2020年经济学二等奖

What are the most important economic effects - good and bad - of forced redistribution? How should this inform government policy?

强制再分配最重要的经济影响(好的和坏的)是什么?这应该如何为政府政策提供信息?

Saskia Poulter,蒂芬女子学校,英国
2020年经济学奖亚军|8 分钟阅读

From its genesis, the metanarrative of the coronavirus crisis has been the exacerbation of existing inequalities: all are in the same storm, but by no means the same boat. The US Bureau of Labour Statistics estimates that an employee in the bottom 20% of the income distribution was four times more likely to lose their job in April 2020 than their counterpart in the highest fifth, whose average propensity to save in fact rose due to foregone expenditure.[1] Meanwhile, the Schumpeterian forces of creative destruction have intensified under market uncertainty such that, epitomising current trends towards tech monopolisation and platform capitalism,[2] Jeff Bezos is projected to become the world’s first trillionaire by 2026.[3] These recent tendencies, however, situate themselves within a wider current: since Piketty famously hypothesised that r>g,[4] Marx’s designation of capital concentration as one of the ‘immanent laws of capitalist production’ has gained renewed authority.[5] Judging, therefore, that government intervention is necessary to forestall such inertia, this essay will seek to establish the primacy of increasing equality: the most important economic effect of forced redistribution. It will weigh this against the potential for undermined efficiency through the lenses of income, inheritance and Tobin taxation, before considering the limitations of consequentialist analysis in informing government policy.

Most fundamentally, the Anglo-American status quo constitutes a socially inefficient resource distribution. Assuming the diminishing marginal utility of wealth, a Bergson-Samuelson-SWF can be constructed, from which convex social indifference curves are derived; when compared to a social utility distribution frontier, these determine a maximum which exhibits only moderate inequality.[6] By suggesting that in excess of a critical value happiness and wealth show negligible correlation, the Easterlin Paradox corroborates this conclusion. Meanwhile, United Nations analysis that the top decile of the American population appropriated 91% of income growth between 1989 and 2006 renders the traditional supposition that inequality benefits all absolutely by ‘trickling down’ woefully unconvincing.[7]

Moreover, Wilkinson and Pickett suggest that inequality generates acute psychic costs (see Figure 1).[8] In their 2018 book ‘The Inner Level’, ‘status anxiety’- that is, the fear of being perceived as unsuccessful by one’s materialistic society- is posited as a evolutionarily grounded causal mechanism for this: in humans as in other primates, cortisol levels are elevated in response to precarity in social dominance hierarchies.[9] Consider the instability inherent to neoliberalism as defined by Foucault (‘the extension of competition to all aspects of life’),[10] and the recent explosion of both pre- and post-transfer variance in individual incomes over time,11 and Wilkinson and Pickett’s claims gain greater credence.

The literature on inequality often delineates between equality of opportunity and outcome; whilst careful not to deny that some income differential is a desideratum for both static and dynamic efficiency, however, Stiglitz regards this distinction as a false dichotomy.[12] Since the Scottish Enlightenment, economists have recognised inequality’s function in incentivising investment, innovation and risk-taking; often, however, children from low-income families lack access to the education, healthcare and financial opportunities which would enable them to respond to such incentives. Equity aside, these barriers imply a gross opportunity cost in the underdevelopment of human capital, leaving workers with low functional flexibility and occupational mobility. Given Deloitte’s estimate that in the burgeoning digital age the half-life of a learned skill is only 4.5 years- compared to 26 years in the previous generation- such immobility is surely troubling.[13]

Moreover, contrary to Kaldor’s purported trade-off between efficiency and equality, the notion that a high Gini coefficient undermines growth is now settling into academic orthodoxy.[14] One explanation for this draws on Keynesian theory of consumption: since low-income agents have a higher marginal propensity to consume, low discretionary incomes among them result in high unconsummated demand. Another justification suggests that popular cries for trade protectionism can be attributed to financial vulnerability: Anglo-American workers resist efficiency-enhancing restructuring to a greater degree than mainland Europeans partially because the stakes of job loss are for them much higher. A robust social safety net might also minimise risk-aversion among entrepreneurs by acting as a guarantee; this parallels the logic underlying England’s Section 93 and America’s Chapter II bankruptcy laws.[15] Even if one rejects all of the above analysis, however, the fact that the liberal-residual US grew at 1.8% p.a. in 1990-2008, compared to the 2.6% of social democratic Norway, demonstrates that equality is at least not inimical to efficiency.[16]

Finally, there is growing suspicion that the psychosocial instability Wilkinson and Pickett describe is paralleled in the financial sector: Rajan posits an inequality-credit-crisis nexus, noting that ‘easy credit has been used as a palliative by governments throughout history’ to maintain aggregate demand and mitigate consumption inequality despite stagnating incomes.[17] Supposedly, this effect contributed to the overleveraging which was so catastrophic around the Minsky moment of 2008. It is clear that, because crises are costly, redistribution acting as a prophylactic to indebtedness is preferable to ex-post instruments such as resolution.

It would be reasonable to conclude, therefore, that a more equal income distribution is, ceteris paribus, a desirable objective. Indubitably,  however, the cp assumption is prohibitively reductive- the ways in which this is the case being contingent on the policy instrument deployed. Consider three examples:

A standard concern is that progressive income taxation generates efficiency costs which negate any distributional benefits.[18] Firstly, taxation disincentivises labouring as implies lower net wages, hence a lower opportunity cost of leisure. ‘Top talent emigration’ and higher turnover rates might ensue and, according to efficiency wage theory, agents reduce the effort allocated to their work. Tax evasion/avoidance is a further contributing factor, as is compensation bargaining, whereby top earners are assumed capable of negotiating their wages upwards, the incentives for which are greatest when tax rates are low. Accordingly, it is argued, top tax-rate cuts stimulate rent-seeking, though not necessarily economic growth.[19]

In identifying a rate above which these effects amount to net detriment, the elasticity of taxable income is a useful parameter. Ultimately, whilst there is no consensus as to its magnitude (Gruber and Saez calculate the current value to be 0.4, but estimates range between zero and one),[20] the precise figure will surely be contingent on the elimination of legal loopholes and poverty traps. The latter is a familiar problem in the UK, where 2017 Universal Credit proposals left families £1144 worse off p.a. where a second earner took five additional weekly hours of minimum-waged work.[21] Governments must be careful to avoid engineering such ‘traps’.

The optimal magnitude of transfers, meanwhile, should be determined according to Dalton’s Principle of Maximum Social Advantage, with the marginal social benefit of spending equalling the marginal social cost.[22] This calculation should incorporate inflation, fiscal sustainability and opportunity costs: particularly, whether capital expenditure might, by addressing inequality’s drivers, be a more effective long-term measure.[23] Concerns that transfers encourage freeriding and a ‘dependency culture’ should be considered but not overemphasised: having repeatedly failed to withstand empirical scrutiny, their presentation often resembles the moralising rhetoric of Weberian stratification.[24]

Nevertheless, income taxation overlooks the fact that income Gini coefficients are on average half the size of those for wealth; inheritance taxation seems an intuitive method of redressing this imbalance.[25] Surprisingly, however, Wolff questions whether such intuition is misguided, hypothesising that bequests in fact decrease inequalities of wealth since transfers are usually greater as a proportion of the current holdings of poorer households compared to richer ones.[26] Ultimately, though, longer-term dynamics undermine this suggestion: poorer agents usually spend their gains whereas the rich are able to save them. It has also been argued that inheritance taxes increase capital scarcity, hence capital returns, thereby exacerbating inequality overall.[27] Empirical analysis provides some foundation for this claim, though it remains unlikely to be sufficient in magnitude for redistribution to be counterproductive overall.[28]

As with income taxation, considerations of elasticity also apply to inheritance, with the additional possibility that high rates could incentivise the profligate running down of savings. Nonetheless, when combined with the ethical argument that inherited wealth is currently allocated arbitrarily (according to the ‘birth lottery’), the case for higher levies appears strong: today, only 5% of UK estates are subject to inheritance tax.[29]

Finally, a Tobin tax is a small ad valorem tax on financial transactions, the burden of which falls overwhelmingly on the most affluent as owners of capital.[30] Though the levy would universally increase transaction costs, currency speculation is virtually the only exchange which occurs at a sufficient frequency for a charge so small to factor in the trader’s cost-benefit analysis; accordingly, the European Parliament estimates that a rate of 0.1% would raise $50bn in annual revenue whilst having virtually no distortionary effect on the real economy.[31]

If imposed unilaterally, however, rigid controls might render a country uncompetitive; this would prove particularly detrimental to the UK, where financial services comprise 6.9% of total economic output.[32] One solution to the collective action problem of opt-out jurisdiction freeriding could be to require the tax’s implementation as a condition of access to supranational organisations such as the IMF; whether governments are politically prepared to so dramatically renounce fiscal sovereignty, however, is another matter.[33]

Moreover, critics of the Tobin tax describe its potential to reduce market liquidity, resulting in falling investment and rising costs of capital. They argue that financial transactions are often enacted to hedge risk and that by discouraging this the policy could prove destabilising. Ultimately, however, such negative effects are offset against the fact that slowing capital flows reduces exchange- rate volatility, leaving national networks less vulnerable to exogenous shocks. Irrational exuberance- led speculative pressures on exchange rates have been known to result in interest rates higher than is warranted by internal monetary conditions, damaging growth and employment; the Asian, Latin American and Russian crises of the 1990s have each been attributed in large part to destabilising capital flows.[34] If implemented multilaterally, then, a Tobin tax could be an efficient mode of collecting funds to be redistributed both domestically and internationally.

Notwithstanding, political economy poses a significant limitation on the influence of consequentialist analysis on policy prescription. Applying Downsian median voter theory, the Meltzer- Richard model suggests that the politico-economic equilibrium should rest in favour of redistributive policy, assuming a right-skewed income distribution and perfectly rational population.[35] Larcinese notes that such abstractions are rarely supported by empirical observation, however, as voter turnout is positively correlated with income, meaning that the pivotal voter is in fact richer than the median in the income distribution.[36] Moreover, the assumption of a perfectly rational homo economicus is obviously simplistic: widespread information asymmetries have been exposed, for example, by studies showing that voters underestimate the extent of inequality in their societies, and even then would prefer a more egalitarian society to that in which they believe they live.[37] Voters also weigh factors other than private pecuniary benefit when assessing policy, as illustrated by enduring popular interest in figures such as Nozick and Rawls.

We should also note that current high levels of public dependence on transfers might well persist into the medium term, given both the shocks and long-term tendencies described above. Beside the radical restructuring global lockdowns have ushered, a long-anticipated wave of automation is projected to reduce a significant proportion of the middle class to technological unemployment;[38] Moravec’s paradox states that high-level reasoning requires less computational power than tasks demanding agile mobility, meaning that ‘high-skilled’ jobs such as accounting are particularly vulnerable.[39] Thus, one might anticipate an increase in self-interested public support for redistribution.

In final analysis, then, governments must be careful to avoid inducing the ill-effects that poorly engineered policy can create; chief among these stand poverty traps, declining international competitiveness and loophole exploitation. Moreover, redistribution must not be viewed as a panacea for socioeconomic ills: transfers leave embodied cultural capital largely untouched, for example, and redressing this would require a much wider package of supply-side interventions.[40] Nevertheless, an extensive body of evidence suggests that citizens in general prefer greater redistribution to the status quo, that these preferences are underrepresented in electoral data, and that increasing numbers will depend upon state assistance for at least the foreseeable future. Consider also the benefits of greater growth, aggregate utility and financial stability which arise from moderate equality, and a strong case can be made that redistribution is indeed a necessary instrument for counterbalancing Marx’s doctrine of increasing misery.[41]

Author's Note

Whilst questions of international redistribution (aid and reparations, for example) undoubtedly warrant discussion, for the sake of brevity this essay focuses on redistribution within a single jurisdiction. For the same reason, it discusses redistribution among citizens as opposed to between firms; the role of subsidies and corporation tax, for example, fall outside of its remit. I presuppose a relatively high-income country, drawing most empirical data from the UK and US.

Footnotes

1 Larry Elliott, ‘Unemployment due to Covid-19 is surely worth more than a footnote’, The Guardian, 10 May 2020.

2 Nick Srnicek, Platform Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016).

3 Leaders, ‘Big tech is thriving in the midst of the recession’, The Economist, 2 May 2020. Tech monopolies Microsoft, Apple, Alphabet, Amazon and Facebook now comprise more than one-fifth of the entire value of the S&P 500 stock market index. 4 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014). Here, r denotes the rate of return on capital (i.e. profits, dividends, rents, incomes and interest), whilst g denotes the overall rate of economic growth. 5 Karl Marx, Capital: a Critique of Political Economy v.1 (London: Penguin Classics, 1990).

6 Nicola Acocella, The Foundations of Economic Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

7 Jan Vandermoortele, ‘Inequality and Gresham’s Law: the bad drives out the good’, Unpublished thinkpiece for the UN in China, March 2013. <https://wess.un.org/archive/2015/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/dps_paper_vandemoortele.pdf>

8 Table: Karen Rowlingson, Does Income Inequality Cause Health and Social Problems? (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2011). <https://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/default/files/jrf/migrated/files/inequality-income-social-problems-full.pdf> In doing so, they address the objection that absolute as opposed to relative poverty is the only factor to warrant consideration.

9 Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The Inner Level (London: Penguin Books, 2018).

10 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-1979 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

11 Jacob Hacker, The Great Risk Shift (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Hacker notes that locus of control scores- a powerful predictor for anxiety- have become substantially more external in recent years. He credits this to the lack of a robust social safety net.

12 Joseph Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality (London: Penguin, 2013). In his book, he formalises the negative correlation between income inequality and the intergenerational mobility of wealth as ‘The Great Gatsby Curve’, which manifests tangibly as the fact that an American child whose parents fall within in the bottom decile of the income distribution has a 20% chance of reaching college, whilst for those from the top decile that figure is closer to 90%.

13 Indranil Roy, Future of Work: an Introduction, January 2019

<https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/it/Documents/human-capital/Future%20of%20Work_Deloitte.pdf> [Last accessed: 9 June 2020].

14 Nicholas Kaldor, ‘Alternative Theories of Distribution’, The Review of Economic Studies, 23, no. 2 (1956), pp. 83-100.

15 Rema Hana, Dispelling the Myth of Welfare Dependency, 9 August 2019 <https://epod.cid.harvard.edu/article/dispelling- myth-welfare-dependency> [Last accessed: 9 June 2020]

16 Ha-Joon Chang, 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism (London: Penguin, 2011). This conclusion holds, irrespective of confounding variables.

17 Raghuram Rajan, Fault Lines (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

18 Progressive income taxation is taken to be a tax scheme applied to a monetary (income) base, whereby the marginal tax rate rises in proportion with said base.

19 Martin Feldstein, ‘The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: a Panel Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act’, The Journal of Political Economy, 103, no. 3 (1996), pp. 551-572.

20 Jon Gruber and Emmanuel Saez, ‘The elasticity of taxable income: evidence and implications’, Journal of Public Economics, 84, no. 1 (2002), pp. 1-32.

21 Nigel Morris, ‘Frank Field: Universal credit is so badly designed it traps families in poverty’, iNews, 15 September 2017.

22 Hugh Dalton, Principles of Public Finance (Oxford: Routledge, 1922).

23 John Hills, Good Times, Bad Times (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2017).

Notably, ‘fiscal sustainability’ need not equate to ‘balancing the budget’, particularly today, with long-term interest rates the lowest in recorded history. Part of the confusion over deficits comes from treating welfare expenditure as consumption as opposed to investment which brings returns through the multiplier effect, productivity improvements and the avoidance of further costs to the state (healthcare or rent and council tax arrears, for example). The now-discredited Reinhardt and Rogoff study is another contributing factor.

24Tracy Shildrick, Robert MacDonald, Andy Furlong, Johann Roden and Robert Crow, Are Cultures of Worklessness Passed Down Through Generations? (London: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2012). In this major study, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation failed to identify a single family in the UK where worklessness had persisted for three or more generations and found that those who were long-term unemployed remained committed to the value of work.

25 Era Dabla-Norris, Kalpana Kochhar, Frantisek Ricka, Nujin Suphaphiphat, and Evridiki Tsounta, Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality: A Global Perspective (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2015).

26 Edward Wolff, ‘Inheritances and Wealth Inequality, 1989-1998’, American Economic Review, 92, no. 2 (2002), pp. 260-264.

27 Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Notes on Estate Taxes, Redistribution and the Concept of Balanced Growth Path Incidence’, Journal of Political Economy, 86, no. 2 (1978), pp. 137-150.

28 Mikael Elinder, Oscar Erixson and Daniel Waldenstrom, Inheritance and Wealth Inequality: Evidence from Population Registers (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2016).

29 The Editorial Board, ‘Why the UK’s inheritance tax needs to be reformed’, The Financial Times, 12 July 2019.

30 Tobin taxation can therefore be considered a progressive policy and falls within the category of ‘forced redistribution’. 31 Ben Patterson and Mickal Galliano, The Feasibility of an International “Tobin Tax” (Luxembourg: European Parliament, 1999).

32 Chris Rhodes, Financial services: contribution to the UK economy (London: House of Commons Library, 2019).

33 Pierre Chaigneau, The Tobin Tax, 10 July 2011 <https://www.next-finance.net/The-Tobin-tax> [Last accessed: 10 June 2020].

34 Ibid.

35 Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard, ‘A Rational Theory of the Size of Government’, Journal of Political Economy, 89, no.1 (1981), pp. 914-1927.

36 Valentino Larcinese, ‘Voting over Redistribution and the Size of the Welfare State: The Role of Turnout’, Political Studies, 55, no. 3 (2007), pp. 568-585.

37 Michael Norton, David Neal, Cassandra Govan, Dan Ariley and Elise Holland, ‘The Not-So-Common-Wealth of Australia: Evidence for a Cross-Cultural Desire for a More Equal Distribution of Wealth’, Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 14, no. 1 (2014), pp. 339-351.

