesis in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, from its notions of the divine law and God (the law-giver). Although the Enlightenment rejected the existence of this divine law-giver, Enlightenment duty-based theories have preserved the Judaeo-Christian concepts of law-based obligation. In other words, they have clung onto the remnants of religious tradition despite the Nietzschean concept of the “Death of God.” Since the Enlightenment eliminated the notion of God, the core pillar of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, it becomes illogical for Enlightenment theories to maintain other aspects of the belief that it subverted. As Anscombe described, “it is as if the notion ‘criminal’ were to remain when criminal law and criminal courts had been abolished.”[5] Such phenomenon depicts my notion of “social schizophrenia,” where the societal disharmony arises from the simultaneous acceptance and rejection of Judaeo-Christian tradition.

To circumvent social schizophrenia, three non-divine alternatives to divine law have been proposed as the moral norm: society, contract, and human virtue.[6] However, if society were the moral standard, an individual is subjected to the circumstantial moral luck concerning whether the rules of the society are good or evil (e.g., 2019 Geneva vs. 1939 Munich). On the other hand, contracts cannot be the standard because people are ignorant of their being under a moral contractual obligation, when, unlike law, it is impossible to be under a contract without being aware. Thus, given the shortcomings of other alternatives, human virtue is the ideal moral norm. However, this outlook on human virtue replaces the Judaeo-Christian concept of “law-based obligation” with the Aristotelian “good man,” who is the rational “standard” of a virtuous and ethical life.[7] Adopting human virtue as the moral norm entails the elimination of “moral obligation” and the rejection duty-based theories in favor of Aristotelian virtue ethics.

In short, there are two approaches to overcome social schizophrenia:
1. Maintain duty-based theories but re-establish God as the divine law-giver (divine law as the norm)
2. Replace duty-based theories with Aristotelian virtue ethics (virtue as the norm)

The first choice reverts the secular philosophical progress since the Enlightenment, and, consequently, normative ethics retrogresses to infallible religious dogma, in which stagnation is the only possibility. Contrarily, the second option is more compatible with the progress of Enlightenment secularism in its overcoming of social schizophrenia.

Moral Schizophrenia

Kantian ethics and utilitarianism establish reason as the basis of moral duties and obligations. However, as evident in Kant’s rejection of emotions as a moral motivation or Bentham’s exclusion of motives from the list of variables for the felicific calculus, these theories eliminate personal motives - “values of personal and interpersonal relations and activities” - from ethical decisions.[8] We can deduce from this that there are moral circumstances where reason and motives clash in a state of disharmony. Michael Stocker calls such phenomenon “moral schizophrenia,” which he describes as “not to be moved by what one values” and vice versa.[9] Like social schizophrenia, moral schizophrenia raises detrimental implications to Kantian ethics and utilitarianism.

Let us consider the Trolly Problem to illustrate moral schizophrenia, ceteris paribus. A trolley is headed towards one’s child, who is on the main track. The moral agent can pull the lever to divert the trolley to the sidetrack, which contains three thieves.

Based purely on personal motives, the agent would resolutely pull the lever because the paternal love for one’s own child surpasses all the other relationships. However, a utilitarian agent, whose reason values mathematical utility, cannot sacrifice three lives for one, since utilitarianism regards every person as no more or less than a single human being. Similarly, a Kantian, whose reason values the categorical imperative (particularly the Second Formulation in this case) as the duty, cannot deliberately condemn the three people as means to the child’s end. For both cases, the agent experiences moral schizophrenia due to the dichotomy between the personal motive and reason.

As shown above, since moral actions lead to discontent in lieu of fulfillment, people are unable to attain the good life (eudaimonia) when reason and motive are in disharmony. Conversely, to actualize eudaimonia, one needs to live in accordance with virtue, which harmonizes reason and motive. I believe the reason is that Aristotle includes emotion within virtue ethics along with reason, since motives such as love and friendship are emotion-based, not reason-based. Aristotle holds that it is the characteristic of virtue to allow emotions “at the right times” and “in the right fashion.”[10] Here, Aristotle is not asserting emotions over reason, since the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean keeps emotions within the reins of reason. Instead, he is saying that one must possess a harmony of motive (emotion) and reason, as the purpose of virtue is to attain eudaimonia, not to fulfill a duty. To return to the Trolley Problem, a virtuous person would pull the lever based on the virtue of love as the harmony of the motive of parental love and the reasoning that a parent has a duty towards the child. Hence, unlike Kantian ethics and utilitarianism, Aristotelian virtue ethics succeeds in overcoming moral schizophrenia.

Second Condition: Defense of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

Self-Centeredness

Critics assert that self-centered ethical theories are retrogressive, as they claim that ethical theories progressed during the Enlightenment by placing the interests of others at the center. Prima facie, Aristotelian virtue ethics is self-centered: the purpose of a virtuous life is to gain eudaimonia for oneself.

Philippa Foot defends virtue as being “beneficial either to others, or to its possessor as well as to others.” Through the virtue of charity, the principal recipients of happiness are others.[11] Furthermore, the virtue of justice is “giving people what they deserve” based on merit, without particular regard to oneself.[12] However, this raises a deeper criticism that a virtuous agent generally disregards the virtuous character of others. From an act of virtue, the virtuous agent receives the most valuable thing (virtuous character for eudaimonia), while others receive momentary happiness. This “virtuous-character-for-self-and-happiness-for-others” mentality treats others and their happiness as a secondary means for the primary achievement of eudaimonia.

Intriguingly, David Solomon employs tu quoque (partner-in-crime) approach to reveal that this kind of self-centeredness is not unique to virtue ethics. In Kantian ethics, “it is self-contradictory to demand that I do (make it my duty to do) what only the other person himself can do.”[13] We can deduce from the previous statement that Kantian ethics is self-centered, considering that there is no duty requiring one to help others to act based on duty and achieve moral status. More subtly, this asymmetry between self and others is also observable in utilitarianism, a principle where an agent endeavors to make others benevolent as well. The benevolence of others is “only of instrumental concern” (to increase utility), while benevolence of self is more than such: benevolence of self is the perspective that gives the “moral significance” to the benevolence of others, but cannot “attain moral significance from this perspective because it is the perspective,” which grants oneself the exclusive “special status.”[14] Since self-centeredness is fundamentally shared amongst prevalent ethical theories, we, as human beings, must ask whether the complete detachment of self, or absolute self-less-ness, is even plausible.

Explicit Action-Guidance

The purpose of normative ethics is “to discover what the right action is.”[15] However, people criticize that Aristotelian virtue ethics lacks explicit action-guidance for all moral circumstances, that it is unable to clearly identify right and wrong, contrary to Kantian ethics and utilitarianism. This raises the fundamental issue of whether Aristotelian virtue ethics is a theory of normative ethics.

Firstly, I affirm that virtue ethics can provide specific action-guidelines. The Aristotelian mean doctrine defines vice (excess and deficiency) and virtue (mean of two vices) as “prohibition” and “positive instruction” that manifest clear specifications of “right action.”[16] These definitions enable us the capability of identifying right and wrong, which we can apply in moral circumstances as the guiding principles.