38 World Economic Forum, The Future of Jobs Report (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2018).

39 Hans Moravec, Mind Children (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).

40 Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, ‘Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction’, in Jerome Karabel and Albert Halsey (eds), Power and Ideology in Education (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 487-511. Suggestions range from Johnsonite infrastructure investment to Corbynite company restructuring.

41 In Capital vol. 1 Marx writes that alongside generating intolerable levels of ‘misery, oppression, slavery, degradation and oppression’, the concentration of wealth poses ‘a fetter upon the laws of production’. For the reasons outlined in the first section of this essay, we might consider this to be among his most prescient claims.

Bibliography

Acocella, Nicola, The Foundations of Economic Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Bourdieu, Pierre and Passeron, Jean-Claude, ‘Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction’, in Jerome Karabel and Albert Halsey (eds), Power and Ideology in Education. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 487-511.

Chaigneau, Pierre, The Tobin Tax, 10 July 2011 <https://www.next-finance.net/The-Tobin-tax> [Last accessed: 10 June 2020].

Chang, Ha-Joon, 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism. London: Penguin, 2011.

Dabla-Norris, Era, Kochhar, Kalpana, Ricka, Frantisek, Suphaphiphat, Nujin and Tsounta, Evridiki Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality: A Global Perspective. Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2015.

Dalton, Hugh, Principles of Public Finance. Oxford: Routledge, 1922.

Editorial Board, ‘Why the UK’s inheritance tax needs to be reformed’, The Financial Times, 12 July 2019.

Elinder, Mikael, Erixson, Oskar and Waldenstrom, Daniel, Inheritance and Wealth Inequality: Evidence from Population Registers. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2016.

Elliott, Larry, ‘Unemployment due to Covid-19 is surely worth more than a footnote.’ The Guardian, 10 May 2020.

Feldstein, Martin, ‘The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: a Panel Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act’, The Journal of Political Economy, 103, no. 3 (1996), pp. 551-572.

Foucault, Michel, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-1979. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Hacker, Jacob, The Great Risk Shift. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Hana, Rema, Dispelling the Myth of Welfare Dependency, 9 August 2019 <https://epod.cid.harvard.edu/article/dispelling-myth-welfare-dependency > [Last accessed: 9 June 2020]

Hills, John, Good Times, Bad Times. Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2017.

Kaldor, Nicholas, ‘Alternative Theories of Distribution’, The Review of Economic Studies, 23, no. 2 (1956), pp. 83-100.

Larcinese, Valentino, ‘Voting over Redistribution and the Size of the Welfare State: The Role of Turnout’, Political Studies, 55, no. 3 (2007), pp. 568-585.

Leaders, ‘Big tech is thriving in the midst of the recession’, The Economist, 2 May 2020.

Leigh, Andrew, Jencks, Christopher and Smeeding, Timothy, ‘Health and Economic Inequality’, in Wiemer Salverda, Brian Nolan and Timothy Smeeding (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Norton, Michael, Neal, David, Govan, Cassandra, Ariley Dan, and Holland, Elise, ‘The Not-So-Common-Wealth of Australia: Evidence for a Cross-Cultural Desire for a More Equal Distribution of Wealth’, Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 14, no. 1 (2014), pp. 339-351.

Marx, Karl, Capital: a Critique of Political Economy v.1. London: Penguin Classics, 1990.

Meltzer, Allan and Richard, Scott, ‘A Rational Theory of the Size of Government’, Journal of Political Economy, 89, no.1 (1981), pp. 914-1927.

Moravec, Hans, Mind Children. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988.

Morris, Nigel, ‘Frank Field: Universal credit is so badly designed it traps families in poverty’, iNews, 15 September 2017.

Patterson, Ben and Galliano, Mickal, The Feasibility of an International “Tobin Tax.” Luxembourg: European Parliament, 1999.

Piketty, Thomas, Capital in the Twenty First Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014. Rajan, Raghuram, Fault Lines. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.

Rhodes, Chris, Financial services: contribution to the UK economy. London: House of Commons Library, 2019.

Rowlingson, Karen, Does Income Inequality Cause Health and Social Problems? York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2011. <https://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/default/files/jrf/migrated/files/inequality-income-social- problems-full.pdf>

Roy, Indranil, Future of Work: an Introduction, January 2019 <https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/it/Documents/humancapital/Future%20of%20Work_Delo itte.pdf> [Last accessed: 9 June 2020].

Shildrick, Tracy, MacDonald, Robert, Furlong, Andy, Roden, Johann and Crow, Robert, Are Cultures of Worklessness Passed Down Through Generations? London: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2012.

Srnicek, Nick, Platform Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016.

Stiglitz, Joseph, ‘Notes on Estate Taxes, Redistribution and the Concept of Balanced Growth Path Incidence’, Journal of Political Economy, 86, no. 2 (1978), pp. 137-150. Stiglitz, Joseph, The Price of Inequality. London: Penguin, 2013.

Vandermoortele, Jan, ‘Inequality and Gresham’s Law: the bad drives out the good’, Unpublished thinkpiece for the UN in China, March 2013. <https://wess.un.org/archive/2015/wp- content/uploads/2015/02/dps_paper_vandemoortele.pdf>

Wilkinson, Richard and Pickett, Kate, The Inner Level. London: Penguin Books, 2018.

Wilkinson, Richard and Pickett, Kate, The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone. London: Penguin Books, 2009.

Wolff, Edward, ‘Inheritances and Wealth Inequality, 1989-1998’, American Economic Review, 92, no. 2 (2002), pp. 260-264.

World Economic Forum, The Future of Jobs Report. Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2018.

2020年经济学三等奖

What is the socially efficient level of crime? (Professor Daniel d’Amico, Brown University)

犯罪的社会效率水平是多少?(布朗大学丹尼尔·达米科教授)

Jaimin Shah,英国爱德华六世国王文法学校
2020年经济学奖第三名 |7 分钟阅读

Nelson Mandela once said, “when a man is denied the right to live the life he believes in, he has no choice but to become an outlaw[1].” It is on this belief that neoclassical economics is firmly founded – the rationale that all economic agents within the market mechanism behave rationally. Consumers are indirectly seeking to maximise utility, firms (whilst upholding their philanthropic Corporate Social Responsibility[2]) are working to elevate their profits and the government is attempting to satisfy macroeconomic targets ranging from equity and equality (an alleviation on the Gini Coefficient[3] for the latter), to international trade and income redistribution. Law-breakers fulfil the first of these three maximisation objectives and so are part of the trio of economic agents as well – they are integrated into the society around us. Despite particular causes of crime being irrational, such as the erratic behaviour associated with addiction (meaning a nuanced, non-zero optimum is required here, preserving a nation’s productive potential), the fundamental principle of informed decision-making (intrinsic cost-benefit analyses) means that this ‘socially efficient’ level of crime exists and can be estimated, as will be demonstrated below.

To begin with, it seems appropriate to graphically and intuitively prove that this so-called ‘social optimum’ de facto exists. One can simplify the overarching problem to a matter of market failure – whereby there is a misallocation of resources in the economy causing a divergence between marginal social cost (MSC) and marginal social benefit (MSB). It is due to this interpretation of crime, that one can associate it with causing negative externalities in production (an external cost to a third party, when a good or service is created, not reflected in market prices). The good or service in this case is (quite abstractly) violent crime in particular. Taking the broad example of bank robberies, Maj Hansen and Ask Elklit found that around 15% of the sample in their seminal research paper suffered from probable ‘acute stress disorder’ after the occurrence of the deeply unfortunate event[4]. Moreover, this can even be extended to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), where an investigation carried out by Italian doctor G. P. Fichera, led to the conclusion that 13% of the sampling units were likely to have this condition[5]. Initiating economic analysis here, this illustrates that the cost of embarking on this unlawful activity, given the monumental repercussions if caught (the marginal private cost, MPC), is not equal to the costs to society (in terms of MSC) given the ‘collateral damage’ and severe emotional trauma the unlucky few unfortunately have to endure – this leads to psychiatric costs and counselling, increasing the disbenefits the state as a whole experiences. As a result, one can ascertain that negative externalities in production (where MSC > MPC) are clearly present in this scenario and thus in the more general case of aggregate-level crime too. Inspecting Figure 1, one can see that MPC (called PMC in this case) is at a lower level than MSC (SMC here) and hence the market is at equilibrium P1Q1 as opposed to P2Q2 (the latter of which is allocative efficiency, where MSC = MSB). Consequently, a socially efficient level of consumption does de jure exist in this sub-market (the aforementioned allocative efficiency). If this is achieved, the shaded deadweight loss (net welfare loss) to society would be eliminated and so the optimum would be reached, implying there could be a more quantitative-based answer to this discussion.

Now that it seems evident that there is a precise level of crime that would be socially efficient (as shown previously by mapping this macroeconomic variable as having negative externalities in production), one should consider the causes of crime with a more general view to quantify this problem. Moreover, the ‘Chicago School Social Disorganisation Theory’ is one of the leading conjectures put forward to attempt to explain criminal behaviour. Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay (the major proponents) suggested that crime was a function of neighbourhood interactions and was not due to individuals and their actions entirely[6]. This links to another contemporary theory first developed by Emile Durkheim and Robert Merton entitled ‘Anomie Theory’ or ‘Strain Theory’ whereby the violent distaste for significant gaps between the wealthiest and the poorest induce a crime-seeking incentive[7]. Both of these ideas put the burden of the blame on the surrounding environment for concocting criminals into our modern-day society. Considering the aforementioned Gini Coefficient (calculated as area

𝐴

------

𝐴+𝐵)

and its accompanying Lorenz Curve (see Figure 2), the 2018 value for this was found to be 0.35 (where 0 is perfect equality and so 1 is perfect inequality) by the ONS[8]. What this illustrates is that, the emphasis Strain Theory and equivalent psychological explanations put on society for creating stark material-income divisions, means that a socially efficient level of crime would have to be individualised; this would take into account the cause, motive, severity and so on, as certain wrongdoings due to difficult personal circumstances (inequity and inequality) may be thought to be more morally acceptable than others. Perhaps more leniency can thus be attributed to this niche over the aforementioned violent crime situation. This means that the socially efficient level of crime should be bespoke to account for these underlying reasons and would not simply be one concrete statistic that encompasses the entire economy.

Utilising this logic further, it is apposite to briefly analyse the problem of addiction within crime itself to determine what form of social optimum would be best in this specific case. Taking the market for cocaine as an example, this is a good that is classically thought to have a highly inelastic demand where the price elasticity of demand (responsiveness of quantity demanded to a change in the price of the product) is mathematically between 0 and -1 (non-inclusive). This is due to the good being habit-forming for some consumers but more profoundly addictive for others. This can be clearly demonstrated in Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner’s book ‘Freakonomics’ where these two economists carried out a statistical investigation into the substantial effects of ‘crack cocaine’ on the African American community in Bogotá, Colombia. The obsession with taking and selling this Class A drug led to a quadruple in homicides rates amongst young urban males of this ethnic community in 5 years[9] – even statistical investigations highlight this association of addiction to cocaine. Moreover, Figure 3 conveys this relationship in the ‘RAND model for cocaine[10] in the USA’ – supply is thought to be highly elastic due to the volume of cocaine in circulation (during the reign of the Medellín Cartel 15 tonnes of this drug was entering the USA daily[11]) and demand has a shape reminiscent of a ‘rectangular hyperbola’ due to the fact that at high prices, only the addicted households remain with a virtually perfectly price inelastic demand. To convey this addiction to be irrational (and so the social optimum would have to be approached cautiously), one can model the experienced utility (actual utility) versus the decision utility (utility thought to be experienced when making consumption decisions). Using the assumption of quasi-linearity (where good 𝑥 is cocaine and 𝑚 comprises of all other goods in the market system), take the following hypothetical functions to model addiction (using econometric tools from Caltech[12]):

  • 𝑈𝐸𝑈(𝑥, 𝑚) = 𝐵𝐸𝑈(𝑥) + 𝑚 = 2√𝑥 + 𝑚 (where 𝑈𝐸𝑈 represents experienced utility and 𝐵𝐸𝑈(𝑥) is the actual benefit associated with consuming 𝑥 units of cocaine).

  • 𝑈𝐷𝑈(𝑥, 𝑚) = 𝐵𝐷𝑈(𝑥) + 𝑚 = 20√𝑥 + 𝑚 (where 𝑈𝐷𝑈 represents decision utility and 𝐵𝐷𝑈(𝑥) is the benefit thought to be associated with consuming 𝑥 units of cocaine).

Hence using these hypothetical quasi-linear utility functions (simply to model addiction to cocaine at a basic, univariate level), one would be attempting to maximise 𝑈𝐸𝑈 and 𝑈𝐷𝑈. Therefore, the maximisation problems can be written as below and solved as follows:

  • 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑥≥0 𝐵𝐸𝑈(𝑥) − 𝑝𝑥 = 2√𝑥 − 𝑝𝑥 (where 𝑝𝑥 is simply the cost with purchasing 𝑥 units of cocaine). Therefore, the optimal quantity is equal to 𝑝2 (this is 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑡).

  • 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑥≥0 𝐵𝐷𝑈(𝑥) − 𝑝𝑥 = 20√𝑥 − 𝑝𝑥 (where 𝑝𝑥 is simply the cost with purchasing 𝑥 units of cocaine). Therefore, the actual quantity (as the consumer will demand 100 according to their perceptions and not the de facto optimum) is equal to (this is 𝑝2𝑥∗(𝑝)).

Therefore, one can see the issue of addiction purely mathematically in this supposed scenario – irrationality is present as 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑡 ≠ 𝑥∗(𝑝), and due to 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑡 < 𝑥∗(𝑝), the so-called addict places a much higher value on cocaine consumption than the actual utility derived from it and so consumes proportionally more than the ‘optimum’. Relating addiction to the socially efficient level of crime, one could thus potentially argue that this optimum (allocative efficiency) would have to remain fairly high (perhaps around 60-70% of current levels). This is due to these forms of crime being significantly entrapping for one’s body and psyche (𝑥∗(𝑝) is 100 times greater than 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑡 in the simple, aforementioned model) and so any attempt to reduce these crimes further, may lead to unintended consequences. These include exacerbations in income distribution (given the virtually perfectly price inelastic demand for cocaine at high prices in the ‘RAND model’) and a degradation of the productive capacity in the economy (especially due to the fact that many casual consumers are those in significantly higher-stress vocations[13], e.g. banking). The latter would lead to a decrease in the factor of production of labour (given the extent of UK cocaine usage and thus potential addiction – 4.2% of UK adults[14]) in the economy hence leading to an inwards shift of the aggregate production possibility curve (see Figure 4 – convex to illustrate the laws of increasing opportunity cost and diminishing marginal returns). This causes long-run aggregate supply (LRAS) to shift leftwards and aggregate demand (AD) to experience a contraction (using the Monetarist viewpoint instead of Keynesian here, where LRAS is perfectly price inelastic at the ‘natural rate of output’) – one can see on Figure 5 that real GDP decreases from Y-Y’ and price level increases from P-P’ consequently going against two macroeconomic objectives of long-run economic growth and price stability (2% for the CPI in the UK).

Taking these propelled, serious consequences into account, one can make a judgment about the socially efficient level for crime more generally using a ‘differential diagnosis’ (coined by Professor Jeffrey Sachs but now for criminological economics rather than development economics[15]). Taking into account ‘Social Disorganisation Theory’ and ‘Strain Theory’, the social optimum for misdemeanour offences should remain relatively close to the levels they are at in present day (perhaps 70-80% of the current summation of offences). This is due to low-level infringements aiding to provide subsistence for the judiciary system (e.g. projected increases in the Ministry of Justice’s budget to $8.1bn in 2020-21[16]) and their relative seriousness in comparison to the rest of aggregate crime, being minimal. Given that the police and defence forces are ‘economic goods’ (scare resources), comparatively less assets should be devoted here. Regarding the aforementioned issue of addiction, especially excessive, irrational cocaine usage, 60-70% of current levels would likely bring about a social optimum as conveyed above. Finally, in terms of wrongdoings that carry more gravitas, such as the previously displayed emotional consequences of bank robberies or the cocaine- fuelled quadruple in homicide rates amongst African Americans in Bogotá (within half a decade), the social optimum for these crimes should be as close to zero as humanely possible. Although Alasdair MacIntyre’s thoughts about Kant’s Categorical Imperative can rather tenuously justify crime for basic, humanitarian needs[17], it is evidently not socially, economically, morally or ethically acceptable for forms of violent crime to exist on a large scale and hence, internalising the significant externalities for these ‘crimes against humanity’ should attempt to eliminate this market altogether. This would not only be socially and economically efficient (in terms of an eliminated deadweight loss to society intertwined with improved scarce resource allocation) but would also be socially sustainable thus paving the way for generations present and generations to come.

Author's Note

My approach to this question was simple – I desired to simplify and breakdown the problem into something more manageable and more quantifiable. Due to the word constraint, it was not feasible to analyse every type of crime (white-collar, murder, arson, assault etc.) in detail, and hence I decided to split the overarching theme into three sub-sections as is demonstrated in the paper below. The use of hypothetical econometric analysis further on in the paper is simply designed to provide a deeper understanding of the issue being discussed at the time. It is not based on real-life observation, experimentation and data collection but serves the purpose to reiterate my argument and overall line of reasoning, in a different, niche, mathematical way (contrasting to the nature of the question which is open-ended and broad).

Footnotes

1 GoodReads [internet]. Nelson Mandela Quotes; 2020. Available from: https://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/367338.Nelson_Mandela

2 Forbes [internet]. Why CSR? The Benefits of Corporate Social Responsibility Will Move You to Act; 2013 May 12. Available from: https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.forbes.com/sites/devinthorpe/2013/05/18/why- csr-the-benefits-of-corporate-social-responsibility-will-move-you-to-act/amp/

3 Economy [internet]. The Gini-coefficient: How do we measure inequality? Available from: https://www.ecnmy.org/learn/your-society/the-question-of-equality/the-gini-coefficient-how-do-we- measure-inequality/

4 Hansen M, Elklit A. Predictors of acute stress disorder in response to bank robbery. European Journal of Psychotraumatology, 2:1, p. 5864. 2011 May 12.

5 Fichera G.P. et al. Post-traumatic Stress Disorder among bank employee victims of robbery. Occupational Medicine, vol. 65, issue 4, pp. 283-89. 2015 June.