For those declaring virtue ethics as retrogression due to its lack of explicitness, they have to ponder whether explicit guidance for all moral possibilities is genuinely feasible. Sarah Broadie maintains that other theories fail to emulate the vast applicability of virtue ethics because only virtue ethics recognizes the impossibility of providing explicit action-guidance for every moral scenario “in itself,” considering that what is right “always depends on the particulars.”[17] Although Kantian ethics and utilitarianism claim to provide explicit moral guidance for all possibilities based on absolute principles (categorical imperative and utility), countless cases
expose their inadequacy, e.g., lying to a Nazi officer about a Jew hiding in the basement (Kantian ethics) or demagogically framing Jews for the sake of nation’s overall peace and stability (utilitarianism). However, since each moral circumstance is unique, the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean is not a rigid mathematical mean between two vices but instead is a flexible concept with the capacity to tailor to particular circumstances based on the agent’s practical and intellectual reasoning. However, unlike Nietzschean ubermensch, the standard of judgment is not the arbitrary individual will, but is rather the established definitions of virtues and vices. All things considered, the lack of explicit action-guidance for all possibilities, in reality, is a strength that enables a vast application of Aristotelian virtue ethics.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Aristotelian virtue ethics successfully fulfills the two established conditions of philosophical progress. Although virtue ethics belonged to an era two thousand years back in time, its resurgence in the twentieth century was a step forward in normative ethics.

Footnotes

1 Alex Deagon, “Popper or Kuhn: Truth and the Progress of Science” (paper, Perspectives on Progress Conference, University of Queensland, Brisbane, 27-29 Nov. 2013, Academia),. 3,
www.academia.edu/5254144/Popper_or_Kuhn_Truth_and_the_Progress_of_Science.

2 Immauel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. Allen W. Wood (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), 15.

3 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2000), 14.

4 Gertrude Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy." Philosophy 33, no. 124 (1958): 5.
www.jstor.org/stable/3749051.
5 Ibid., 12.
6 Ibid., 13-15.
7 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. trans. F. H. Peters (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1893), 74.

8 Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories." The Journal of Philosophy 73, no. 14 (1976): 455. doi:10.2307/2025782.

9 Ibid., 454.

10 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 46.
11 John Hacker-Wright. Pilippa Foot’s Moral Thought (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013), 77
12 Michael Sandel, Justice: What’s The Right Thing To Do? (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 187.
13 Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), 44.

14 Yong Huang, Why Be Moral?: Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers (New York: SUNY Press, 2014), 84
15 Roger Crisp, “What is Virtue Ethics?” Practical Ethics Bite. University of Oxford, 22 Sep. 2014, podcasts.ox.ac.uk/what-virtue-ethics.
16 Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtue theory and Abortion.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 20, no. 3 (1991): 227.
17 Sarah Broadie, Ethics With Aristotle (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 102.

Author’s Note

Given the broadness of the topic and the word limit, I have focused on the evaluation of the resurgence of Aristotelian virtue ethics as progress or retrogression exclusively within the field of normative ethics, despite the resurgence of virtue (aretaic turn) within other philosophical fields, such as epistemology, political philosophy, and legal theory. Furthermore, this essay narrows the field of normative ethics in the twentieth century to its two most dominant and prevalent ethical theories: utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. The answer to the question requires the comparison of Aristotelian virtue ethics with the existing ethical theories in the twentieth century. If too many theories are taken into consideration, this paper would not be able to delve into thorough depth, considering the word restriction. Therefore, comparing Aristotelian virtue ethics to utilitarianism and Kantian ethics as the representation of the twentieth century normative ethics prior the resurgence of virtue ethics would be the most coherent and efficient method for the evaluation of virtue ethics as progress or retrogression.

Bibliography

Anscombe, Gertrude. "Modern Moral Philosophy." Philosophy 33, no. 124 (1958): 1-19.
www.jstor.org/stable/3749051.

Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Translated by F. H. Peters. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1893.

Bentham, Jeremy. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2000.

Broadie, Sarah. Ethics With Aristotle. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Crisp, Roger. “What is Virtue Ethics?” Practical Ethics Bites. University of Oxford, 22 Sep. 2014.
podcasts.ox.ac.uk/what-virtue-ethics.

Deagon, Alex. “Popper or Kuhn: Truth and the Progress of Science.” Paper presented at Perspectives on Progress
Conference, University of Queensland, Brisbane, 27-29 Nov. 2013, Academia,
www.academia.edu/5254144/Popper_or_Kuhn_Truth_and_the_Progress_of_Science.

Hacker-Wright, John. Philippa Foot’s Moral Thought. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013.

Huang, Yong. Why Be Moral?: Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers. New York: SUNY Press, 2014.

Hursthouse, Rosalind. “Virtue theory and Abortion.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 20, no. 3 (1991): 223-246

Kant, Immanuel. The Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited by Mary J. Gregor. New

York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964.

Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited and translated by Allen W. Wood. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002.

Sandel, Michael. Justice: What’s The Right Thing To Do? New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009.

Stocker, Michael. "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories." The Journal of Philosophy 73, no. 14 (1976): 453-66. doi:10.2307/2025782.

2020年哲学奖三等奖

Is Intuition to Philosophy as Observation is to Science?

直觉之于哲学,就像观察之于科学吗?

Ali Haider,英国沃灵顿县文法学校
2020年哲学奖第三名 |7 分钟阅读

Urging the question is a reasonable enough suggestion: rather as empirical observation in science provides the basis for the evaluation of hypotheses concerning the workings of the physical universe, intuition would similarly seem to operate as a sounding board for the evaluation of arguments and theories (normative, of mind, knowledge, art, inter alia) in philosophy. But in order to better assess whether both entities occupy the same functional roles in their respective disciplines beyond this prima facie symmetry, it is necessary to submit either to a sort of truth-conditional analysis of its uses.

‘Observation’ in this discussion refers to the empirical data-gathering procedures – fieldwork, experiment, simulation, etc. – which, aided by the use of sophisticated technical instruments, form the basis of conventional scientific practice. A suitable definition of ‘intuition’, which in the literature has been variously interpreted as a belief, a disposition to believe, and even a wholly sui generis mental state, is more difficult.[1] However, as a working definition that best establishes a comparable functional role to ‘observation’ in science, an intuition may be described as a mental state approaching ‘surmise’, a kind of pre-theoretical impression about a state of affairs, often though not always with isolable propositional content, and of variable conviction and sophistication.

This discussion will focus on some of the more pressing and, in the author’s estimation, interesting threats to the intuition-observation symmetry, with particular emphasis on the incommensurability of data and the nature of falsification and academic consensus.

Resisting falsification in philosophy

One possible asymmetry between intuition and empirical observation is that the former is functionally impotent in respect of falsifying erroneous theories, unlike empirical data.

Essential to the scientific method is the notion that observation provides the fundamental basis for the evaluation of hypotheses. Specific, falsifiable hypotheses are subjected by a community of trained peers to several rounds of experimental scrutiny. The presence of any data directly contrary to the closely defined expectations of a hypothesis will begin to provide grounds for disconfirmation. Sufficient replication of disconfirmatory results will entirely annihilate its chances of widespread acceptance within a scientific community. As such, empirical observation may be imputed to bear the functional role of falsifying erroneous scientific theories.[2]

In philosophy, however, while one’s intuitions about a matter are sometimes treated as providing a sort of prima facie justification for believing a proposition, they might similarly contravene a particular argument’s conclusions, but with no necessary consequences for the argument’s veracity.

Consider William Macaskill’s simple hypothetical concerning whether an agent should save a multi-million-pound Picasso or a child from a burning building.[3] On a utilitarian framework, the likelier prescription, ceteris paribus, would probably be to save the painting, for the money acquired from its sale could be reliably used to purchase several anti-malaria bed nets for vulnerable African children, and unambiguously save many more lives.[4] Nevertheless, for various intuitive reasons, most agents would probably be more inclined to rescue the child.

However, despite the inconsistency between the utilitarian conclusion and quite plausibly an overwhelmingly popular contrary intuition, such an incompatibility alone does not necessarily disconfirm the utilitarian verdict, or the utility calculus at large, as with incongruous evidence in science. One can, in moves resembling Strawson’s distinction concerning ‘descriptive and revisionary metaphysics’, choose to defend one’s intuitions, or follow a chain of reasoning to its ultimate conclusions and revise them.[5]

Indeed, it would be no sin for the philosopher not to rule in accordance with strong intuitions, insofar as her conclusions were independently justified. If, as Peter Singer observes, one’s own interests really are no more important than others’, and it would be diminishing greater suffering to procure those anti- malaria bed nets, then perhaps the utilitarian verdict here is correct after all. As per Singer’s ‘escalator of reason’ metaphor, the autonomy of the human reasoning faculty ensures that, over our species’ evolutionary trajectory, the indiscriminate exercise of reason in worldly affairs is liable, eventually, to lead one towards certain difficult conclusions such as this.[6] It seems possible for one to be ‘rationally persuaded’ in this way of the truth of a nonetheless counterintuitive proposition.

But it is also possible that a certain falsificatory impotence is to be expected in ethics, where resisting intuitional pulls is often justified under the guise of systematising one’s judgements.

(Similar intuitional incongruity is also easily demonstrated in, for instance, the philosophy of mind: credence in physicalist and functionalist theories is threatened by strong intuitions about irreducible qualia, perhaps attributable to a species-wide “common-sense dualism”.[7] Yet such intuitional incongruity is again not understood to falsify these theories which, indeed, are popular philosophical positions.)[8] However, conceding a falsificatory impotence to intuition in even one major philosophical domain like ethics is sufficient to substantially disturb the intuition-observation symmetry.

Of course, if no other intuitions were involved here, this would also suggest that intuitional influences can be resisted altogether in evaluating philosophical theories. But this is not clear; indeed, it might be impossible to accept an argument’s conclusions without some intuitional motivation. Favouring the utilitarian or functionalist options above might appeal to certain, more fundamental intuitions concerning ethical consistency or logical laws, or even be reducible to broader intuitions resembling Kant’s transcendental categories, conditioning one’s experience. Indeed, if every philosophical judgement were intuitionally motivated, the possibility of intuitional falsification would itself be unfalsifiable – one’s intuitions might just happen to accord with the ‘correct’ position every time.

But in assessing intuitions, one would ultimately seem to be confronted with two possibilities:

  • Either such fundamental, ‘categorical’ intuitions are independently verifiable – i.e., something like the law of non-contradiction may be construed as true independently of one’s experience of the world through it. On this view, siding with categorical intuitions in a philosophical dilemma may be regarded as being non-intuitionally, ‘rationally persuaded’ of a proposition. This means that, rather than a battle between competing intuitions, a real incongruity between a philosophical proposition and the remaining genuine intuition in the dilemma is preserved. Yet because this incongruity cannot alone falsify the theory, intuitions retain their falsificatory impotence.

  • Or, if every philosophical judgement appeals to some intuition, including ineluctable perceptual categories, no intuition can be shown to be more ‘legitimate’ than another. One cannot demonstrate the validity of the law of non-contradiction because one cannot escape the categorical intuition of non-contradiction. Because of such sceptical concern, one is no more justified in siding with a category-based intuition than any other intuition. Hence, no intuition can be considered legitimate enough to establish from its relation to a theory an incongruity that may give rise to the theory’s falsification, and once again, intuitions retain their falsificatory impotence.

Thus, either because intuitional incongruity may be entirely repudiated or because it is impossible to establish genuine intuitional incongruity, philosophical propositions would not seem to be intuitionally falsifiable. Naturally, moreover, if one cannot distinguish the intuitional circumstances under which a philosophical theory would be false, then one cannot establish conditions for intuitional verification or Popperian ‘corroboration’ of philosophical theories, either.[9]

Resisting falsification in science

But there is another variable that would threaten intuition’s apparently exclusive falsificatory impotence. As Thomas Kuhn observed, in science, observational data can be ‘theory-laden’.[10] In particular, there is a permanent possibility that an observer brings to bear various theoretical presuppositions that filter their perception and conceptualisation of empirical data.

Because these background assumptions are never themselves subject to experimental scrutiny, two scientists belonging to radically different paradigms can interpret the same phenomena as vindicatory of different hypotheses. Thus, “when Aristotle and Galileo looked at swinging stones, the first saw constrained fall, the second a pendulum”.[11] These experiments may be reproduced indefinitely, and yet, because they are unable to distinguish between the conceptual underpinnings of either hypothesis, the empirical data appear consistent with both and unable to falsify either.[12] It would hence seem that, just as intuitions cannot falsify erroneous philosophical theories, the theory-ladenness of observational data constrains their ability to falsify erroneous scientific hypotheses, too.

However, differences in the theoretical presuppositions of competing hypotheses have not always been significant enough to adversely affect predictive power, indicating that their sensitivity to the truth is not significantly compromised by interstitial conceptual details. Famously, Priestley and Lavoisier obtained the same quantitative results in key experiments on combustion, although one was an adherent of the theory of phlogiston, and the other of oxygen.[13]

Additionally, an observer’s theoretical presuppositions can be greatly rectified by subsequent generations when previously overlooked implications of their hypotheses come to conflict with established data. As Popper remarks, competing hypotheses undergo a process resembling natural selection, whereby one is provisionally adopted if it constitutes an improvement over an existing paradigm in respect of explanatory power, and holds promise in respect of predictive power.[14] Crucially, its integration into a field’s multi-paradigm matrix requires the attempted falsification of its most radical predictions, deduced as ‘propositions’ from the initial hypothesis.[15] This hypervigilant screening of hypotheses serves to sustain a longer-term falsificatory potency in science. One might then still reasonably conclude that intuition in philosophy is possessed of a falsificatory impotence not rivalled even by theory-laden observation in science.

One minor concession that might be made in intuition’s favour is that intuitional judgements still exert some influence over an argument’s palatability. The counterintuitive quality of the utilitarian verdict in Macaskill’s dilemma, though not binding one to any conclusion about the argument, might place an added epistemological burden on one who ignores the pull of her intuitions to justify this opposite judgement. This may also explain why philosophers from Grice to Parfit are often compelled to provide ‘error theories’ that ‘explain away’ intuitional incongruity.[16] However, this is still far from occupying the role of outright falsification that empirical observation plays in science.

Intuitional variation

Another curious aspect of the intuitional character is that it is subject to two kinds of variation not available to its putative empirical counterpart. First, and less consequentially, there is some variation in the importance that is often granted to philosophical intuitions. With respect to fringe ethical scenarios, philosophers – including the aforementioned Singer and Macaskill – sometimes recommend that one should not always rely so closely on one’s intuitions, without the risk of an almighty backlash from their peers, such as one might expect were one to encounter a scientist exhorting others not to consider empirical data.

Secondly, it is an open question whether intuitions have any objective basis, but even supposing they do, philosophy appears to lack a common evaluative framework with which members of the profession might independently reach the same, ‘legitimate’ intuitive judgements. No amount of philosophical analysis seems fit to isolate ‘correct’ intuitions, much less without eroding the common-sense understanding of intuitions as pre-theoretical impressions.

One consequence of the lack of such a framework is that intuitions are in practice subject to a degree of irresolvable individual variation. Thus, two new asymmetries in the functional roles of intuition and observation emerge: first, critical internal disagreement between ‘philosophical data’ is made possible, whereas in science, empirical data are in principle and increasingly in practice assimilable under common theoretical frameworks (although present difficulties in, e.g. reconciling the Standard Model with general relativity may disturb this trend). But inconsistent datasets of this sort also prevent ‘results’ from being reproducible, creating a diffidence towards scholarly consensus in philosophy. By contrast, although Kuhnian paradigm shifts can disturb the solidity of scientific consensus, the truth-sensitivity of scientific practice, evident in the ‘epistemic pruning’ of empirical falsification, contributes to a kind of long-term consensus hitherto unseen in philosophy.[17]

Conclusion

It is difficult to glean the precise influence of intuition over all philosophical inquiry. The philosopher finds herself in the unusual position of being swayed by intuitional data, even conjuring error theories to account for them, in a discipline in which confirmatory intuitional data are not even an explicit sine qua non of theoretical legitimacy.