6 Porter, Jeremy & Capellan, Joel & Chintakrindi, Sriram. The Encyclopaedia of Crime & Punishment, p. 1179. 2015 December 28.

7 Agnew R. Encyclopaedia of social problems; Strain Theory. Thousand Oaks: SAGE publications, pp. 904-906. 2008.

8 Office for National Statistics. Household income inequality, UK: financial year ending 2019, p. 4. 2020 March 3.

9 Levitt SD, Dubner SJ. Freakonomics. 4th Ed. Penguin Random House UK; p. 112. 2015.

10 Manski CF, Pepper JV, Thomas YF. Assessment of Two Cost-Effectiveness Studies on Cocaine Control Policy, p. 9; National Research Council. National Academic Press, Washington DC. 1999.

11 Independent [internet]. 10 facts reveal the absurdity of Pablo Escobar’s wealth. Business Insider. 2017 December 2017. Available from: https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.independent.co.uk/news/people/pablo-escobar-worth-wealth-money- how-much-a8133141.html%3famp

12 Caltech [internet]. Principles of Economics with Calculus; online course, EDX. 2020 January 7. Available from: https://www.edx.org.uk/course/principles-of-economics-with-calculus

13 The Guardian [internet]. Confessions from the City: why firms are failing to tackle the cocaine crisis. 2017 September 9. Available from: https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.theguardian.com/society/2017/sep/09/city-firms-failing-to-tackle- cocaine-crisis

14 The Guardian [internet]. Confessions from the City: why firms are failing to tackle the cocaine crisis. 2017 September 9. Available from: https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.theguardian.com/society/2017/sep/09/city-firms-failing-to-tackle- cocaine-crisis

15 Sachs J. The End of Poverty; how we can make it happen in our lifetime. 1st Ed, Penguin Books Ltd, p. 273, 2005.

16 HM Treasury [internet]. Policy Paper – Spending Round 2019. UK Government. 2019 September 4. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/spending-round-2019-document/spending-round-2019

17 Dimmock M, Fisher A. AQA Philosophy and OCR Religious Studies; Chapter 11 – Stealing in Ethics. Open Book Publishers. 2017.

Bibliography

Agnew R. Encyclopaedia of social problems; Strain Theory. Thousand Oaks: SAGE publications, pp. 904-906. 2008.

Fichera G.P. et al. Post-traumatic Stress Disorder among bank employee victims of robbery. Occupational Medicine, vol. 65, issue 4, pp. 283-89. 2015 June.

Hansen M, Elklit A. Predictors of acute stress disorder in response to bank robbery. European Journal of Psychotraumatology, 2:1, p. 5864. 2011 May 12.

Levitt SD, Dubner SJ. Freakonomics. 4th Ed. Penguin Random House UK; p. 112. 2015.

Manski CF, Pepper JV, Thomas YF. Assessment of Two Cost-Effectiveness Studies on Cocaine Control Policy, p. 9; National Research Council. National Academic Press, Washington DC. 1999.

Office for National Statistics. Household income inequality, UK: financial year ending 2019, p. 4. 2020 March 3.

Porter, Jeremy & Capellan, Joel & Chintakrindi, Sriram. The Encyclopaedia of Crime & Punishment, p. 1179. 2015 December 28.

Sachs J. The End of Poverty; how we can make it happen in our lifetime. 1st Ed, Penguin Books Ltd, p. 273, 2005.

2020年经济学奖一等奖

What is the socially efficient level of crime?

犯罪的社会效率水平是多少?

拉斐尔·孔特,威廉·博拉斯爵士文法学校,英国
2020年经济学奖得主|10 分钟阅读

In this essay, it is argued that the socially efficient level of crime is actually significantly above nil, despite rampant social costs, due to the necessary trade-off between prevention expenditure and costs inflicted by crimes, as well as the potential beneficial effects of crime.[1] However, it must be recognised that there is no ‘simple relationship’ between crime and social costs derived from it, although cost-benefit analysis supplemented by case studies provides an indication.[2] Firstly, there are the social costs of crime with an added opportunity cost dimension. Secondly, there are prevention costs followed by the potential social benefits. Finally, the use of fines may help to determine a socially efficient level. Here, crime refers to various acts that imply a transgression of social norms and are punishable by law, from financial crimes to homicide, although naturally “crime” can have varying definitions, within different legal systems.

In this context, ‘social efficiency’ can be characterised as taking all the consequences of crime on all economic agents into consideration.[3] Specifically, social efficiency can be defined as: marginal social costs totalling marginal social benefits (MSC=MSB) with social costs divided into preemptive prevention costs and the social costs of the crimes expenditure and costs inflicted by crimes, as well as the potential beneficial effects of crimes themselves.[4] Therefore, in order to minimise overall social costs, the marginal cost of preventing crime should equal the marginal social cost of crime (MCp=MSC). If MCp>MSC of crime, then crimes are more costly to prevent than allowing them to occur, thus contributing to a higher overall social cost. Contrastingly, if MCp<MSC, then crime could have been prevented at a lower social cost than the social cost inflicted by the crime.

However, it can be argued that the socially efficient level of crime is nil as it is ‘the primary source of inefficiency in the economy,’ effectively ‘bypassing the market.’[5] [6]Principally, external costs involved in crime can be so considerable that it should not be present at all. This includes costs attached to crime which can be divided into apprehension, conviction and punishment costs.[7] Firstly, apprehension costs can be estimated using UK police spending, which was £14,063m in 2019-20. [8]Secondly, average unit conviction costs range from £200 for commercial theft to £800,980 for homicide. [9]Thirdly, incarceration cost the taxpayer £2,753,747,261 in the UK in 2015, i.e. £32,510 per prisoner. [10]In 2018-19, the total Ministry of Justice operating expenditure was £10 billion, with an income of £1.6 billion.[11] Similar statistics in the US are even more alarming with criminal justice system expenditure in 2012 amounting to $210 billion.[12] Such sums exemplify the huge social costs of crime, suggesting that the optimum level is close to nil, if not absolute zero.

Additionally, there are considerable social costs as consequences of crime, such as the lost output of crime victims. For example, in the UK, the average cost of lost productivity for violent crime victims is £2,060 (5 hours off work and 36 reduced productivity hours).[13] The same rationale can be used to estimate the social costs of crime regarding healthcare costs. For the same crime, average unit costs of healthcare amount to £920.[14] Moreover, there are also large anticipatory and reactionary social costs, notably defensive precautions taken by potential victims. This includes a range of measures such as insurance, locks, doors, private CCTV and alarms, with UK cost estimates ranging from £3bn to £4bn to around £25bn.’[15] This allocation of resources to hinder crime naturally inflicts significant monetary and psychological costs to society, although it does provide employment and other economic benefits. Similarly, resources used to commit a crime also represent costs to society.[16] [17]Here, an opportunity cost dimension must be added to fully capture the argument.[18] Principally, the criminals’ human and physical capital could have been utilised to contribute to the productive potential of the economy, creating potential social gains instead of inflicting high social costs through crime. This opportunity cost also includes the resources expended by potential victims to protect themselves from crime. The next best alternative may have been expenditure on goods and services to improve real living standards.

However, it can also be argued that the socially efficient level of crime is relatively high because resources allocated towards prevention can generate an even greater burden on society than if some crimes were allowed to occur (MCp<MSC). This is corroborated by Friedman stating that ‘theft is inefficient, but spending $100 to prevent a $10 theft is more inefficient.’[19] The following analysis can be divided into the high monetary and non-monetary costs of prevention.

On a monetary level, such high costs would take the form of expenditure on human and physical resources such as enhanced police presence and surveillance. Although this creates employment, an opportunity cost is still presented. In order to estimate the expenditure required to bring crime levels close to 0, the example of Singapore can be used where high penalties are coupled with high policing expenditure of over $200 US per capita[20] to achieve a relatively low crime rate of 617 per 100,000 with an intentional homicide rate of 0.7 per 100,000.[21] [22]This also implies that innumerable resources would be required to achieve a point where crime was virtually nil, inflicting even greater social costs through taxation than the crimes themselves.

Non-monetary costs of prevention also suggest that the socially efficient level of crime is well above nil. These social costs focus on the infringements of citizens’ rights and liberties, such as freedom of assembly and movement, which would undoubtedly be restricted by a police state seeking extremely low levels of crime. A relevant example for this is the former GDR where the Secret Police crushed crime and dissent through ‘increased social control, draconian state sanctions and reduced opportunity structures.’[23] However, this inevitably led to spiralling long-term social costs with recent articles stating that ‘memories of the police state continue to exact a profound psychological toll,’ even 30 years after German reunification.[24] As a consequence of the actions of the Stasi, psychologists have diagnosed various conditions, including post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and depression.[25] Overall, this case study demonstrates how efforts to reduce crime to very low levels tend to lead to far greater social costs than those actually created by crimes themselves. This example shows the lasting harm of such measures. Even if a more social-liberal rather than authoritarian approach was taken, as in Scandinavian countries, whereby the incentive to commit crime is reduced through redistributive measures, costs would remain high and crime would probably persist. Even today, economists argue that in the USA, ‘spending less on policing would increase social welfare.[26]

However, the idea that prevention is better than cure can also be applied with regard to crime. Although it is very difficult to calculate the social benefit stemming from preventative measures, a study of CCTV (closed-circuit television) suggests that the trade-off between infringement on civil rights and liberties and reducing crime is not as great as commonly perceived. Firstly, it is accepted that ‘CCTV can, when properly implemented and monitored, be effective at reducing crime.’[27] However, Roman and Farrell also argue that ‘there is evidence that CCTV can be introduced without infringing upon people's freedoms.’[28] Similarly, the argument regarding the infringement on civil liberties is weakened by the fact that it is arguing ‘for a right to anonymously commit crime.’[29] Therefore, as technology develops, it can be argued that the trade-off between prevention and social costs created is becoming less applicable, suggesting that the socially efficient level will decrease in the long-term.

Secondly, it can be claimed that the socially efficient level of crime in some circumstances is perhaps surprisingly high, due to the potential social benefits. This is particularly significant in relation to redistributive crimes such as theft and fraud which are effectively transfer payments. From a utilitarian perspective, if some resources are reallocated from wealthier agents to poorer agents, then total utility for the overall population increases. This is explained by the law of diminishing marginal utility which states that less affluent agents have higher levels of marginal utility, i.e. an increase in their resources will dramatically improve living standards. If crime can have this effect, then this may be able to improve development outcomes. From a macroeconomic perspective, the transfer will increase consumption, a key component of aggregate demand (AD=C+I+G+(X-M)) (AD-AD1) due to poorer individuals’ higher marginal propensity to consume which could, in turn, lead to an expansion of GDP (Y-Y1). This suggests that a certain type and level of crime can lead to economic benefits. However, the net improvement is likely to be marginal and will reduce long-term consumption trends. From a microeconomic perspective, if a poor thief were more likely to purchase merit goods and the wealthy were more likely to buy demerit goods, then crime would be contributing to correcting market failures caused by negative externalities.

However, redistributive crimes are also committed by prosperous individuals and firms through tax evasion. Additionally, the proceeds of organised crime are unlikely to be invested in social capital but tend to be used to fund further crime. Moreover, crimes such as counterfeiting, ‘theft by false pretenses,’ can have significant social costs such as resulting demand-pull inflation and the inefficient use of resources required for counterfeiting, undermining the redistributive effect.[30] At the core of the redistributive argument, which states that the private benefits to the criminal partially negate the private cost, lies the ethical dilemma that the ‘criminal’s illicit gain should not count as a social benefit.’[31] Furthermore, if crime is allowed to rise to dangerous levels, then the incentive to accumulate wealth legally may erode, increasing the risk of capital and labour flight, inflicting vast social costs. To summarise, it is inefficient to allow ‘pure coercive transfers of wealth.’[32]

However, social costs can be minimised in many cases by applying fines, the most common form of punishment used today.[33] Primarily fines do not consume social resources, but act as a transfer payment. Acting as a Pigouvian tax, fines can internalise the externality and correct the inefficient outcomes caused by crime. This is illustrated by the diagram below, with the social optimum being: MPC+ fines = MSC. Moreover, fines may avoid an expensive prison system. ‘Indeed, fines are so cheap to administer that they yield a profit to the state.’[34] Overall, this suggests that minor offences sanctioned by fines generate a small social cost, supporting the argument that the socially efficient level is greater than nil. Alternatively, community service could be used more extensively to offset crime-induced social loss.

However, the use of fines to determine a socially efficient level of crime is ethically questionable,  inflicting  potentially  long-term  social  costs  as  they  ‘permit  offences  to be bought  for  a  price.’[35] Additionally,  debates arise as to how fines should be calculated, inevitably causing government failure and further inefficiencies. Furthermore, some crimes are arguably ‘so heinous that no amount of money could compensate for the harm inflicted,’ making fines unsuitable.[36] This also exposes further difficulties when attempting to establish a socially efficient level as the value is wholly dependent on the types of crime committed. However,  while redistributive crimes can imply some inefficiencies,  so-called  ‘efficien crimes’[37] do exist, suggesting that the social optimum is not absolute zero. Reasoned speeding is a common example used to justify this argument as there may be times where the potential cost of an accident is less than the benefits of speeding. However, this can be ethically doubtful, due to the subjectivity of this concept.

Overall, despite best attempts, crime is an inevitable social evil. Hence, instead of devoting more resources to combat it, increasing the burden on the taxpayer, criminal law should ensure that crime delivers as few social costs as possible through efficient punishments or perhaps through the legalisation of some acts such as the possession and supply of Class B drugs such as cannabis. Accordingly, the socially efficient level of crime varies according to the offence, but is perhaps greater than commonly assumed, although it is impossible to give a conclusive value.

C,R 1.png
C,R 2.png
C,R 3.png

Footnotes

1 Friedman, D., n.d. Crime. [online] Econlib. Available at: <https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Crime.html> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

2 Skogh, G. and Stuart, C., 1982. An Economic Analysis of Crime Rates, Punishment, and the Social Consequences of Crime. Public Choice, [online] 38(2), p.171. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/30023585?seq=1> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

3 Bohm, P., 1987. Social Efficiency: A Concise Introduction To Welfare Economics. 2nd ed. [ebook] London: Macmillan Education Ltd., p.xii. Available at: <https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/bfm%3A978-1-349-18786-7%2F1.pdf> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

4 Cooper, R. and Ulen, T., 2013. AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT CHAPTER 11. [ebook] Pearson, p.471. Available at: <http://web4.uwindsor.ca/users/m/mfc/41240.nsf/831fc2c71873e46285256d6e006c367a/10ff8b04ff3a317885256d88005720f6$FILE/C&U4thchpt11.pdf> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

5 Ferraz, E. and Soares, R., 2018. Socially Optimal Crime And Punishment. [ebook] p.13. Available at: <https://www.fea.usp.br/sites/default/files/anexoevento/socp_ferraz_soares.pdf> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

6 Posner, R., 1985. An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law. Columbia Law Review, [online] 85(6), p.1195. Available at: <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6448/aee7b1aaa0785667ee8f0ba4fb7e9fe0a3c0.pdf>.

7 Becker, G., 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy, [online] 76(2), p.207. Available at: <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808(196803/04)76:2%3C169:CAPAEA%3E2.0.CO;2-I> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

8 Home Office, 2019. Police Funding For England & Wales 2015-2020 Statistical Bulletin. London, p.6.

9 Home Office, 2018. The Economic And Social Costs Of Crime Second Edition Research Report 99. London, p.58.

10 Ministry of Justice, 2016. Costs Per Place And Costs Per Prisoner By Individual Prison National Offender Management Service Annual Report And Accounts 2015-16 Management Information Addendum. London: Ministry of Justice Press Office, p.3.

11 House of Commons Library, 2019. The Spending Of The Ministry Of Justice Debate Pack. London, p.3.

12 Ferraz, E. and Soares, R., 2018. Socially Optimal Crime And Punishment. [ebook] p.1. Available at: <https://www.fea.usp.br/sites/default/files/anexo-evento/socp_ferraz_soares.pdf> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

13 Home Office, 2018. The Economic And Social Costs Of Crime Second Edition Research Report 99. London, p.42.

14 Ibid. p.46.

15 Ibid. p.23.

16 Skogh, G. and Stuart, C., 1982. An Economic Analysis of Crime Rates, Punishment, and the Social Consequences of Crime. Public Choice, [online] 38(2), p.171. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/30023585?seq=1> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

17 Ibid.

18 Cooper, R. and Ulen, T., 2013. AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT CHAPTER 11. [ebook] Pearson, p 471. Available at: <http://web4.uwindsor.ca/users/m/mfc/41240.nsf/831fc2c71873e46285256d6e006c367a/10ff8b04ff3a317885256d88005720f6/$FILE/C&U4thchpt11.pdf> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

19 Friedman, D., n.d. Crime. [online] Econlib. Available at: <https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Crime.html> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

20 Farrell, G. and Clark, K., 2004. WHAT DOES THE WORLD SPEND ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE?. [ebook] Helsinki: The European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, p.16. Available at: <https://www.heuni.fi/material/attachments/heuni/papers/6KtlkZMtL/HEUNI_papers_20.pdf> [Accessed 13 May 2020].

21 Ibid.

22 Hirschmann, R., 2020. Singapore: Crime Rate 2019 | Statista. [online] Statista. Available at: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/628339/crime-rates-in-singapore/> [Accessed 13 May 2020].

23 Kury, H. and Smartt, U., 2001. The Changing Face Of Germany's Crime Rate Since Unification. [ebook] Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, p.47. Available at: <https://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/sites/crimeandjustice.org.uk/files/09627250108553673.pdf> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

24 Bailey, C., 2019. The Lingering Trauma of Stasi Surveillance. The Atlantic, [online] Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/11/lingering-trauma-east-german-police-state/601669/> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

25 Ibid.

26 Ferraz, E. and Soares, R., 2018. Socially Optimal Crime And Punishment. [ebook] p.31. Available at: <https://www.fea.usp.br/sites/default/files/anexo-evento/socp_ferraz_soares.pdf> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

27 Roman, J. and Farrell, G., n.d. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR CRIME PREVENTION: Opportunity Costs, Routine Savings And Crime Externalities. [ebook] pp.80, 81. Available at: <http://www.socialvalueuk.org/app/uploads/2016/03/cba%20for%20crim%20prevention.pdf> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

28 Roman, J. and Farrell, G., n.d. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR CRIME PREVENTION: Opportunity Costs, Routine Savings And Crime Externalities. [ebook] pp.80, 81. Available at: <http://www.socialvalueuk.org/app/uploads/2016/03/cba%20for%20crim%20prevention.pdf> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

29 Ibid.

30 Posner, R., 1985. An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law. Columbia Law Review, [online] 85(6), p.1198. Available at:

<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6448/aee7b1aaa0785667ee8f0ba4fb7e9fe0a3c0.pdf

31 Cooper, R. and Ulen, T., 2013. AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT CHAPTER 11. [ebook] Pearson,

p.471. Available at: <http://web4.uwindsor.ca/users/m/mfc/41-240.nsf/831fc2c71873e46285256d6e006c367a/10ff8b04ff3a317885256d88005720f6/

$FILE/C&U4thchpt11.pdf> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

32 Posner, R., 1985. An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law. Columbia Law Review, [online] 85(6), p.1196. Available at: <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6448/aee7b1aaa0785667ee8f0ba4fb7e9fe0a3c0.pdf

33 Becker, G., 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy, [online] 76(2), p.193. Available at: <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808(196803/04)76:2%3C169:CAPAEA%3E2.0.CO;2-I> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

34 Cooper, R. and Ulen, T., 2013. AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT CHAPTER 11. [ebook] Pearson, p.474. Available at: <http://web4.uwindsor.ca/users/m/mfc/41-240.nsf/831fc2c71873e46285256d6e006c367a/10ff8b04ff3a317885256d88005720f6/

$FILE/C&U4thchpt11.pdf> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

35 Becker, G., 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy, [online] 76(2), p.196. Available at: <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808(196803/04)76:2%3C169:CAPAEA%3E2.0.CO;2-I> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

36 Ibid.

37 Friedman, D., n.d. David Friedman, Price Theory: Chapter 20: The Economics Of Law And Law Breaking. [online] Daviddfriedman.com. Available at:

<http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Price_Theory/PThy_Chapter_20/PThy_Chapter_20.html> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

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Bohm, P., 1987. Social Efficiency: A Concise Introduction To Welfare Economics. 2nd ed. [ebook] London: Macmillan Education Ltd., p.xii. Available at:

<https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/bfm%3A978-1-349-18786-7%2F1.pdf> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

Cooper, R. and Ulen, T., 2013. AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT CHAPTER 11. [ebook] Pearson, pp.445, 47, 474. Available at:

<http://web4.uwindsor.ca/users/m/mfc/41-240.nsf/831fc2c71873e46285256d6e006c367a/10ff8b04ff3 a317885256d88005720f6/$FILE/C&U4thchpt11.pdf> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

Farrell, G. and Clark, K., 2004. WHAT DOES THE WORLD SPEND ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE?. [ebook] Helsinki: The European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, p.16. Available at:

<https://www.heuni.fi/material/attachments/heuni/papers/6KtlkZMtL/HEUNI_papers_20.pdf> [Accessed 13 May 2020].

Ferraz, E. and Soares, R., 2018. Socially Optimal Crime And Punishment. [ebook] pp.1, 2, 13, 31. Available at: <https://www.fea.usp.br/sites/default/files/anexo-evento/socp_ferraz_soares.pdf> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

Friedman, D., n.d. Crime. [online] Econlib. Available at: <https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Crime.html> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

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Roman, J. and Farrell, G., n.d. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR CRIME PREVENTION: Opportunity Costs, Routine Savings And Crime Externalities. [ebook] pp.80, 81. Available at:

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2019年政治奖一等奖

How much should we care about social cohesion?我们应该在多大程度上关心社会凝聚力?

Nayah Victoria Thu,挪威奥斯陆国际学校
2019年政治奖得主|7 分钟阅读

Introduction

In a world where our common future looks increasingly uncertain, humanity needs a measure of collective potential: social cohesion. Using GDP as a proxy for progress is outdated, as purely economic measures are neither sustainable nor sufficiently holistic. Academics have previously dismissed "additional indicators [as] a fundamentally political question" (Feigl, Hergovich and Rehm). However, social cohesion is neither “additional”, nor solely “political”. Instead, it provides a central focus for the necessary shift in global mindset away from perpetual economic growth. Social cohesion is imperative as humanity moves towards the ecological and societal sustainability embodied in initiatives such as the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

Referring to the “bonds” that hold society together, social cohesion can be defined as “the willingness of members of a society to cooperate with each other in order to survive and prosper” (Stanley). This concept was born of Emilie Durkheim’s attempt to define the quality lost during the “social erosion” of early industrialization. He baptized it the “consciousness collective; the belief held by citizens of a nation-state that they share a moral community, which enables them to trust each other” (Larsen). In the present day, Durkheim would notice striking parallels to his lifetime: great technological change in an increasingly connected yet polarized world. As Durkheim’s perspective can be used to defend forced homogeneity, his concept must evolve to reflect modern liberal values. The trusting community he mentions must originate organically in order to reach its full potential. While he refers to the “nationstate”, moving towards the ecological ceiling of our biosphere requires genuine cooperation on a much greater level. The infrastructure to improve measurements of cohesion should likewise be globally developed, encompassing factors such as: “life satisfaction, trust, prosocial behaviour, suicide and voter turnout” (OECD). Social cohesion’s utilitarian value lies in determining the factors necessary for the future prosperity of the human race.

Reimagining Development

Humanity needs to start measuring and appreciating the social qualities required to move into ecological and societal balance. In On Liberty, Mill argues for the ability of any person to do what they want provided they do not hurt others. Today, this capability to “hurt” includes future generations – redefining the individual as part of an interconnected system, where affecting others is the rule, not the exception. As “Identity is socially constructed” (World Bank), the independence and sense of fulfilment required for peace is only possible through the opportunities afforded by a socially cohesive state. It encompasses the social structure necessary for individual development and group identity, remaining deeply utilitarian in nature. It is a measure of “inclusion…trust… and mobility” (Fonesca, Lukosch and Brazier). Liberal values and cohesion are mutually supportive: respect of individual freedom makes people more willing to work together, and less likely to abuse others’ rights. In addition, the empathy and collaboration of a cohesive society increases altruism, serving general utility. Merely replacing “citizen” with “consumer” changed survey respondents’ values, causing “reduced social involvement” (Bauer, Wilkie and Kim). A holistic system to measure fulfilment and cooperation would be even more powerful than reversing this semantic change. It could transform the individual’s role from that of a narcissistic homo economicus to a cooperative member of humanity.

Cohesion and the State

Social cohesion provides a lens through which to objectively analyse the rise of countries culturally dissimilar to the West. It is a defining component of development, more important than historical similarities or differences. Locke justifies the state through tacit consent: the acceptance of state systems and benefits. High social cohesion measures citizens’ acceptance of and willingness to work with one another and the state, thus embodying tacit consent. As any country’s potential for development is contingent on its legitimacy and contemporary political situation, cohesion also constitutes the essence of sustainable growth. This sheds light on the significance of high trust levels present in China “across … the last couple of decades” (Ortiz-Ospina and Roser). The constituent elements of social cohesion, from prosocial behaviour to high voter turn-out, justify the Chinese government, enabling it to mobilize the population towards its common goals.

Although social cohesion is criticized as “vague enough to follow political meanderings” (Stanley), this applies to political misuse of the term, not its essence. Independently evaluating alleged social cohesion clarifies this distinction. In Greece, the “cost of protecting
insiders falls largely on ‘outsiders’” (The Economist), as the bloated public sector excludes younger citizens from economic participation. While undertaken in the name of cohesion, this leads to social stratification – eroding organic trust and undermining cooperative potential. Greece is blatantly misusing the term. Nevertheless, elements of social cohesion are open to interpretation. For example, Plotke questions whether competitive elections are the only valuable method of political representation. He broadens “representation” to include interest and “type” representation and “suggests that modern understandings of political representation are to some extent contingent on political realities” (Dovi). Explaining the importance of cohesive inclusion in representing a diverse society, he recommends analysing of contemporary political systems. Their effect on representation can be extended to their ability to support social cohesion. For example, within Western democracies, first-past-thepost and plurality systems are markedly different. The latter cultivates a culture of compromise, while the former, used in the UK and USA, is more divisive. Countries relying on a winner-takes-all system must strengthen their true cohesiveness or remain susceptible to partisan division. Any government desirous to retain power must understand the significance of social cohesion.

Focusing on social cohesion makes any state accountable for its citizens’ welfare, no matter the form of government. The feedback loops of political participation incentivize the incumbents to do more for their citizens. This is clearly shown in the democratic process of voting, as “average life satisfaction is significantly related to the vote share [of the incumbent party]” (Ward). If social cohesion were an accepted measure of success, it would incentivize authoritarian regimes like the government of Equatorial Guinea to polish their international image by developing their country and society, instead of chasing oligarchical economic gains, touting a deceptively high GDP per capita and “spending huge sums on public relations” (Birrell) to “prove” their development. The presence of moral norms, with the “expectations of a social contract backed up by public accountability” (Raworth 125) can have tangible effects on objective measures of welfare. A Ugandan hospital’s public noticeboard and results reporting led to “33% fewer children dying under the age of five” (125). Note that the phrase “social contract” is imperfect as it does not imply common ownership of solutions, unlike the inclusive concept of “society [as] a joint-stock company” (Emerson 3). Nevertheless, social cohesion can prevent a transactional, economic worldview, holding governments accountable for all their actions.

Cohesion and Development

Social cohesion within countries is paramount to measuring the potential for successful international aid. According to William Easterly, the IMF and World Bank’s efforts to fix long-term economic issues have been less successful than their crisis control. Attempting to forge societal development using economic tools, they block the “circuitous route to a free market” (Easterly). This route implies that social cohesion must grow organically to reach the minimum level of trusting co-operation required to implement economic plans. Working through corrupt governments, organizations cannot mobilize the population or increase vertical trust required for the country’s self-sufficiency. Willingness to cooperate must be present for economic tools to successfully encourage sustainable development.

Social cohesion can correspond to social homogeneity. Economically developed Botswana, unlike many African countries, has a dominate ethnic group, language and a relatively intact traditional hierarchy. Linguistic and social diversity pose a barrier to trusting interaction. They have a negative correlation with societal development as “Countries with high social capital…tend to be linguistically homogenous” (Prospero). Perceived cultural and linguistic norms allow for conversion of social capital into tangible benefits, as outlined by Bourdieu. However, Botswana is a case of naturally occurring homogeneity, comparable to monocultural countries like Japan and Iceland. Cultural homogeneity should be seen as a possible contributing factor to social cohesion, not a desirable end in itself.

Just as social cohesion’s value lies in serving general utility, homogeneity’s value lies solely in its ability to generate social cohesion. Utility is served by social inclusion; “The process of improving the ability, opportunity, and dignity of those disadvantaged on the basis of their identity to take part in society” (Bordia Das). Durkheim attempted to artificially recreate natural homogeneity. However, he mistakenly neglected to acknowledge that marginalizing minority groups strips social cohesion of its utilitarian value. Today, modern academics recognize that “[forced] social homogeneity may be detrimental to social cohesion” (Stanley). For instance, destabilizing legal initiatives to create social homogeneity leave minorities like the Rohingya “lack[ing] basic rights” (Blakemore). This diminishes incentives to cooperate, breeding a culture of fear inconducive to the trust that forms the essence of social cohesion. With the ensuing power imbalance, authoritarian states lack the fluidity to respond to threats to their social and group identity. Considering current migratory pressure and the importance of inclusion for utility, social homogeneity becomes an unworthy goal.

Our Common Humanity

Inter-group, pro-social behaviour is arguably a greater source of legitimate power than any monopoly on physical force. Bourdieu argues that owners of social capital could become much stronger if owners of economic capital did not pit them against each other. Though such solidarity is difficult to maintain, moments of collective human identity and purpose can inspire group action. Grassroot efforts, personified in protests like Occupy and Extinction Rebellion, are imperative in raising awareness of our shared humanity. Similarly, according to Roger Griffins, counter-movements in less cohesive states succeed because they rely on shared, inextinguishable moral ideas. These commonalities establish trust, increasing group efficacy. A tendency towards self-interest does not prevent unifying goals from nurturing the horizontal trust necessary for social cohesion.

Just as the technological change and inequality of the industrial revolution worried Durkheim, so should the current power of social media merit a greater focus on social cohesion. Social media algorithms confirm, not challenge, extremist views as various groups discuss complex issues “within politically homogeneous ‘echo chambers’” (University of Pennsylvania). This creates a dichotomy between collective human identity and divisive factions, accelerating polarization. However, "egalitarian social networks, in which no individual is more powerful than another” utilize the “remarkably strong effects of bipartisan social learning on eliminating polarization" (University of Pennsylvania). By refocusing, governments and media companies can not only accelerate, but also mitigate polarization. Even technicalities such as “the shade of blue and the size of buttons” (The Economist) greatly impact people’s
willingness to listen to each other and empathize with other groups. Social media can facilitate constructive interaction, as long as it aims to promote social cohesion.

Social cohesion is a fragile, long-term goal that requires a sense of our common future. Focusing on interaction and present similarities facilitates this understanding. Inter-group exchange enables cohesion to grow organically in a larger, inclusive moral community. It is infinitely preferable to denying the presence of minority groups or persecuting them in misguided attempts at creating homogeneity. Mill argued “The only people who need to concern themselves regularly about … society in general are those few whose actions have an influence that extends that far” (Mill 13). The interdependence of 21st century society means that every individual’s actions reverberate globally in some regard, solidifying the importance of a cohesive human identity and global awareness.

Conclusion

There is no single panacea for the challenges facing humanity. Solutions are not solely technological, political, economic or cultural, but complex webs of vertical and horizontal cooperative effort. Social cohesion is a crucial measure of our propensity to cooperate,
focusing on stability and holistic development as opposed to short-term economic gain. Only by appreciating its essence can we harness our collective potential to achieve harmony within the limits of our shared planet.

Bibliography

Bauer, Monika A., et al. "Cuing consumerism: situational materialism undermines personal and social well being." Psychological Science 16 March 2012: 517-523.

Birrell, Ian. The Observer: Equatorial Guinea. 23 October 2011. 27 July 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/23/equatorial-guinea-africa-corruptionkleptocracy>.

Blakemore, Erin. Who are the Rohyinga People? 8 February 2019. 13 July 2019. <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/people/reference/rohingya-people/>.

Bordia Das, Maitreyi. Social Inclusion. n.d. 7 July 2019. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/socialinclusion>.

Dovi, Suzanne. "Political Representation." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. Fall 2018. etaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018. 13 July 2019. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/political-representation/>.

Easterly, William. The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Effort's to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. Penguin Random House, 2006.

Emerson, Ralph Waldo. "Self Reliance." Emerson, Ralph Waldo. Essays: First Series. 1841.

Feigl, George, Sven Hergovich and Miriam Rehm. "Beyond GDP: can we re-focus the debate?" Social developments in the European Union 2012. 2012. 63-89.

Fonesca, Javier, Stephan Lukosch and Frances Brazier. "Social cohesion revisited: a new definition and how to characterize it." Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research (2019): 231-253.

Larsen, Christian Albrekt. "Social cohesion: Definition, measurement and developments." Research Paper. n.d.

Mill, J.S. Utilitarianism. 1863.

OECD. "Social Cohesion Indicators." Society at a glance: Asia/Pacific 2011. OECD Publishing, 2012.

Ortiz-Ospina, Esteban and Max Roser. Trust. 2019. 28 July 2019. <https://ourworldindata.org/trust>.

Prospero. Social capital in the 21st century. 18 June 2015. 13 July 2019. <https://www.economist.com/prospero/2015/06/18/social-capital-in-the-21st-century>.

Raworth, Kate. The Doughnut Economy. Chelsea Green, 2017.

Stanley, Dick. "What Do We Know about Social Cohesion: The Research Perspective of the Federal Government's Social Cohesion Research Network." The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers Canadiens De Sociologie 28.1 (2003): 5–17.

The Economist. The Cruelty of Compassion. 28 January 2010. 17 July 2019. <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2010/01/28/the-cruelty-of-compassion>.

—. Whatsapp Suggests a Cure for Virality. 26 July 2018. 26 July 2019. <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/07/26/whatsapp-suggests-a-cure-for-virality>.

University of Pennsylvania. Can social media networks reduce political polarization on climate change? 3 September 2018. 22 July 2019. <https://phys.org/news/2018-09-social-medianetworks-political-polarization.html>.

Ward, George. Chapter 3: Happiness and Voting Behaviour. 20 March 2019. 28 July 2019. <https://worldhappiness.report/ed/2019/happiness-and-voting-behavior/>.

World Bank. Inclusion Matters: The Foundation for Shared Prosperity. Washington DC: World Bank, 2013.

2020年政治奖二等奖

Governments do a lot of things, such as collecting taxes and drafting people into the military, that we would object to individuals doing. Can this be justified?

政府做了很多事情,比如收税和征召人们参军,我们会反对个人这样做。这能合理吗?

Elizabeth Zhu,加拿大多伦多大学学校
2020年政治奖第二名|7 分钟阅读

Introduction

The political authority of governments rests on two grounds, both independent of each other: first it is justified on the basis of necessity, to protect citizens from a harmful state of nature, and second, on the basis of reciprocity and citizens’ normative duties to their government.

What do I defend in this essay? I argue that it is justified for democratically elected governments to impose reasonable costs on citizens to bring about societal good. These ‘reasonable costs’ fall under a set of criteria: a) they must not severely violate the basic rights of citizens b) they should be absolutely necessary as a means to fulfill the societal good c) on net, citizens should be made better able to exercise their rights and freedoms in the long term. For example, laws that enforce slavery or severely breach individuals’ privacy are excluded from the authority of governments. As Locke argued, the purpose of the state is to protect the ‘natural freedoms’ of individuals, including life, liberty and property rights (Locke). By extension, Joseph Raz argues that governments should only order citizens to do what they had prior reason to do (Raz). Thus, governments are justified only in enforcing just laws that protect the best interests of citizens in the long run, such as enforcing property rights, controlling borders, criminalizing hate speech, and punishing those who violate the law. Moreover, citizens have a reciprocal duty to obey these laws; though political authority differs from political obligation, the former implies the latter, and thus a defense of a duty to obey the law strengthens the justification for political authority.