However, intuitional judgements would at least seem to vary significantly enough in nature and application as to occupy a different functional role from observation. This is epitomised in the relevant dissimilarities of being incommensurable, indisposed to scholarly consensus, and unable to falsify erroneous theories.

Author's Note:

Because it is not possible to demonstrate exhaustively over the course of an essay of this sort whether falsification through intuitional judgement is really impossible in all areas of philosophy, the author has elected instead (with relevant qualifications to his argument) to survey moral philosophy and, briefly, philosophy of mind, to provide an indication of the scope of such a criticism.

Footnotes:

1 Pust, Joel, "Intuition", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Ed.), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/intuition/)

2 More contentious is the claim that empirical data serves to ‘verify’ hypotheses it is consistent with, as Popper noted. Because of the inductive nature of scientific practice, one can at most assert that theory-data consistency may serve to ‘corroborate’ a theory, resulting in its provisional adoption and possible retention after repeated attempts at falsification – and even then, only as a ‘working model’ of the phenomenon in question, and not holy writ.

3 William Macaskill, Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism Can Help You Make a Difference (Guardian Faber, 2016)

4 Let it be assumed that the funds obtained from the auctioning of the painting could be counted upon to save more lives, with no extraneous factors tipping the utility calculus in the other direction (one might, for instance, donate to a GiveWell-approved charity such as the Against Malaria Foundation).

5 Peter Frederick Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (Routledge, 1964)

6 Peter Singer, The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress (Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 135-137

7 Paul Bloom, Descartes’ Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human (Penguin, 2011), pp.191-192

8 Bourget, D., Chalmers, D.J., ‘What do philosophers believe?’, Philosophical Studies Vol. 170, pp. 465–500 (2014) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7

9 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge, 2002, 2nd ed.), pp. 248-252

10 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 2012, 4th ed.), pp. 111-113

11 Ibid. pp. 121-122

12 Ibid. pp. 112-115

13 Conant, J.B., (ed.) “The Overthrow of the Phlogiston Theory: The Chemical Revolution of 1775–1789,” in J.B. Conant and L.K. Nash (eds.), Harvard Studies in Experimental Science, vol. I, (Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 74–80

14 Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp. 90-92

15 Ibid.

16 Climenhaga, Nevin, ‘Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy’, Mind, Vol. 127, Issue 505, January 2018, pp. 69–104, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw032

17 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 50-52

Bibliography

Bloom, P., Descartes’ Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human (Penguin, 2011)

Bourget, D., Chalmers, D.J., ‘What do philosophers believe?’, Philosophical Studies Vol. 170, pp. 465–500 (2014) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7

Climenhaga, Nevin, ‘Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy’, Mind, Vol. 127, Issue 505, January 2018, pp. 69–104, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw032

Conant, J.B., (ed.) “The Overthrow of the Phlogiston Theory: The Chemical Revolution of 1775– 1789,” in J.B. Conant and L.K. Nash (eds.), Harvard Studies in Experimental Science, vol. 1 (Harvard University Press, 1957)

Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 2012)

Macaskill, W., Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism Can Help You Make a Difference (Guardian Faber, 2016)

Popper, K., The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge, 2002)

Pust, Joel, "Intuition", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Ed.), Edward N.Zalta (ed.), (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/intuition/)

Singer, P., The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress (Princeton University Press, 2011)

Strawson, P.F., Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (Routledge, 1964)

2020年哲学奖二等奖

Is Intuition to Philosophy as Observation is to Science?

姜敏俊,韩国国际学校:韩国济州校区

2020年哲学奖亚军|8 分钟阅读

When asked what characterizes the empirical sciences, it is often said that its reliance upon observations serves as the answer. When the same is asked of philosophy, many philosophers hold that the answer lies in philosophy’s dependence upon our intuitions. Naturally, then, the question arises: is observation to science as intuition is to philosophy? To answer this question, I will analyze and compare the roles assigned to observation and intuition in science and philosophy, respectively. After such examination, I come to the conclusion that as there are roles that only intuition serves and not observation, their contributions in their respective fields are not analogous to each other.

Before discussing what roles intuition and observation have, however, it must first be granted that the two do indeed have their places in scientific and philosophical inquiry. As such, the scientific and philosophical method and whether observation and intuition contribute to them must be examined beforehand.

Scientific Theorization and Evaluation

The scientific method, in contemporary literature, is identified with two steps: theorization and evaluation (Dorling & Miller, 1981; Gieseler, Loschelder, & Friese, 2019; Popper, 2002). Scientists first start their inquiry by postulating rational theoretical systems that, in accordance with reason, explain observations (Gieseler, Loschelder, & Friese, 2019; Popper, 2002; Staley, 2014). In the process, scientists follow what I call Theory Constructing Principles (TCPs). TCPs are the necessary principles of reason[1] that allow scientists to think rationally. Without TCPs, the very rules of reason, no rational theorization can take place. Thus, by constructing rational theories, all scientists follow TCPs.

After scientists hypothesize theories, they discern the most plausible ones.[2] They carry out this evaluation by using what I call various Theory Evaluation Principles (TEPs): generally, scientists prefer theories that do not contradict empirical observations, that are falsifiable, precise, parsimonious, and in agreement with corroborated theories (Gieseler, Loschelder, & Friese, 2019; Popper, 2002). Theories displaying these virtues laid out in TEPs, are favored over theories that fail to do so. As both theory construction and evaluation are closely related to observation, it seems reasonable to conclude that observation is at the core of the scientific method.

Philosophical Theorization and Evaluation

Philosophers generally believe that philosophical inquiry can be broken down into three major steps: philosophers first canvass intuitions, then construct rational theories that systematize them, and lastly evaluate their plausibilities (Bealer, 1998). Simply put, philosophical inquiry also involves a theorization-and-assessment process.

As there cannot be any form of rational theorization without the basic principles of reason, philosophers—in constructing rational theories—follow TCPs as well. Furthermore, after their construction, philosophical theories undergo an evaluation process in which philosophers apply their own TEPs: generally, philosophers prefer theories that are largely in agreement with intuitions, that are precise and ontologically parsimonious (Carroll & Markosian, 2010; Pust, 2000). As such, intuition also is deeply connected with the philosophical method in both the theory construction and evaluation process. Therefore, it seems, observation and intuition have their rightful places in science and philosophy, respectively.

With this established, to answer the question on whether intuition in philosophy is analogous to observation in science, I will specify the conditions that allow intuition to be similar to observation. If intuition in philosophy lacks the epistemic status observation enjoys in science, or vice versa, an affirmative answer to the question will not be available. Thus, in order for one to be justified in claiming that intuition’s role philosophy is similar to observation’s role science, intuition must satisfy the two following conditions:

  1. Intuition in philosophy must not lack any of the roles taken up by observation in science.

   2. Intuition’s role in philosophy must not exceed the roles taken up by observation in science.

The First Condition: Roles Both Observation and Intuition Serve

Observation’s Roles: Explanandum and Evidence

As mentioned before, theories exist as the explanans that explain observational data. Consequently, in constructing theories, observation takes on the role as the explanandum, i.e., that which is to be explained. As the purpose of a theory lies in explaining observational data, observation is one of the most important pieces of evidence scientists use to test the theory’s validity.[3] Therefore, it could be said that observation, in science, takes up the role as (ⅰ) the explanandum and (ⅱ) the evidence that evaluates a theory’s validity.

To give a thoughtful answer to the question, intuition and observation’s role in their respective fields must be examined in depth. Observation’s first role is self-evident: observation is that which is to be explained by scientific theories. However, the second role lacks some clarity. Due to the apparent vagueness of the term ‘evidence’, numerous philosophers, in their attempt to analyze the scientific method, have made many endeavors to precisely identify how observation’s evidential role in theory evaluation is to be understood (Chalmer, 2013; Staley, 2014). Of these efforts, I will discuss two of the most widely held considerations:

Hypothetico-deductivism and Bayesian Personalism.

Hypothetico-deductivism on Observation as Evidence. In Hypothetico-deductivism (HD), during their evaluation process, theories are subject to rigorous testing as scientists actively seek to falsify them by finding observational data that contradict their predictions (Popper, 2002). If a theory’s predictions are at odds with actual observations—and thus fail to satisfy the first TEP as laid out before—it is rejected regardless of whether or not it satisfies the rest of the TEPs.[4] By shaving off false theories through rigorous testing, scientists conversely seek to select theories that are consistent with empirical observations.[5] These unfalsified theories—although they never could, in principle, be proven to be true—are among the best, most plausible ones available to scientists.[6] As such, in the theory evaluation process, observation serves as the evidence—perhaps the most important one—that indicates which theories are false and which theories are most plausible.

Bayesian Personalism on Observation as Evidence. On the contrary, in Bayesian Personalism (BP), the main focus of theory evaluation is on who determines whether a theory must be accepted or not. A theory’s validity is determined by scientists and “ [the] subjective probabilities [, i.e.,] measures of subjective degrees of belief[, they assign to theories]” (Dorling & Miller, 1981, p. 110). In the evaluation process, empirical observation influences probabilities scientists assign to theories by strengthening or weakening scientists’ degree of belief in the theories in question (Dorling & Miller, 1981). As such, the evidential role of observation is to shape a theory’s subjective probability assigned by scientists, i.e., to persuade scientists.

Intuition’s Role: Explanandum and Evidence

In philosophy, it is widely accepted that “theories are designed to … explain [intuitions]” (Bealer, 1987, p. 312). Moreover, intuition—in philosophical argumentation—is presented as evidence for or against theories (Bealer, 1998; Pust, 2000). Thus, it could be said that intuition, in philosophy, takes up the role as (ⅰ) the explanandum and (ⅱ) the evidence that evaluates a theory’s validity.

The evidential role of intuition displays the same sense of ambiguity that was seen in the evidential role of observation. Therefore, I will further analyze the evidential status of intuition according to the two interpretations of the scientific method discussed before: HD and BP.

Hypothetico-deductivism on Intuition as Evidence. HD could characterize intuition’s role as evidence similar to how it describes the evidential role of observation in science. Philosophers “argue for [a theory] by showing that [what] it implies … is indicated by… intuitive judgements … [and] against the correctness of a theory by producing a … case [or cases] about which intuition disagrees with the theory in question” (Pust, 2000, p. 3). As a good theory must account for all the evidence, i.e., intuitions (Bealer, 1998), philosophers would reject falsified theories whose entailments contradict intuitive judgements. On the other hand, theories that are consistent with our intuitions would be considered to be strongly supported (Pust, 2000). Thus, intuition, in HD, could be interpreted as the evidence that either falsifies or strongly favors certain philosophical theories. HD’s interpretation of intuition’s evidential role seems to closely resemble its interpretation of observation’s evidential role: both intuition and observation either support or falsify theories in their respective fields.

Bayesian Personalism on Intuition as Evidence. In BP as well, intuition could be interpreted to take on an evidential role that closely resembles that of observation. When philosophers are persuaded by intuition to believe in the truth of a theory,[7] BP could emphasize the philosophers—the subjects in philosophical evaluation—and the evidential role intuition has in influencing their degree of belief. Intuition would form a theory’s subjective probability by strengthening or weakening a scientist’s degree of belief in the theory. Therefore, in BP, similar to how observation influences scientists, intuition would have the evidential role of persuading philosophers and thereby shaping a theory’s probability. As such, intuition seems to satisfy the first condition: intuition in philosophy, like observation in science, is the explanandum and the evidence used in theory evaluation in both HD and BP.

The Second Condition: Roles Only Intuition Serves

Intuition as the basis of philosophical theories

The epistemic weight intuition has in philosophical theory construction is quite distinct from that of observation in scientific theorization. As Bealer notes, philosophical inquiry starts from canvassing intuitions and proceeds to theorization by systematizing those intuitions (Bealer, 1998). Philosophical theories, in other words, are rooted in intuition. The only interpretation of the scientific method in which theories are derived from observations is inductivism (Chalmers, 2013). However, both Hypothetico-deductivists and Bayesian Personalists unanimously accept the glaring problems of induction presented by Hume and others (Dorling & Miller, 1981; Popper, 2002). Consequently, both views reject inductivism and would dare not describe scientific theories as being rooted in observational data. Thus, in both HD and BP, intuition serves an additional role that observation does not: intuition is the basis of philosophical theories.

Intuition in the Justification and Identification of TEPs and TCPs

Furthermore, intuition is responsible for much of the justification and identification processes of TEPs and TCPs. In many cases, philosophers—without rational justification—simply have the intuition that there are some theories that are better than others; that there are common qualities those theories possess which make them better; and perhaps most importantly, that philosophers know what those qualities are (Bealer, 1998; Carroll & Markosian, 2010). Simply put, much of the attempts at identifying and justifying TEPs rely on intuition.[8] For example, in discussing the reasons philosophers adhere to the principle of theoretical parsimony,[9] Carroll and Markosian write, “many philosophers just prefer a leaner, meaner ontology” (2010, p. 213).

Not only this, but the only evidence philosophers can offer for TCPs are exclusively their intuitions. Philosophers have the intuition that some truths are necessary for rational theory construction; that those truths cannot be false; and that philosophers know which ones they are. As Bealer writes, “[out of the] many alleged principles of logic and linguistic theory … [a philosopher] tell[s] which ones are true … ultimately by using intuition as evidence” (1987, p.310). Despite intuition’s intricate connection to TEPs and TCPs, observation enjoys no such relationship. Although observation can be used to evaluate theories, it itself cannot justify why it can be used as evidence. These are matters reserved for rational, and intuitive justifications.[10] Furthermore, empirical observation, by definition, has no part in constructing a priori principles of reason as well (BonJour, 1998).

Conclusion

Thus intuition’s role in philosophy can be summarized as the following:

intuition, in philosophy, takes up the role as (ⅰ) the explanandum, (ⅱ) the evidence that evaluates a theory’s validity, (ⅰⅰⅰ) the basis of philosophical theories, and (ⅳ) the evidence for the justification and the identification of TEPs and (ⅴ) TCPs.

There may be additional roles assigned to intuition and observation that I have failed to mention. Some may be assigned to both. However, as I have demonstrated, these three roles assigned to intuition that I have laid out are not to be found in observation. Moreover, it seems that these fundamental discrepancies are too great to be simply discarded as trivial. Consequently, regardless of any additional roles of intuition and observation I may have overlooked, intuition fails to fulfil the second condition. Therefore, the conclusion must be as follows: intuition in philosophy is not analogous to observation in science.