Necessity and Securing Freedoms

First, governments have a right to impose certain demands on citizens out of necessity: to protect all citizens from an anarchic state of nature, particularly the most vulnerable. Take the absence of the examples stated in the prompt: without collecting taxes, governments would lack the funds to implement necessary public services and a functioning criminal justice system, and without military conscription, the state would be unable to properly defend itself from foreign attacks.

More broadly, without enforceable property and criminal laws, frequent conflicts and disagreements are likely to occur. Vigilante justice would replace a legitimate justice system, risking ineffective deterrence and biased punishments for perpetrators. In a brutish state of nature, individuals are unlikely to lead prosperous lives or pursue productive projects for fear of having the fruits of their labour stolen without consequence. Hobbes correctly argued that life without political order leads to a society “where every man is enemy to every man” (Hobbes). Rousseau famously said, “man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains” to describe the exploitative and unequal anarchy that exists in a state of nature (Rousseau). Provided this, the state has a samaritan duty to prevent a state of nature, and can only do so by demanding certain trade-offs from citizens. Moreover, government authority is particularly beneficial for the most vulnerable members of society who would otherwise be left at the mercy of anarchy. The poor, people with disabilities, and historically oppressed groups are likely to face unregulated discrimination and structural barriers in a state of nature where every individual must fend for themselves. In contrast, by taxing citizens to fund welfare programs, infrastructure, and public services, the government can provide a safety net and legal protection for individuals who may be disadvantaged by the lottery of birth. Therefore, governments are justified in imposing basic demands to secure the freedom of all individuals, and to prevent exploitation that will likely occur in a state of nature, thereby ensuring equality.

This begs the question: what grants governments unique political authority? Unlike individuals or private companies, the state is uniquely situated to protect us from a state of nature because only it has the means to fix a problem of collective action. As Wellmann puts it, political peril is a “coordination problem” which can only be resolved through state coercion (Wellmann and Simmons). Without forcible taxation or military conscription from the government, it is likely that citizens will free-ride on public goods rather than contribute. To use the example of taxation, self-interested individuals may be reluctant to sacrifice their earnings to contribute to the societal good. Similarly, individuals are often unwilling to risk their lives in war, yet protecting the safety of all citizens in a country requires that some citizens fight on the frontlines. Only governments are able to enforce a cohesive set of laws across a geographic area, unlike individuals or private organizations with conflicting interests. Only governments can reliably oversee an impartial justice system, in contrast to individually motivated and often disproportionate punishments led by vigilantes in a state of nature. Another reason why governments are uniquely equipped to enforce the law is due to their vast political expertise and knowledge of their state; a lawmaker is educated to weigh the pros and cons of a bill in their country, and are likely to be more well- informed of its societal and geopolitical implications than the average individual.

Importantly, our right to basic goods such as security, property and liberty entails a further right to have those goods enforced. Citizens cannot access rights unless there is a state that ensures those rights are granted; rights do not exist in a vacuum or in the abstract. Kant said, “justice is united with the authorization to use coercion against anyone who violates justice” (Kant). According to Kant’s categorical imperative, an individual should only be able to claim a right of their own upon upholding the rights of others. To guarantee that fundamental rights are enforced for all, governments must extract demands from citizens; for example, taxing them to fund public services to provide basic necessities or conscripting citizens into the military to protect the state, thereby upholding the lives of citizens at home. Only through taxation is the government able to guarantee the right to public healthcare and education. Freedom for individuals can only occur under state coercion; only then can citizens feel secure and have their bodily integrity upheld.

An oft-cited counterargument against the authority of governments is the libertarian view that individuals know what is best for themselves and have earned the fruits of their labour, meaning that government intervention is a violation of their autonomy. However, there are two flaws with this argument. First, though individuals may know what is best for themselves, they are ill- equipped to know what is best for society; the government is justified to impose reasonable costs on individuals to protect society as a whole. This is because the state has a duty to protect the moral equality of all citizens above the political whims of individuals. Conversely, individuals ought to obey the law to rescue others from a dire state of anarchy (Wellmann and Simmons). Second, it is unlikely that individuals would have amassed wealth in the first place without government intervention. A businessman likely benefits from roads built by the government, subsidies, intellectual property laws, and most of all, the maintenance of an orderly society. In exchange, it is only appropriate for the government to demand that citizens contribute to the functioning of the state. In a similar critique of the authority of governments, Robert Wolff argues in In Defense of Anarchism that moral autonomy is incompatible with political authority as obeying the state requires that individuals do not follow their own moral compass (Wolff). Yet this is precisely the purpose of political authority; as morality is subjective, an individual’s moral views should not dictate the law, but rather, the majority’s views should determine how society is governed. While in a state of anarchy the most powerful individuals are likely to dictate society regardless of the morality of their views, through demands such as taxation and military conscription that apply equally to most citizens, the government is able to enforce democratic checks and balances that ensure the views of all citizens are represented.

Associative Obligations and Reciprocity

Second, governments are justified in enforcing these demands due to the uniquely normative and reciprocal relationship they have with citizens. Normatively, the moral authority of governments can be justified on a purely associative basis: citizens have an inherent obligation to obey the state they were born into. As Dworkin argued, “Political association, like family or friendship and other forms of association more local and intimate, is itself pregnant of obligation” (Dworkin). Similar to a family unit where children owe duties to their parents by virtue of being born into that family regardless of their consent, citizens acquire obligations to obey political authority by virtue of being born into a state. In Crito, Socrates reasoned that he ought not to flee the state but rather accept his punishment of hemlock because his long residence in Athens meant he had entered an ‘agreement’ with the city’s laws (Plato). Thus, one’s continued birth, education, and residence in a state signals tacit consent to its authority.

Beyond appealing to our intuitions, government authority is justified on a reciprocal basis. Rousseau argued in The Social Contract that citizens agree to a hypothetical pact to transfer certain rights to a collective governing body that serves the common good (Rousseau). Unlike individuals, democratic governments have been elected into power, and thus represent the interests of a majority of the population. In exchange for letting citizens participate in the political process, the state is justified in enforcing laws. More importantly, citizens benefit from public goods that are integral to their wellbeing, from laws that protect citizens against theft to welfare programs that provide a safety net for the poor. The mere presence of state authority ensures that individuals live in an orderly society rather than an anarchy; a functioning society is implausible without taxes or military conscription. Irrespective of whether we have explicitly consented to state authority, our participation in an orderly society and enjoyment of public goods means we have a reciprocal duty to repay the state through taxes and military conscription.

To this, Hume objected that not all individuals have chosen to be a part of the state and receive these benefits as most individuals cannot move out of their country of origin. He raises the analogy of an individual being forcibly carried onto a ship where they are unjustly subject to the captain’s commands (Hume). However, a duty to reciprocate still exists for three reasons. First, the fact that citizens benefit from public services and reside in an orderly society, or at the very least are presented with the option of doing so, entails tacit consent of the state’s authority and thus a duty to obey the law, lest they become a free rider. Second, ignoring duties to oneself, citizens have a samaritan duty to contribute their share in protecting others from a state of nature, and consequently, governments have a proportional duty to impose demands on citizens. Third, the importance of explicit consent is questionable, since we tend to dismiss consent when the act in question is exceedingly immoral or harmful. For example, we prohibit individuals from consenting to sell themselves into slavery or to sell their organs. Given this, it is unclear why the opposite does not equally apply: if individuals fail to explicitly consent to an action that is extremely beneficial or just, should a lack of consent bar that action? To illustrate this using Hume’s analogy, if a ship was sinking and the captain ordered all the passengers to coordinate to patch up the hole, assuming the ship can only be saved if everyone obeys the command, arguably this authority is justified regardless of an individual’s lack of consent to being ordered.

Conclusion

Governments must extract certain sacrifices from citizens to protect their freedom. Though the alternative of anarchy creates the illusion of freedom, individuals cannot access security and liberty without state coercion. Unlike individuals, governments hold a uniquely reciprocal relationship to citizens, granting them a right, and indeed a duty, to tax and conscript citizens to provide public goods and services that individuals cannot provide for themselves.

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Hume, D. (1985). “Of the Original Contract,” in Essays, Moral Political, and Literary ed. E.F. Miller. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics.

Huemer, M. (2013). The Problem of Political Authority: An Examination of the Right to Coerce and the Duty to Obey. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

Hobbes, T, 1588-1679. (1968). Leviathan. Baltimore: Penguin Books,

Kant, I. (1797). The Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Plato & Gallop, D. (1997). Crito. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Raz, Joseph. (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Rousseau, J.-J., & In Frankel, C. (1947). The Social Contract. New York: Hafner Publishing Co.

Wellman, C. H., & Simmons, A. J. (2005). Is there a duty to obey the law? New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wolff, Robert Paul. (1970). In Defense of Anarchism. Harper Collins.

2020年政治奖三等奖

 An analysis of American charitable giving and its implications on government efficacy
美国慈善捐赠及其对政府效能的影响分析

Calvin Xu,加拿大阿普尔比学院
2020年政治奖第三名 |6.5 分钟阅读

Among the hundreds of billions of dollars dedicated by Americans towards philanthropy each year, the state receives a minuscule fraction of this money. The ultimate goals of charities and the state are often aligned: to promote social wellbeing and improve the lives of people. The state often does so through the funding of numerous universal social services, while charities tend to focus on protecting the interests of certain vulnerable groups in society. While the state is in many cases more efficient than private charities, the specific niches charities fill, and the contrasting public perceptions of charities and the state make governments unable to compete with private charities for donations. The implication is therefore not that cannibalization of one over the other would greatly serve the social good, but that their coexistence is necessary to achieve common goals.

An intuitive answer to the reason why philanthropic contributions are mostly directed towards private charities rather than the government is a free-market capitalist idea of competition. This reasoning claims that consumers, in this case donors, would choose to make contributions to the institution that would maximize the impact of their donation. However, the idea that the private sector is always more efficient than the state is misleading. The government can provide many public services in a much more efficient way than the private sector. For instance, in the United States, where the private sector has a significantly higher share in the healthcare industry, total healthcare spending per capita in 2019 was around double that of European countries and Canada where there exists universal healthcare under a single-payer model funded by government spending, despite similar outcomes judging by life expectancy (OECD, 2020). Similarly, the government is generally more efficient in the operation of public services. In the UK, for example, public subsidies towards railways actually increased dramatically following privatization, while rail services that remained state operated cost taxpayers less money (Simms & Reid, 2013). This demonstrates a higher efficiency on the part of the state towards the funding of widely accessible social services. This includes, among others, services such as healthcare, public transportation networks, and a social security net.

These services require massive bureaucracies and significant funding to be operational. The US government has the advantage of a far higher budget than the $300 billion dollars Americans donated to charity each year and is therefore better suited to fund most public services.

Therefore, in many cases, the government is not only the most efficient but also an irreplaceable actor in providing critical social services.

A common argument raised as to why the private sector is more efficient is that there exists an incentive structure to constantly improve efficiency to gain a competitive advantage. A charity that provides educational resources in low income communities, for example, has a direct incentive to prove it can do so more efficiently than other organizations performing similar functions, thereby securing more donations. The public sector, opponents argue, lacks the same incentives which is what allows waste and inefficiency. Not only is this somewhat offset by aforementioned advantages of the public sector, the assertion that there exists little to no incentive to improve efficiency in the public sector is also false. Politicians in democratic systems of governance have a direct incentive to improve efficiency as they hope to be reelected by taxpayers. Similarly, bureaucracies operating within the state have an incentive to be more efficient and improve processes because a negative perception towards it will likely result in cuts in funding towards that bureaucracy. For example, perception of wasteful spending on the part of the department of transportation would likely lead to voters calling for reduced funding, or even partial privatization. Therefore, there exists a similar incentive in the public sector to improve efficiency and the management of taxpayer dollars.

Given that the state is often more efficient in the promotion of social wellbeing through funding public services, the same line of reasoning of competition would therefore suggest that most charitable donations would go towards the state, rather than private charities, which is contradicted by the actual behavior of donors. This occurs due to two main factors. Firstly, the relationship between the state and private charities is for the most part not one of competition. Instead, the state and private charities complement each other in their functionalities, where private charities are able to fill niche roles where the state has failed or is less efficient. Therefore, while the state may be more efficient in broad social services accessible to wide ranges of people, charities often focus on specific vulnerable groups. For instance, while the state may be an effective provider of a social safety net in the form of welfare checks and food stamps for those in poverty, the specific needs of communities that were placed in poverty in the first place by government neglect or past and current instances of institutional racism on the part of the state are ones that may be better, or uniquely, addressed by non-profit organizations that have a deeper understanding of such a community. Social problems seen as “too small” for governments, but nevertheless have an enormous negative impact on the lives and wellbeing of people, can be combatted through philanthropy. This is clearly understood by governments, because there exist government grants and subsidies for non-profit organizations. In fact, a study done by the Global Centre for Public Service Excellence found “no conclusive evidence that one model of ownership is intrinsically more efficient than the others” (Rao, 2015). Rather, the paper suggests that the type of service and contextual factors generally determined the efficacy of the private versus public sector (Rao, 2015). Therefore, the conclusion drawn is not that private charities or government spending should be abolished in favor of the other, but that the coexistence of both complement each other in a way that is best able to serve the social good.

The notion that private charities fill niches governments are unable or unwilling to is further supported by the distribution of charitable giving. In 2018, charitable giving to international affairs as well as environment and animal organizations rose, with giving to environment and animal organizations reaching an all-time high (Giving USA, 2019). This comes amid the current US administration, which has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement and placed lowered emphasis on environmental concerns in favor of economic development (Pompeo, 2019). Additionally, this administration has also been criticized for its handling of international affairs, with global favorability ratings of American foreign policy sliding (Buttigieg & Gordon, 2020). The increase in charitable donations to these areas can be seen as a response to where the government has failed and provides further support for the complementary nature of the government and charities.

Moreover, donors favor private charities because they have a generally better perception than the government and its policies. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, taxation is widely unpopular among the general public. A Gallup poll on the perceptions of Americans towards government taxation policy found that although less individuals today compared to previous decades feel that they pay too much federal income tax, that number is still around half of all Americans and over a third believe that the amount of income tax they paid was unfair (Gallup, n.d.). In fact, since 1956, the percentage of individuals who felt they paid too little federal income tax has never exceeded 4% (Gallup, n.d.). Therefore, due to the ill will towards the existence of what is effectively an obligatory contribution towards the government, and the minuscule amount of people who feel they pay too little in taxes, individuals are unlikely to want to donate to the government.

Secondly, the effects of your donation to private charitable organizations is far more observable and traceable. Donations to the government are put into a wide variety of government programs. Therefore, the donor does not know what they are donating to when they are making a contribution. While an individual may support increased funding to healthcare, or roads, or education, they may not support increased funding to military spending and vice versa. Given that the individual is often unable to control the spending of their donation, it is far more appealing for someone passionate about education to donate to a private charity focused solely on education, or for someone passionate about the military to donate to a private charity focused solely on providing financial assistance to homeless veterans. Private charities cater towards specific goals, which allows donors to have increased choice in the spending of their donation, therefore being much more appealing to donors that are passionate about a specific cause or a specific community. Additionally, donating to governments is inherently political, and governments will often allocate spending and enact policies that a significant portion of the population may disagree to, while charities tend to be uncontroversial and universally appealing.

Thirdly, the idea of the government as a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy is one that is quite pervasive, and many people buy into the narrative that the private sector is more efficient, despite this being inaccurate. Private charities are therefore far more sympathetic, seen as good actors in contrast to the government, even though inefficiencies and corruption exist in equal, or even greater quantities in private charities. This is further exacerbated by advertisement campaigns commonly employed by private charities that portray sympathetic individuals in need and empowering success stories that provoke strong emotions. While politicians also highlight the successes of the government during campaigns for the purposes of reelection, adversaries to the incumbents in power often do the exact opposite, pointing out the failures of the government, creating a less favorable image of the government in general. This means that a significant part of the reason as to why the state cannot compete with private charities for donations lies not in the state’s actual inefficiency compared to private charities, but in the perception of the state in contrast to private charities.

The government provides many critical services that have an enormous impact in improving general social wellbeing among the public, often in a far more efficient way than private institutions. However, there exist needs that the government is unable or unwilling to fulfill, thus creating the demand for private charities aimed at addressing these specific needs. Individuals choose to donate primarily to these private charities because of a negative perception towards the government, whether in regards to taxation, perceived waste of resources, or generally as a sympathetic actor. Additionally, government policies and spending are inevitably controversial, and spread across a broad range of issues concerning the general good. Donors who value choice highly, or who are primarily concerned with addressing specific issues will therefore turn towards charities, who are more focused on an uncontroversial niche. The implications of the apparent disconnect between government efficiency and charitable donations are neither that the inefficient government should be replaced by private sector non-profit organizations, nor that the functions performed by private charities should be cannibalized by the state. Instead, the conclusion that should be drawn is that governments cannot compete with private charities because their relationship should not be one of competition, but rather that they should complement each other in ultimately promoting the wellbeing of a society.

Bibliography

Buttigieg, P., & Gordon, P. H. (2020, July 14). Present at the Destruction of U.S. Power and Influence. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/14/trump-biden-foreign- policy-alliances/

Gallup. (n.d.). Taxes. Gallup.Com. Retrieved July 12, 2020, from https://news.gallup.com/poll/1714/Taxes.aspx

Giving USA. (2019, June 18). Giving USA 2019: Americans gave $427.71 billion to charity in 2018 amid complex year for charitable giving. https://givingusa.org/giving-usa-2019- americans-gave-427-71-billion-to-charity-in-2018-amid-complex-year-for-charitable- giving/

OECD. (2020). Health spending. OECD. http://data.oecd.org/healthres/health-spending.htm Pompeo, M. R. (2019, November 4). On the U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. United

States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-from-the-paris- agreement/

Rao, S. (2015). Is the private sector more efficient? A cautionary tale. Global Centre for Public Service Excellence. https://gsdrc.org/document-library/is-the-private-sector-more- efficient-a-cautionary-tale/

Simms, A., & Reid, S. (2013, April 25). “The private sector is superior”. Time to move on from this old dogma. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/apr/25/private-sector-superiority- mythbuster

2020年政治奖一等奖

American citizens give away more than $300 billion each year in charitable donations. Only a tiny fraction of this (less than 0.001%) is donated to federal, state, and local governments. Politicians claim that they spend taxpayers' money efficiently, to accomplish the most good with the budgets at their disposal. But if this were true wouldn't governments be able to compete more successfully with private charities? What are the implications of your answer?

美国公民每年捐赠超过3000亿美元的慈善捐款。其中只有一小部分(不到0.001%)捐赠给联邦,州和地方政府。政客们声称,他们有效地使用纳税人的钱,以利用他们可支配的预算实现最大的好处。但如果这是真的,政府难道就不能更成功地与私人慈善机构竞争吗?你的回答意味着什么?

Helny Hobbs,纽斯特德伍德学校,英国
2020年政治奖得主|7 分钟阅读

Introduction

Americans are one of the most philanthropic peoples in the world with their voluntary giving exceeding the total GDP of nations such as Israel and Chile. However, donations to federal, state and local governments are astronomically low, despite the aim of government being to advance social good in the same way as the third sector. Government’s inability to successfully compete with non-profits stems, not from lack of efficiency as it would appear prima facie, but from their inability to match the 'warm glow’ provided by private charity and, most of all, philanthropic particularism. The implications of these factors are that America’s welfare system perpetuates the status quo and often does not deliver necessary change. Government and private charity should be provoked to compete on terms of efficiency, to ensure the maximum potential for social good is fulfilled by devising new methods to measure efficiency and informing Americans of their biases. However, in cases where particularism cannot be overcome, it is the duty of government to step in and increase taxation.

A Matter of Efficiency?

When it comes to explaining the gulf between donations to government and private charity, the veracity of the claim that government does not use its money efficiently is inconsequential – instead, it is whether government is perceived as inefficient that may influence how people donate. Since President Carter popularised small-government rhetoric in the seventies, Americans have become notorious for their distrust of government effectiveness (especially at the federal level), with 73% of Americans - both Republicans and Democrats - believing that charities are more cost-effective than government agencies.

However, efficiency is not a significant consideration in philanthropic decisions for most individuals as it is subjugated by human nature. For example, imagine a burning building in which there is a child and $1 million that you have pledged to give to the Malaria Foundation. Would you save the child or the money that could save the lives of many more children? While the latter would be more effective, human nature favours the former demonstrating how humans are motivated by considerations besides efficiency. Singer agrees in his “drowning child” hypothetical. This becomes increasingly evident when looking at the third sector: according to Guide Dogs of America it costs $42,000 to train a guide dog but only $25 to fund 80% effective surgery for sufferers of trachoma in Africa which could restore their sight, however, the former charity still receives donations. Further, even if donors try to be effective, because of the difficulty in evaluating the efficiency of an initiative donors experience an ‘evaluability bias’ (Ord) that sees them prioritise easily measurable factors such as overhead ratio, irrespective of cost-effectiveness. Therefore, even if governments were viewed as on-par with the third sector in terms of efficiency, they would still not be able to compete for funds as there are more powerful factors at play that sway the preference of Americans towards private charity.

The ‘Warm Glow’ of Philanthropy

The first of these factors is the increased emotional reward from donating to charity over governments, or the ‘warm glow’ theory (Andreoni). The dominant motivation behind charitable giving is “the internal satisfaction that individuals derive from the act of giving” (Hernández-Murillo) which economists model as a commodity which individuals shop for in the market of philanthropy, trying to find the best place to get their money’s worth. Governments are significantly worse at providing this emotional reward; they are large so donors feel disconnected from the end result of their money, seeing it as swallowed up into the great administrative machine, unlike private charities which use advertising to link donors to their work such as: “£5 could pay for a goat for two families” (Oxfam) which gives donors more satisfaction as they feel that they are having a tangible impact. Further, the extensive impact of government schemes is a blessing and a curse as a single victim is better at inducing a strong affective response than a large number of victims presented in a statistical form (Slovic). One only must look to the recent George Floyd protests to evidence how powerful the story of one man receiving injustice is compared to statistics about police brutality that have been available for years.

The prioritisation of emotional reward means that philanthropic competition is reduced to an emotionally driven marketing campaign. However, some warn of the dangers of straying away from this approach, replacing emotion with facts and figures and thereby removing our humanity as "privately funded charity is the only charity stemming from individual compassion” (Tocqueville). However, there is a misconception that less emotional approach eradicates human empathy when it can enhance it. Mill argued that those who must concern themself with society are “those few whose actions have an influence that extends that far”; in the global world we live in today, this applies not to the few but to the majority. Empathy must take on a different form, one that accommodates for the vast information available to us about suffering across the world. To ignore this data and continue to base philanthropic decisions upon how emotionally roused we are by specific issues would be to be unempathetic to the rest of the suffering that happens across the world. While we cannot entirely withdraw emotion from charitable decisions as it is a powerful tool that motivates us to do good in the first place, we must have a measured approach, harnessing this empathy while recognising how it informs our biases: as Singer states, philanthropic decisions must be a “combination of heart and head”.

Philanthropic Particularism

The second and most influential factor is ‘philanthropic particularism’ (Salmon) - where donors tend to prefer certain groups and issues. Americans are much more likely to donate to private charity as it gives them the scope to display their personal preference without the interests of the rest of the country having to play a role, as they do when donating to the democratically elected government. In the US especially, with its laissez-faire neo-liberal attitudes, the impoverished are seen as ‘undeserving’ (a trope fuelled by racial divisions) which sees many Americans prefer to donate to religious organisations (32% of all donations) over redistributive organisations such as governments. The significance of particularism becomes more evident when looking to countries with highly homogenous populations like Scandinavian countries where people derive adequate satisfaction from government ‘charity’ as they relate to the recipients. Therefore, a much larger proportion of Scandinavians are prepared to support growth of the welfare state, unlike America where demographic divisions see more conflicts of interest within the electorate who are averse to an opposing group benefitting at their expense. While one may avoid their donation being used for a cause they are adverse to by specifying what the money should go towards, this is easier to do in private charity where there is more transparency about exactly how the money can be used, unlike governments where information about schemes being undertaken is not readily available.

This partisanship is reinforced by the belief that in America, civic duties are fulfilled through paying tax and that if government needed more money they would raise taxes - a falsehood, as the US government keeps taxes low to keep support amongst the electorate even though they have scope to do good with additional funds. Americans defend their right to income post-taxation, arguing for the liberty to spend it how they wish. However, the inadequate taxes enforced leave government with little capacity to implement social welfare meaning the responsibility falls upon private charities to fill the gaping holes in the social safety net, and thus the responsibility for choosing which issues need attention on donors.

Therefore, particularism has drastic ramifications as it dictates the shape of the welfare system and causes philanthropy to become a plutocracy with billionaires such as Bezos having the power to decide who deserves aid in America. Konkzal highlights that this system “channels aid towards the interests and needs of those who already hold large amounts of power” exemplified in the extortionate amount of charitable giving that goes into political advocacy and elite colleges. Where drastic and transformative change is needed that may be at the expense of those in the upper echelons of society, change will be opposed and the issue disregarded (Reich). Carter would criticize this, arguing that private charity is “democracy in action” with people ‘voting’ with their money, protecting non-mainstream ideas. However, wealth inequality means that not every ‘voter’ is equal, a necessary qualification for democracy.

The Case for Effective Altruism

While competition isn’t to do with effectiveness but emotional reward and particularism, governments and private charity should be competing in the market on the sole term of efficiency, with donors taking a utilitarian approach. The recent, rapidly accelerating effective altruism movement - headed by Peter Singer - argues for a new approach to welfare motivated by efficiency alone, making philanthropy “more about the beneficiaries of our money than our own need for warm and fuzzy feelings” (Fraser). The effectiveness of different charitable organisations can vary by as much as 2000%, suggesting huge scope for improving the effectiveness of welfare by redistributing resources. Once it becomes a competition of effectiveness, market forces will ensure that both charity and governments focus on improving their effectiveness instead of on ways to harness emotion and unimportant factors in advertising (such as reducing their overhead costs).

The easier it becomes to donate effectively, the more Americans will. To eliminate the ‘evaluability bias’ and distrust in government effectiveness, government and private charity must adopt comparable scales of effectiveness (such as the STEPS framework proposed by Eder) and make this information accessible and widely available. This will allow potential donors to realise the areas where government is more suitable to deal with an issue than charity. For example, non-profits such as ‘Ascension’ are trying to remedy issues with healthcare however their work often deals with the symptoms of the issue instead of the root of the problem in the way that government could if they reform the entire structure. This example illustrates how even though political action is often more unpredictable in yielding results, the “benefits of successful initiative are potentially much higher” in many cases (Baron), which will be made evident through these comparable statistics so that individuals have the capacity evaluate the most effective use of their money.

However, donating efficiently involves not just donating to the organisation that is best suited to deal with a chosen issue, but donating towards issues that are most in need. While quantifying effectiveness of institutions that are addressing similar issues is undemanding, it is difficult to compare dissimilar issues - for example, is curing a hundred children of blindness better than saving the life of one child? - so it is unrealistic to deploy statistics in this situation. Instead we must be mildly optimistic that philanthropic individuals have a measure of objective desire to do good with their money, so if informed of biases that are preventing them from doing so, will try to overcome them. Indeed, Americans will receive a heightened ‘warm glow’ knowing that they are donating more effectively, which will be a strong motivator. However, this more subjective approach based upon trusting individuals will not eradicate philanthropic particularism, so in the numerous cases where particularism sees the most important issues being disregarded, it is the duty of governments to protect the needy amongst their electorate and step in, acquiring additional funds through state or federal tax.

Conclusion

By changing the perception of government to an institution bent upon aiding those in need and deserving to be considered by donors in the same way as non-profits, doors will be opened to new approaches to social issues that utilise the power of government. Competition based solely on efficiency should be stimulated, by making it easier to evaluate this factor and by cultivating a culture of effective altruism. However, as ingrained biases mean that Americans cannot shoulder the responsibility of identifying the most pressing social issues, government must begin to step in and obtain the necessary funds through taxation to aid those disregarded by the Americans able to afford charitable giving.

Bibliography

Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote. Why Doesn’t The US Have A European-Style Welfare State? Harvard Institute of Economic Research, November 2001.

Andreoni, James. Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving. The Economic Journal, vol. 100, no. 401, 1990, pp. 464–477. JSTOR, <www.jstor.org/stable/2234133>

Bapanapalli, Satish. Why Forced ‘Charity’ Is Bad Economics. Foundation for Economic Education, 13 May 2020. < https://fee.org/articles/why-forced-charity-is-bad-economics/>

Baron and Szymanska. Heuristics and Biases in Charity. December 2010.

CAF. Giving Thought Podcast: Philanthropy and the Welfare State. 18 November 2018. <https://www.cafonline.org/about- us/blog-home/giving-thought/podcasts-from-giving-thought/philanthropy-and-the-welfare-state>

Caviola, Everett, Faulmüller, Kahane and Savulescu. The evaluability bias in charitable giving: Saving administration costs or saving lives? Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 9, No. 4, July 2014, pp. 303–315 <﷟ttp://journal.sjdm.org/14/14402a/jdm14402a.pdf>

Eder, Paul. How Do You Measure the Effectiveness of Government? Government Executive, 15 July 2015. <https://www.govexec.com/management/2015/07/how-do-americans-measure-effectiveness-government/117814/>

Fraser, Giles. It’s called effective altruism – but is it really the best way to do good? The Guardian, 23 November 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/money/belief/2017/nov/23/its-called-effective-altruism-but-is-it-really-the-best-way-to-do- good>

Gneezy, A, Gneezy, U and Keenan, E.A. Avoiding overhead aversion in charity. Science, October 2014. <https://science.sciencemag.org/content/346/6209/632>

Govindarajan and Ramamurti. How One Nonprofit Is Expanding Health Care for the Uninsured. Harvard Business Review, 11 October 2018. <https://hbr.org/2018/10/how-one-nonprofit-is-expanding-health-care-for-the-uninsured>

Hernández-Murillo and Roisman. The Economics of Charitable Giving: What Gives? Federal reserve Bank of St Louis, October 2005.

Husock, Howard. Why Government Can't Replace Charity. Forbes. 10 April 2014. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardhusock/2014/04/10/lesson-for-april-15-why-government-cant-replace- charity/#1334b36279e2>

Independent Sector. How Americans trust and value the charitable sector. Independent Sector, 2016. <https://independentsector.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/United-for-Charity-v5.pdf>

Konczal, Mike. The Conservative Myth of a Social Safety Net Built on Charity. The Atlantic, 24 March 2014. <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/03/the-conservative-myth-of-a-social-safety-net-built-on- charity/284552/>

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2019年哲学奖得主

Aristotelian virtue ethics achieved something of a resurgence in the twentieth century. Was this progress or retrogression?亚里士多德的美德伦理在二十世纪取得了某种复兴。这是进步还是倒退?

徐英勋,查德威克国际学校,韩国

2019年哲学奖得主|8 分钟阅读

Progress and Retrogression in Philosophy

In the physical world, time measures progress and retrogression as steps along the linear timeline based on the empirical evidentiary facts. These facts are verified or falsified as time passes, which inextricably links time and progress. For example, replacing the heliocentrism with geocentrism is retrogressive because the astronomical evidence accumulated through time discredits the latter. However, progress in philosophy is incompatible with such a view because philosophy belongs to the abstract world, where the lack of empirical factual basis obfuscates the link between time and progress. Hence, a step backward in time does not necessarily equate to retrogression: we cannot say that the Aristotelian concept of justice is retrogressive compared to the Rawlsian concept purely based on the concept of time.

To answer the question, we need to construct a method that measures progress in philosophy. I seek to achieve this by asserting that, in philosophy, a certain degree of falsification is achievable. Utilizing philosophical inquiry and thought experiments, we can rationally assess the logical validity of theories and assign “true” and “false” status to philosophical thoughts. With this in mind, I propose to employ the fourth process of the Popperian model of progress - “t2 has passed tests which t1 failed to pass”[1] - divided into the following two conditions:

Progress occurs:
1. When the new theory provides a logical response to the deficiencies of existing thoughts.
2. When the new theory can be rationally justified from criticisms.

The first condition is crucial because the new theory must be a development from the previous idea to be considered as progress, where development is defined as rectifying the existing deficiencies. If not, the new theory fails the tests that existing theories had failed, which condemns it to the same false status as the existing theories. The second condition indicates that the new theory cannot be unjustifiably false, since no philosophers, seekers of the truth, would consciously advocate for a false theory. Holding false position necessitates irrational dogmatism, which deprives philosophy of truth and reason, of its goal and foundation.

Utilizing these two conditions, I contend that Aristotelian virtue ethics was progress from Kantian ethics and utilitarianism.

First Condition: Overcoming Social and Moral Schizophrenia

Social Schizophrenia

The sense of moral obligation thoroughly pervades within Kantian ethics and utilitarianism. Kant writes that only “an action done from duty has moral worth”[2]; likewise, Bentham states that pain and pleasure “point out what we ought to do.”[3] When used as moral terms, “ought” and “duty” adopt the special connotations of being obliged, bound, or required, which are concepts that necessitate a presence of law.[4] This insertion of law into ethics has its genealogical genesis in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, from its notions of the divine law and God (the law-giver). Although the Enlightenment rejected the existence of this divine law-giver, Enlightenment duty-based theories have preserved the Judaeo-Christian concepts of law-based obligation. In other words, they have clung onto the remnants of religious tradition despite the Nietzschean concept of the “Death of God.” Since the Enlightenment eliminated the notion of God, the core pillar of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, it becomes illogical for Enlightenment theories to maintain other aspects of the belief that it subverted. As Anscombe described, “it is as if the notion ‘criminal’ were to remain when criminal law and criminal courts had been abolished.”[5] Such phenomenon depicts my notion of “social schizophrenia,” where the societal disharmony arises from the simultaneous acceptance and rejection of Judaeo-Christian tradition.

To circumvent social schizophrenia, three non-divine alternatives to divine law have been proposed as the moral norm: society, contract, and human virtue.[6] However, if society were the moral standard, an individual is subjected to the circumstantial moral luck concerning whether the rules of the society are good or evil (e.g., 2019 Geneva vs. 1939 Munich). On the other hand, contracts cannot be the standard because people are ignorant of their being under a moral contractual obligation, when, unlike law, it is impossible to be under a contract without being aware. Thus, given the shortcomings of other alternatives, human virtue is the ideal moral norm. However, this outlook on human virtue replaces the Judaeo-Christian concept of “law-based obligation” with the Aristotelian “good man,” who is the rational “standard” of a virtuous and ethical life.[7] Adopting human virtue as the moral norm entails the elimination of “moral obligation” and the rejection duty-based theories in favor of Aristotelian virtue ethics.

In short, there are two approaches to overcome social schizophrenia:
1. Maintain duty-based theories but re-establish God as the divine law-giver (divine law as the norm)
2. Replace duty-based theories with Aristotelian virtue ethics (virtue as the norm)

The first choice reverts the secular philosophical progress since the Enlightenment, and, consequently, normative ethics retrogresses to infallible religious dogma, in which stagnation is the only possibility. Contrarily, the second option is more compatible with the progress of Enlightenment secularism in its overcoming of social schizophrenia.

Moral Schizophrenia

Kantian ethics and utilitarianism establish reason as the basis of moral duties and obligations. However, as evident in Kant’s rejection of emotions as a moral motivation or Bentham’s exclusion of motives from the list of variables for the felicific calculus, these theories eliminate personal motives - “values of personal and interpersonal relations and activities” - from ethical decisions.[8] We can deduce from this that there are moral circumstances where reason and motives clash in a state of disharmony. Michael Stocker calls such phenomenon “moral schizophrenia,” which he describes as “not to be moved by what one values” and vice versa.[9] Like social schizophrenia, moral schizophrenia raises detrimental implications to Kantian ethics and utilitarianism.