Footnotes:

1 The principles of logic, arithmetic, geometry, set theory, modality, probability, etc.

2 Dorling & Miller, 1981; Gieseler, Loschelder, & Friese, 2019; Popper, 2002

3 Gieseler, Loschelder, & Friese, 2019; Popper, 2002; Staley, 2014

4 Popper, 2002

5 Popper, 2002

6 Popper, 2002

7 Pust, 2000

8 Concerning intuition’s contribution to the justification and identification of TEPs, I do not wish to imply that intuition is the only evidence philosophers can offer. Unlike TCPs, some philosophers do provide other rational justifications for some TEPs apart from mere intuitions.

9 The principle of theoretical parsimony states that theories, preferably, should be ontologically parsimonious and must not posit entities beyond necessity. This principle is stated in TEPs listed above.

10 Bealer, 1998; Carroll & Markosian, 2010

Bibliography

Bealer, G. (1987). The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism. Philosophical Perspectives, 1, 289-365. doi:10.2307/2214149

Bealer, G. (1998). Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy. In DePaul, M., & Ramsey, W. (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. pp. 201-240.

BonJour, L. (1998). In Defense of Pure Reason. Cambridge University Press.

Carroll, J. W., & Markosian, N. (2010). An Introduction to Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press.

Chalmer, A. F. (2013). What is this thing called Science? (4th ed.). University of Queensland Press.

Dorling, J., & Miller, D. (1981). Bayesian Personalism, Falsificationism, and the Problem of Induction. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 55, 109-141. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4106855.pdf?ab_segments=0%252Fbasic_SYC-5187% 252Ftest&refreqid=excelsior%3A034b8233ec77dfcbdabe67ef272d7197

Gieseler K., Loschelder D.D., & Friese M. (2019) What Makes for a Good Theory? How to Evaluate a Theory Using the Strength Model of Self-Control as an Example. In Sassenberg K., & Vliek M. (Eds) Social Psychology in Action. pp. 3-21

Popper, K. (2002). The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2nd ed.). Routledge. Pust, J. (2000). Intuitions as Evidence. Nozick, R. (Ed.) Routledge.

Staely, K. W. (2014). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Cambridge University Press

2020年哲学大奖得主

Is intuition to philosophy as observation is to science?
直觉之于哲学就像观察之于科学吗?

伊森·克里斯蒂安·陈,新加坡英华学校

2020年大奖得主|7 分钟阅读

I. Introduction

Science and philosophy share the fundamental goal of knowledge production. The former explains and predicts the material universe,[1] and the latter seeks to answer questions within the fields of logic, epistemology, metaphysics, and axiology.[2] This common objective will contextualise my discussion of observation and intuition as means to the end of producing scientific and philosophical knowledge respectively.

Observation and intuition can both be thought of as independent sources of knowledge. When we observe, we receive information either via direct sensory perception or with the aid of instruments.[3] Intuition, on the other hand, is best defined by what it is not. An intuition does not result from inference, memory, testimony, reason, or observation;[4] of these sources, a knower still believes intuitions to be a priori truths.[5] in the absence

The question of whether intuition is to philosophy as observation is to science can be broken down into three sub-questions:

  1. What roles do observation and intuition play in scientific and philosophical knowledge production respectively?

  2. How reliably do they fulfil these roles?

  3. How exclusively do they occupy these roles?

These sub-questions correspond to the bases of comparison of role, reliability, and exclusivity respectively. The extent to which the set of answers for observation coincides with that of intuition is then the extent to which intuition is to philosophy as observation is to science. With this condition in mind, I propose the following answers.

Firstly, observation and intuition both play evidential roles in supporting and refuting scientific and philosophical claims, and productive roles in producing them. They differ, however, in that evidential observation is used deductively when falsifying scientific knowledge claims, while evidential intuition lacks a deductive function.

Secondly, both observation and intuition possess unreliabilities in precision and accuracy. While certain problems can be accounted for in both cases, observation and intuition still feature seemingly unresolvable issues with accuracy, which therefore threaten reliability.

Lastly, the evidential and productive functions of both observation and intuition are non-exclusive, in that they can, in some cases, be substituted by other sources of knowledge.

Thus, I contend that intuition is largely to philosophy as observation is to science, save for the fact that intuition, unlike observation, is not used deductively.

II. What roles do observation and intuition play in scientific and philosophical knowledge production respectively?

In the production of scientific knowledge, the roles of observation are twofold. When applied to a pre-existing claim, observation is evidential, and can be used to support or falsify said claim. Observation can also precede and bring about the production of knowledge, in which case its function is productive. These roles are not mutually exclusive; observation can produce and later support the same claim.

Observation is used as supporting evidence when corroborating a scientific hypothesis. That is to say, if a specific observation P (“This beaker of water boils at 100°C”) corroborates a general claim Q (“Water boils at 100°C”), we have increased confidence that Q is correct.[6] Moreover, as written by Hume, our confidence in Q tends to grow as more instances of P are observed.[7] In this way, through the corroboration of hypotheses, scientists use particular observations of the natural world to support general explanations of its behaviour.

It is important, however, to differentiate between the deductive and inductive uses of evidential observation. To conclude with epistemic certainty that “all swans are white” from observing any number of white swans is to commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent, whereas the mere observation of one non-white swan would suffice to seductively falsify the claim.[8] Therefore, while observation can only serve inductively to support a hypothesis, scientists employ evidential observation deductively when falsifying them.[9]

The productive role of observation is illustrated well by one of science’s most famous anecdotes. One summer, a young Isaac Newton observed an apple fall from a tree. He wondered "why... that apple [should] always descend perpendicularly to the ground", which would later inspire his work on gravity.[10] Science seeks to describe the natural world; the observation of a natural phenomenon can therefore produce scientific knowledge regarding said phenomenon.

Does intuition share the evidential and productive functions of observation? The latter is a significantly less controversial question among philosophers—it seems that, at least sometimes, our intuitions do produce our beliefs. Many philosophers adhered to the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge, but adjusted their stances after learning of Gettier-type counterexamples, which produce the intuition that the justified true beliefs they describe do not count as knowledge.[11] If beliefs in the JTB account had caused intuitions regarding knowledge, then Gettier cases would have been dismissed as unintuitive.

The thesis that intuition is used as evidence for and against philosophical beliefs is dubbed Centrality by Cappelen.[12] Opposing Centrality,   Cappelen argues that the description ‘intuitive’, when applied to philosophical claims, can be removed or substituted without loss of meaning.[13] Ichikawa explains in support of this claim that we use intuitive propositions not because they are intuitive, but because they are true.[14] As  Climenhaga notes, these objections are refuted by the fact that our intuitions tend to coincide with our beliefs, and that our confidence in a given belief does not decrease even with the awareness that it has been caused by our intuitions.[15] Centrality provides the best explanation for this phenomenon. Moreover, beyond treating their own intuitions as evidence, philosophers frequently 'explain away' others' intuitions when used to justify opposing claims or as counterexamples to their own; if intuitions were not seen as evidential, this would be unnecessary.[16]

Like observation, intuition thus serves as evidence for and against philosophical claims. Examples of both cases are ubiquitous in philosophical dialogue;[17] other than the aforementioned Gettier problem, which is an instance of the latter, Searle uses the ‘Chinese room’ intuition pump to support his claim that machines cannot understand—they only simulate the ability to do so.[18]

It appears, however, that evidential intuition is not employed deductively. Sound deductive claims rely on true premises, yet Gutting notes that philosophers tend to avoid this requirement with intuitions, neglecting to account for their truth and simply expecting their audience to share the same intuitions.[19] In many occasions, the deductive premise-conclusion structure is not even adhered to, philosophers instead supporting general claims with individual examples and counterexamples of intuitions.[20] Hence, this is where the evidential role of intuition diverges from that of observation: while observation is used deductively to falsify and inductively to support, the role of intuition is limited to that of support.

III. How reliably do they fulfil these roles?

Sources of unreliability can be split into two categories: imprecisions, referring to qualitative or quantitative inexactitudes or variations, and inaccuracies, meaning distance from the truth. The most apparent hindrance to the reliability of observation is the problem of imperfections in our senses and scientific instruments, classified as random and systematic error. 21] The former results from unpredictable changes in experimental conditions that usually affect precision, while the latter arises from consistent instrumental defects that typically affect accuracy.[22] account for these errors.[23] Nonetheless, scientists are able to analyse and mathematically account for these errors.[23]

A more pressing inaccuracy arises in the theory-ladenness of observation: that our observations are always interpreted through the subjective 'lenses' of the beliefs, or theories, to which we subscribe,[24] limiting our ability to accurately observe a subject in its entirety. Kuhn outlines three types of observational theory-ladenness:

Firstly, our beliefs can directly affect what we perceive. In an experiment by perceptual psychologists Bruner and Postman, subjects repeatedly mistook wrongly-coloured playing cards for their normal counterparts when viewed quickly.[25] This, according to Kuhn, depicts how our perceptions are affected by pur conceptual resources.[26]

Secondly, our beliefs also influence our semantic understanding of the descriptions of observations.[27] For example, a Newtonian physicist would interpret the word 'mass' to refer to a constant, while an Einsteinian would believe the value described by the same term to depend on the velocity of the object in question.[28] This prevents observers subscribing to different theories from truly understanding descriptions of each other's observations.

Lastly, separate aspects of the same observation may vary in salience based on the theories of the observer. Kuhn proposes the thought experiment of Galileo and an Aristotelian physicist observing a pendulum. The Aristotelian, viewing the pendulum’s bob as falling under a string’s constraint, would have given attention to the bob’s weight, vertical displacement, and time taken to come to rest.[29] In contrast, Galileo would treat pendular motion as restricted circular motion, measuring the string's length, angular displacement, and time per swing.[30]

Our intuitions, like observation, also appear to feature ‘imprecision’, or varying intuitions in response to the same stimulus. Experimental philosophers Petrinovich and O’Neill, when surveying participants, found that moral intuitions varied based on how a dilemma was phrased and the order in which different dilemmas were presented.[31] However, Zamzow and Nichols observe that people are less confident in their responsive intuitions to thought experiments when influenced, even unknowingly, by philosophically irrelevant factors.[32] Confidence, therefore, may be a mechanism to qualitatively determine the imprecision of our intuitions, reminiscent of the calculable experimental uncertainty of observations.

In terms of accuracy, Kahneman suggests that like our observations, our intuitions are also influenced by our beliefs and theories that are 'trained' by our environment.[33] A professional chess player can be said to act on highly accurate intuitions during a game due to the regular environment of chess and repeated practice within it.[34] Contrarily, it is difficult to call philosophy a regular environment: philosophical intuitions span a huge range of topics, and may sometimes extend into non-philosophical domains that provide contextual knowledge.[35] Neither can philosophers reliably practice intuiting, as the accuracy of corrective feedback is hard to determine due to the general lack of consensus in the philosophical community (as opposed to chess, which has easily analysable games and binary win-lose outcomes).[36] Like observation, intuition thus also features an accuracy problem, in that it is difficult to define standards by which the truth of intuitions can be determined in the first place.

IV. How exclusively do they occupy these roles?

Although observation is a heavily utilised evidential source for most of the empirical sciences,[37] exceptions exist in abstract disciplines like theoretical physics. Ellis and Silk criticise string theorists and proponents of the many-worlds interpretation for relying on the "elegance"  and explanatory power of their theories, rather than empirical observation, as supporting evidence for their veracity.[38] Since their theories describe unobservable phenomena, an observation also loses the ability to falsify their claims.[39] Regardless of the normative question of whether observation ought to be used as scientific evidence, that the scientific community has, in fact, appealed to alternative sources of evidence shows the non-exclusivity of observation’s evidential role.

Describing non-observational causes of scientific knowledge production may be more difficult as many scientific claims fundamentally result from observation; even theoretical claims like string theory seek to explain observed phenomena.[40] Accounts exist, however, of other unconscious processes producing knowledge claims, such as August Kekulé's dream of an ouroboros inspiring him to describe the ring-shaped structure of benzene,[41] which was only confirmed directly by observation in the following century.[42]

The emergent field of experimental philosophy illustrates well the non-exclusivity of intuition’s evidential role in philosophy. Beyond intuition, contemporary evidential sources have expanded to encompass reaction times,[43] neuroimaging,[44] and human behaviour,[45] using observation, in fact, to support philosophical claims.

Experimental philosophy also features alternative sources of philosophical knowledge production. Schwitzgebel and Rust questioned if ethics professors behaved with higher or more consistent moral standards than their non-ethicist colleagues; only after collecting behavioural data could they formulate the claim that there is generally no variation between ethicists' and non-ethicists' moral behaviour.[46] As a whole, therefore, observation and intuition do not exclusively fulfil their evidential and productive functions.

V. Conclusion

Of the three bases of comparison—role, reliability, and exclusivity—intuition and observation are similar on all counts, with the exception that intuition, unlike observation, does not play a deductive role in philosophy. Thus, I conclude that less the aforementioned difference, intuition is to philosophy as observation is to science.

Footnotes

1 Richard Purtill, “The Purpose of Science,” Philosophy of Science 37, no. 2 (1970): 301-06, www.jstor.org/stable/186678.

2 Archie J. Bahm, “What is Philosophy?” The Scientific Monthly 52, no. 6 (1941): 553-60, www.jstor.org/stable/17261.

3 Roberto Torretti, “Observation,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37, no. 1 (1986): 1-23, www.jstor.org/stable/686995.

4 Nevin Climenhaga, “Intuitions are used as evidence in philosophy,” Mind 127, no. 505 (2018): 69-104, https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/127/505/69/3800471.

5 Ernest Sosa, "Postscript to 'Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology,'" in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge, ed. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 151.

6 Peter Ellerton, “What exactly is the scientific method and why do so many people get it wrong?” School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry - University of Queensland, last modified November 30, 2016, accessed June 17, 2020,

https://hpi.uq.edu.au/article/2016/09/what-exactly-scientific-method-and-why-do-so-many-people-get-i t-wrong.

7 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Urbana, Illinois: Project Gutenberg, 2006), 36, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/9662/9662-h/9662-h.htm.

8 A. C. Grayling, The history of philosophy (New York: Penguin, 2019), 397.

9 Ellerton, “Scientific method.”

10 Steve Connor, “The core of truth behind Sir Isaac Newton’s apple,” The Independent, January 18, 2010, accessed June 18, 2020, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/the-core-of-truth-behind-sir-isaac-newtons-apple-1870915.html.

11 Stephen Hetherington, "Gettier Problems," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed July 05, 2020, https://www.iep.utm.edu/gettier/

12 Herman Cappelen, Philosophy without Intuitions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3.

13 Ibid.

14 Jonathan Ichikawa, "Who needs intuitions? Two Experimentalist Critiques," in Intuitions, ed. Anthony Robert Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 236. 15 Climenhaga, “Intuitions are used as evidence in philosophy.”

16 Ibid.

17 Joel Pust, Intuitions as Evidence (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.), 2.

18 John Searle, “Minds, Brains and Programs,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no. 3 (1980): 417-57, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756.

19 Gary Gutting, "Can Philosophical Beliefs Be Rationally Justified?" American Philosophical Quarterly

19, no. 4 (1982): 315-30, www.jstor.org/stable/20013972.

20 Ibid.

21 John Robert Taylor, An Introduction to Error Analysis: The Study of Uncertainties in Physical Measurements (Sausalito, California: University Science Books, 1999), 94.