Let us consider the Trolly Problem to illustrate moral schizophrenia, ceteris paribus. A trolley is headed towards one’s child, who is on the main track. The moral agent can pull the lever to divert the trolley to the sidetrack, which contains three thieves.

Based purely on personal motives, the agent would resolutely pull the lever because the paternal love for one’s own child surpasses all the other relationships. However, a utilitarian agent, whose reason values mathematical utility, cannot sacrifice three lives for one, since utilitarianism regards every person as no more or less than a single human being. Similarly, a Kantian, whose reason values the categorical imperative (particularly the Second Formulation in this case) as the duty, cannot deliberately condemn the three people as means to the child’s end. For both cases, the agent experiences moral schizophrenia due to the dichotomy between the personal motive and reason.

As shown above, since moral actions lead to discontent in lieu of fulfillment, people are unable to attain the good life (eudaimonia) when reason and motive are in disharmony. Conversely, to actualize eudaimonia, one needs to live in accordance with virtue, which harmonizes reason and motive. I believe the reason is that Aristotle includes emotion within virtue ethics along with reason, since motives such as love and friendship are emotion-based, not reason-based. Aristotle holds that it is the characteristic of virtue to allow emotions “at the right times” and “in the right fashion.”[10] Here, Aristotle is not asserting emotions over reason, since the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean keeps emotions within the reins of reason. Instead, he is saying that one must possess a harmony of motive (emotion) and reason, as the purpose of virtue is to attain eudaimonia, not to fulfill a duty. To return to the Trolley Problem, a virtuous person would pull the lever based on the virtue of love as the harmony of the motive of parental love and the reasoning that a parent has a duty towards the child. Hence, unlike Kantian ethics and utilitarianism, Aristotelian virtue ethics succeeds in overcoming moral schizophrenia.

Second Condition: Defense of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

Self-Centeredness

Critics assert that self-centered ethical theories are retrogressive, as they claim that ethical theories progressed during the Enlightenment by placing the interests of others at the center. Prima facie, Aristotelian virtue ethics is self-centered: the purpose of a virtuous life is to gain eudaimonia for oneself.

Philippa Foot defends virtue as being “beneficial either to others, or to its possessor as well as to others.” Through the virtue of charity, the principal recipients of happiness are others.[11] Furthermore, the virtue of justice is “giving people what they deserve” based on merit, without particular regard to oneself.[12] However, this raises a deeper criticism that a virtuous agent generally disregards the virtuous character of others. From an act of virtue, the virtuous agent receives the most valuable thing (virtuous character for eudaimonia), while others receive momentary happiness. This “virtuous-character-for-self-and-happiness-for-others” mentality treats others and their happiness as a secondary means for the primary achievement of eudaimonia.

Intriguingly, David Solomon employs tu quoque (partner-in-crime) approach to reveal that this kind of self-centeredness is not unique to virtue ethics. In Kantian ethics, “it is self-contradictory to demand that I do (make it my duty to do) what only the other person himself can do.”[13] We can deduce from the previous statement that Kantian ethics is self-centered, considering that there is no duty requiring one to help others to act based on duty and achieve moral status. More subtly, this asymmetry between self and others is also observable in utilitarianism, a principle where an agent endeavors to make others benevolent as well. The benevolence of others is “only of instrumental concern” (to increase utility), while benevolence of self is more than such: benevolence of self is the perspective that gives the “moral significance” to the benevolence of others, but cannot “attain moral significance from this perspective because it is the perspective,” which grants oneself the exclusive “special status.”[14] Since self-centeredness is fundamentally shared amongst prevalent ethical theories, we, as human beings, must ask whether the complete detachment of self, or absolute self-less-ness, is even plausible.

Explicit Action-Guidance

The purpose of normative ethics is “to discover what the right action is.”[15] However, people criticize that Aristotelian virtue ethics lacks explicit action-guidance for all moral circumstances, that it is unable to clearly identify right and wrong, contrary to Kantian ethics and utilitarianism. This raises the fundamental issue of whether Aristotelian virtue ethics is a theory of normative ethics.

Firstly, I affirm that virtue ethics can provide specific action-guidelines. The Aristotelian mean doctrine defines vice (excess and deficiency) and virtue (mean of two vices) as “prohibition” and “positive instruction” that manifest clear specifications of “right action.”[16] These definitions enable us the capability of identifying right and wrong, which we can apply in moral circumstances as the guiding principles.

For those declaring virtue ethics as retrogression due to its lack of explicitness, they have to ponder whether explicit guidance for all moral possibilities is genuinely feasible. Sarah Broadie maintains that other theories fail to emulate the vast applicability of virtue ethics because only virtue ethics recognizes the impossibility of providing explicit action-guidance for every moral scenario “in itself,” considering that what is right “always depends on the particulars.”[17] Although Kantian ethics and utilitarianism claim to provide explicit moral guidance for all possibilities based on absolute principles (categorical imperative and utility), countless cases
expose their inadequacy, e.g., lying to a Nazi officer about a Jew hiding in the basement (Kantian ethics) or demagogically framing Jews for the sake of nation’s overall peace and stability (utilitarianism). However, since each moral circumstance is unique, the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean is not a rigid mathematical mean between two vices but instead is a flexible concept with the capacity to tailor to particular circumstances based on the agent’s practical and intellectual reasoning. However, unlike Nietzschean ubermensch, the standard of judgment is not the arbitrary individual will, but is rather the established definitions of virtues and vices. All things considered, the lack of explicit action-guidance for all possibilities, in reality, is a strength that enables a vast application of Aristotelian virtue ethics.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Aristotelian virtue ethics successfully fulfills the two established conditions of philosophical progress. Although virtue ethics belonged to an era two thousand years back in time, its resurgence in the twentieth century was a step forward in normative ethics.

Footnotes

1 Alex Deagon, “Popper or Kuhn: Truth and the Progress of Science” (paper, Perspectives on Progress Conference, University of Queensland, Brisbane, 27-29 Nov. 2013, Academia),. 3,
www.academia.edu/5254144/Popper_or_Kuhn_Truth_and_the_Progress_of_Science.

2 Immauel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. Allen W. Wood (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), 15.

3 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2000), 14.

4 Gertrude Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy." Philosophy 33, no. 124 (1958): 5.
www.jstor.org/stable/3749051.
5 Ibid., 12.
6 Ibid., 13-15.
7 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. trans. F. H. Peters (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1893), 74.

8 Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories." The Journal of Philosophy 73, no. 14 (1976): 455. doi:10.2307/2025782.

9 Ibid., 454.

10 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 46.
11 John Hacker-Wright. Pilippa Foot’s Moral Thought (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013), 77
12 Michael Sandel, Justice: What’s The Right Thing To Do? (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 187.
13 Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), 44.

14 Yong Huang, Why Be Moral?: Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers (New York: SUNY Press, 2014), 84
15 Roger Crisp, “What is Virtue Ethics?” Practical Ethics Bite. University of Oxford, 22 Sep. 2014, podcasts.ox.ac.uk/what-virtue-ethics.
16 Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtue theory and Abortion.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 20, no. 3 (1991): 227.
17 Sarah Broadie, Ethics With Aristotle (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 102.

Author’s Note

Given the broadness of the topic and the word limit, I have focused on the evaluation of the resurgence of Aristotelian virtue ethics as progress or retrogression exclusively within the field of normative ethics, despite the resurgence of virtue (aretaic turn) within other philosophical fields, such as epistemology, political philosophy, and legal theory. Furthermore, this essay narrows the field of normative ethics in the twentieth century to its two most dominant and prevalent ethical theories: utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. The answer to the question requires the comparison of Aristotelian virtue ethics with the existing ethical theories in the twentieth century. If too many theories are taken into consideration, this paper would not be able to delve into thorough depth, considering the word restriction. Therefore, comparing Aristotelian virtue ethics to utilitarianism and Kantian ethics as the representation of the twentieth century normative ethics prior the resurgence of virtue ethics would be the most coherent and efficient method for the evaluation of virtue ethics as progress or retrogression.

Bibliography

Anscombe, Gertrude. "Modern Moral Philosophy." Philosophy 33, no. 124 (1958): 1-19.
www.jstor.org/stable/3749051.

Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Translated by F. H. Peters. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1893.

Bentham, Jeremy. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2000.

Broadie, Sarah. Ethics With Aristotle. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Crisp, Roger. “What is Virtue Ethics?” Practical Ethics Bites. University of Oxford, 22 Sep. 2014.
podcasts.ox.ac.uk/what-virtue-ethics.

Deagon, Alex. “Popper or Kuhn: Truth and the Progress of Science.” Paper presented at Perspectives on Progress
Conference, University of Queensland, Brisbane, 27-29 Nov. 2013, Academia,
www.academia.edu/5254144/Popper_or_Kuhn_Truth_and_the_Progress_of_Science.

Hacker-Wright, John. Philippa Foot’s Moral Thought. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013.

Huang, Yong. Why Be Moral?: Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers. New York: SUNY Press, 2014.

Hursthouse, Rosalind. “Virtue theory and Abortion.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 20, no. 3 (1991): 223-246

Kant, Immanuel. The Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited by Mary J. Gregor. New

York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964.

Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited and translated by Allen W. Wood. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002.

Sandel, Michael. Justice: What’s The Right Thing To Do? New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009.

Stocker, Michael. "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories." The Journal of Philosophy 73, no. 14 (1976): 453-66. doi:10.2307/2025782.

2020年哲学奖三等奖

Is Intuition to Philosophy as Observation is to Science?

直觉之于哲学,就像观察之于科学吗?

Ali Haider,英国沃灵顿县文法学校
2020年哲学奖第三名 |7 分钟阅读

Urging the question is a reasonable enough suggestion: rather as empirical observation in science provides the basis for the evaluation of hypotheses concerning the workings of the physical universe, intuition would similarly seem to operate as a sounding board for the evaluation of arguments and theories (normative, of mind, knowledge, art, inter alia) in philosophy. But in order to better assess whether both entities occupy the same functional roles in their respective disciplines beyond this prima facie symmetry, it is necessary to submit either to a sort of truth-conditional analysis of its uses.

‘Observation’ in this discussion refers to the empirical data-gathering procedures – fieldwork, experiment, simulation, etc. – which, aided by the use of sophisticated technical instruments, form the basis of conventional scientific practice. A suitable definition of ‘intuition’, which in the literature has been variously interpreted as a belief, a disposition to believe, and even a wholly sui generis mental state, is more difficult.[1] However, as a working definition that best establishes a comparable functional role to ‘observation’ in science, an intuition may be described as a mental state approaching ‘surmise’, a kind of pre-theoretical impression about a state of affairs, often though not always with isolable propositional content, and of variable conviction and sophistication.

This discussion will focus on some of the more pressing and, in the author’s estimation, interesting threats to the intuition-observation symmetry, with particular emphasis on the incommensurability of data and the nature of falsification and academic consensus.

Resisting falsification in philosophy

One possible asymmetry between intuition and empirical observation is that the former is functionally impotent in respect of falsifying erroneous theories, unlike empirical data.

Essential to the scientific method is the notion that observation provides the fundamental basis for the evaluation of hypotheses. Specific, falsifiable hypotheses are subjected by a community of trained peers to several rounds of experimental scrutiny. The presence of any data directly contrary to the closely defined expectations of a hypothesis will begin to provide grounds for disconfirmation. Sufficient replication of disconfirmatory results will entirely annihilate its chances of widespread acceptance within a scientific community. As such, empirical observation may be imputed to bear the functional role of falsifying erroneous scientific theories.[2]

In philosophy, however, while one’s intuitions about a matter are sometimes treated as providing a sort of prima facie justification for believing a proposition, they might similarly contravene a particular argument’s conclusions, but with no necessary consequences for the argument’s veracity.

Consider William Macaskill’s simple hypothetical concerning whether an agent should save a multi-million-pound Picasso or a child from a burning building.[3] On a utilitarian framework, the likelier prescription, ceteris paribus, would probably be to save the painting, for the money acquired from its sale could be reliably used to purchase several anti-malaria bed nets for vulnerable African children, and unambiguously save many more lives.[4] Nevertheless, for various intuitive reasons, most agents would probably be more inclined to rescue the child.

However, despite the inconsistency between the utilitarian conclusion and quite plausibly an overwhelmingly popular contrary intuition, such an incompatibility alone does not necessarily disconfirm the utilitarian verdict, or the utility calculus at large, as with incongruous evidence in science. One can, in moves resembling Strawson’s distinction concerning ‘descriptive and revisionary metaphysics’, choose to defend one’s intuitions, or follow a chain of reasoning to its ultimate conclusions and revise them.[5]

Indeed, it would be no sin for the philosopher not to rule in accordance with strong intuitions, insofar as her conclusions were independently justified. If, as Peter Singer observes, one’s own interests really are no more important than others’, and it would be diminishing greater suffering to procure those anti- malaria bed nets, then perhaps the utilitarian verdict here is correct after all. As per Singer’s ‘escalator of reason’ metaphor, the autonomy of the human reasoning faculty ensures that, over our species’ evolutionary trajectory, the indiscriminate exercise of reason in worldly affairs is liable, eventually, to lead one towards certain difficult conclusions such as this.[6] It seems possible for one to be ‘rationally persuaded’ in this way of the truth of a nonetheless counterintuitive proposition.

But it is also possible that a certain falsificatory impotence is to be expected in ethics, where resisting intuitional pulls is often justified under the guise of systematising one’s judgements.

(Similar intuitional incongruity is also easily demonstrated in, for instance, the philosophy of mind: credence in physicalist and functionalist theories is threatened by strong intuitions about irreducible qualia, perhaps attributable to a species-wide “common-sense dualism”.[7] Yet such intuitional incongruity is again not understood to falsify these theories which, indeed, are popular philosophical positions.)[8] However, conceding a falsificatory impotence to intuition in even one major philosophical domain like ethics is sufficient to substantially disturb the intuition-observation symmetry.

Of course, if no other intuitions were involved here, this would also suggest that intuitional influences can be resisted altogether in evaluating philosophical theories. But this is not clear; indeed, it might be impossible to accept an argument’s conclusions without some intuitional motivation. Favouring the utilitarian or functionalist options above might appeal to certain, more fundamental intuitions concerning ethical consistency or logical laws, or even be reducible to broader intuitions resembling Kant’s transcendental categories, conditioning one’s experience. Indeed, if every philosophical judgement were intuitionally motivated, the possibility of intuitional falsification would itself be unfalsifiable – one’s intuitions might just happen to accord with the ‘correct’ position every time.

But in assessing intuitions, one would ultimately seem to be confronted with two possibilities:

  • Either such fundamental, ‘categorical’ intuitions are independently verifiable – i.e., something like the law of non-contradiction may be construed as true independently of one’s experience of the world through it. On this view, siding with categorical intuitions in a philosophical dilemma may be regarded as being non-intuitionally, ‘rationally persuaded’ of a proposition. This means that, rather than a battle between competing intuitions, a real incongruity between a philosophical proposition and the remaining genuine intuition in the dilemma is preserved. Yet because this incongruity cannot alone falsify the theory, intuitions retain their falsificatory impotence.

  • Or, if every philosophical judgement appeals to some intuition, including ineluctable perceptual categories, no intuition can be shown to be more ‘legitimate’ than another. One cannot demonstrate the validity of the law of non-contradiction because one cannot escape the categorical intuition of non-contradiction. Because of such sceptical concern, one is no more justified in siding with a category-based intuition than any other intuition. Hence, no intuition can be considered legitimate enough to establish from its relation to a theory an incongruity that may give rise to the theory’s falsification, and once again, intuitions retain their falsificatory impotence.

Thus, either because intuitional incongruity may be entirely repudiated or because it is impossible to establish genuine intuitional incongruity, philosophical propositions would not seem to be intuitionally falsifiable. Naturally, moreover, if one cannot distinguish the intuitional circumstances under which a philosophical theory would be false, then one cannot establish conditions for intuitional verification or Popperian ‘corroboration’ of philosophical theories, either.[9]

Resisting falsification in science

But there is another variable that would threaten intuition’s apparently exclusive falsificatory impotence. As Thomas Kuhn observed, in science, observational data can be ‘theory-laden’.[10] In particular, there is a permanent possibility that an observer brings to bear various theoretical presuppositions that filter their perception and conceptualisation of empirical data.

Because these background assumptions are never themselves subject to experimental scrutiny, two scientists belonging to radically different paradigms can interpret the same phenomena as vindicatory of different hypotheses. Thus, “when Aristotle and Galileo looked at swinging stones, the first saw constrained fall, the second a pendulum”.[11] These experiments may be reproduced indefinitely, and yet, because they are unable to distinguish between the conceptual underpinnings of either hypothesis, the empirical data appear consistent with both and unable to falsify either.[12] It would hence seem that, just as intuitions cannot falsify erroneous philosophical theories, the theory-ladenness of observational data constrains their ability to falsify erroneous scientific hypotheses, too.

However, differences in the theoretical presuppositions of competing hypotheses have not always been significant enough to adversely affect predictive power, indicating that their sensitivity to the truth is not significantly compromised by interstitial conceptual details. Famously, Priestley and Lavoisier obtained the same quantitative results in key experiments on combustion, although one was an adherent of the theory of phlogiston, and the other of oxygen.[13]

Additionally, an observer’s theoretical presuppositions can be greatly rectified by subsequent generations when previously overlooked implications of their hypotheses come to conflict with established data. As Popper remarks, competing hypotheses undergo a process resembling natural selection, whereby one is provisionally adopted if it constitutes an improvement over an existing paradigm in respect of explanatory power, and holds promise in respect of predictive power.[14] Crucially, its integration into a field’s multi-paradigm matrix requires the attempted falsification of its most radical predictions, deduced as ‘propositions’ from the initial hypothesis.[15] This hypervigilant screening of hypotheses serves to sustain a longer-term falsificatory potency in science. One might then still reasonably conclude that intuition in philosophy is possessed of a falsificatory impotence not rivalled even by theory-laden observation in science.