22 “Random vs Systematic Error,” UMD Department of Physics - UMD Physics, accessed July 06, 2020, https://www.physics.umd.edu/courses/Phys276/Hill/Information/Notes/ErrorAnalysis.html.

23 “Random and Systematic Errors,” Mathematics & Statistics | Texas Tech University, accessed July 06, 2020, http://www.math.ttu.edu/~gilliam/ttu/s08/m1300_s08/downloads/errors.pdf

24 A. Franklin et al., "Can a Theory-Laden Observation Test the Theory?" The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40, no. 2 (1989): 229-31, www.jstor.org/stable/687514.

25 Thomas S. Kuhn, The structure of scientific revolutions (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 63.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., 127

28 Franklin et al., "Can a Theory-Laden Observation Test the Theory?"

29 Kuhn, The structure of scientific revolutions, 123.

30 Ibid., 124.

31 L. Petrinovich & P. O’Neill, “Influence of wording and framing effects on moral intuitions,” Ethology & Sociobiology 17, no. 3 (1996): 145-71.

32 Jennifer L. Zamzow & Shaun Nichols, “Variations in Ethical Intuitions,” Philosophical Issues 19 (2009): 368-88.

33 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 241. 34 Matthew Allen DeStefano, "The Reliability and Nature of Philosophical Intuitions" (University of Missouri-St. Louis, 2014).

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 James Bogen, "Theory and Observation in Science," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2020), ed. Edward N. Zalta, accessed July 07, 2020, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/science-theory-observation/.

38 George Ellis & Joe Silk, "Scientific method: Defend the integrity of physics," Nature 516 (2014): 321-23, doi:10.1038/516321a.

39 Ibid.

40 Matthew Chalmers, "The roots and fruits of string theory," CERN Courier, October 29, 2018, accessed July 11, 2020, https://cerncourier.com/a/the-roots-and-fruits-of-string-theory/.

41 Albert Rothenberg, "Creative Cognitive Processes in Kekulé's Discovery of the Structure of the Benzene Molecule," The American Journal of Psychology 108, no. 3 (1995): 419-38, doi:10.2307/1422898.

42 Lonsdale, K.. "The Structure of the Benzene Ring in Hexamethylbenzene". Proceedings of the Royal Society 123A (1929): 494-515. doi:10.1098/rspa.1929.0081.

43 Jonathan Phillips & Fiery Cushman, "Morality constrains the default representation of what is possible," PNAS 114, no. 18 (2017): 4649-54, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1619717114.

44 Joshua Green et al. “An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment,” Science 293 (2001): 2105-8, doi:10.1126/science.1062872.

45 Eric Schwitzgebel & Joshua Rust, “The moral behavior of ethics professors: Relationships among self-reported behavior, expressed normative attitude, and directly observed behavior,” Philosophical Psychology 27, no.3 (2014): 293-327, doi: 10.1080/09515089.2012.727135

46 Ibid.

Bibliography

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Cappelen, Herman. Philosophy without Intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Grayling, A. C. The history of philosophy. New York: Penguin, 2019.

Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Urbana, Illinois: Project Gutenberg, 2006. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/9662/9662-h/9662-h.htm.

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Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011.

Kuhn, Thomas S. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1962.

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Sosa, Ernest. "Postscript to 'Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology.'" In Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge, edited by Jonathan L. Kvanvig. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996.

Taylor, John Robert. An Introduction to Error Analysis: The Study of Uncertainties in Physical Measurements. Sausalito, California: University Science Books, 1999.

Journal articles

Bahm, Archie J. "What Is Philosophy?" The Scientific Monthly 52, no. 6 (1941): 553-60. www.jstor.org/stable/17261.

Climenhaga, Nevin. "Intuitions are used as evidence in philosophy." Mind 127, no. 505 (2018): 69-104. https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/127/505/69/3800471.

DeStefano, Matthew Allen. "The Reliability and Nature of Philosophical Intuitions." University of Missouri-St. Louis, 2014.

Ellis, George & Joe Silk. "Scientific method: Defend the integrity of physics." Nature 516 (2014). doi:10.1038/516321a.

Franklin, A. & M. Anderson & D. Brock & S. Coleman & J. Downing & A. Gruvander & J. Lilly et al. "Can a Theory-Laden Observation Test the Theory?" The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40, no. 2 (1989): 229-31. www.jstor.org/stable/687514.

Green, Joshua & Sommerville, R. & Nystrom, Leigh & Darley, John & Cohen, Jonathan. “An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment.” Science 293 (2001): 2105-8. doi:10.1126/science.1062872.

Gutting, Gary. "Can Philosophical Beliefs Be Rationally Justified?" American Philosophical Quarterly 19, no. 4 (1982): 315-30. www.jstor.org/stable/20013972.

Lonsdale, K.. "The Structure of the Benzene Ring in Hexamethylbenzene". Proceedings of the Royal Society 123A (1929): 494-515. doi:10.1098/rspa.1929.0081.

Purtill, Richard. "The Purpose of Science." Philosophy of Science 37, no. 2 (1970): 301-306. www.jstor.org/stable/186678.

Petrinovich, L. & P. O’Neill, “Influence of wording and framing effects on moral intuitions.”

Ethology & Sociobiology 17, no. 3 (1996): 145-71.

Phillips, Jonathan & Fiery Cushman. "Morality constrains the default representation of what is possible." PNAS 114, no. 18 (2017): 4649-54. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1619717114.

Rothenberg, Albert. "Creative Cognitive Processes in Kekulé's Discovery of the Structure of the Benzene Molecule." The American Journal of Psychology 108, no. 3 (1995): 419-38. doi:10.2307/1422898.

Schwitzgebel, Eric & Joshua Rust. “The moral behavior of ethics professors: Relationships among self-reported behavior, expressed normative attitude, and directly observed behavior.” Philosophical Psychology 27, no.3 (2014): 293-327.

doi:10.1080/09515089.2012.727135.

Searle, John. “Minds, Brains and Programs.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no. 3 (1980): 417-57, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756.

Torretti, Roberto. "Observation." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37, no. 1 (1986): 1-23. www.jstor.org/stable/686995.

Zamzow, Jennifer L. & Shaun Nichols. “Variations in Ethical Intuitions.” Philosophical Issues

19 (2009): 368-88.

Websites

Bogen, James. "Theory and Observation in Science." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2020), edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed July 07, 2020, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/science-theory-observation/.

Ellerton, Peter. “What exactly is the scientific method and why do so many people get it wrong?” School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry - University of Queensland. Last modified November 30, 2016. Accessed June 17, 2020.

https://hpi.uq.edu.au/article/2016/09/what-exactly-scientific-method-and-why-do-so-many-pe ople-get-it-wrong.

Hetherington, Stephen. "Gettier Problems." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed July 05, 2020, https://www.iep.utm.edu/gettier/.

“Random and Systematic Errors.” Mathematics & Statistics | Texas Tech University. Accessed July 06, 2020, http://www.math.ttu.edu/~gilliam/ttu/s08/m1300_s08/downloads

/errors.pdf.

“Random vs Systematic Error.” UMD Department of Physics - UMD Physics. Accessed July 06, 2020. https://www.physics.umd.edu/courses/Phys276/Hill/Information/Notes/Error Analysis.html.

News articles

Chalmers, Matthew. "The roots and fruits of string theory." CERN Courier. October 29, 2018. Accessed July 11, 2020. https://cerncourier.com/a/the-roots-and-fruits-of-string-theory/.

Connor, Steve. “The core of truth behind Sir Isaac Newton’s apple.” The Independent. January 18, 2010. Accessed June 18, 2020. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/ the-core-of-truth-behind-sir-isaac-newtons-apple-1870915.html.

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