One minor concession that might be made in intuition’s favour is that intuitional judgements still exert some influence over an argument’s palatability. The counterintuitive quality of the utilitarian verdict in Macaskill’s dilemma, though not binding one to any conclusion about the argument, might place an added epistemological burden on one who ignores the pull of her intuitions to justify this opposite judgement. This may also explain why philosophers from Grice to Parfit are often compelled to provide ‘error theories’ that ‘explain away’ intuitional incongruity.[16] However, this is still far from occupying the role of outright falsification that empirical observation plays in science.

Intuitional variation

Another curious aspect of the intuitional character is that it is subject to two kinds of variation not available to its putative empirical counterpart. First, and less consequentially, there is some variation in the importance that is often granted to philosophical intuitions. With respect to fringe ethical scenarios, philosophers – including the aforementioned Singer and Macaskill – sometimes recommend that one should not always rely so closely on one’s intuitions, without the risk of an almighty backlash from their peers, such as one might expect were one to encounter a scientist exhorting others not to consider empirical data.

Secondly, it is an open question whether intuitions have any objective basis, but even supposing they do, philosophy appears to lack a common evaluative framework with which members of the profession might independently reach the same, ‘legitimate’ intuitive judgements. No amount of philosophical analysis seems fit to isolate ‘correct’ intuitions, much less without eroding the common-sense understanding of intuitions as pre-theoretical impressions.

One consequence of the lack of such a framework is that intuitions are in practice subject to a degree of irresolvable individual variation. Thus, two new asymmetries in the functional roles of intuition and observation emerge: first, critical internal disagreement between ‘philosophical data’ is made possible, whereas in science, empirical data are in principle and increasingly in practice assimilable under common theoretical frameworks (although present difficulties in, e.g. reconciling the Standard Model with general relativity may disturb this trend). But inconsistent datasets of this sort also prevent ‘results’ from being reproducible, creating a diffidence towards scholarly consensus in philosophy. By contrast, although Kuhnian paradigm shifts can disturb the solidity of scientific consensus, the truth-sensitivity of scientific practice, evident in the ‘epistemic pruning’ of empirical falsification, contributes to a kind of long-term consensus hitherto unseen in philosophy.[17]

Conclusion

It is difficult to glean the precise influence of intuition over all philosophical inquiry. The philosopher finds herself in the unusual position of being swayed by intuitional data, even conjuring error theories to account for them, in a discipline in which confirmatory intuitional data are not even an explicit sine qua non of theoretical legitimacy.

However, intuitional judgements would at least seem to vary significantly enough in nature and application as to occupy a different functional role from observation. This is epitomised in the relevant dissimilarities of being incommensurable, indisposed to scholarly consensus, and unable to falsify erroneous theories.

Author's Note:

Because it is not possible to demonstrate exhaustively over the course of an essay of this sort whether falsification through intuitional judgement is really impossible in all areas of philosophy, the author has elected instead (with relevant qualifications to his argument) to survey moral philosophy and, briefly, philosophy of mind, to provide an indication of the scope of such a criticism.

Footnotes:

1 Pust, Joel, "Intuition", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Ed.), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/intuition/)

2 More contentious is the claim that empirical data serves to ‘verify’ hypotheses it is consistent with, as Popper noted. Because of the inductive nature of scientific practice, one can at most assert that theory-data consistency may serve to ‘corroborate’ a theory, resulting in its provisional adoption and possible retention after repeated attempts at falsification – and even then, only as a ‘working model’ of the phenomenon in question, and not holy writ.

3 William Macaskill, Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism Can Help You Make a Difference (Guardian Faber, 2016)

4 Let it be assumed that the funds obtained from the auctioning of the painting could be counted upon to save more lives, with no extraneous factors tipping the utility calculus in the other direction (one might, for instance, donate to a GiveWell-approved charity such as the Against Malaria Foundation).

5 Peter Frederick Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (Routledge, 1964)

6 Peter Singer, The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress (Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 135-137

7 Paul Bloom, Descartes’ Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human (Penguin, 2011), pp.191-192

8 Bourget, D., Chalmers, D.J., ‘What do philosophers believe?’, Philosophical Studies Vol. 170, pp. 465–500 (2014) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7

9 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge, 2002, 2nd ed.), pp. 248-252

10 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 2012, 4th ed.), pp. 111-113

11 Ibid. pp. 121-122

12 Ibid. pp. 112-115

13 Conant, J.B., (ed.) “The Overthrow of the Phlogiston Theory: The Chemical Revolution of 1775–1789,” in J.B. Conant and L.K. Nash (eds.), Harvard Studies in Experimental Science, vol. I, (Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 74–80

14 Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp. 90-92

15 Ibid.

16 Climenhaga, Nevin, ‘Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy’, Mind, Vol. 127, Issue 505, January 2018, pp. 69–104, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw032

17 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 50-52

Bibliography

Bloom, P., Descartes’ Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human (Penguin, 2011)

Bourget, D., Chalmers, D.J., ‘What do philosophers believe?’, Philosophical Studies Vol. 170, pp. 465–500 (2014) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7

Climenhaga, Nevin, ‘Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy’, Mind, Vol. 127, Issue 505, January 2018, pp. 69–104, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw032

Conant, J.B., (ed.) “The Overthrow of the Phlogiston Theory: The Chemical Revolution of 1775– 1789,” in J.B. Conant and L.K. Nash (eds.), Harvard Studies in Experimental Science, vol. 1 (Harvard University Press, 1957)

Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 2012)

Macaskill, W., Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism Can Help You Make a Difference (Guardian Faber, 2016)

Popper, K., The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge, 2002)

Pust, Joel, "Intuition", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Ed.), Edward N.Zalta (ed.), (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/intuition/)

Singer, P., The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress (Princeton University Press, 2011)

Strawson, P.F., Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (Routledge, 1964)

2020年哲学奖二等奖

Is Intuition to Philosophy as Observation is to Science?

姜敏俊,韩国国际学校:韩国济州校区

2020年哲学奖亚军|8 分钟阅读

When asked what characterizes the empirical sciences, it is often said that its reliance upon observations serves as the answer. When the same is asked of philosophy, many philosophers hold that the answer lies in philosophy’s dependence upon our intuitions. Naturally, then, the question arises: is observation to science as intuition is to philosophy? To answer this question, I will analyze and compare the roles assigned to observation and intuition in science and philosophy, respectively. After such examination, I come to the conclusion that as there are roles that only intuition serves and not observation, their contributions in their respective fields are not analogous to each other.

Before discussing what roles intuition and observation have, however, it must first be granted that the two do indeed have their places in scientific and philosophical inquiry. As such, the scientific and philosophical method and whether observation and intuition contribute to them must be examined beforehand.

Scientific Theorization and Evaluation

The scientific method, in contemporary literature, is identified with two steps: theorization and evaluation (Dorling & Miller, 1981; Gieseler, Loschelder, & Friese, 2019; Popper, 2002). Scientists first start their inquiry by postulating rational theoretical systems that, in accordance with reason, explain observations (Gieseler, Loschelder, & Friese, 2019; Popper, 2002; Staley, 2014). In the process, scientists follow what I call Theory Constructing Principles (TCPs). TCPs are the necessary principles of reason[1] that allow scientists to think rationally. Without TCPs, the very rules of reason, no rational theorization can take place. Thus, by constructing rational theories, all scientists follow TCPs.

After scientists hypothesize theories, they discern the most plausible ones.[2] They carry out this evaluation by using what I call various Theory Evaluation Principles (TEPs): generally, scientists prefer theories that do not contradict empirical observations, that are falsifiable, precise, parsimonious, and in agreement with corroborated theories (Gieseler, Loschelder, & Friese, 2019; Popper, 2002). Theories displaying these virtues laid out in TEPs, are favored over theories that fail to do so. As both theory construction and evaluation are closely related to observation, it seems reasonable to conclude that observation is at the core of the scientific method.

Philosophical Theorization and Evaluation

Philosophers generally believe that philosophical inquiry can be broken down into three major steps: philosophers first canvass intuitions, then construct rational theories that systematize them, and lastly evaluate their plausibilities (Bealer, 1998). Simply put, philosophical inquiry also involves a theorization-and-assessment process.

As there cannot be any form of rational theorization without the basic principles of reason, philosophers—in constructing rational theories—follow TCPs as well. Furthermore, after their construction, philosophical theories undergo an evaluation process in which philosophers apply their own TEPs: generally, philosophers prefer theories that are largely in agreement with intuitions, that are precise and ontologically parsimonious (Carroll & Markosian, 2010; Pust, 2000). As such, intuition also is deeply connected with the philosophical method in both the theory construction and evaluation process. Therefore, it seems, observation and intuition have their rightful places in science and philosophy, respectively.

With this established, to answer the question on whether intuition in philosophy is analogous to observation in science, I will specify the conditions that allow intuition to be similar to observation. If intuition in philosophy lacks the epistemic status observation enjoys in science, or vice versa, an affirmative answer to the question will not be available. Thus, in order for one to be justified in claiming that intuition’s role philosophy is similar to observation’s role science, intuition must satisfy the two following conditions:

  1. Intuition in philosophy must not lack any of the roles taken up by observation in science.

   2. Intuition’s role in philosophy must not exceed the roles taken up by observation in science.

The First Condition: Roles Both Observation and Intuition Serve

Observation’s Roles: Explanandum and Evidence

As mentioned before, theories exist as the explanans that explain observational data. Consequently, in constructing theories, observation takes on the role as the explanandum, i.e., that which is to be explained. As the purpose of a theory lies in explaining observational data, observation is one of the most important pieces of evidence scientists use to test the theory’s validity.[3] Therefore, it could be said that observation, in science, takes up the role as (ⅰ) the explanandum and (ⅱ) the evidence that evaluates a theory’s validity.

To give a thoughtful answer to the question, intuition and observation’s role in their respective fields must be examined in depth. Observation’s first role is self-evident: observation is that which is to be explained by scientific theories. However, the second role lacks some clarity. Due to the apparent vagueness of the term ‘evidence’, numerous philosophers, in their attempt to analyze the scientific method, have made many endeavors to precisely identify how observation’s evidential role in theory evaluation is to be understood (Chalmer, 2013; Staley, 2014). Of these efforts, I will discuss two of the most widely held considerations:

Hypothetico-deductivism and Bayesian Personalism.

Hypothetico-deductivism on Observation as Evidence. In Hypothetico-deductivism (HD), during their evaluation process, theories are subject to rigorous testing as scientists actively seek to falsify them by finding observational data that contradict their predictions (Popper, 2002). If a theory’s predictions are at odds with actual observations—and thus fail to satisfy the first TEP as laid out before—it is rejected regardless of whether or not it satisfies the rest of the TEPs.[4] By shaving off false theories through rigorous testing, scientists conversely seek to select theories that are consistent with empirical observations.[5] These unfalsified theories—although they never could, in principle, be proven to be true—are among the best, most plausible ones available to scientists.[6] As such, in the theory evaluation process, observation serves as the evidence—perhaps the most important one—that indicates which theories are false and which theories are most plausible.

Bayesian Personalism on Observation as Evidence. On the contrary, in Bayesian Personalism (BP), the main focus of theory evaluation is on who determines whether a theory must be accepted or not. A theory’s validity is determined by scientists and “ [the] subjective probabilities [, i.e.,] measures of subjective degrees of belief[, they assign to theories]” (Dorling & Miller, 1981, p. 110). In the evaluation process, empirical observation influences probabilities scientists assign to theories by strengthening or weakening scientists’ degree of belief in the theories in question (Dorling & Miller, 1981). As such, the evidential role of observation is to shape a theory’s subjective probability assigned by scientists, i.e., to persuade scientists.

Intuition’s Role: Explanandum and Evidence

In philosophy, it is widely accepted that “theories are designed to … explain [intuitions]” (Bealer, 1987, p. 312). Moreover, intuition—in philosophical argumentation—is presented as evidence for or against theories (Bealer, 1998; Pust, 2000). Thus, it could be said that intuition, in philosophy, takes up the role as (ⅰ) the explanandum and (ⅱ) the evidence that evaluates a theory’s validity.

The evidential role of intuition displays the same sense of ambiguity that was seen in the evidential role of observation. Therefore, I will further analyze the evidential status of intuition according to the two interpretations of the scientific method discussed before: HD and BP.

Hypothetico-deductivism on Intuition as Evidence. HD could characterize intuition’s role as evidence similar to how it describes the evidential role of observation in science. Philosophers “argue for [a theory] by showing that [what] it implies … is indicated by… intuitive judgements … [and] against the correctness of a theory by producing a … case [or cases] about which intuition disagrees with the theory in question” (Pust, 2000, p. 3). As a good theory must account for all the evidence, i.e., intuitions (Bealer, 1998), philosophers would reject falsified theories whose entailments contradict intuitive judgements. On the other hand, theories that are consistent with our intuitions would be considered to be strongly supported (Pust, 2000). Thus, intuition, in HD, could be interpreted as the evidence that either falsifies or strongly favors certain philosophical theories. HD’s interpretation of intuition’s evidential role seems to closely resemble its interpretation of observation’s evidential role: both intuition and observation either support or falsify theories in their respective fields.

Bayesian Personalism on Intuition as Evidence. In BP as well, intuition could be interpreted to take on an evidential role that closely resembles that of observation. When philosophers are persuaded by intuition to believe in the truth of a theory,[7] BP could emphasize the philosophers—the subjects in philosophical evaluation—and the evidential role intuition has in influencing their degree of belief. Intuition would form a theory’s subjective probability by strengthening or weakening a scientist’s degree of belief in the theory. Therefore, in BP, similar to how observation influences scientists, intuition would have the evidential role of persuading philosophers and thereby shaping a theory’s probability. As such, intuition seems to satisfy the first condition: intuition in philosophy, like observation in science, is the explanandum and the evidence used in theory evaluation in both HD and BP.

The Second Condition: Roles Only Intuition Serves

Intuition as the basis of philosophical theories

The epistemic weight intuition has in philosophical theory construction is quite distinct from that of observation in scientific theorization. As Bealer notes, philosophical inquiry starts from canvassing intuitions and proceeds to theorization by systematizing those intuitions (Bealer, 1998). Philosophical theories, in other words, are rooted in intuition. The only interpretation of the scientific method in which theories are derived from observations is inductivism (Chalmers, 2013). However, both Hypothetico-deductivists and Bayesian Personalists unanimously accept the glaring problems of induction presented by Hume and others (Dorling & Miller, 1981; Popper, 2002). Consequently, both views reject inductivism and would dare not describe scientific theories as being rooted in observational data. Thus, in both HD and BP, intuition serves an additional role that observation does not: intuition is the basis of philosophical theories.

Intuition in the Justification and Identification of TEPs and TCPs

Furthermore, intuition is responsible for much of the justification and identification processes of TEPs and TCPs. In many cases, philosophers—without rational justification—simply have the intuition that there are some theories that are better than others; that there are common qualities those theories possess which make them better; and perhaps most importantly, that philosophers know what those qualities are (Bealer, 1998; Carroll & Markosian, 2010). Simply put, much of the attempts at identifying and justifying TEPs rely on intuition.[8] For example, in discussing the reasons philosophers adhere to the principle of theoretical parsimony,[9] Carroll and Markosian write, “many philosophers just prefer a leaner, meaner ontology” (2010, p. 213).

Not only this, but the only evidence philosophers can offer for TCPs are exclusively their intuitions. Philosophers have the intuition that some truths are necessary for rational theory construction; that those truths cannot be false; and that philosophers know which ones they are. As Bealer writes, “[out of the] many alleged principles of logic and linguistic theory … [a philosopher] tell[s] which ones are true … ultimately by using intuition as evidence” (1987, p.310). Despite intuition’s intricate connection to TEPs and TCPs, observation enjoys no such relationship. Although observation can be used to evaluate theories, it itself cannot justify why it can be used as evidence. These are matters reserved for rational, and intuitive justifications.[10] Furthermore, empirical observation, by definition, has no part in constructing a priori principles of reason as well (BonJour, 1998).

Conclusion

Thus intuition’s role in philosophy can be summarized as the following:

intuition, in philosophy, takes up the role as (ⅰ) the explanandum, (ⅱ) the evidence that evaluates a theory’s validity, (ⅰⅰⅰ) the basis of philosophical theories, and (ⅳ) the evidence for the justification and the identification of TEPs and (ⅴ) TCPs.

There may be additional roles assigned to intuition and observation that I have failed to mention. Some may be assigned to both. However, as I have demonstrated, these three roles assigned to intuition that I have laid out are not to be found in observation. Moreover, it seems that these fundamental discrepancies are too great to be simply discarded as trivial. Consequently, regardless of any additional roles of intuition and observation I may have overlooked, intuition fails to fulfil the second condition. Therefore, the conclusion must be as follows: intuition in philosophy is not analogous to observation in science.

Footnotes:

1 The principles of logic, arithmetic, geometry, set theory, modality, probability, etc.

2 Dorling & Miller, 1981; Gieseler, Loschelder, & Friese, 2019; Popper, 2002

3 Gieseler, Loschelder, & Friese, 2019; Popper, 2002; Staley, 2014

4 Popper, 2002

5 Popper, 2002

6 Popper, 2002

7 Pust, 2000

8 Concerning intuition’s contribution to the justification and identification of TEPs, I do not wish to imply that intuition is the only evidence philosophers can offer. Unlike TCPs, some philosophers do provide other rational justifications for some TEPs apart from mere intuitions.

9 The principle of theoretical parsimony states that theories, preferably, should be ontologically parsimonious and must not posit entities beyond necessity. This principle is stated in TEPs listed above.

10 Bealer, 1998; Carroll & Markosian, 2010

Bibliography

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Bealer, G. (1998). Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy. In DePaul, M., & Ramsey, W. (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. pp. 201-240.

BonJour, L. (1998). In Defense of Pure Reason. Cambridge University Press.

Carroll, J. W., & Markosian, N. (2010). An Introduction to Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press.

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Dorling, J., & Miller, D. (1981). Bayesian Personalism, Falsificationism, and the Problem of Induction. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 55, 109-141. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4106855.pdf?ab_segments=0%252Fbasic_SYC-5187% 252Ftest&refreqid=excelsior%3A034b8233ec77dfcbdabe67ef272d7197

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